For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.

Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.

For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.

Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest has protected state.

Additionally, an SEV-ES guest must only and always intercept DR7 reads and
writes. Update set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() to account for
this.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8db966fa2f9803d6454ce773863025d0e2e7f3cc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.

Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This will be used by SEV-ES to inject MSR failure via the GHCB.
Reviewed-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Allocate a page during vCPU creation to be used as the encrypted VM save
area (VMSA) for the SEV-ES guest. Provide a flag in the kvm_vcpu_arch
structure that indicates whether the guest state is protected.

When freeing a VMSA page that has been encrypted, the cache contents must
be flushed using the MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH before freeing the page.

[ i386 build warnings ]
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fde272b17eec804f3b9db18c131262fe074015c5.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add support to KVM for determining if a system is capable of supporting
SEV-ES as well as determining if a guest is an SEV-ES guest.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e66792323982c822350e40c7a1cf67ea2978a70b.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Move kvm_machine_check to x86.h to avoid two exact copies
of the same function in kvm.c and svm.c.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NUros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20201029135600.122392-1-ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Until commit e7c587da ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for
IBRS/IBPB/STIBP"), KVM was testing both Intel and AMD CPUID bits before
allowing the guest to write MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD.
Testing only Intel bits on VMX processors, or only AMD bits on SVM
processors, fails if the guests are created with the "opposite" vendor
as the host.

While at it, also tweak the host CPU check to use the vendor-agnostic
feature bit X86_FEATURE_IBPB, since we only care about the availability
of the MSR on the host here and not about specific CPUID bits.

Fixes: e7c587da ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NDenis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Similarly to what vmx/vmx.c does, use vcpu->arch.cr4 to check if CR4
bits PGE, PKE and OSXSAVE have changed.  When switching between VMCB01
and VMCB02, CPUID has to be adjusted every time if CR4.PKE or CR4.OSXSAVE
change; without this patch, instead, CR4 would be checked against the
previous value for L2 on vmentry, and against the previous value for
L1 on vmexit, and CPUID would not be updated.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM does not have separate ASIDs for L1 and L2; either the nested
hypervisor and nested guests share a single ASID, or on older processor
the ASID is used only to implement TLB flushing.

Either way, ASIDs are handled at the VM level.  In preparation
for having different VMCBs passed to VMLOAD/VMRUN/VMSAVE for L1 and
L2, store the current ASID to struct vcpu_svm and only move it to
the VMCB in svm_vcpu_run.  This way, TLB flushes can be applied
no matter which VMCB will be active during the next svm_vcpu_run.
Signed-off-by: NCathy Avery <cavery@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201011184818.3609-2-cavery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

On emulated VM-entry and VM-exit, update the CPUID bits that reflect
CR4.OSXSAVE and CR4.PKE.

This fixes a bug where the CPUID bits could continue to reflect L2 CR4
values after emulated VM-exit to L1. It also fixes a related bug where
the CPUID bits could continue to reflect L1 CR4 values after emulated
VM-entry to L2. The latter bug is mainly relevant to SVM, wherein
CPUID is not a required intercept. However, it could also be relevant
to VMX, because the code to conditionally update these CPUID bits
assumes that the guest CPUID and the guest CR4 are always in sync.

Fixes: 8eb3f87d ("KVM: nVMX: fix guest CR4 loading when emulating L2 to L1 exit")
Fixes: 2acf923e ("KVM: VMX: Enable XSAVE/XRSTOR for guest")
Fixes: b9baba86 ("KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest")
Reported-by: NAbhiroop Dabral <adabral@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NRicardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201029170648.483210-1-jmattson@google.com>

Split out VMX's checks on CR4.VMXE to a dedicated hook, .is_valid_cr4(),
and invoke the new hook from kvm_valid_cr4().  This fixes an issue where
KVM_SET_SREGS would return success while failing to actually set CR4.

Fixing the issue by explicitly checking kvm_x86_ops.set_cr4()'s return
in __set_sregs() is not a viable option as KVM has already stuffed a
variety of vCPU state.

Note, kvm_valid_cr4() and is_valid_cr4() have different return types and
inverted semantics.  This will be remedied in a future patch.

Fixes: 5e1746d6 ("KVM: nVMX: Allow setting the VMXE bit in CR4")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201007014417.29276-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop svm_set_cr4()'s explicit check CR4.VMXE now that common x86 handles
the check by incorporating VMXE into the CR4 reserved bits, via
kvm_cpu_caps.  SVM obviously does not set X86_FEATURE_VMX.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201007014417.29276-4-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For AMD SEV guests, update the cr3_lm_rsvd_bits to mask
the memory encryption bit in reserved bits.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <160521948301.32054.5783800787423231162.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This way we don't waste memory on VMs which don't use nesting
virtualization even when the host enabled it for them.
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This will be used to signal an error to the userspace, in case
the vendor code failed during handling of this msr. (e.g -ENOMEM)
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

We will introduce the concept of MSRs that may not be handled in kernel
space soon. Some MSRs are directly passed through to the guest, effectively
making them handled by KVM from user space's point of view.

