binderfs should not have a separate device_initcall(). When a kernel is
compiled with CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDERFS register the filesystem alongside
CONFIG_ANDROID_IPC. This use-case is especially sensible when users specify
CONFIG_ANDROID_IPC=y, CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDERFS=y and
ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES="".
When CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDERFS=n then this always succeeds so there's no
regression potential for legacy workloads.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Several users have tried to only rely on binderfs to provide binder devices
and set CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES="" empty. This is a great use-case of
binderfs and one that was always intended to work. However, this is
currently not possible since setting CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES="" emtpy
will simply panic the kernel:

kobject: (00000000028c2f79): attempted to be registered with empty name!
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1703 at lib/kobject.c:228 kobject_add_internal+0x288/0x2b0
Modules linked in: binder_linux(+) bridge stp llc ipmi_ssif gpio_ich dcdbas coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass serio_raw input_leds lpc_ich i5100_edac mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler sch_fq_codel ib_i
CPU: 7 PID: 1703 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2-brauner-binderfs #263
Hardware name: Dell      DCS XS24-SC2          /XS24-SC2              , BIOS S59_3C20 04/07/2011
RIP: 0010:kobject_add_internal+0x288/0x2b0
Code: 12 95 48 c7 c7 78 63 3b 95 e8 77 35 71 ff e9 91 fe ff ff 0f 0b eb a7 0f 0b eb 9a 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 00 63 3b 95 e8 f8 95 6a ff <0f> 0b 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 6d fe ff ff 41 bc fe ff ff ff e9 62 fe
RSP: 0018:ffff973f84237a30 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b53e2472010 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff8b53edbd63a0
RBP: ffff973f84237a60 R08: 0000000000000342 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffff973f84237af0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8b53e9f1a1e0 R14: 00000000e9f1a1e0 R15: 0000000000a00037
FS:  00007fbac36f7540(0000) GS:ffff8b53edbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac364cfa7 CR3: 00000004a6d48000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
Call Trace:
 kobject_add+0x71/0xd0
 ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
 ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
 device_add+0x12e/0x6b0
 device_create_groups_vargs+0xe4/0xf0
 device_create_with_groups+0x3f/0x60
 ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
 misc_register+0x140/0x180
 binder_init+0x1ed/0x2d4 [binder_linux]
 ? trace_event_define_fields_binder_transaction_fd_send+0x8e/0x8e [binder_linux]
 do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1c9
 ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x1c0
 do_init_module+0x5f/0x216
 load_module+0x223d/0x2b20
 __do_sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x120
 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x120
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x120
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fbac3202839
Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1f f6 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd1494a908 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b629ebec60 RCX: 00007fbac3202839
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055b629c20d2e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055b629c20d2e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055b629ec2310
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000055b629ebed70 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 000055b629ebec60

So check for the empty string since strsep() will otherwise return the
emtpy string which will cause kobject_add_internal() to panic when trying
to add a kobject with an emtpy name.

Fixes: ac4812c5 ("binder: Support multiple /dev instances")
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

As discussed at Linux Plumbers Conference 2018 in Vancouver [1] this is the
implementation of binderfs.

/* Abstract */
binderfs is a backwards-compatible filesystem for Android's binder ipc
mechanism. Each ipc namespace will mount a new binderfs instance. Mounting
binderfs multiple times at different locations in the same ipc namespace
will not cause a new super block to be allocated and hence it will be the
same filesystem instance.
Each new binderfs mount will have its own set of binder devices only
visible in the ipc namespace it has been mounted in. All devices in a new
binderfs mount will follow the scheme binder%d and numbering will always
start at 0.

/* Backwards compatibility */
Devices requested in the Kconfig via CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES for the
initial ipc namespace will work as before. They will be registered via
misc_register() and appear in the devtmpfs mount. Specifically, the
standard devices binder, hwbinder, and vndbinder will all appear in their
standard locations in /dev. Mounting or unmounting the binderfs mount in
the initial ipc namespace will have no effect on these devices, i.e. they
will neither show up in the binderfs mount nor will they disappear when the
binderfs mount is gone.

/* binder-control */
Each new binderfs instance comes with a binder-control device. No other
devices will be present at first. The binder-control device can be used to
dynamically allocate binder devices. All requests operate on the binderfs
mount the binder-control device resides in.
Assuming a new instance of binderfs has been mounted at /dev/binderfs
via mount -t binderfs binderfs /dev/binderfs. Then a request to create a
new binder device can be made as illustrated in [2].
Binderfs devices can simply be removed via unlink().

