mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit 9a3ecd5e
category: feature
feature: KVM Bus Lock Debug Exception
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/intel-kernel/issues/I5RHW7
CVE: N/A
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
commit/?id=9a3ecd5e

Intel-SIG: commit 9a3ecd5e ("KVM: X86: Rename DR6_INIT to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW")

-------------------------------------

KVM: X86: Rename DR6_INIT to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW

DR6_INIT contains the 1-reserved bits as well as the bit that is cleared
to 0 when the condition (e.g. RTM) happens. The value can be used to
initialize dr6 and also be the XOR mask between the #DB exit
qualification (or payload) and DR6.

Concerning that DR6_INIT is used as initial value only once, rename it
to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and apply it in other places, which would make the
incoming changes for bus lock debug exception more simple.
Signed-off-by: NChenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210202090433.13441-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
[Define DR6_FIXED_1 from DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and DR6_VOLATILE. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAichun Shi <aichun.shi@intel.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.11-rc1
commit 8cce12b3
category: feature
feature: KVM bus lock debug exception
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/intel-kernel/issues/I5RHW7
CVE: N/A
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
commit/?id=8cce12b3

Intel-SIG: commit 8cce12b3 ("KVM: nSVM: set fixed bits by hand")

-------------------------------------

KVM: nSVM: set fixed bits by hand

SVM generally ignores fixed-1 bits.  Set them manually so that we
do not end up by mistake without those bits set in struct kvm_vcpu;
it is part of userspace API that KVM always returns value with the
bits set.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAichun Shi <aichun.shi@intel.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.18-rc1
commit 4a204f78
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5NGRU
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Expand KVM's mask for the AVIC host physical ID to the full 12 bits defined
by the architecture.  The number of bits consumed by hardware is model
specific, e.g. early CPUs ignored bits 11:8, but there is no way for KVM
to enumerate the "true" size.  So, KVM must allow using all bits, else it
risks rejecting completely legal x2APIC IDs on newer CPUs.

This means KVM relies on hardware to not assign x2APIC IDs that exceed the
"true" width of the field, but presumably hardware is smart enough to tie
the width to the max x2APIC ID.  KVM also relies on hardware to support at
least 8 bits, as the legacy xAPIC ID is writable by software.  But, those
assumptions are unavoidable due to the lack of any way to enumerate the
"true" width.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: 44a95dae ("KVM: x86: Detect and Initialize AVIC support")
Signed-off-by: NSuravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220211000851.185799-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17
commit 39150352
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5NGRU
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

asm/svm.h is the correct place for all values that are defined in
the SVM spec, and that includes AVIC.

Also add some values from the spec that were not defined before
and will be soon useful.
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220207155447.840194-10-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.15
commit 43e540cc
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5NGRU
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

When the 5-level page table is enabled on host OS, the nested page table
for guest VMs must use 5-level as well. Update get_npt_level() function
to reflect this requirement. In the meanwhile, remove the code that
prevents kvm-amd driver from being loaded when 5-level page table is
detected.
Signed-off-by: NWei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210818165549.3771014-4-wei.huang2@amd.com>
[Tweak condition as suggested by Sean. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.13
commit 03ca4589
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5NGRU
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Disallow loading KVM SVM if 5-level paging is supported.  In theory, NPT
for L1 should simply work, but there unknowns with respect to how the
guest's MAXPHYADDR will be handled by hardware.

Nested NPT is more problematic, as running an L1 VMM that is using
2-level page tables requires stacking single-entry PDP and PML4 tables in
KVM's NPT for L2, as there are no equivalent entries in L1's NPT to
shadow.  Barring hardware magic, for 5-level paging, KVM would need stack
another layer to handle PML5.

Opportunistically rename the lm_root pointer, which is used for the
aforementioned stacking when shadowing 2-level L1 NPT, to pml4_root to
call out that it's specifically for PML4.
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210505204221.1934471-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.124
commit 401bef1f95de92c3a8c6eece46e02fa88d7285ee
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5L6E7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=401bef1f95de92c3a8c6eece46e02fa88d7285ee

--------------------------------

commit d22d2474 upstream.

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe
less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data
that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory
that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data.
Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these
sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.
Reported-by: NAndy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eaf78265 ("KVM: SVM: Move SEV code to separate file")
Fixes: 2c07ded0 ("KVM: SVM: add support for SEV attestation command")
Fixes: 4cfdd47d ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command")
Fixes: d3d1af85 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command")
Fixes: eba04b20 ("KVM: x86: Account a variety of miscellaneous allocations")
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220516154310.3685678-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NSudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.124
commit d6be031a2f5e27f27f3648bac98d2a35874eaddc
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5L6E7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=d6be031a2f5e27f27f3648bac98d2a35874eaddc

--------------------------------

commit eba04b20 upstream.

