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  1. 06 11月, 2019 4 次提交
    • J
      drm/i915: Support ro ppgtt mapped cmdparser shadow buffers · 4f7af194
      由 Jon Bloomfield 提交于 
      For Gen7, the original cmdparser motive was to permit limited
use of register read/write instructions in unprivileged BB's.
This worked by copying the user supplied bb to a kmd owned
bb, and running it in secure mode, from the ggtt, only if
the scanner finds no unsafe commands or registers.

For Gen8+ we can't use this same technique because running bb's
from the ggtt also disables access to ppgtt space. But we also
do not actually require 'secure' execution since we are only
trying to reduce the available command/register set. Instead we
will copy the user buffer to a kmd owned read-only bb in ppgtt,
and run in the usual non-secure mode.

Note that ro pages are only supported by ppgtt (not ggtt), but
luckily that's exactly what we need.

Add the required paths to map the shadow buffer to ppgtt ro for Gen8+

v2: IS_GEN7/IS_GEN (Mika)
v3: rebase
v4: rebase
v5: rebase
Signed-off-by: NJon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NChris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
      4f7af194
    • J
      drm/i915: Add support for mandatory cmdparsing · 311a50e7
      由 Jon Bloomfield 提交于 
      The existing cmdparser for gen7 can be bypassed by specifying
batch_len=0 in the execbuf call. This is safe because bypassing
simply reduces the cmd-set available.

In a later patch we will introduce cmdparsing for gen9, as a
security measure, which must be strictly enforced since without
it we are vulnerable to DoS attacks.

Introduce the concept of 'required' cmd parsing that cannot be
bypassed by submitting zero-length bb's.

v2: rebase (Mika)
v2: rebase (Mika)
v3: fix conflict on engine flags (Mika)
Signed-off-by: NJon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NChris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
      311a50e7
    • J
      drm/i915: Remove Master tables from cmdparser · 66d8aba1
      由 Jon Bloomfield 提交于 
      The previous patch has killed support for secure batches
on gen6+, and hence the cmdparsers master tables are
now dead code. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: NJon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: NChris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
      66d8aba1
    • J
      drm/i915: Disable Secure Batches for gen6+ · 44157641
      由 Jon Bloomfield 提交于 
      Retroactively stop reporting support for secure batches
through the api for gen6+ so that older binaries trigger
the fallback path instead.

Older binaries use secure batches pre gen6 to access resources
that are not available to normal usermode processes. However,
all known userspace explicitly checks for HAS_SECURE_BATCHES
before relying on the secure batch feature.

Since there are no known binaries relying on this for newer gens
we can kill secure batches from gen6, via I915_PARAM_HAS_SECURE_BATCHES.

v2: rebase (Mika)
v3: rebase (Mika)
Signed-off-by: NJon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NChris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
      44157641
  3. 22 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 21 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 20 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 19 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 16 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  13. 13 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  15. 10 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  17. 09 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  19. 07 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  21. 04 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  23. 02 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  25. 30 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  27. 13 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  29. 26 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  31. 21 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  33. 17 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  35. 11 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  37. 06 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  39. 28 5月, 2019 4 次提交
  41. 22 5月, 2019 2 次提交
    • C
      drm/i915: Allow specification of parallel execbuf · a88b6e4c
      由 Chris Wilson 提交于 
      There is a desire to split a task onto two engines and have them run at
the same time, e.g. scanline interleaving to spread the workload evenly.
Through the use of the out-fence from the first execbuf, we can
coordinate secondary execbuf to only become ready simultaneously with
the first, so that with all things idle the second execbufs are executed
in parallel with the first. The key difference here between the new
EXEC_FENCE_SUBMIT and the existing EXEC_FENCE_IN is that the in-fence
waits for the completion of the first request (so that all of its
rendering results are visible to the second execbuf, the more common
userspace fence requirement).

