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  1. 05 6月, 2005 3 次提交
    • M
      [PATCH] s390: in_interrupt vs. in_atomic · 595bf2aa
      由 Martin Schwidefsky 提交于 
      The condition for no context in do_exception checks for hard and soft
interrupts by using in_interrupt() but not for preemption.  This is bad for
the users of __copy_from/to_user_inatomic because the fault handler might call
schedule although the preemption count is != 0.  Use in_atomic() instead
in_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      595bf2aa
    • B
      [PATCH] s390: uml ptrace fixes · c5c3a6d8
      由 Bodo Stroesser 提交于 
      To make UML build and run on s390, I needed to do these two little
changes:

1) UML includes some of the subarch's (s390) headers. I had to
   change one of them with the following one-liner, to make this
   compile. AFAICS, this change doesn't break compilation of s390
   itself.

2) UML needs to intercept syscalls via ptrace to invalidate the syscall,
   read syscall's parameters and write the result with the result of
   UML's syscall processing. Also, UML needs to make sure, that the host
   does no syscall restart processing. On i386 for example, this can be
   done by writing -1 to orig_eax on the 2nd syscall interception
   (orig_eax is the syscall number, which after the interception is used
   as a "interrupt was a syscall" flag only.
   Unfortunately, s390 holds syscall number and syscall result in gpr2 and
   its "interrupt was a syscall" flag (trap) is unreachable via ptrace.
   So I changed the host to set trap to -1, if the syscall number is changed
   to an invalid value on the first syscall interception.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      c5c3a6d8
    • M
      [PATCH] s390: ptrace peek and poke · 778959db
      由 Martin Schwidefsky 提交于 
      The special cases of peek and poke on acrs[15] and the fpc register are not
handled correctly.  A poke on acrs[15] will clobber the 4 bytes after the
access registers in the thread_info structure.  That happens to be the kernel
stack pointer.  A poke on the fpc with an invalid value is not caught by the
validity check.  On the next context switch the broken fpc value will cause a
program check in the kernel.  Improving the checks in peek and poke fixes
this.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      778959db
  3. 04 6月, 2005 1 次提交
  5. 03 6月, 2005 3 次提交
  7. 02 6月, 2005 3 次提交
  9. 01 6月, 2005 22 次提交
  11. 31 5月, 2005 1 次提交
  13. 29 5月, 2005 7 次提交