Switch to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for a handful of allocations that are
clearly associated with a single task/VM.

Note, there are a several SEV allocations that aren't accounted, but
those can (hopefully) be fixed by using the local stack for memory.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210331023025.2485960-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NSudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.18
commit 75189d1d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5RD6Y
CVE: NA

-------------

NMI-watchdog is one of the favorite features of kernel developers,
but it does not work in AMD guest even with vPMU enabled and worse,
the system misrepresents this capability via /proc.

This is a PMC emulation error. KVM does not pass the latest valid
value to perf_event in time when guest NMI-watchdog is running, thus
the perf_event corresponding to the watchdog counter will enter the
old state at some point after the first guest NMI injection, forcing
the hardware register PMC0 to be constantly written to 0x800000000001.

Meanwhile, the running counter should accurately reflect its new value
based on the latest coordinated pmc->counter (from vPMC's point of view)
rather than the value written directly by the guest.

Fixes: 168d918f ("KVM: x86: Adjust counter sample period after a wrmsr")
Reported-by: NDongli Cao <caodongli@kingsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: NYanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Tested-by: NYanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220409015226.38619-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKeqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit df748593c55389892902aecb8691080ad5e8cff5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS
CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=df748593c55389892902aecb8691080ad5e8cff5

--------------------------------

commit a149180f upstream.

Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the
Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps.

ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a
little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't
have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the
start (+0x3f).

Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one
(+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the
IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works.

  [ Alexandre: SVM part. ]
  [ bp: Build fix, massages. ]
Suggested-by: NAndrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflicts at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: there is no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
[cascardo: objtool commit 34c861e8 missing]
[cascardo: conflict fixup]
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: SEV-ES is not supported, so drop the change
 in arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S]
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

conflict:
	arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Signed-off-by: NLin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit 3c91e2257622c169bf74d587e48b96923285ed74
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS
CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3c91e2257622c169bf74d587e48b96923285ed74

--------------------------------

commit f94909ce upstream.

Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making
RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without
RET defined.

  find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file
  do
	sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file
  done
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: ran the above command]
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

conflict:
	arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S
Signed-off-by: NLin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.19-rc2
commit 6cd88243
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PJ7H
CVE: CVE-2022-39189

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6cd88243c7e03845a450795e134b488fc2afb736

----------------------------------------

If a vCPU is outside guest mode and is scheduled out, it might be in the
process of making a memory access.  A problem occurs if another vCPU uses
the PV TLB flush feature during the period when the vCPU is scheduled
out, and a virtual address has already been translated but has not yet
been accessed, because this is equivalent to using a stale TLB entry.

To avoid this, only report a vCPU as preempted if sure that the guest
is at an instruction boundary.  A rescheduling request will be delivered
to the host physical CPU as an external interrupt, so for simplicity
consider any vmexit *not* instruction boundary except for external
interrupts.

It would in principle be okay to report the vCPU as preempted also
if it is sleeping in kvm_vcpu_block(): a TLB flush IPI will incur the
vmentry/vmexit overhead unnecessarily, and optimistic spinning is
also unlikely to succeed.  However, leave it for later because right
now kvm_vcpu_check_block() is doing memory accesses.  Even
though the TLB flush issue only applies to virtual memory address,
it's very much preferrable to be conservative.
Reported-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

conflict:
	arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
Signed-off-by: NGuo Mengqi <guomengqi3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.115
commit fbb7c61e76017202dedd2020f4d51264f500de68
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5IZ9C

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fbb7c61e76017202dedd2020f4d51264f500de68

--------------------------------

commit 5eb84932 upstream.

Zen renumbered some of the performance counters that correspond to the
well known events in perf_hw_id. This code in KVM was never updated for
that, so guest that attempt to use counters on Zen that correspond to the
pre-Zen perf_hw_id values will silently receive the wrong values.

This has been observed in the wild with rr[0] when running in Zen 3
guests. rr uses the retired conditional branch counter 00d1 which is
incorrectly recognized by KVM as PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND.