Since we only have a single input fence slot, userspace cannot mix an
in-fence and a submit-fence. It has to use one or the other! This is not
such a harsh requirement, since by virtue of the submit-fence, the
secondary execbuf inherit all of the dependencies from the first
request, and for the application the dependencies should be common
between the primary and secondary execbuf.
Suggested-by: NTvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Testcase: igt/gem_exec_fence/parallel
Link: https://github.com/intel/media-driver/pull/546Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NTvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190521211134.16117-10-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
      a88b6e4c
    • C
      drm/i915: Allow a context to define its set of engines · 976b55f0
      由 Chris Wilson 提交于 
      Over the last few years, we have debated how to extend the user API to
support an increase in the number of engines, that may be sparse and
even be heterogeneous within a class (not all video decoders created
equal). We settled on using (class, instance) tuples to identify a
specific engine, with an API for the user to construct a map of engines
to capabilities. Into this picture, we then add a challenge of virtual
engines; one user engine that maps behind the scenes to any number of
physical engines. To keep it general, we want the user to have full
control over that mapping. To that end, we allow the user to constrain a
context to define the set of engines that it can access, order fully
controlled by the user via (class, instance). With such precise control
in context setup, we can continue to use the existing execbuf uABI of
specifying a single index; only now it doesn't automagically map onto
the engines, it uses the user defined engine map from the context.

v2: Fixup freeing of local on success of get_engines()
v3: Allow empty engines[]
v4: s/nengine/num_engines/
v5: Replace 64 limit on num_engines with a note that execbuf is
currently limited to only using the first 64 engines.
v6: Actually use the engines_mutex to guard the ctx->engines.

Testcase: igt/gem_ctx_engines
Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NTvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190521211134.16117-2-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
      976b55f0
  43. 27 4月, 2019 2 次提交
  45. 25 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  47. 03 4月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      i915, uaccess: Fix redundant CLAC · 8f4faed0
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      New tooling noticed this:

 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x3c: redundant UACCESS disable
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0x66: redundant UACCESS disable

You don't need user_access_end() if user_access_begin() fails.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8f4faed0
  49. 22 3月, 2019 1 次提交
    • C
      drm/i915: Flush pages on acquisition · a679f58d
      由 Chris Wilson 提交于 
      When we return pages to the system, we ensure that they are marked as
being in the CPU domain since any external access is uncontrolled and we
must assume the worst. This means that we need to always flush the pages
on acquisition if we need to use them on the GPU, and from the beginning
have used set-domain. Set-domain is overkill for the purpose as it is a
general synchronisation barrier, but our intent is to only flush the
pages being swapped in. If we move that flush into the pages acquisition
phase, we know then that when we have obj->mm.pages, they are coherent
with the GPU and need only maintain that status without resorting to
heavy handed use of set-domain.

The principle knock-on effect for userspace is through mmap-gtt
pagefaulting. Our uAPI has always implied that the GTT mmap was async
(especially as when any pagefault occurs is unpredicatable to userspace)
and so userspace had to apply explicit domain control itself
(set-domain). However, swapping is transparent to the kernel, and so on
first fault we need to acquire the pages and make them coherent for
access through the GTT. Our use of set-domain here leaks into the uABI
that the first pagefault was synchronous. This is unintentional and
baring a few igt should be unoticed, nevertheless we bump the uABI
version for mmap-gtt to reflect the change in behaviour.

Another implication of the change is that gem_create() is presumed to
create an object that is coherent with the CPU and is in the CPU write
domain, so a set-domain(CPU) following a gem_create() would be a minor
operation that merely checked whether we could allocate all pages for
the object. On applying this change, a set-domain(CPU) causes a clflush
as we acquire the pages. This will have a small impact on mesa as we move
the clflush here on !llc from execbuf time to create, but that should
have minimal performance impact as the same clflush exists but is now
done early and because of the clflush issue, userspace recycles bo and
so should resist allocating fresh objects.

Internally, the presumption that objects are created in the CPU
write-domain and remain so through writes to obj->mm.mapping is more
prevalent than I expected; but easy enough to catch and apply a manual
flush.

For the future, we should push the page flush from the central
set_pages() into the callers so that we can more finely control when it
is applied, but for now doing it one location is easier to validate, at
the cost of sometimes flushing when there is no need.
Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Antonio Argenziano <antonio.argenziano@intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthew Auld <matthew.william.auld@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190321161908.8007-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
      a679f58d
  51. 08 3月, 2019 1 次提交
  53. 06 3月, 2019 1 次提交