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  1. 16 1月, 2023 4 次提交
  3. 12 12月, 2022 1 次提交
  5. 24 11月, 2022 1 次提交
    • L
      virtio_net: Fix probe failed when modprobe virtio_net · b0686565
      由 Li Zetao 提交于 
      When doing the following test steps, an error was found:
  step 1: modprobe virtio_net succeeded
    # modprobe virtio_net        <-- OK

  step 2: fault injection in register_netdevice()
    # modprobe -r virtio_net     <-- OK
    # ...
      FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
      name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
      CPU: 0 PID: 3521 Comm: modprobe
      Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
      Call Trace:
       <TASK>
       ...
       should_failslab+0xa/0x20
       ...
       dev_set_name+0xc0/0x100
       netdev_register_kobject+0xc2/0x340
       register_netdevice+0xbb9/0x1320
       virtnet_probe+0x1d72/0x2658 [virtio_net]
       ...
       </TASK>
      virtio_net: probe of virtio0 failed with error -22

  step 3: modprobe virtio_net failed
    # modprobe virtio_net        <-- failed
      virtio_net: probe of virtio0 failed with error -2

The root cause of the problem is that the queues are not
disable on the error handling path when register_netdevice()
fails in virtnet_probe(), resulting in an error "-ENOENT"
returned in the next modprobe call in setup_vq().

virtio_pci_modern_device uses virtqueues to send or
receive message, and "queue_enable" records whether the
queues are available. In vp_modern_find_vqs(), all queues
will be selected and activated, but once queues are enabled
there is no way to go back except reset.

Fix it by reset virtio device on error handling path. This
makes error handling follow the same order as normal device
cleanup in virtnet_remove() which does: unregister, destroy
failover, then reset. And that flow is better tested than
error handling so we can be reasonably sure it works well.

Fixes: 02465555 ("virtio_net: fix use after free on allocation failure")
Signed-off-by: NLi Zetao <lizetao1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122150046.3910638-1-lizetao1@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      b0686565
  7. 29 10月, 2022 1 次提交
  9. 07 10月, 2022 2 次提交
  11. 01 9月, 2022 1 次提交
  13. 16 8月, 2022 1 次提交
  15. 12 8月, 2022 1 次提交
  17. 11 8月, 2022 7 次提交
  19. 08 8月, 2022 1 次提交
  21. 27 7月, 2022 1 次提交
    • J
      virtio-net: fix the race between refill work and close · 5a159128
      由 Jason Wang 提交于 
      We try using cancel_delayed_work_sync() to prevent the work from
enabling NAPI. This is insufficient since we don't disable the source
of the refill work scheduling. This means an NAPI poll callback after
cancel_delayed_work_sync() can schedule the refill work then can
re-enable the NAPI that leads to use-after-free [1].

Since the work can enable NAPI, we can't simply disable NAPI before
calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(). So fix this by introducing a
dedicated boolean to control whether or not the work could be
scheduled from NAPI.

[1]
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refill_work+0x43/0xd4
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810562c92e by task kworker/2:1/42

CPU: 2 PID: 42 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1+ #480
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events refill_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
 print_report.cold+0xbb/0x6ac
 ? _printk+0xad/0xde
 ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4
 kasan_report+0xa8/0x130
 ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4
 refill_work+0x43/0xd4
 process_one_work+0x43d/0x780
 worker_thread+0x2a0/0x6f0
 ? process_one_work+0x780/0x780
 kthread+0x167/0x1a0
 ? kthread_exit+0x50/0x50
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
 </TASK>
...

Fixes: b2baed69 ("virtio_net: set/cancel work on ndo_open/ndo_stop")
Signed-off-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NXuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5a159128
  23. 27 6月, 2022 1 次提交
    • J
      virtio-net: fix race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready() · 50c0ada6
      由 Jason Wang 提交于 
      We currently call virtio_device_ready() after netdev
registration. Since ndo_open() can be called immediately
after register_netdev, this means there exists a race between
ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready(): the driver may start to use the
device before DRIVER_OK which violates the spec.

Fix this by switching to use register_netdevice() and protect the
virtio_device_ready() with rtnl_lock() to make sure ndo_open() can
only be called after virtio_device_ready().

Fixes: 4baf1e33 ("virtio_net: enable VQs early")
Signed-off-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220617072949.30734-1-jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      50c0ada6
  25. 23 6月, 2022 1 次提交
    • S
      virtio_net: fix xdp_rxq_info bug after suspend/resume · 8af52fe9
      由 Stephan Gerhold 提交于 
      The following sequence currently causes a driver bug warning
when using virtio_net:

  # ip link set eth0 up
  # echo mem > /sys/power/state (or e.g. # rtcwake -s 10 -m mem)
  <resume>
  # ip link set eth0 down

  Missing register, driver bug
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 375 at net/core/xdp.c:138 xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
  Call trace:
   xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
   virtnet_close+0x58/0xac
   __dev_close_many+0xac/0x140
   __dev_change_flags+0xd8/0x210
   dev_change_flags+0x24/0x64
   do_setlink+0x230/0xdd0
   ...