This patch introduces all logic required to ensure that MSRs that
user space wants trapped are not marked as direct access for guests.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-6-graf@amazon.com>
[Make terminology a bit more similar to VMX. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Prepare vmx and svm for a subsequent change that ensures the MSR permission
bitmap is set to allow an MSR that userspace is tracking to force a vmx_vmexit
in the guest.
Signed-off-by: NAaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NOliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
[agraf: rebase, adapt SVM scheme to nested changes that came in between]
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-5-graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use the newly introduced TRACE_EVENT_KVM_EXIT to define the guts of
kvm_nested_vmexit so that it captures and prints the same information as
kvm_exit.  This has the bonus side effect of fixing the interrupt info
and error code printing for the case where they're invalid, e.g. if the
exit was a failed VM-Entry.  This also sets the stage for retrieving
EXIT_QUALIFICATION and VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO in nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit()
if and only if the VM-Exit is being routed to L1.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200923201349.16097-7-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Extend the kvm_exit tracepoint to align it with kvm_nested_vmexit in
terms of what information is captured.  On SVM, add interrupt info and
error code, while on VMX it add IDT vectoring and error code.  This
sets the stage for macrofying the kvm_exit tracepoint definition so that
it can be reused for kvm_nested_vmexit without loss of information.

Opportunistically stuff a zero for VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO if the VM-Enter
failed, as the field is guaranteed to be invalid.  Note, it'd be
possible to further filter the interrupt/exception fields based on the
VM-Exit reason, but the helper is intended only for tracepoints, i.e.
an extra VMREAD or two is a non-issue, the failed VM-Enter case is just
low hanging fruit.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200923201349.16097-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use kvm_rip_read() to read the guest's RIP for the nested VM-Exit
tracepoint instead of having the caller pass in an argument.  Params
that are passed into a tracepoint are evaluated even if the tracepoint
is disabled, i.e. passing in RIP for VMX incurs a VMREAD and retpoline
to retrieve a value that may never be used, e.g. if the exit is due to a
hardware interrupt.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200923201349.16097-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add trace_kvm_cr_write and trace_kvm_cr_read for svm.
Signed-off-by: NHaiwei Li <lihaiwei@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <f3031602-db3b-c4fe-b719-d402663b0a2b@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Analyze is_guest_mode() in svm_vcpu_run() instead of svm_exit_handlers_fastpath()
in conformity with VMX version.
Suggested-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1600066548-4343-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Replace the existing kvm_x86_ops.need_emulation_on_page_fault() with a
more generic is_emulatable(), and unconditionally call the new function
in x86_emulate_instruction().

KVM will use the generic hook to support multiple security related
technologies that prevent emulation in one way or another.  Similar to
the existing AMD #NPF case where emulation of the current instruction is
not possible due to lack of information, AMD's SEV-ES and Intel's SGX
and TDX will introduce scenarios where emulation is impossible due to
the guest's register state being inaccessible.  And again similar to the
existing #NPF case, emulation can be initiated by kvm_mmu_page_fault(),
i.e. outside of the control of vendor-specific code.

While the cause and architecturally visible behavior of the various
cases are different, e.g. SGX will inject a #UD, AMD #NPF is a clean
resume or complete shutdown, and SEV-ES and TDX "return" an error, the
impact on the common emulation code is identical: KVM must stop
emulation immediately and resume the guest.

Query is_emulatable() in handle_ud() as well so that the
force_emulation_prefix code doesn't incorrectly modify RIP before
calling emulate_instruction() in the absurdly unlikely scenario that
KVM encounters forced emulation in conjunction with "do not emulate".

Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200915232702.15945-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The following intercept bit has been added to support VMEXIT
for INVPCID instruction:
Code    Name            Cause
A2h     VMEXIT_INVPCID  INVPCID instruction

The following bit has been added to the VMCB layout control area
to control intercept of INVPCID:
Byte Offset     Bit(s)    Function
14h             2         intercept INVPCID

Enable the interceptions when the the guest is running with shadow
page table enabled and handle the tlbflush based on the invpcid
instruction type.

For the guests with nested page table (NPT) support, the INVPCID
feature works as running it natively. KVM does not need to do any
special handling in this case.

AMD documentation for INVPCID feature is available at "AMD64
Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming,
Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)"

The documentation can be obtained at the links below:
Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985255929.11252.17346684135277453258.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove set_cr_intercept, clr_cr_intercept and is_cr_intercept. Instead
call generic svm_set_intercept, svm_clr_intercept an dsvm_is_intercep
tfor all cr intercepts.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985253016.11252.16945893859439811480.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Convert all the intercepts to one array of 32 bit vectors in
vmcb_control_area. This makes it easy for future intercept vector
additions. Also update trace functions.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985250813.11252.5736581193881040525.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Modify intercept_exceptions to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use
the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept to
set/clear/test the intercept_exceptions bits.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985250037.11252.1361972528657052410.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Modify intercept_dr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use
the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept
to set/clear/test the intercept_dr bits.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985249255.11252.10000868032136333355.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Change intercept_cr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area.
Use the new vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept
where applicable.
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <159985248506.11252.9081085950784508671.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
[Change constant names. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Kernel coding style suggests not to use labels like error1,error2
Suggested-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827171145.374620-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Another small refactoring.
Suggested-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827171145.374620-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>