/* Implementation details */
- dynamic major number allocation:
  When binderfs is registered as a new filesystem it will dynamically
  allocate a new major number. The allocated major number will be returned
  in struct binderfs_device when a new binder device is allocated.
- global minor number tracking:
  Minor are tracked in a global idr struct that is capped at
  BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR. The minor number tracker is protected by a global
  mutex. This is the only point of contention between binderfs mounts.
- struct binderfs_info:
  Each binderfs super block has its own struct binderfs_info that tracks
  specific details about a binderfs instance:
  - ipc namespace
  - dentry of the binder-control device
  - root uid and root gid of the user namespace the binderfs instance
    was mounted in
- mountable by user namespace root:
  binderfs can be mounted by user namespace root in a non-initial user
  namespace. The devices will be owned by user namespace root.
- binderfs binder devices without misc infrastructure:
  New binder devices associated with a binderfs mount do not use the
  full misc_register() infrastructure.
  The misc_register() infrastructure can only create new devices in the
  host's devtmpfs mount. binderfs does however only make devices appear
  under its own mountpoint and thus allocates new character device nodes
  from the inode of the root dentry of the super block. This will have
  the side-effect that binderfs specific device nodes do not appear in
  sysfs. This behavior is similar to devpts allocated pts devices and
  has no effect on the functionality of the ipc mechanism itself.

[1]: https://goo.gl/JL2tfX
[2]: program to allocate a new binderfs binder device:

     #define _GNU_SOURCE
     #include <errno.h>
     #include <fcntl.h>
     #include <stdio.h>
     #include <stdlib.h>
     #include <string.h>
     #include <sys/ioctl.h>
     #include <sys/stat.h>
     #include <sys/types.h>
     #include <unistd.h>
     #include <linux/android/binder_ctl.h>

     int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     {
             int fd, ret, saved_errno;
             size_t len;
             struct binderfs_device device = { 0 };

             if (argc < 2)
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

             len = strlen(argv[1]);
             if (len > BINDERFS_MAX_NAME)
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

             memcpy(device.name, argv[1], len);

             fd = open("/dev/binderfs/binder-control", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
             if (fd < 0) {
                     printf("%s - Failed to open binder-control device\n",
                            strerror(errno));
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
             }

             ret = ioctl(fd, BINDER_CTL_ADD, &device);
             saved_errno = errno;
             close(fd);
             errno = saved_errno;
             if (ret < 0) {
                     printf("%s - Failed to allocate new binder device\n",
                            strerror(errno));
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
             }

             printf("Allocated new binder device with major %d, minor %d, and "
                    "name %s\n", device.major, device.minor,
                    device.name);

             exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
     }

Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

44d8047f ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
exposed a pre-existing issue in the binder driver.

fdget() is used in ksys_ioctl() as a performance optimization.
One of the rules associated with fdget() is that ksys_close() must
not be called between the fdget() and the fdput(). There is a case
where this requirement is not met in the binder driver which results
in the reference count dropping to 0 when the device is still in
use. This can result in use-after-free or other issues.

If userpace has passed a file-descriptor for the binder driver using
a BINDER_TYPE_FDA object, then kys_close() is called on it when
handling a binder_ioctl(BC_FREE_BUFFER) command. This violates
the assumptions for using fdget().

The problem is fixed by deferring the close using task_work_add(). A
new variant of __close_fd() was created that returns a struct file
with a reference. The fput() is deferred instead of using ksys_close().

Fixes: 44d8047f ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When dumping out binder transactions via a debug node,
the output is too verbose if a process has many nodes.
Change the output for transaction dumps to only display
nodes with pending async transactions.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

We already have the DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE.There is no need to define
such a macro,so remove BINDER_DEBUG_ENTRY.
Signed-off-by: NYangtao Li <tiny.windzz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoey Pabalinas <joeypabalinas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Add __acquire()/__release() annnotations to fix warnings
in sparse context checking

There is one case where the warning was due to a lack of
a "default:" case in a switch statement where a lock was
being released in each of the cases, so the default
case was added.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER
ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer
while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where
BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that
was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free
detected by KASAN with a malicious test program.

This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute
to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed
it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that
when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set
to 1 allowing a free to go through.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: NArve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Fixes the following sparse warning:

drivers/android/binder.c:3312:1: warning:
 symbol 'binder_free_buf' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This allows the context manager to retrieve information about nodes
that it holds a reference to, such as the current number of
references to those nodes.

