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  1. 14 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • O
      coredump: add %i/%I in core_pattern to report the tid of the crashed thread · b03023ec
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      format_corename() can only pass the leader's pid to the core handler,
but there is no simple way to figure out which thread originated the
coredump.

As Jan explains, this also means that there is no simple way to create
the backtrace of the crashed process:

As programs are mostly compiled with implicit gcc -fomit-frame-pointer
one needs program's .eh_frame section (equivalently PT_GNU_EH_FRAME
segment) or .debug_frame section.  .debug_frame usually is present only
in separate debug info files usually not even installed on the system.
While .eh_frame is a part of the executable/library (and it is even
always mapped for C++ exceptions unwinding) it no longer has to be
present anywhere on the disk as the program could be upgraded in the
meantime and the running instance has its executable file already
unlinked from disk.

One possibility is to echo 0x3f >/proc/*/coredump_filter and dump all
the file-backed memory including the executable's .eh_frame section.
But that can create huge core files, for example even due to mmapped
data files.

Other possibility would be to read .eh_frame from /proc/PID/mem at the
core_pattern handler time of the core dump.  For the backtrace one needs
to read the register state first which can be done from core_pattern
handler:

    ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT)
    close(0);    // close pipe fd to resume the sleeping dumper
    waitpid();   // should report EXIT
    PTRACE_GETREGS or other requests

The remaining problem is how to get the 'tid' value of the crashed
thread.  It could be read from the first NT_PRSTATUS note of the core
file but that makes the core_pattern handler complicated.

Unfortunately %t is already used so this patch uses %i/%I.

Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/overview)
is experimenting with this.  It is using the elfutils
(https://fedorahosted.org/elfutils/) unwinder for generating the
backtraces.  Apart from not needing matching executables as mentioned
above, another advantage is that we can get the backtrace without saving
the core (which might be quite large) to disk.

[mmilata@redhat.com: final paragraph of changelog]
Signed-off-by: NJan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Milata <mmilata@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b03023ec
  3. 02 9月, 2014 1 次提交
    • E
      tipc: add name distributor resiliency queue · a5325ae5
      由 Erik Hugne 提交于 
      TIPC name table updates are distributed asynchronously in a cluster,
entailing a risk of certain race conditions. E.g., if two nodes
simultaneously issue conflicting (overlapping) publications, this may
not be detected until both publications have reached a third node, in
which case one of the publications will be silently dropped on that
node. Hence, we end up with an inconsistent name table.

In most cases this conflict is just a temporary race, e.g., one
node is issuing a publication under the assumption that a previous,
conflicting, publication has already been withdrawn by the other node.
However, because of the (rtt related) distributed update delay, this
may not yet hold true on all nodes. The symptom of this failure is a
syslog message: "tipc: Cannot publish {%u,%u,%u}, overlap error".

In this commit we add a resiliency queue at the receiving end of
the name table distributor. When insertion of an arriving publication
fails, we retain it in this queue for a short amount of time, assuming
that another update will arrive very soon and clear the conflict. If so
happens, we insert the publication, otherwise we drop it.

The (configurable) retention value defaults to 2000 ms. Knowing from
experience that the situation described above is extremely rare, there
is no risk that the queue will accumulate any large number of items.
Signed-off-by: NErik Hugne <erik.hugne@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: NJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a5325ae5
  5. 09 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 24 6月, 2014 2 次提交
    • A
      kernel/watchdog.c: print traces for all cpus on lockup detection · ed235875
      由 Aaron Tomlin 提交于 
      A 'softlockup' is defined as a bug that causes the kernel to loop in
kernel mode for more than a predefined period to time, without giving
other tasks a chance to run.

Currently, upon detection of this condition by the per-cpu watchdog
task, debug information (including a stack trace) is sent to the system
log.

On some occasions, we have observed that the "victim" rather than the
actual "culprit" (i.e.  the owner/holder of the contended resource) is
reported to the user.  Often this information has proven to be
insufficient to assist debugging efforts.

To avoid loss of useful debug information, for architectures which
support NMI, this patch makes it possible to improve soft lockup
reporting.  This is accomplished by issuing an NMI to each cpu to obtain
a stack trace.

If NMI is not supported we just revert back to the old method.  A sysctl
and boot-time parameter is available to toggle this feature.

