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  1. 25 2月, 2017 2 次提交
  3. 24 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 20 2月, 2017 22 次提交
  7. 17 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 16 2月, 2017 2 次提交
  11. 15 2月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      fuse: fix use after free issue in fuse_dev_do_read() · 6ba4d272
      由 Sahitya Tummala 提交于 
      There is a potential race between fuse_dev_do_write()
and request_wait_answer() contexts as shown below:

TASK 1:
__fuse_request_send():
  |--spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
  |--queue_request();
  |--spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
  |--request_wait_answer():
       |--if (test_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags))
       <gets pre-empted after it is validated true>
                                   TASK 2:
                                   fuse_dev_do_write():
                                     |--clears bit FR_SENT,
                                     |--request_end():
                                        |--sets bit FR_FINISHED
                                        |--spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
                                        |--list_del_init(&req->intr_entry);
                                        |--spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
                                        |--fuse_put_request();
       |--queue_interrupt();
       <request gets queued to interrupts list>
            |--wake_up_locked(&fiq->waitq);
       |--wait_event_freezable();
       <as FR_FINISHED is set, it returns and then
       the caller frees this request>

Now, the next fuse_dev_do_read(), see interrupts list is not empty
and then calls fuse_read_interrupt() which tries to access the request
which is already free'd and gets the below crash:

[11432.401266] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
...
[11432.418518] Kernel BUG at ffffff80083720e0
[11432.456168] PC is at __list_del_entry+0x6c/0xc4
[11432.463573] LR is at fuse_dev_do_read+0x1ac/0x474
...
[11432.679999] [<ffffff80083720e0>] __list_del_entry+0x6c/0xc4
[11432.687794] [<ffffff80082c65e0>] fuse_dev_do_read+0x1ac/0x474
[11432.693180] [<ffffff80082c6b14>] fuse_dev_read+0x6c/0x78
[11432.699082] [<ffffff80081d5638>] __vfs_read+0xc0/0xe8
[11432.704459] [<ffffff80081d5efc>] vfs_read+0x90/0x108
[11432.709406] [<ffffff80081d67f0>] SyS_read+0x58/0x94

As FR_FINISHED bit is set before deleting the intr_entry with input
queue lock in request completion path, do the testing of this flag and
queueing atomically with the same lock in queue_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: NSahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: fd22d62e ("fuse: no fc->lock for iqueue parts")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+
      6ba4d272
  13. 14 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 11 2月, 2017 1 次提交
    • O
      Btrfs: fix btrfs_decompress_buf2page() · 6e78b3f7
      由 Omar Sandoval 提交于 
      If btrfs_decompress_buf2page() is handed a bio with its page in the
middle of the working buffer, then we adjust the offset into the working
buffer. After we copy into the bio, we advance the iterator by the
number of bytes we copied. Then, we have some logic to handle the case
of discontiguous pages and adjust the offset into the working buffer
again. However, if we didn't advance the bio to a new page, we may enter
this case in error, essentially repeating the adjustment that we already
made when we entered the function. The end result is bogus data in the
bio.

Previously, we only checked for this case when we advanced to a new
page, but the conversion to bio iterators changed that. This restores
the old, correct behavior.

A case I saw when testing with zlib was:

    buf_start = 42769
    total_out = 46865
    working_bytes = total_out - buf_start = 4096
    start_byte = 45056

The condition (total_out > start_byte && buf_start < start_byte) is
true, so we adjust the offset:

    buf_offset = start_byte - buf_start = 2287
    working_bytes -= buf_offset = 1809
    current_buf_start = buf_start = 42769

Then, we copy

    bytes = min(bvec.bv_len, PAGE_SIZE - buf_offset, working_bytes) = 1809
    buf_offset += bytes = 4096
    working_bytes -= bytes = 0
    current_buf_start += bytes = 44578

After bio_advance(), we are still in the same page, so start_byte is the
same. Then, we check (total_out > start_byte && current_buf_start < start_byte),
which is true! So, we adjust the values again:

    buf_offset = start_byte - buf_start = 2287
    working_bytes = total_out - start_byte = 1809
    current_buf_start = buf_start + buf_offset = 45056

But note that working_bytes was already zero before this, so we should
have stopped copying.

