- 22 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The IMA TCB policy is dangerous. A normal use can use all of a system's memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of executables. The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the measurements meaningless. There is no good fix for this in the kernel. A full TCB policy would need to be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and useful system. But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements. One option would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the LSM. For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting to such broad rules.... IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements and supports i_version. Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default. This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 19 5月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote: > Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to > 32K in several of the utilities. > > This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer > works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11. getsebool works fine. > > sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to > be present in the other read functions. Maybe it could be removed? Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to what is available in the buffer. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being defined in two places and could someday get out of sync. This patch moves the declaration into magic.h so it is only done once. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 15 5月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The IMA default policy measures every single file opened by root. This is terrible for most users. Consider a system (like mine) with virtual machine images. When those images are touched (which happens at boot for me) those images are measured. This is just way too much for the default case. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The IMA policy file does not implement read. Trying to just open/read/close the file will load a blank policy and you cannot then change the policy without a reboot. This removes the read permission from the file so one must at least be attempting to write... Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 12 5月, 2009 4 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Both of the securityfs users (TPM and IMA) can call securityfs_remove and pass an IS_ERR(dentry) in their failure paths. This patch handles those rather than panicing when it tries to start deferencing some negative memory. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
If IMA tried to measure a file which was larger than 4G dentry_open would fail with -EOVERFLOW since IMA wasn't passing O_LARGEFILE. This patch passes O_LARGEFILE to all IMA opens to avoid this problem. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently IMA does not handle failures from dentry_open(). This means that we leave a pointer set to ERR_PTR(errno) and then try to use it just a few lines later in fput(). Oops. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Proper invocation of the current credentials is to use current_cred() not current->cred. This patches makes IMA use the new method. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 06 5月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Remove integrity audit messages from __setup() Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Based on a request from Eric Paris to simplify parsing, replace audit_log_format statements containing "%s" with audit_log_string(). Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
An audit subsystem change replaced AUDIT_EQUAL with Audit_equal. Update calls to security_filter_rule_init()/match() to reflect the change. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 05 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
The CRED patch incorrectly converted the SELinux send_sigiotask hook to use the current task SID rather than the target task SID in its permission check, yielding the wrong permission check. This fixes the hook function. Detected by the ltp selinux testsuite and confirmed to correct the test failure. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 30 4月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing. But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent. Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's ->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit). Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit hook. This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
We are still calling secondary_ops->sysctl even though the capabilities module does not define a sysctl operation. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 18 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Etienne Basset 提交于
the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error). Signed-off-by: NEtienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 14 4月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Signed-off-by: NKentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NToshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Etienne Basset 提交于
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \ It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : 0: no logging 1: log denied (default) 2: log accepted 3: log denied&accepted Signed-off-by: NEtienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Etienne Basset 提交于
This patch creates auditing functions usable by LSM to audit security events. It provides standard dumping of FS, NET, task etc ... events (code borrowed from SELinux) and provides 2 callbacks to define LSM specific auditing, which should be flexible enough to convert SELinux too. Signed-off-by: NEtienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 10 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on dest_keyring's semaphore. Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called from request_key_and_link(). This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act as the fallback. To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 09 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
One-liner: capsh --print is broken without this patch. In certain cases, cap_prctl returns error > 0 for success. However, the 'no_change' label was always setting error to 0. As a result, for example, 'prctl(CAP_BSET_READ, N)' would always return 0. It should return 1 if a process has N in its bounding set (as by default it does). I'm keeping the no_change label even though it's now functionally the same as 'error'. Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 07 4月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Since TOMOYO's policy management tools does not use the "undelete domain" command, we decided to remove that command. Signed-off-by: NKentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NToshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Since TOMOYO's policy management tools does not use the "undelete domain" command, we decided to remove that command. Signed-off-by: NKentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NToshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 03 4月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: NDaire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
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由 Li Zefan 提交于
There is nothing special that has to be protected by cgroup_lock, so introduce devcgroup_mtuex for it's own use. Signed-off-by: NLi Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use file capabilities. For instance, removing setuid root from ping and doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for non-root users. In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability, which makes the capability effective immediately. This patch uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full privilege to a setuid-root program. So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with privilege. But if /bin/ping has both setuid-root and cap_net_raw in fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run with only cap_net_raw. Changelog: Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded, as per James Morris' suggestion. Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0. Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 KaiGai Kohei 提交于
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly. Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode, even if the global setting is enforcing mode. However, we don't have an application program interface to inform what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not. It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly. This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace. If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should allow any required actions, as the kernel doing. This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions without read_lock(&policy_rwlock). Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++------------------------- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 01 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration of struct fs_struct; Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 28 3月, 2009 5 次提交
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由 Etienne Basset 提交于
This patch adds a new special option '-CIPSO' to the Smack subsystem. When used in the netlabel list, it means "use CIPSO networking". A use case is when your local network speaks CIPSO and you want also to connect to the unlabeled Internet. This patch also add some documentation describing that. The patch also corrects an oops when setting a '' SMACK64 xattr to a file. Signed-off-by: NEtienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
This patch cleans up a lot of the Smack network access control code. The largest changes are to fix the labeling of incoming TCP connections in a manner similar to the recent SELinux changes which use the security_inet_conn_request() hook to label the request_sock and let the label move to the child socket via the normal network stack mechanisms. In addition to the incoming TCP connection fixes this patch also removes the smk_labled field from the socket_smack struct as the minor optimization advantage was outweighed by the difficulty in maintaining it's proper state. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about what can be safely accomplished using this hook. If a legitimate need for this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to finally remove it from the kernel. Further code simplifications are likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple, straight-up removal of the compat_net code. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 27 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Fix a typo. Reported-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: NKentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NToshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 26 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Etienne Basset 提交于
the following patch (on top of 2.6.29) converts Smack lists to standard linux lists Please review and consider for inclusion in 2.6.30-rc regards, Etienne Signed-off-by: NEtienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 10 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Drop the printk message when an inode is found without an associated dentry. This should only happen when userspace can't be accessing those inodes and those labels will get set correctly on the next d_instantiate. Thus there is no reason to send this message. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 06 3月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
New selinux permission to separate the ability to turn on tty auditing from the ability to set audit rules. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open. Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the filesystem namespace. This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission. It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to be. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 05 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 etienne 提交于
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in 2.6.29rc. It should go in before -final. 1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label), preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with IP options) 2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24, /32 masks but not other masks) 3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ... 4) they were not sorted 1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue. The patch : -creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr, -sorted by netmask length -use the new sorted nature of smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific -corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr & netlbladdr_seq_show Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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