This happens because virtnet_freeze() frees the receive_queue
completely (including struct xdp_rxq_info) but does not call
xdp_rxq_info_unreg(). Similarly, virtnet_restore() sets up the
receive_queue again but does not call xdp_rxq_info_reg().

Actually, parts of virtnet_freeze_down() and virtnet_restore_up()
are almost identical to virtnet_close() and virtnet_open(): only
the calls to xdp_rxq_info_(un)reg() are missing. This means that
we can fix this easily and avoid such problems in the future by
just calling virtnet_close()/open() from the freeze/restore handlers.

Aside from adding the missing xdp_rxq_info calls the only difference
is that the refill work is only cancelled if netif_running(). However,
this should not make any functional difference since the refill work
should only be active if the network interface is actually up.

Fixes: 754b8a21 ("virtio_net: setup xdp_rxq_info")
Signed-off-by: NStephan Gerhold <stephan.gerhold@kernkonzept.com>
Acked-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621114845.3650258-1-stephan.gerhold@kernkonzept.comSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      8af52fe9
  27. 08 5月, 2022 1 次提交
  29. 06 5月, 2022 1 次提交
  31. 26 4月, 2022 1 次提交
    • N
      virtio_net: fix wrong buf address calculation when using xdp · acb16b39
      由 Nikolay Aleksandrov 提交于 
      We received a report[1] of kernel crashes when Cilium is used in XDP
mode with virtio_net after updating to newer kernels. After
investigating the reason it turned out that when using mergeable bufs
with an XDP program which adjusts xdp.data or xdp.data_meta page_to_buf()
calculates the build_skb address wrong because the offset can become less
than the headroom so it gets the address of the previous page (-X bytes
depending on how lower offset is):
 page_to_skb: page addr ffff9eb2923e2000 buf ffff9eb2923e1ffc offset 252 headroom 256

This is a pr_err() I added in the beginning of page_to_skb which clearly
shows offset that is less than headroom by adding 4 bytes of metadata
via an xdp prog. The calculations done are:
 receive_mergeable():
 headroom = VIRTIO_XDP_HEADROOM; // VIRTIO_XDP_HEADROOM == 256 bytes
 offset = xdp.data - page_address(xdp_page) -
          vi->hdr_len - metasize;

 page_to_skb():
 p = page_address(page) + offset;
 ...
 buf = p - headroom;

Now buf goes -4 bytes from the page's starting address as can be seen
above which is set as skb->head and skb->data by build_skb later. Depending
on what's done with the skb (when it's freed most often) we get all kinds
of corruptions and BUG_ON() triggers in mm[2]. We have to recalculate
the new headroom after the xdp program has run, similar to how offset
and len are recalculated. Headroom is directly related to
data_hard_start, data and data_meta, so we use them to get the new size.
The result is correct (similar pr_err() in page_to_skb, one case of
xdp_page and one case of virtnet buf):
 a) Case with 4 bytes of metadata
 [  115.949641] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcfad2000 offset 252 headroom 252
 [  121.084105] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcf018000 offset 20732 headroom 252
 b) Case of pushing data +32 bytes
 [  153.181401] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd0c4d000 offset 288 headroom 288
 [  158.480421] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd00b0000 offset 24864 headroom 288
 c) Case of pushing data -33 bytes
 [  835.906830] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd3270000 offset 223 headroom 223
 [  840.839910] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcdd68000 offset 12511 headroom 223

Offset and headroom are equal because offset points to the start of
reserved bytes for the virtio_net header which are at buf start +
headroom, while data points at buf start + vnet hdr size + headroom so
when data or data_meta are adjusted by the xdp prog both the headroom size
and the offset change equally. We can use data_hard_start to compute the
new headroom after the xdp prog (linearized / page start case, the
virtnet buf case is similar just with bigger base offset):
 xdp.data_hard_start = page_address + vnet_hdr
 xdp.data = page_address + vnet_hdr + headroom
 new headroom after xdp prog = xdp.data - xdp.data_hard_start - metasize

An example reproducer xdp prog[3] is below.

