Overlayfs is using clone_private_mount() to create internal mounts for
underlying layers.  These are used for operations requiring a path, such as
dentry_open().

Since these private mounts are not in any namespace they are treated as
short term, "detached" mounts and mntput() involves taking the global
mount_lock, which can result in serious cacheline pingpong.

Make these private mounts longterm instead, which trade the penalty on
mntput() for a slightly longer shutdown time due to an added RCU grace
period when putting these mounts.

Introduce a new helper kern_unmount_many() that can take care of multiple
longterm mounts with a single RCU grace period.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

This function acts as an out-of-line helper for is_local_mountpoint
is only called after the latter verifies the dentry is not a mountpoint.
There's no semantic changes and the resulting object code is smaller:

add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 0/-26 (-26)
Function                                     old     new   delta
__is_local_mountpoint                        147     121     -26
Total: Before=34161, After=34135, chg -0.08%
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If mounts are deleted after a read(2) call on /proc/self/mounts (or its
kin), the subsequent read(2) could miss a mount that comes after the
deleted one in the list.  This is because the file position is interpreted
as the number mount entries from the start of the list.

E.g. first read gets entries #0 to #9; the seq file index will be 10.  Then
entry #5 is deleted, resulting in #10 becoming #9 and #11 becoming #10,
etc...  The next read will continue from entry #10, and #9 is missed.

Solve this by adding a cursor entry for each open instance.  Taking the
global namespace_sem for write seems excessive, since we are only dealing
with a per-namespace list.  Instead add a per-namespace spinlock and use
that together with namespace_sem taken for read to protect against
concurrent modification of the mount list.  This may reduce parallelism of
is_local_mountpoint(), but it's hardly a big contention point.  We could
also use RCU freeing of cursors to make traversal not need additional
locks, if that turns out to be neceesary.

Only move the cursor once for each read (cursor is not added on open) to
minimize cacheline invalidation.  When EOF is reached, the cursor is taken
off the list, in order to prevent an excessive number of cursors due to
inactive open file descriptors.
Reported-by: NKarel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

For quite a while we have been thinking about using pidfds to attach to
namespaces. This patchset has existed for about a year already but we've
wanted to wait to see how the general api would be received and adopted.
Now that more and more programs in userspace have started using pidfds
for process management it's time to send this one out.

This patch makes it possible to use pidfds to attach to the namespaces
of another process, i.e. they can be passed as the first argument to the
setns() syscall. When only a single namespace type is specified the
semantics are equivalent to passing an nsfd. That means
setns(nsfd, CLONE_NEWNET) equals setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWNET). However,
when a pidfd is passed, multiple namespace flags can be specified in the
second setns() argument and setns() will attach the caller to all the
specified namespaces all at once or to none of them. Specifying 0 is not
valid together with a pidfd.

Here are just two obvious examples:
setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWNET);
setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWUSER);
Allowing to also attach subsets of namespaces supports various use-cases
where callers setns to a subset of namespaces to retain privilege, perform
an action and then re-attach another subset of namespaces.

If the need arises, as Eric suggested, we can extend this patchset to
assume even more context than just attaching all namespaces. His suggestion
specifically was about assuming the process' root directory when
setns(pidfd, 0) or setns(pidfd, SETNS_PIDFD) is specified. For now, just
keep it flexible in terms of supporting subsets of namespaces but let's
wait until we have users asking for even more context to be assumed. At
that point we can add an extension.

The obvious example where this is useful is a standard container
manager interacting with a running container: pushing and pulling files
or directories, injecting mounts, attaching/execing any kind of process,
managing network devices all these operations require attaching to all
or at least multiple namespaces at the same time. Given that nowadays
most containers are spawned with all namespaces enabled we're currently
looking at at least 14 syscalls, 7 to open the /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns>
nsfds, another 7 to actually perform the namespace switch. With time
namespaces we're looking at about 16 syscalls.
(We could amortize the first 7 or 8 syscalls for opening the nsfds by
 stashing them in each container's monitor process but that would mean
 we need to send around those file descriptors through unix sockets
 everytime we want to interact with the container or keep on-disk
 state. Even in scenarios where a caller wants to join a particular
 namespace in a particular order callers still profit from batching
 other namespaces. That mostly applies to the user namespace but
 all container runtimes I found join the user namespace first no matter
 if it privileges or deprivileges the container similar to how unshare
 behaves.)
With pidfds this becomes a single syscall no matter how many namespaces
are supposed to be attached to.