Such information can for example be used to determine whether the
servicemanager is the only process holding a reference to a node.
This information can then be passed on to the process holding the
node, which can in turn decide whether it wants to shut down to
reduce resource usage.
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Binder uses internal fs interfaces to allocate and install fds:

__alloc_fd
__fd_install
__close_fd
get_files_struct
put_files_struct

These were used to support the passing of fds between processes
as part of a transaction. The actual allocation and installation
of the fds in the target process was handled by the sending
process so the standard functions, alloc_fd() and fd_install()
which assume task==current couldn't be used.

This patch refactors this mechanism so that the fds are
allocated and installed by the target process allowing the
standard functions to be used.

The sender now creates a list of fd fixups that contains the
struct *file and the address to fixup with the new fd once
it is allocated. This list is processed by the target process
when the transaction is dequeued.

A new error case is introduced by this change. If an async
transaction with file descriptors cannot allocate new
fds in the target (probably due to out of file descriptors),
the transaction is discarded with a log message. In the old
implementation this would have been detected in the sender
context and failed prior to sending.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When a process dies, failed reply is sent to the sender of any transaction
queued on a dead thread's todo list. The sender asserts that the
received failed reply corresponds to the head of the transaction stack.
This assert can fail if the dead thread is allowed to send outgoing
transactions when there is already a transaction on its todo list,
because this new transaction can end up on the transaction stack of the
original sender. The following steps illustrate how this assertion can
fail.

1. Thread1 sends txn19 to Thread2
   (T1->transaction_stack=txn19, T2->todo+=txn19)
2. Without processing todo list, Thread2 sends txn20 to Thread1
   (T1->todo+=txn20, T2->transaction_stack=txn20)
3. T1 processes txn20 on its todo list
   (T1->transaction_stack=txn20->txn19, T1->todo=<empty>)
4. T2 dies, T2->todo cleanup attempts to send failed reply for txn19, but
   T1->transaction_stack points to txn20 -- assertion failes

Step 2. is the incorrect behavior. When there is a transaction on a
thread's todo list, this thread should not be able to send any outgoing
synchronous transactions. Only the head of the todo list needs to be
checked because only threads that are waiting for proc work can directly
receive work from another thread, and no work is allowed to be queued
on such a thread without waking up the thread. This patch also enforces
that a thread is not waiting for proc work when a work is directly
enqueued to its todo list.
Acked-by: NArve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NSherry Yang <sherryy@android.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Use rate-limited debug messages where userspace can trigger
excessive log spams.
Acked-by: NArve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NSherry Yang <sherryy@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

If asm/cacheflush.h is included first, the following build warnings are
seen with sparc32 builds.

In file included from arch/sparc/include/asm/cacheflush.h:11:0,
        from drivers/android/binder.c:54:
arch/sparc/include/asm/cacheflush_32.h:40:37: warning:
	'struct page' declared inside parameter list will not be visible
	outside of this definition or declaration

Moving the asm/ include after linux/ includes solves the problem.
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler in
struct vm_operations_struct. For now, this is just
documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT
value rather than an errno.  Once all instances are
converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type.

Reference id -> 1c8f4220 ("mm: change return type
to vm_fault_t")
Signed-off-by: NSouptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

binder_update_page_range needs down_write of mmap_sem because
vm_insert_page need to change vma->vm_flags to VM_MIXEDMAP unless
it is set. However, when I profile binder working, it seems
every binder buffers should be mapped in advance by binder_mmap.
It means we could set VM_MIXEDMAP in binder_mmap time which is
already hold a mmap_sem as down_write so binder_update_page_range
doesn't need to hold a mmap_sem as down_write.
Please use proper API down_read. It would help mmap_sem contention
problem as well as fixing down_write abuse.

Ganesh Mahendran tested app launching and binder throughput test
and he said he couldn't find any problem and I did binder latency
test per Greg KH request(Thanks Martijn to teach me how I can do)
I cannot find any problem, too.

Cc: Ganesh Mahendran <opensource.ganesh@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NMinchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJoel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When to execute binder_stat_br the e->cmd has been modifying as BR_OK
instead of the original return error cmd, in fact we want to know the
original return error, such as BR_DEAD_REPLY or BR_FAILED_REPLY, etc.
instead of always BR_OK, in order to avoid the value of the e->cmd is
always BR_OK, so we need assign the value of the e->cmd to cmd before
e->cmd = BR_OK.
Signed-off-by: Nsongjinshi <songjinshi@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

New devices launching with Android P need to use the 64-bit
binder interface, even on 32-bit SoCs [0].

This change removes the Kconfig option to select the 32-bit
binder interface. We don't think this will affect existing
userspace for the following reasons:
1) The latest Android common tree is 4.14, so we don't
   believe any Android devices are on kernels >4.14.
2) Android devices launch on an LTS release and stick with
   it, so we wouldn't expect devices running on <= 4.14 now
   to upgrade to 4.17 or later. But even if they did, they'd
   rebuild the world (kernel + userspace) anyway.
3) Other userspaces like 'anbox' are already using the
   64-bit interface.