[1] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/19453

[2] Two of the many traces:
 [   40.437400] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0  pfn:14940
 [   40.916726] BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-resolve  pfn:053b7
 [   41.300891] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:720!
 [   41.301801] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 [   41.302784] CPU: 1 PID: 1181 Comm: kubelet Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B   W         5.18.0-rc1+ #37
 [   41.304458] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
 [   41.306018] RIP: 0010:page_frag_free+0x79/0xe0
 [   41.306836] Code: 00 00 75 ea 48 8b 07 a9 00 00 01 00 74 e0 48 8b 47 48 48 8d 50 ff a8 01 48 0f 45 fa eb d0 48 c7 c6 18 b8 30 a6 e8 d7 f8 fc ff <0f> 0b 48 8d 78 ff eb bc 48 8b 07 a9 00 00 01 00 74 3a 66 90 0f b6
 [   41.310235] RSP: 0018:ffffac05c2a6bc78 EFLAGS: 00010292
 [   41.311201] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [   41.312502] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa6423004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
 [   41.313794] RBP: ffff993c98823600 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
 [   41.315089] R10: ffffac05c2a6ba68 R11: ffffffffa698ca28 R12: ffff993c98823600
 [   41.316398] R13: ffff993c86311ebc R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000005c
 [   41.317700] FS:  00007fe13fc56740(0000) GS:ffff993cdd900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [   41.319150] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [   41.320152] CR2: 000000c00008a000 CR3: 0000000014908000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
 [   41.321387] Call Trace:
 [   41.321819]  <TASK>
 [   41.322193]  skb_release_data+0x13f/0x1c0
 [   41.322902]  __kfree_skb+0x20/0x30
 [   41.343870]  tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x671/0x880
 [   41.363764]  tcp_recvmsg+0x5e/0x1c0
 [   41.384102]  inet_recvmsg+0x42/0x100
 [   41.406783]  ? sock_recvmsg+0x1d/0x70
 [   41.428201]  sock_read_iter+0x84/0xd0
 [   41.445592]  ? 0xffffffffa3000000
 [   41.462442]  new_sync_read+0x148/0x160
 [   41.479314]  ? 0xffffffffa3000000
 [   41.496937]  vfs_read+0x138/0x190
 [   41.517198]  ksys_read+0x87/0xc0
 [   41.535336]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
 [   41.551637]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 [   41.568050] RIP: 0033:0x48765b
 [   41.583955] Code: e8 4a 35 fe ff eb 88 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc e8 fb 7a fe ff 48 8b 7c 24 10 48 8b 74 24 18 48 8b 54 24 20 48 8b 44 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 76 20 48 c7 44 24 28 ff ff ff ff 48 c7 44 24 30
 [   41.632818] RSP: 002b:000000c000a2f5b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
 [   41.664588] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000c000062000 RCX: 000000000048765b
 [   41.681205] RDX: 0000000000005e54 RSI: 000000c000e66000 RDI: 0000000000000016
 [   41.697164] RBP: 000000c000a2f608 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000000001b4
 [   41.713034] R10: 00000000000000b6 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000000000e9
 [   41.728755] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000c000a92000 R15: ffffffffffffffff
 [   41.744254]  </TASK>
 [   41.758585] Modules linked in: br_netfilter bridge veth netconsole virtio_net

 and

 [   33.524802] BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-network  pfn:11e60
 [   33.528617] page ffffe05dc0147b00 ffffe05dc04e7a00 ffff8ae9851ec000 (1) len 82 offset 252 metasize 4 hroom 0 hdr_len 12 data ffff8ae9851ec10c data_meta ffff8ae9851ec108 data_end ffff8ae9851ec14e
 [   33.529764] page:000000003792b5ba refcount:0 mapcount:-512 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11e60
 [   33.532463] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
 [   33.532468] raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 [   33.532470] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000fffffdff 0000000000000000
 [   33.532471] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
 [   33.532472] Modules linked in: br_netfilter bridge veth netconsole virtio_net
 [   33.532479] CPU: 0 PID: 791 Comm: systemd-network Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ #37
 [   33.532482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
 [   33.532484] Call Trace:
 [   33.532496]  <TASK>
 [   33.532500]  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a
 [   33.532506]  bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
 [   33.532510]  free_pcp_prepare+0x290/0x420
 [   33.532515]  free_unref_page+0x1b/0x100
 [   33.532518]  skb_release_data+0x13f/0x1c0
 [   33.532524]  kfree_skb_reason+0x3e/0xc0
 [   33.532527]  ip6_mc_input+0x23c/0x2b0
 [   33.532531]  ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x83/0x90
 [   33.532534]  ip6_sublist_rcv+0x22b/0x2b0

[3] XDP program to reproduce(xdp_pass.c):
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>

 SEC("xdp_pass")
 int xdp_pkt_pass(struct xdp_md *ctx)
 {
          bpf_xdp_adjust_head(ctx, -(int)32);
          return XDP_PASS;
 }

 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";

 compile: clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c xdp_pass.c -o xdp_pass.o
 load on virtio_net: ip link set enp1s0 xdpdrv obj xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
CC: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CC: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
CC: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Fixes: 8fb7da9e ("virtio_net: get build_skb() buf by data ptr")
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: NXuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425103703.3067292-1-razor@blackwall.orgSigned-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      acb16b39
  33. 29 3月, 2022 4 次提交
  35. 15 2月, 2022 1 次提交
  37. 16 1月, 2022 1 次提交
  39. 15 1月, 2022 1 次提交
  41. 16 12月, 2021 1 次提交
  43. 14 12月, 2021 1 次提交
  45. 25 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  47. 22 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  49. 17 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  51. 01 11月, 2021 2 次提交