Fixes: 974b1adc ("btrfs: use bio iterators for the decompression handlers")
Reported-by: NPat Erley <pat-lkml@erley.org>
Reviewed-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
      6e78b3f7
  17. 10 2月, 2017 2 次提交
  19. 09 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  21. 08 2月, 2017 1 次提交
    • H
      mm: fix KPF_SWAPCACHE in /proc/kpageflags · b6789123
      由 Hugh Dickins 提交于 
      Commit 6326fec1 ("mm: Use owner_priv bit for PageSwapCache, valid
when PageSwapBacked") aliased PG_swapcache to PG_owner_priv_1 (and
depending on PageSwapBacked being true).

As a result, the KPF_SWAPCACHE bit in '/proc/kpageflags' should now be
synthesized, instead of being shown on unrelated pages which just happen
to have PG_owner_priv_1 set.
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b6789123
  23. 04 2月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      fs: break out of iomap_file_buffered_write on fatal signals · d1908f52
      由 Michal Hocko 提交于 
      Tetsuo has noticed that an OOM stress test which performs large write
requests can cause the full memory reserves depletion.  He has tracked
this down to the following path

	__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x436/0x4d0
	alloc_pages_current+0x97/0x1b0
	__page_cache_alloc+0x15d/0x1a0          mm/filemap.c:728
	pagecache_get_page+0x5a/0x2b0           mm/filemap.c:1331
	grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x23/0x40   mm/filemap.c:2773
	iomap_write_begin+0x50/0xd0             fs/iomap.c:118
	iomap_write_actor+0xb5/0x1a0            fs/iomap.c:190
	? iomap_write_end+0x80/0x80             fs/iomap.c:150
	iomap_apply+0xb3/0x130                  fs/iomap.c:79
	iomap_file_buffered_write+0x68/0xa0     fs/iomap.c:243
	? iomap_write_end+0x80/0x80
	xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x132/0x390 [xfs]
	? remove_wait_queue+0x59/0x60
	xfs_file_write_iter+0x90/0x130 [xfs]
	__vfs_write+0xe5/0x140
	vfs_write+0xc7/0x1f0
	? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d0/0x380
	SyS_write+0x58/0xc0
	do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200
	entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

the oom victim has access to all memory reserves to make a forward
progress to exit easier.  But iomap_file_buffered_write and other
callers of iomap_apply loop to complete the full request.  We need to
check for fatal signals and back off with a short write instead.

As the iomap_apply delegates all the work down to the actor we have to
hook into those.  All callers that work with the page cache are calling
iomap_write_begin so we will check for signals there.  dax_iomap_actor
has to handle the situation explicitly because it copies data to the
userspace directly.  Other callers like iomap_page_mkwrite work on a
single page or iomap_fiemap_actor do not allocate memory based on the
given len.

Fixes: 68a9f5e7 ("xfs: implement iomap based buffered write path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170201092706.9966-2-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.8+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d1908f52
  25. 01 2月, 2017 4 次提交
    • D
      fscache: Fix dead object requeue · e26bfebd
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Under some circumstances, an fscache object can become queued such that it
fscache_object_work_func() can be called once the object is in the
OBJECT_DEAD state.  This results in the kernel oopsing when it tries to
invoke the handler for the state (which is hard coded to 0x2).

The way this comes about is something like the following:

 (1) The object dispatcher is processing a work state for an object.  This
     is done in workqueue context.

 (2) An out-of-band event comes in that isn't masked, causing the object to
     be queued, say EV_KILL.

 (3) The object dispatcher finishes processing the current work state on
     that object and then sees there's another event to process, so,
     without returning to the workqueue core, it processes that event too.
     It then follows the chain of events that initiates until we reach
     OBJECT_DEAD without going through a wait state (such as
     WAIT_FOR_CLEARANCE).

     At this point, object->events may be 0, object->event_mask will be 0
     and oob_event_mask will be 0.

 (4) The object dispatcher returns to the workqueue processor, and in due
     course, this sees that the object's work item is still queued and
     invokes it again.

 (5) The current state is a work state (OBJECT_DEAD), so the dispatcher
     jumps to it - resulting in an OOPS.

When I'm seeing this, the work state in (1) appears to have been either
LOOK_UP_OBJECT or CREATE_OBJECT (object->oob_table is
fscache_osm_lookup_oob).

The window for (2) is very small:

 (A) object->event_mask is cleared whilst the event dispatch process is
     underway - though there's no memory barrier to force this to the top
     of the function.

     The window, therefore is from the time the object was selected by the
     workqueue processor and made requeueable to the time the mask was
     cleared.

 (B) fscache_raise_event() will only queue the object if it manages to set
     the event bit and the corresponding event_mask bit was set.