[0] https://rr-project.org/Signed-off-by: NKyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Message-Id: <20220503050136.86298-1-khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Check guest family, not host. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.111
commit 66b0fa6b22187caf4d789bdac8dcca49940628b0
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5GL1Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=66b0fa6b22187caf4d789bdac8dcca49940628b0

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 9b026073 ]

AMD EPYC CPUs never raise a #GP for a WRMSR to a PerfEvtSeln MSR. Some
reserved bits are cleared, and some are not. Specifically, on
Zen3/Milan, bits 19 and 42 are not cleared.

When emulating such a WRMSR, KVM should not synthesize a #GP,
regardless of which bits are set. However, undocumented bits should
not be passed through to the hardware MSR. So, rather than checking
for reserved bits and synthesizing a #GP, just clear the reserved
bits.

This may seem pedantic, but since KVM currently does not support the
"Host/Guest Only" bits (41:40), it is necessary to clear these bits
rather than synthesizing #GP, because some popular guests (e.g Linux)
will set the "Host Only" bit even on CPUs that don't support
EFER.SVME, and they don't expect a #GP.

For example,

root@Ubuntu1804:~# perf stat -e r26 -a sleep 1

 Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

                 0      r26

       1.001070977 seconds time elapsed

Feb 23 03:59:58 Ubuntu1804 kernel: [  405.379957] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010200 (tried to write 0x0000020000130026) at rIP: 0xffffffff9b276a28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
Feb 23 03:59:58 Ubuntu1804 kernel: [  405.379958] Call Trace:
Feb 23 03:59:58 Ubuntu1804 kernel: [  405.379963]  amd_pmu_disable_event+0x27/0x90

Fixes: ca724305 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM")
Reported-by: NLotus Fenn <lotusf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Dunn <daviddunn@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220226234131.2167175-1-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.110
commit 0fb470eb48892e131d10aa3be6915239e65758f3
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I574AL

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0fb470eb48892e131d10aa3be6915239e65758f3

--------------------------------

commit a80ced6e upstream.

As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger
crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds:

crash> bt
PID: 22218  TASK: ffff951a6ad74980  CPU: 73  COMMAND: "vcpu8"
 #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397
 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d
 #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d
 #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d
 #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9
 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51
 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace
    [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227]
    RIP: ffffffffc0761b53  RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08  RFLAGS: 00010086
    RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78  RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0  RSI: 000000000000019a  RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8
    RBP: 000000000000019a   R8: 0000000000000040   R9: ffff94ca41b82200
    R10: ffffffffffffffcf  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000001
    R13: 0000000000000001  R14: ffffffffffffffcf  R15: 000000000000005f
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm]
 #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm]
 #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm]
    RIP: 00007f143c36488b  RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 00007f05780041d0  RCX: 00007f143c36488b
    RDX: 00007f05780041d0  RSI: 000000004008ae6a  RDI: 0000000000000020
    RBP: 00000000000004e8   R8: 0000000000000008   R9: 00007f05780041e0
    R10: 00007f0578004560  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 00000000000004e0
    R13: 000000000000001a  R14: 00007f1424001c60  R15: 00007f0578003bc0
    ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b0677 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on
out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix
this.
Co-developed-by: NYi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NYi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NYi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Message-Id: <20220309113025.44469-1-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.18-rc4
commit 683412cc
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I58DFI
CVE: CVE-2022-0171

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b

--------------------------------

Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots).  Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.

Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.

KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.

Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: NSean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: NMingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

conflicts:
    arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
    arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
    virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 99cd2a043760e4fcf06fe3c67e9885a2d64c986d
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=99cd2a043760e4fcf06fe3c67e9885a2d64c986d

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 7c174f30 ]

The find_arch_event() returns a "unsigned int" value,
which is used by the pmc_reprogram_counter() to
program a PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE type perf_event.

The returned value is actually the kernel defined generic
perf_hw_id, let's rename it to pmc_perf_hw_id() with simpler
incoming parameters for better self-explanation.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20211130074221.93635-3-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 9dcedbe943be8c93722c1ed68b59001b28b0d889
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9dcedbe943be8c93722c1ed68b59001b28b0d889

--------------------------------

commit 55467fcd upstream.

Always signal that emulation is possible for !SEV guests regardless of
whether or not the CPU provided a valid instruction byte stream.  KVM can
read all guest state (memory and registers) for !SEV guests, i.e. can
fetch the code stream from memory even if the CPU failed to do so because
of the SMAP errata.