A decently designed, large-scale container manager usually isn't the
parent of any of the containers it spawns so the containers don't die
when it crashes or needs to update or reinitialize. This means that
for the manager to interact with containers through pids is inherently
racy especially on systems where the maximum pid number is not
significicantly bumped. This is even more problematic since we often spawn
and manage thousands or ten-thousands of containers. Interacting with a
container through a pid thus can become risky quite quickly. Especially
since we allow for an administrator to enable advanced features such as
syscall interception where we're performing syscalls in lieu of the
container. In all of those cases we use pidfds if they are available and
we pass them around as stable references. Using them to setns() to the
target process' namespaces is as reliable as using nsfds. Either the
target process is already dead and we get ESRCH or we manage to attach
to its namespaces but we can't accidently attach to another process'
namespaces. So pidfds lend themselves to be used with this api.
The other main advantage is that with this change the pidfd becomes the
only relevant token for most container interactions and it's the only
token we need to create and send around.

Apart from significiantly reducing the number of syscalls from double
digit to single digit which is a decent reason post-spectre/meltdown
this also allows to switch to a set of namespaces atomically, i.e.
either attaching to all the specified namespaces succeeds or we fail. If
we fail we haven't changed a single namespace. There are currently three
namespaces that can fail (other than for ENOMEM which really is not
very interesting since we then have other problems anyway) for
non-trivial reasons, user, mount, and pid namespaces. We can fail to
attach to a pid namespace if it is not our current active pid namespace
or a descendant of it. We can fail to attach to a user namespace because
we are multi-threaded or because our current mount namespace shares
filesystem state with other tasks, or because we're trying to setns()
to the same user namespace, i.e. the target task has the same user
namespace as we do. We can fail to attach to a mount namespace because
it shares filesystem state with other tasks or because we fail to lookup
the new root for the new mount namespace. In most non-pathological
scenarios these issues can be somewhat mitigated. But there are cases where
we're half-attached to some namespace and failing to attach to another one.
I've talked about some of these problem during the hallway track (something
only the pre-COVID-19 generation will remember) of Plumbers in Los Angeles
in 2018(?). Even if all these issues could be avoided with super careful
userspace coding it would be nicer to have this done in-kernel. Pidfds seem
to lend themselves nicely for this.

The other neat thing about this is that setns() becomes an actual
counterpart to the namespace bits of unshare().
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com

Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new
set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we
will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns
logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings
setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is
responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons.
First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all
install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized
independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code
easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed.

The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument
in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer
argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly
opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself
already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it
can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this
should have functional consequences.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com

Some filesystem references got broken by a previous patch
series I submitted. Address those.
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # fs/affs/Kconfig
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/57318c53008dbda7f6f4a5a9e5787f4d37e8565a.1586881715.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

New LOOKUP flag, telling path_lookupat() to act as path_mountpointat().
IOW, traverse mounts at the final point and skip revalidation of the
location where it ends up.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

1) no instances of ->d_automount() have ever made use of the "return
ERR_PTR(-EISDIR) if you don't feel like mounting anything" - that's
a rudiment of plans that got superseded before the thing went into
the tree.  Despite the comment in follow_automount(), autofs has
never done that.

2) if there's no ->d_automount() in dentry_operations, filesystems
should not set DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT in the first place.  None have
ever done so...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Protection against automount/automount races (two threads hitting the same
referral point at the same time) is based upon do_add_mount() prevention of
identical overmounts - trying to overmount the root of mounted tree with
the same tree fails with -EBUSY.  It's unreliable (the other thread might've
mounted something on top of the automount it has triggered) *and* causes
no end of headache for follow_automount() and its caller, since
finish_automount() behaves like do_new_mount() - if the mountpoint to be is
overmounted, it mounts on top what's overmounting it.  It's not only wrong
(we want to go into what's overmounting the automount point and quietly
discard what we planned to mount there), it introduces the possibility of
original parent mount getting dropped.  That's what 8aef1884 (VFS: Fix
vfsmount overput on simultaneous automount) deals with, but it can't do
anything about the reliability of conflict detection - if something had
been overmounted the other thread's automount (e.g. that other thread
having stepped into automount in mount(2)), we don't get that -EBUSY and
the result is
	 referral point under automounted NFS under explicit overmount
under another copy of automounted NFS

What we need is finish_automount() *NOT* digging into overmounts - if it
finds one, it should just quietly discard the thing it was asked to mount.
And don't bother with actually crossing into the results of finish_automount() -
the same loop that calls follow_automount() will do that just fine on the
next iteration.