Note that this change doesn't remove the 32-bit UAPI
itself; the reason for that is that Android userspace
always uses the latest UAPI headers from upstream, and
userspace retains 32-bit support for devices that are
upgrading. This will be removed as well in 2-3 years,
at which point we can remove the code from the UAPI
as well.

Finally, this change introduces build errors on archs where
64-bit get_user/put_user is not supported, so make binder
unavailable on m68k (which wouldn't want it anyway).

[0]: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/build/+/595193Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

It doesn't make any difference to runtime but I've switched these two
checks to make my static checker happy.

The problem is that "buffer->data_size" is user controlled and if it's
less than "sizeo(*hdr)" then that means "offset" can be more than
"buffer->data_size".  It's just cleaner to check it in the other order.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This can't happen with normal nodes (because you can't get a ref
to a node you own), but it could happen with the context manager;
to make the behavior consistent with regular nodes, reject
transactions into the context manager by the process owning it.

Reported-by: syzbot+09e05aba06723a94d43d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

To prevent races with ep_remove_waitqueue() removing the
waitqueue at the same time.

Reported-by: syzbot+a2a3c4909716e271487e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The format specifier "%p" can leak kernel addresses. Use
"%pK" instead. There were 4 remaining cases in binder.c.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

binder_send_failed_reply() is called when a synchronous
transaction fails. It reports an error to the thread that
is waiting for the completion. Given that the transaction
is synchronous, there should never be more than 1 error
response to that thread -- this was being asserted with
a WARN().

However, when exercising the driver with syzbot tests, cases
were observed where multiple "synchronous" requests were
sent without waiting for responses, so it is possible that
multiple errors would be reported to the thread. This testing
was conducted with panic_on_warn set which forced the crash.

This is easily reproduced by sending back-to-back
"synchronous" transactions without checking for any
response (eg, set read_size to 0):

    bwr.write_buffer = (uintptr_t)&bc1;
    bwr.write_size = sizeof(bc1);
    bwr.read_buffer = (uintptr_t)&br;
    bwr.read_size = 0;
    ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr);
    sleep(1);
    bwr2.write_buffer = (uintptr_t)&bc2;
    bwr2.write_size = sizeof(bc2);
    bwr2.read_buffer = (uintptr_t)&br;
    bwr2.read_size = 0;
    ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr2);
    sleep(1);

The first transaction is sent to the servicemanager and the reply
fails because no VMA is set up by this client. After
binder_send_failed_reply() is called, the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR
is sitting on the thread's todo list since the read_size was 0 and
the client is not waiting for a response.

The 2nd transaction is sent and the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR has not
been consumed, so the thread's reply_error.cmd is still set (normally
cleared when the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR is handled). Therefore
when the servicemanager attempts to reply to the 2nd failed
transaction, the error is already set and it triggers this warning.

This is a user error since it is not waiting for the synchronous
transaction to complete. If it ever does check, it will see an
error.

Changed the WARN() to a pr_warn().
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

If the kzalloc() in binder_get_thread() fails, binder_poll()
dereferences the resulting NULL pointer.

Fix it by returning POLLERR if the memory allocation failed.

This bug was found by syzkaller using fault injection.
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 457b9a6f ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:

    for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
        L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
        for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
    done

with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.

NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do.  But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.

The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Assign true or false to boolean variables instead of an integer value.

This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

checkpatch warns against the use of symbolic permissions,
this patch migrates all symbolic permissions in the binder
driver to octal permissions.

Test: debugfs nodes created by binder have the same unix
permissions prior to and after this patch was applied.
Signed-off-by: NHarsh Shandilya <harsh@prjkt.io>
Cc: "Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

It was no longer being used.
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

binder_poll() passes the thread->wait waitqueue that
can be slept on for work. When a thread that uses
epoll explicitly exits using BINDER_THREAD_EXIT,
the waitqueue is freed, but it is never removed
from the corresponding epoll data structure. When
the process subsequently exits, the epoll cleanup
code tries to access the waitlist, which results in
a use-after-free.

Prevent this by using POLLFREE when the thread exits.
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Coding style fixup
Signed-off-by: NElad Wexler <elad.wexler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Both list_lru_init() and register_shrinker() might return an error.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Sherry Yang <sherryy@android.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

proc->files cleanup is initiated by binder_vma_close. Therefore
a reference on the binder_proc is not enough to prevent the
files_struct from being released while the binder_proc still has
a reference. This can lead to an attempt to dereference the
stale pointer obtained from proc->files prior to proc->files
cleanup. This has been seen once in task_get_unused_fd_flags()
when __alloc_fd() is called with a stale "files".