[dzickus@redhat.com: add CONFIG_SMP in certain areas]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional CONFIG_SMP=n optimisations]
[mq@suse.cz: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: NAaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDon Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Moskyto Matejka <mq@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ed235875
    • D
      mm, pcp: allow restoring percpu_pagelist_fraction default · 7cd2b0a3
      由 David Rientjes 提交于 
      Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: NOleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7cd2b0a3
  9. 07 6月, 2014 1 次提交
    • K
      sysctl: allow for strict write position handling · f4aacea2
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start.  This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:

  open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY)   = 1
  write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
  write(1, "/bin/true", 9)                = 9
  close(1)                                = 0

  $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
  /bin/true

Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write.  Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.

The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations.  For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.

This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions).  For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior.  Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f4aacea2
  11. 05 6月, 2014 2 次提交
    • D
      Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt: clarify vfs_cache_pressure description · 4a0da71b
      由 Denys Vlasenko 提交于 
      Existing description is worded in a way which almost encourages setting of
vfs_cache_pressure above 100, possibly way above it.

Users are left in a dark what this numeric value is - an int?  a
percentage?  what the scale is?

As a result, we are getting reports about noticeable performance
degradation from users who have set vfs_cache_pressure to ridiculously
high values - because they thought there is no downside to it.

Via code inspection it's obvious that this value is treated as a
percentage.  This patch changes text to reflect this fact, and adds a
cautionary paragraph advising against setting vfs_cache_pressure sky high.
Signed-off-by: NDenys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4a0da71b
    • M
      mm: disable zone_reclaim_mode by default · 4f9b16a6
      由 Mel Gorman 提交于 
      When it was introduced, zone_reclaim_mode made sense as NUMA distances
punished and workloads were generally partitioned to fit into a NUMA
node.  NUMA machines are now common but few of the workloads are
NUMA-aware and it's routine to see major performance degradation due to
zone_reclaim_mode being enabled but relatively few can identify the
problem.

Those that require zone_reclaim_mode are likely to be able to detect
when it needs to be enabled and tune appropriately so lets have a
sensible default for the bulk of users.

This patch (of 2):

zone_reclaim_mode causes processes to prefer reclaiming memory from
local node instead of spilling over to other nodes.  This made sense
initially when NUMA machines were almost exclusively HPC and the
workload was partitioned into nodes.  The NUMA penalties were
sufficiently high to justify reclaiming the memory.  On current machines
and workloads it is often the case that zone_reclaim_mode destroys
performance but not all users know how to detect this.  Favour the
common case and disable it by default.  Users that are sophisticated
enough to know they need zone_reclaim_mode will detect it.
Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4f9b16a6
  13. 08 4月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 04 4月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 13 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE · 66cc69e3
      由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于 
      Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded
within a kernel supporting module signature.

This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to
take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules
(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is
that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with
the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash
upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y.

Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and
TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system
crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules.

With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed
module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag.
Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a
force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint
within this module.

Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system
crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag
to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules
within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for
a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed
by Steven Rostedt).

Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list
for the sake of completeness.
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
NAKed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      66cc69e3
  19. 31 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  21. 30 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  23. 28 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  25. 25 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  27. 24 1月, 2014 1 次提交
    • K
      kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load · 7984754b
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      For general-purpose (i.e.  distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec.  However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled).  Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set.  With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.

The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard.  Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.

In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:

1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
   verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.

1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed.  4 is the state of things now.  The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7984754b
  29. 22 1月, 2014 1 次提交
    • J
      mm: add overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable · 49f0ce5f
      由 Jerome Marchand 提交于 
      Some applications that run on HPC clusters are designed around the
availability of RAM and the overcommit ratio is fine tuned to get the
maximum usage of memory without swapping.  With growing memory, the
1%-of-all-RAM grain provided by overcommit_ratio has become too coarse
for these workload (on a 2TB machine it represents no less than 20GB).

This patch adds the new overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable that allow a
much finer grain.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build]
Signed-off-by: NJerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      49f0ce5f
  31. 17 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  33. 13 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • R
      vsprintf: check real user/group id for %pK · 312b4e22
      由 Ryan Mallon 提交于 
      Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
permission by the real user id.  This is problematic with files which
use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time.  If a setuid
binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
leaked.

This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04:

  $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
  00000000 T startup_32

  $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
  pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'

This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
setuid binaries may leak more information.

Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having
CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids.
If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the
pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged.

Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct
the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.