IOW, instead of calling lock_mount() have finish_automount() do it manually,
_without_ the "move into overmount and retry" part.  And leave crossing into
the results to the caller of follow_automount(), which simplifies it a lot.

Moral: if you end up with a lot of glue working around the calling conventions
of something, perhaps these calling conventions are simply wrong...

Fixes: 8aef1884 (VFS: Fix vfsmount overput on simultaneous automount)
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

preparation to finish_automount() fix (next commit)
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

don't bother with the byte-by-byte loops, etc.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Make to_mnt_ns() static to address the following 'sparse' warning:

    fs/namespace.c:1731:22: warning: symbol 'to_mnt_ns' was not declared. Should it be static?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234830.156260-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In prepare_namespace(), do_mount() can be used instead of ksys_mount()
as the first and third argument are const strings in the kernel, the
second and fourth argument are passed through anyway, and the fifth
argument is NULL.

In do_mount_root(), ksys_mount() is called with the first and third
argument being already kernelspace strings, which do not need to be
copied over from userspace to kernelspace (again). The second and
fourth arguments are passed through to do_mount() anyway. The fifth
argument, while already residing in kernelspace, needs to be put into
a page of its own. Then, do_mount() can be used instead of
ksys_mount().

Once this is done, there are no in-kernel users to ksys_mount() left,
which can therefore be removed.
Signed-off-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>

Thw open_tree and move_mount syscalls take names from the
user, so add the __user to these to ensure the following
warnings from sparse are fixed:

fs/namespace.c:2392:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
fs/namespace.c:2392:35:    expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
fs/namespace.c:2392:35:    got char const *filename
fs/namespace.c:3541:38: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
fs/namespace.c:3541:38:    expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
fs/namespace.c:3541:38:    got char const *from_pathname
fs/namespace.c:3550:36: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
fs/namespace.c:3550:36:    expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
fs/namespace.c:3550:36:    got char const *to_pathname
Signed-off-by: NBen Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

After do_add_mount() returns success, the caller doesn't hold a
reference to the 'struct mount' anymore.  So it's invalid to access it
in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry().

Fix it by calling mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry() before do_add_mount()
rather than after, and adjusting the warning message accordingly.

Reported-by: syzbot+da4f525235510683d855@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f8b92ba6 ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry")
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass
tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than
0x00) as syscall arguments.

In copy_mount_options a user address is being subtracted from TASK_SIZE.
If the address is lower than TASK_SIZE, the size is calculated to not
allow the exact_copy_from_user() call to cross TASK_SIZE boundary.
However if the address is tagged, then the size will be calculated
incorrectly.

Untag the address before subtracting.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1de225e4a54204bfd7f25dac2635e31aa4aa1d90.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKhalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The unused vfs code can be removed.  Don't pass empty subtype (same as if
->parse callback isn't called).

The bits that are left involve determining whether it's permitted to split the
filesystem type string passed in to mount(2).  Consequently, this means that we
cannot get rid of the FS_HAS_SUBTYPE flag unless we define that a type string
with a dot in it always indicates a subtype specification.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

old wrappers with few callers remaining; put them out of their misery...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The warning reuses the uptime max of 30 years used by
settimeofday().

Note that the warning is only emitted for writable filesystem mounts
through the mount syscall. Automounts do not have the same warning.

Print out the warning in human readable format using the struct tm.
After discussion with Arnd Bergmann, we chose to print only the year number.
The raw s_time_max is also displayed, and the user can easily decode
it e.g. "date -u -d @$((0x7fffffff))". We did not want to consolidate
struct rtc_tm and struct tm just to print the date using a format specifier
as part of this series.
Given that the rtc_tm is not compiled on all architectures, this is not a
trivial patch. This can be added in the future.
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

Since 9e8925b6 ("locks: Allow disabling mandatory locking at compile
time"), attempts to mount filesystems with "-o mand" will fail.
Unfortunately, there is no other indiciation of the reason for the
failure.