     The enqueuement is then deferred slightly whilst we get a ref on the
     object and get the per-CPU variable for workqueue congestion.  This
     slight deferral slightly increases the probability by allowing extra
     time for the workqueue to make the item requeueable.

Handle this by giving the dead state a processor function and checking the
for the dead state address rather than seeing if the processor function is
address 0x2.  The dead state processor function can then set a flag to
indicate that it's occurred and give a warning if it occurs more than once
per object.

If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen (note the RIP
value):

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002
IP: [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
PGD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 17 PID: 16077 Comm: kworker/u48:9 Not tainted 3.10.0-327.18.2.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
task: ffff880302b63980 ti: ffff880717544000 task.ti: ffff880717544000
RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000002>]  [<0000000000000002>] 0x1
RSP: 0018:ffff880717547df8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0368640 RBX: ffff880edf7a4480 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff880edf7a4480
RBP: ffff880717547e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dfc40a25cb3a4510
R10: dfc40a25cb3a4510 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880edf7a4510 R14: ffff8817f6153400 R15: 0000000000000600
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88181f420000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 000000000194a000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffffa0363695 ffff880edf7a4510 ffff88093f16f900 ffff8817faa4ec00
 ffff880717547e60 ffffffff8109d5db 00000000faa4ec18 0000000000000000
 ffff8817faa4ec18 ffff88093f16f930 ffff880302b63980 ffff88093f16f900
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffffa0363695>] ? fscache_object_work_func+0xa5/0x200 [fscache]
 [<ffffffff8109d5db>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x470
 [<ffffffff8109e4ac>] worker_thread+0x21c/0x400
 [<ffffffff8109e290>] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400
 [<ffffffff810a5acf>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 [<ffffffff810a5a00>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
 [<ffffffff816460d8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 [<ffffffff810a5a00>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJeremy McNicoll <jeremymc@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NFrank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      e26bfebd
    • D
      fscache: Clear outstanding writes when disabling a cookie · 6bdded59
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      fscache_disable_cookie() needs to clear the outstanding writes on the
cookie it's disabling because they cannot be completed after.

Without this, fscache_nfs_open_file() gets stuck because it disables the
cookie when the file is opened for writing but can't uncache the pages till
afterwards - otherwise there's a race between the open routine and anyone
who already has it open R/O and is still reading from it.

Looking in /proc/pid/stack of the offending process shows:

[<ffffffffa0142883>] __fscache_wait_on_page_write+0x82/0x9b [fscache]
[<ffffffffa014336e>] __fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages+0x91/0xe1 [fscache]
[<ffffffffa01740fa>] nfs_fscache_open_file+0x59/0x9e [nfs]
[<ffffffffa01ccf41>] nfs4_file_open+0x17f/0x1b8 [nfsv4]
[<ffffffff8117350e>] do_dentry_open+0x16d/0x2b7
[<ffffffff811743ac>] vfs_open+0x5c/0x65
[<ffffffff81184185>] path_openat+0x785/0x8fb
[<ffffffff81184343>] do_filp_open+0x48/0x9e
[<ffffffff81174710>] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cb
[<ffffffff811747b9>] SyS_open+0x19/0x1b
[<ffffffff81001c44>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x17a
[<ffffffff8165c2da>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Reported-by: NJianhong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      6bdded59
    • D
      FS-Cache: Initialise stores_lock in netfs cookie · 62deb818
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Initialise the stores_lock in fscache netfs cookies.  Technically, it
shouldn't be necessary, since the netfs cookie is an index and stores no
data, but initialising it anyway adds insignificant overhead.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      62deb818
    • C
      nfsd: special case truncates some more · 41f53350
      由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于 
      Both the NFS protocols and the Linux VFS use a setattr operation with a
bitmap of attributs to set to set various file attributes including the
file size and the uid/gid.

The Linux syscalls never mixes size updates with unrelated updates like
the uid/gid, and some file systems like XFS and GFS2 rely on the fact
that truncates might not update random other attributes, and many other
file systems handle the case but do not update the different attributes
in the same transaction.  NFSD on the other hand passes the attributes
it gets on the wire more or less directly through to the VFS, leading to
updates the file systems don't expect.  XFS at least has an assert on
the allowed attributes, which caught an unusual NFS client setting the
size and group at the same time.

To handle this issue properly this switches nfsd to call vfs_truncate
for size changes, and then handle all other attributes through
notify_change.  As a side effect this also means less boilerplace code
around the size change as we can now reuse the VFS code.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
      41f53350