Fixes: 05d5a486 ("KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[jwang: adjust context for kernel 5.10.101]
Signed-off-by: NJack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit fe383750d40d43d74ffc63f2d695c6f7b9901ff3
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fe383750d40d43d74ffc63f2d695c6f7b9901ff3

--------------------------------

commit dd4589ee upstream.

Remove a WARN on an "AVIC IPI invalid target" exit, the WARN is trivial
to trigger from guest as it will fail on any destination APIC ID that
doesn't exist from the guest's perspective.

Don't bother recording anything in the kernel log, the common tracepoint
for kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi() is sufficient for debugging.

This reverts commit 37ef0c44.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220204214205.3306634-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit bd39fe29bbbba8ad84605f6ded5c570b24f6cf8b
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bd39fe29bbbba8ad84605f6ded5c570b24f6cf8b

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit cdf85e0c ]

Inject a #GP instead of synthesizing triple fault to try to avoid killing
the guest if emulation of an SEV guest fails due to encountering the SMAP
erratum.  The injected #GP may still be fatal to the guest, e.g. if the
userspace process is providing critical functionality, but KVM should
make every attempt to keep the guest alive.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.97
commit 080dbe7e9b86a0392d8dffc00d9971792afc121f
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O0O

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=080dbe7e9b86a0392d8dffc00d9971792afc121f

--------------------------------

commit f7e57078 upstream.

Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS.  If userspace
forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.

Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.

Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
in an architecturally impossible state.

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
   kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
   kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
   kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
   kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
   kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
   __fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
   task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
   exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
   do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
   do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
   get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
   arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
   handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
   do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
   </TASK>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+8112db3ab20e70d50c31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125220358.2091737-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Backported-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.96
commit a2c8e1d9e41b7d916257653d3bbe36418c4e7b88
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55NWB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a2c8e1d9e41b7d916257653d3bbe36418c4e7b88

--------------------------------

commit 31c25585 upstream.

Revert a completely broken check on an "invalid" RIP in SVM's workaround
for the DecodeAssists SMAP errata.  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot() obviously
expects a gfn, i.e. operates in the guest physical address space, whereas
RIP is a virtual (not even linear) address.  The "fix" worked for the
problematic KVM selftest because the test identity mapped RIP.

Fully revert the hack instead of trying to translate RIP to a GPA, as the
non-SEV case is now handled earlier, and KVM cannot access guest page
tables to translate RIP.

This reverts commit e72436bc.

Fixes: e72436bc ("KVM: SVM: avoid infinite loop on NPF from bad address")
Reported-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.84
commit 60ce9a754060c6a5833926d28319759d47c16720
bugzilla: 186030 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4QV2F

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=60ce9a754060c6a5833926d28319759d47c16720

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit cb1d220d ]

If we run the following perf command in an AMD Milan guest:

  perf stat \
  -e cpu/event=0x1d0/ \
  -e cpu/event=0x1c7/ \
  -e cpu/umask=0x1f,event=0x18e/ \
  -e cpu/umask=0x7,event=0x18e/ \
  -e cpu/umask=0x18,event=0x18e/ \
  ./workload

dmesg will report a #GP warning from an unchecked MSR access
error on MSR_F15H_PERF_CTLx.

This is because according to APM (Revision: 4.03) Figure 13-7,
the bits [35:32] of AMD PerfEvtSeln register is a part of the
event select encoding, which extends the EVENT_SELECT field
from 8 bits to 12 bits.

Opportunistically update pmu->reserved_bits for reserved bit 19.
Reported-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Fixes: ca724305 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM")
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20211118130320.95997-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.72
commit b56475c29bd82589c5cab0c349476206ae7a2e40
bugzilla: 182982 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4I3L1

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b56475c29bd82589c5cab0c349476206ae7a2e40

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit aee77e11 ]

In svm_clear_vintr we try to restore the virtual interrupt
injection that might be pending, but we fail to restore
the interrupt vector.
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.71
commit 4ed671e6bc62325729311dbc75c6db52d10233a7
bugzilla: 182981 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4I3KD

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=4ed671e6bc62325729311dbc75c6db52d10233a7

--------------------------------

commit faf6b755 upstream.

These field correspond to features that we don't expose yet to L2

While currently there are no CVE worthy features in this field,
if AMD adds more features to this field, that could allow guest
escapes similar to CVE-2021-3653 and CVE-2021-3656.
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.60
commit 3dc5666baf2a135f250e4101d41d5959ac2c2e1f
bugzilla: 177018 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EAUG

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3dc5666baf2a135f250e4101d41d5959ac2c2e1f

--------------------------------

commit c7dfa400 upstream.