This is a only temporary solution to the issue.  The correct solution is
to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK
with a function which checks the open() time permission.  %pK uses in
printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and
instead protected by using dmesg_restrict.
Signed-off-by: NRyan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      312b4e22
    • Z
      mm: improve the description for dirty_background_ratio/dirty_ratio sysctl · 715ea41e
      由 Zheng Liu 提交于 
      Now dirty_background_ratio/dirty_ratio contains a percentage of total
avaiable memory, which contains free pages and reclaimable pages.  The
number of these pages is not equal to the number of total system memory.
But they are described as a percentage of total system memory in
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt.  So we need to fix them to avoid
misunderstanding.
Signed-off-by: NZheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      715ea41e
  35. 09 10月, 2013 5 次提交
  37. 12 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  39. 31 8月, 2013 1 次提交
    • S
      qdisc: allow setting default queuing discipline · 6da7c8fc
      由 stephen hemminger 提交于 
      By default, the pfifo_fast queue discipline has been used by default
for all devices. But we have better choices now.

This patch allow setting the default queueing discipline with sysctl.
This allows easy use of better queueing disciplines on all devices
without having to use tc qdisc scripts. It is intended to allow
an easy path for distributions to make fq_codel or sfq the default
qdisc.

This patch also makes pfifo_fast more of a first class qdisc, since
it is now possible to manually override the default and explicitly
use pfifo_fast. The behavior for systems who do not use the sysctl
is unchanged, they still get pfifo_fast

Also removes leftover random # in sysctl net core.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6da7c8fc
  41. 02 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 11 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  45. 10 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 09 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  49. 26 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      net: poll/select low latency socket support · 2d48d67f
      由 Eliezer Tamir 提交于 
      select/poll busy-poll support.

Split sysctl value into two separate ones, one for read and one for poll.
updated Documentation/sysctl/net.txt

Add a new poll flag POLL_LL. When this flag is set, sock_poll will call
sk_poll_ll if possible. sock_poll sets this flag in its return value
to indicate to select/poll when a socket that can busy poll is found.

When poll/select have nothing to report, call the low-level
sock_poll again until we are out of time or we find something.

Once the system call finds something, it stops setting POLL_LL, so it can
return the result to the user ASAP.
Signed-off-by: NEliezer Tamir <eliezer.tamir@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2d48d67f
  51. 24 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  53. 23 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      perf: Drop sample rate when sampling is too slow · 14c63f17
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      This patch keeps track of how long perf's NMI handler is taking,
and also calculates how many samples perf can take a second.  If
the sample length times the expected max number of samples
exceeds a configurable threshold, it drops the sample rate.

This way, we don't have a runaway sampling process eating up the
CPU.

This patch can tend to drop the sample rate down to level where
perf doesn't work very well.  *BUT* the alternative is that my
system hangs because it spends all of its time handling NMIs.

I'll take a busted performance tool over an entire system that's
busted and undebuggable any day.

BTW, my suspicion is that there's still an underlying bug here.
Using the HPET instead of the TSC is definitely a contributing
factor, but I suspect there are some other things going on.
But, I can't go dig down on a bug like that with my machine
hanging all the time.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: acme@ghostprotocols.net
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
[ Prettified it a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      14c63f17
  55. 18 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • Y
      tipc: change socket buffer overflow control to respect sk_rcvbuf · cc79dd1b
      由 Ying Xue 提交于 
      As per feedback from the netdev community, we change the buffer
overflow protection algorithm in receiving sockets so that it
always respects the nominal upper limit set in sk_rcvbuf.

Instead of scaling up from a small sk_rcvbuf value, which leads to
violation of the configured sk_rcvbuf limit, we now calculate the
weighted per-message limit by scaling down from a much bigger value,
still in the same field, according to the importance priority of the
received message.

To allow for administrative tunability of the socket receive buffer
size, we create a tipc_rmem sysctl variable to allow the user to
configure an even bigger value via sysctl command.  It is a size of
three (min/default/max) to be consistent with things like tcp_rmem.

By default, the value initialized in tipc_rmem[1] is equal to the
receive socket size needed by a TIPC_CRITICAL_IMPORTANCE message.
This value is also set as the default value of sk_rcvbuf.
Originally-by: NJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
[Ying: added sysctl variation to Jon's original patch]
Signed-off-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
[PG: don't compile sysctl.c if not config'd; add Documentation]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cc79dd1b
  57. 11 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  59. 28 5月, 2013 2 次提交
  61. 20 5月, 2013 1 次提交