Change how the function is defined for better readability. When
CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING is disabled, printk a warning when
someone attempts to mount with -o mand.

Also, add a blurb to the mandatory-locking.txt file to explain about
the "mand" option, and the behavior one should expect when it is
disabled.
Reported-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

	We need to drop everything we remove from the tree, whether
mnt_has_parent() is true or not.  Usually the bug manifests as a slow
memory leak (leaked struct mount for initramfs); it becomes much more
visible in mount_subtree() users, such as btrfs.  There we leak
a struct mount for btrfs superblock being mounted, which prevents
fs shutdown on subsequent umount.

Fixes: 56cbb429 ("switch the remnants of releasing the mountpoint away from fs_pin")
Reported-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

user_path_mountpoint_at() always gets it and the reasons to have it
there (i.e. in umount(2)) apply to kern_path_mountpoint() callers
as well.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We used to need rather convoluted ordering trickery to guarantee
that dput() of ex-mountpoints happens before the final mntput()
of the same.  Since we don't need that anymore, there's no point
playing with fs_pin for that.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Lift getting the original mount (dentry is actually not needed at all)
of the mountpoint into the callers - to do_move_mount() and pivot_root()
level.  That simplifies the cleanup in those and allows to get saner
arguments for attach_mnt_recursive().
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Using dput_to_list() to shift the contributing reference from ->mnt_mountpoint
to ->mnt_mp->m_dentry.  Dentries are dropped (with dput_to_list()) as soon
as struct mountpoint is destroyed; in cases where we are under namespace_sem
we use the global list, shrinking it in namespace_unlock().  In case of
detaching stuck MNT_LOCKed children at final mntput_no_expire() we use a local
list and shrink it ourselves.  ->mnt_ex_mountpoint crap is gone.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

No point having two call sites (earlier in init_rootfs() from
mnt_init() in case we are going to use shmem-style rootfs,
later from do_basic_setup() unconditionally), along with the
logics in shmem_init() itself to make the second call a no-op...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

init_mount_tree() can get to rootfs_fs_type directly and that simplifies
a lot of things.  We don't need to register it, we don't need to look
it up *and* we don't need to bother with preventing subsequent userland
mounts.  That's the way we should've done that from the very beginning.

There is a user-visible change, namely the disappearance of "rootfs"
from /proc/filesystems.  Note that it's been unmountable all along
and it didn't show up in /proc/mounts; however, it *is* a user-visible
change and theoretically some script might've been using its presence
in /proc/filesystems to tell 2.4.11+ from earlier kernels.

*IF* any complaints about behaviour change do show up, we could fake
it in /proc/filesystems.  I very much doubt we'll have to, though.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

make unhash_mnt() return the mountpoint to be dropped, let callers
deal with it.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... not since 1e9c75fb ("mnt: fix __detach_mounts infinite loop")
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

sys_move_mount() crashes by dereferencing the pointer MNT_NS_INTERNAL,
a.k.a. ERR_PTR(-EINVAL), if the old mount is specified by fd for a
kernel object with an internal mount, such as a pipe or memfd.

Fix it by checking for this case and returning -EINVAL.

[AV: what we want is is_mounted(); use that instead of making the
condition even more convoluted]

Reproducer:

    #include <unistd.h>

    #define __NR_move_mount         429
    #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004

    int main()
    {
    	int fds[2];

    	pipe(fds);
        syscall(__NR_move_mount, fds[0], "", -1, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+6004acbaa1893ad013f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2db154b3 ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

When propagating mounts across mount namespaces owned by different user
namespaces it is not possible anymore to move or umount the mount in the
less privileged mount namespace.

Here is a reproducer:

  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt
  sudo --make-rshared /mnt

  # create unprivileged user + mount namespace and preserve propagation
  unshare -U -m --map-root --propagation=unchanged

  # now change back to the original mount namespace in another terminal:
  sudo mkdir /mnt/aaa
  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt/aaa

  # now in the unprivileged user + mount namespace
  mount --move /mnt/aaa /opt

Unfortunately, this is a pretty big deal for userspace since this is
e.g. used to inject mounts into running unprivileged containers.
So this regression really needs to go away rather quickly.

The problem is that a recent change falsely locked the root of the newly
added mounts by setting MNT_LOCKED. Fix this by only locking the mounts
on copy_mnt_ns() and not when adding a new mount.