If L1 disables VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts, and doesn't enable
Virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE (currently not supported for the nested hypervisor),
then VMLOAD/VMSAVE must operate on the L1 physical memory, which is only
possible by making L0 intercept these instructions.

Failure to do so allowed the nested guest to run VMLOAD/VMSAVE unintercepted,
and thus read/write portions of the host physical memory.

Fixes: 89c8a498 ("KVM: SVM: Enable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature")
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.60
commit c0883f693187c646c0972d73e525523f9486c2e3
bugzilla: 177018 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EAUG

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c0883f693187c646c0972d73e525523f9486c2e3

--------------------------------

commit 0f923e07 upstream.

* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
  nested_vmcb02_prepare_control

* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr

This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.

Fixes: 3d6368ef ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.59
commit 9f105d2d4f6c60f92b0a0b5346a19b157d8d7e25
bugzilla: 176988 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EAR4

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9f105d2d4f6c60f92b0a0b5346a19b157d8d7e25

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 179c6c27 ]

Use the raw ASID, not ASID-1, when nullifying the last used VMCB when
freeing an SEV ASID.  The consumer, pre_sev_run(), indexes the array by
the raw ASID, thus KVM could get a false negative when checking for a
different VMCB if KVM manages to reallocate the same ASID+VMCB combo for
a new VM.

Note, this cannot cause a functional issue _in the current code_, as
pre_sev_run() also checks which pCPU last did VMRUN for the vCPU, and
last_vmentry_cpu is initialized to -1 during vCPU creation, i.e. is
guaranteed to mismatch on the first VMRUN.  However, prior to commit
8a14fe4f ("kvm: x86: Move last_cpu into kvm_vcpu_arch as
last_vmentry_cpu"), SVM tracked pCPU on its own and zero-initialized the
last_cpu variable.  Thus it's theoretically possible that older versions
of KVM could miss a TLB flush if the first VMRUN is on pCPU0 and the ASID
and VMCB exactly match those of a prior VM.

Fixes: 70cd94e6 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.52
commit bedc5d091138f5ee79aebad252a95ad37017039b
bugzilla: 175542 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DTKU

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bedc5d091138f5ee79aebad252a95ad37017039b

--------------------------------

commit fce7e152 upstream.

APM states that #GP is raised upon write to MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA when
the supplied address is not page-aligned or is outside of "maximum
supported physical address for this implementation".
page_address_valid() check seems suitable. Also, forcefully page-align
the address when it's written from VMM.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210628104425.391276-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[Add comment about behavior for host-provided values. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.47
commit 7570a8b5dd493eebda5c0c826f3a87e2e6117791
bugzilla: 172973 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DAKB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7570a8b5dd493eebda5c0c826f3a87e2e6117791

--------------------------------

commit 934002cd upstream.

Send SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION command to PSP firmware if ASID binding
fails. If a failure happens after  a successful LAUNCH_START command,
a decommission command should be executed. Otherwise, guest context
will be unfreed inside the AMD SP. After the firmware will not have
memory to allocate more SEV guest context, LAUNCH_START command will
begin to fail with SEV_RET_RESOURCE_LIMIT error.

The existing code calls decommission inside sev_unbind_asid, but it is
not called if a failure happens before guest activation succeeds. If
sev_bind_asid fails, decommission is never called. PSP firmware has a
limit for the number of guests. If sev_asid_binding fails many times,
PSP firmware will not have resources to create another guest context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 59414c98 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command")
Reported-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlper Gun <alpergun@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210610174604.2554090-1-alpergun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.43
commit b3ee3f50ab1bf7b60ba4a8346dca05ba3412fead
bugzilla: 109284
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 0884335a upstream.

Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode.  The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:

  In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
  for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
  bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.

Fixes: 7ff76d58 ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797a ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.41
commit 514883ebac77ff9939da92e268b24a71c9fe4e05
bugzilla: 51890
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 16045714 upstream.

Defer the call to account guest time until after servicing any IRQ(s)
that happened in the guest or immediately after VM-Exit.  Tick-based
accounting of vCPU time relies on PF_VCPU being set when the tick IRQ
handler runs, and IRQs are blocked throughout the main sequence of
vcpu_enter_guest(), including the call into vendor code to actually
enter and exit the guest.

This fixes a bug where reported guest time remains '0', even when
running an infinite loop in the guest:

  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209831

Fixes: 87fa7f3e ("x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs")
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210505002735.1684165-4-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.37
commit 6748f80aeaf37ad921a6ba1b83ef6018c430ddef
bugzilla: 51868
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 6f2b296a upstream.

