1. 01 2月, 2018 19 次提交
  2. 24 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  3. 23 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  4. 22 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 20 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  6. 14 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 08 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  8. 07 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  9. 05 1月, 2018 5 次提交
  10. 22 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 19 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      mm,vmscan: Make unregister_shrinker() no-op if register_shrinker() failed. · bb422a73
      Tetsuo Handa 提交于
      Syzbot caught an oops at unregister_shrinker() because combination of
      commit 1d3d4437 ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") and fault
      injection made register_shrinker() fail and the caller of
      register_shrinker() did not check for failure.
      
      ----------
      [  554.881422] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
      [  554.881422] name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
      [  554.881438] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82
      [  554.881443] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      [  554.881445] Call Trace:
      [  554.881459]  dump_stack+0x194/0x257
      [  554.881474]  ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x53/0x53
      [  554.881486]  ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0
      [  554.881507]  should_fail+0x8c0/0xa40
      [  554.881522]  ? fault_create_debugfs_attr+0x1f0/0x1f0
      [  554.881537]  ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
      [  554.881546]  ? find_next_zero_bit+0x2c/0x40
      [  554.881560]  ? ida_get_new_above+0x421/0x9d0
      [  554.881577]  ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0
      [  554.881594]  ? __lock_is_held+0xb6/0x140
      [  554.881628]  ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320
      [  554.881634]  ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990
      [  554.881649]  ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0
      [  554.881672]  should_failslab+0xec/0x120
      [  554.881684]  __kmalloc+0x63/0x760
      [  554.881692]  ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990
      [  554.881712]  ? register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0
      [  554.881721]  ? trace_event_raw_event_module_request+0x320/0x320
      [  554.881737]  register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0
      [  554.881747]  ? prepare_kswapd_sleep+0x1f0/0x1f0
      [  554.881755]  ? _down_write_nest_lock+0x120/0x120
      [  554.881765]  ? memcpy+0x45/0x50
      [  554.881785]  sget_userns+0xbcd/0xe20
      (...snipped...)
      [  554.898693] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
      [  554.898724] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
      [  554.898732] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
      [  554.898737] Dumping ftrace buffer:
      [  554.898741]    (ftrace buffer empty)
      [  554.898743] Modules linked in:
      [  554.898752] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82
      [  554.898755] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      [  554.898760] task: ffff8801d1dbe5c0 task.stack: ffff8801c9e38000
      [  554.898772] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x150
      [  554.898775] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c9e3f108 EFLAGS: 00010246
      [  554.898780] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
      [  554.898784] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801c53c6f98 RDI: ffff8801c53c6fa0
      [  554.898788] RBP: ffff8801c9e3f120 R08: 1ffff100393c7d55 R09: 0000000000000004
      [  554.898791] R10: ffff8801c9e3ef70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
      [  554.898795] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff100393c7e45 R15: ffff8801c53c6f98
      [  554.898800] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  554.898804] CS:  0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  554.898807] CR2: 00000000dbc23000 CR3: 00000001c7269000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
      [  554.898813] DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [  554.898816] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
      [  554.898818] Call Trace:
      [  554.898828]  unregister_shrinker+0x79/0x300
      [  554.898837]  ? perf_trace_mm_vmscan_writepage+0x750/0x750
      [  554.898844]  ? down_write+0x87/0x120
      [  554.898851]  ? deactivate_super+0x139/0x1b0
      [  554.898857]  ? down_read+0x150/0x150
      [  554.898864]  ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320
      [  554.898875]  deactivate_locked_super+0x64/0xd0
      [  554.898883]  deactivate_super+0x141/0x1b0
      ----------
      
      Since allowing register_shrinker() callers to call unregister_shrinker()
      when register_shrinker() failed can simplify error recovery path, this
      patch makes unregister_shrinker() no-op when register_shrinker() failed.
      Also, reset shrinker->nr_deferred in case unregister_shrinker() was
      by error called twice.
      Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
      Signed-off-by: NAliaksei Karaliou <akaraliou.dev@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: Glauber Costa <glauber@scylladb.com>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      bb422a73
  12. 17 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 16 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • L
      Revert "mm: replace p??_write with pte_access_permitted in fault + gup paths" · f6f37321
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This reverts commits 5c9d2d5c, c7da82b8, and e7fe7b5c.
      
      We'll probably need to revisit this, but basically we should not
      complicate the get_user_pages_fast() case, and checking the actual page
      table protection key bits will require more care anyway, since the
      protection keys depend on the exact state of the VM in question.
      
      Particularly when doing a "remote" page lookup (ie in somebody elses VM,
      not your own), you need to be much more careful than this was.  Dave
      Hansen says:
      
       "So, the underlying bug here is that we now a get_user_pages_remote()
        and then go ahead and do the p*_access_permitted() checks against the
        current PKRU. This was introduced recently with the addition of the
        new p??_access_permitted() calls.
      
        We have checks in the VMA path for the "remote" gups and we avoid
        consulting PKRU for them. This got missed in the pkeys selftests
        because I did a ptrace read, but not a *write*. I also didn't
        explicitly test it against something where a COW needed to be done"
      
      It's also not entirely clear that it makes sense to check the protection
      key bits at this level at all.  But one possible eventual solution is to
      make the get_user_pages_fast() case just abort if it sees protection key
      bits set, which makes us fall back to the regular get_user_pages() case,
      which then has a vma and can do the check there if we want to.
      
      We'll see.
      
      Somewhat related to this all: what we _do_ want to do some day is to
      check the PAGE_USER bit - it should obviously always be set for user
      pages, but it would be a good check to have back.  Because we have no
      generic way to test for it, we lost it as part of moving over from the
      architecture-specific x86 GUP implementation to the generic one in
      commit e585513b ("x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic
      get_user_page_fast() implementation").
      
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f6f37321
  14. 15 12月, 2017 2 次提交