Fixes: 3bd045cc ("separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies")
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: NChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: NChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

sys_fsmount() needs to take a reference to the new mount when adding it
to the anonymous mount namespace.  Otherwise the filesystem can be
unmounted while it's still in use, as found by syzkaller.
Reported-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+99de05d099a170867f22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+7008b8b8ba7df475fdc8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 93766fbd ("vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock")
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  released under gpl v2

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 15 file(s).
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NSteve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAllison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: NAlexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171438.895196075@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Call graph of vfs_get_tree():
	vfs_fsconfig_locked()	# neither kernmount, nor submount
	do_new_mount()		# neither kernmount, nor submount
	fc_mount()
		afs_mntpt_do_automount()	# submount
		mount_one_hugetlbfs()		# kernmount
		pid_ns_prepare_proc()		# kernmount
		mq_create_mount()		# kernmount
		vfs_kern_mount()
			simple_pin_fs()		# kernmount
			vfs_submount()		# submount
			kern_mount()		# kernmount
			init_mount_tree()
			btrfs_mount()
			nfs_do_root_mount()

	The first two need the check (unconditionally).
init_mount_tree() is setting rootfs up; any capability
checks make zero sense for that one.  And btrfs_mount()/
nfs_do_root_mount() have the checks already done in their
callers.

	IOW, we can shift mount_capable() handling into
the two callers - one in the normal case of mount(2),
another - in fsconfig(2) handling of FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE.
I.e. the syscalls that set a new filesystem up.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

What triggers it is a race between mount --move and umount -l
of the source; we should reject it (the source is parentless *and*
not the root of anon namespace at that), but the check for namespace
being an anon one is broken in that case - is_anon_ns() needs
ns to be non-NULL.  Better fixed here than in is_anon_ns(), since
the rest of the callers is guaranteed to get a non-NULL argument...

Reported-by: syzbot+494c7ddf66acac0ad747@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Provide a system call by which a filesystem opened with fsopen() and
configured by a series of fsconfig() calls can have a detached mount object
created for it.  This mount object can then be attached to the VFS mount
hierarchy using move_mount() by passing the returned file descriptor as the
from directory fd.

The system call looks like:

	int mfd = fsmount(int fsfd, unsigned int flags,
			  unsigned int attr_flags);

where fsfd is the file descriptor returned by fsopen().  flags can be 0 or
FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC.  attr_flags is a bitwise-OR of the following flags:

	MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY	Mount read-only
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID	Ignore suid and sgid bits
	MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV	Disallow access to device special files
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC	Disallow program execution
	MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME	Setting on how atime should be updated
	MOUNT_ATTR_RELATIME	- Update atime relative to mtime/ctime
	MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME	- Do not update access times
	MOUNT_ATTR_STRICTATIME	- Always perform atime updates
	MOUNT_ATTR_NODIRATIME	Do not update directory access times

In the event that fsmount() fails, it may be possible to get an error
message by calling read() on fsfd.  If no message is available, ENODATA
will be reported.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Allow a detached tree created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE) to be
attached by move_mount(2).

If by the time of final fput() of OPEN_TREE_CLONE-opened file its tree is
not detached anymore, it won't be dissolved.  move_mount(2) is adjusted
to handle detached source.

That gives us equivalents of mount --bind and mount --rbind.

Thanks also to Alan Jenkins <alan.christopher.jenkins@gmail.com> for
providing a whole bunch of ways to break things using this interface.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to
another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree.

The new system call looks like the following:

	int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path,
		       int to_dfd, const char *to_path,
		       unsigned int flags);
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

open_tree(dfd, pathname, flags)

Returns an O_PATH-opened file descriptor or an error.
dfd and pathname specify the location to open, in usual
fashion (see e.g. fstatat(2)).  flags should be an OR of
some of the following:
	* AT_PATH_EMPTY, AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW -
same meanings as usual
	* OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC - make the resulting descriptor
close-on-exec
	* OPEN_TREE_CLONE or OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE -
instead of opening the location in question, create a detached
mount tree matching the subtree rooted at location specified by
dfd/pathname.  With AT_RECURSIVE the entire subtree is cloned,
without it - only the part within in the mount containing the
location in question.  In other words, the same as mount --rbind
or mount --bind would've taken.  The detached tree will be
dissolved on the final close of obtained file.  Creation of such
detached trees requires the same capabilities as doing mount --bind.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>