Inject #GP on guest accesses to MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP is unsupported in
the guest's CPUID model.

Fixes: 46896c73 ("KVM: svm: add support for RDTSCP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210423223404.3860547-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.37
commit 6ccdbedd167c624697790c1c1edea7e9a04daf4d
bugzilla: 51868
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8727906f upstream.

Reject KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT if they are attempted after one
or more vCPUs have been created.  KVM assumes a VM is tagged SEV/SEV-ES
prior to vCPU creation, e.g. init_vmcb() needs to mark the VMCB as SEV
enabled, and svm_create_vcpu() needs to allocate the VMSA.  At best,
creating vCPUs before SEV/SEV-ES init will lead to unexpected errors
and/or behavior, and at worst it will crash the host, e.g.
sev_launch_update_vmsa() will dereference a null svm->vmsa pointer.

Fixes: 1654efcb ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command")
Fixes: ad73109a ("KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210331031936.2495277-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.37
commit ead4fb53fd42baf5f3922b6bab781b34cdf703b3
bugzilla: 51868
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 6d1b867d upstream.

Don't strip the C-bit from the faulting address on an intercepted #PF,
the address is a virtual address, not a physical address.

Fixes: 0ede79e1 ("KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210305011101.3597423-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.28
commit e6d8eb65532ee788e88468eb2af582c4e70012f0
bugzilla: 51779

--------------------------------

commit 3c346c0c upstream.

Fixing nested_vmcb_check_save to avoid all TOC/TOU races
is a bit harder in released kernels, so do the bare minimum
by avoiding that EFER.SVME is cleared.  This is problematic
because svm_set_efer frees the data structures for nested
virtualization if EFER.SVME is cleared.

Also check that EFER.SVME remains set after a nested vmexit;
clearing it could happen if the bit is zero in the save area
that is passed to KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE (the save area of the
nested state corresponds to the nested hypervisor's state
and is restored on the next nested vmexit).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fcf4876 ("KVM: nSVM: implement on demand allocation of the nested state")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: N  Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.28
commit 5f6625f5cd5c593fae05a6ce22b406166bc796b8
bugzilla: 51779

--------------------------------

commit a58d9166 upstream.

Avoid races between check and use of the nested VMCB controls.  This
for example ensures that the VMRUN intercept is always reflected to the
nested hypervisor, instead of being processed by the host.  Without this
patch, it is possible to end up with svm->nested.hsave pointing to
the MSR permission bitmap for nested guests.

This bug is CVE-2021-29657.
Reported-by: NFelix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fcf4876 ("KVM: nSVM: implement on demand allocation of the nested state")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: N  Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.23
commit 3b659091587a39bc581e0cf2775b03d18ed97fa7
bugzilla: 50838

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 9e46f6c6 ]

This problem was reported on a SVM guest while executing kexec.
Kexec fails to load the new kernel when the PCID feature is enabled.

When kexec starts loading the new kernel, it starts the process by
resetting the vCPU's and then bringing each vCPU online one by one.
The vCPU reset is supposed to reset all the register states before the
vCPUs are brought online. However, the CR4 register is not reset during
this process. If this register is already setup during the last boot,
all the flags can remain intact. The X86_CR4_PCIDE bit can only be
enabled in long mode. So, it must be enabled much later in SMP
initialization.  Having the X86_CR4_PCIDE bit set during SMP boot can
cause a boot failures.

Fix the issue by resetting the CR4 register in init_vmcb().
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <161471109108.30811.6392805173629704166.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: N  Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.20
commit da5b48ac720d381d2fe963b8036f62fe85231842
bugzilla: 50608

--------------------------------

commit a04aead1 upstream.

In case of npt=0 on host, nSVM needs the same .inject_page_fault tweak
as VMX has, to make sure that shadow mmu faults are injected as vmexits.

It is not clear why this is needed at all, but for now keep the same
code as VMX and we'll fix it for both.

Based on a patch by Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>.

Fixes: 7c86663b ("KVM: nSVM: inject exceptions via svm_check_nested_events")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.20
commit f1ea1bee3573444d0429bb00bc790fa8db64e5d5
bugzilla: 50608

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 0a8ed2ea ]

Intercept INVPCID if it's disabled in the guest, even when using NPT,
as KVM needs to inject #UD in this case.

Fixes: 4407a797 ("KVM: SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD")
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210212003411.1102677-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>