The fix is to protect proc->files with a mutex to prevent cleanup
while in use.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If a call to put_user() fails, we failed to
properly free a transaction and send a failed
reply (if necessary).
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This flag determines whether the thread should currently
process the work in the thread->todo worklist.

The prime usecase for this is improving the performance
of synchronous transactions: all synchronous transactions
post a BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE to the calling thread,
but there's no reason to return that command to userspace
right away - userspace anyway needs to wait for the reply.

Likewise, a synchronous transaction that contains a binder
object can cause a BC_ACQUIRE/BC_INCREFS to be returned to
userspace; since the caller must anyway hold a strong/weak
ref for the duration of the call, postponing these commands
until the reply comes in is not a problem.

Note that this flag is not used to determine whether a
thread can handle process work; a thread should never pick
up process work when thread work is still pending.

Before patch:
------------------------------------------------------------------
Benchmark                           Time           CPU Iterations
------------------------------------------------------------------
BM_sendVec_binderize/4          45959 ns      20288 ns      34351
BM_sendVec_binderize/8          45603 ns      20080 ns      34909
BM_sendVec_binderize/16         45528 ns      20113 ns      34863
BM_sendVec_binderize/32         45551 ns      20122 ns      34881
BM_sendVec_binderize/64         45701 ns      20183 ns      34864
BM_sendVec_binderize/128        45824 ns      20250 ns      34576
BM_sendVec_binderize/256        45695 ns      20171 ns      34759
BM_sendVec_binderize/512        45743 ns      20211 ns      34489
BM_sendVec_binderize/1024       46169 ns      20430 ns      34081

After patch:
------------------------------------------------------------------
Benchmark                           Time           CPU Iterations
------------------------------------------------------------------
BM_sendVec_binderize/4          42939 ns      17262 ns      40653
BM_sendVec_binderize/8          42823 ns      17243 ns      40671
BM_sendVec_binderize/16         42898 ns      17243 ns      40594
BM_sendVec_binderize/32         42838 ns      17267 ns      40527
BM_sendVec_binderize/64         42854 ns      17249 ns      40379
BM_sendVec_binderize/128        42881 ns      17288 ns      40427
BM_sendVec_binderize/256        42917 ns      17297 ns      40429
BM_sendVec_binderize/512        43184 ns      17395 ns      40411
BM_sendVec_binderize/1024       43119 ns      17357 ns      40432
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Several function prototypes for the set/get functions defined by
module_param_call() have a slightly wrong argument types. This fixes
those in an effort to clean up the calls when running under type-enforced
compiler instrumentation for CFI. This is the result of running the
following semantic patch:

@match_module_param_call_function@
declarer name module_param_call;
identifier _name, _set_func, _get_func;
expression _arg, _mode;
@@

 module_param_call(_name, _set_func, _get_func, _arg, _mode);

@fix_set_prototype
 depends on match_module_param_call_function@
identifier match_module_param_call_function._set_func;
identifier _val, _param;
type _val_type, _param_type;
@@

 int _set_func(
-_val_type _val
+const char * _val
 ,
-_param_type _param
+const struct kernel_param * _param
 ) { ... }

@fix_get_prototype
 depends on match_module_param_call_function@
identifier match_module_param_call_function._get_func;
identifier _val, _param;
type _val_type, _param_type;
@@

 int _get_func(
-_val_type _val
+char * _val
 ,
-_param_type _param
+const struct kernel_param * _param
 ) { ... }

Two additional by-hand changes are included for places where the above
Coccinelle script didn't notice them:

	drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
	fs/lockd/svc.c
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

pr_err() messages should terminated with a new-line to avoid
other messages being concatenated onto the end.
Signed-off-by: NArvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Because we're not guaranteed that subsequent calls
to poll() will have a poll_table_struct parameter
with _qproc set. When _qproc is not set, poll_wait()
is a noop, and we won't be woken up correctly.
Signed-off-by: NMartijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

User-space normally keeps the node alive when creating a transaction
since it has a reference to the target. The local strong ref keeps it
alive if the sending process dies before the target process processes
the transaction. If the source process is malicious or has a reference
counting bug, this can fail.

In this case, when we attempt to decrement the node in the failure
path, the node has already been freed.

This is fixed by taking a tmpref on the node while constructing
the transaction. To avoid re-acquiring the node lock and inner
proc lock to increment the proc's tmpref, a helper is used that
does the ref increments on both the node and proc.
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>