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  1. 01 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  3. 31 3月, 2020 2 次提交
  5. 24 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  7. 09 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  9. 27 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  11. 13 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  13. 06 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  15. 31 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  17. 30 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  19. 16 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • E
      net: avoid potential infinite loop in tc_ctl_action() · 39f13ea2
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      tc_ctl_action() has the ability to loop forever if tcf_action_add()
returns -EAGAIN.

This special case has been done in case a module needed to be loaded,
but it turns out that tcf_add_notify() could also return -EAGAIN
if the socket sk_rcvbuf limit is hit.

We need to separate the two cases, and only loop for the module
loading case.

While we are at it, add a limit of 10 attempts since unbounded
loops are always scary.

syzbot repro was something like :

socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_ROUTE) = 3
write(3, ..., 38) = 38
setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, [0], 4) = 0
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{..., 388}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0x10}, ...)

NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 1054 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x70/0xb2 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x23b/0x28b lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:146 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:205 [inline]
 watchdog+0x9d0/0xef0 kernel/hung_task.c:289
 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8859 Comm: syz-executor910 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:751 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x1df/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3453
Code: 5c 08 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 c7 c0 58 1d f3 88 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 10 00 0f 85 d3 00 00 00 <48> 83 3d 21 9e 99 07 00 0f 84 b9 00 00 00 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 f6
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6f3f1b8 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 1ffffffff11e63ab RBX: ffff88808c9c6080 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808c9c6914
RBP: ffff8880a6f3f1d0 R08: ffff88808c9c6080 R09: fffffbfff16be5d1
R10: fffffbfff16be5d0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff8746591f
R13: ffff88808c9c6080 R14: ffffffff8746591f R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00000000011e4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000a8920000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 trace_hardirqs_off+0x62/0x240 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:45
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xc8/0x150 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
 __wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:142
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:466 [inline]
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:463 [inline]
 netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x705/0xb80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1514
 netlink_broadcast+0x3a/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1534
 rtnetlink_send+0xdd/0x110 net/core/rtnetlink.c:714
 tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:1343 [inline]
 tcf_action_add+0x243/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1362
 tc_ctl_action+0x3b5/0x4bc net/sched/act_api.c:1410
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5386
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5404
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440939

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cf0adbb9c28c8866c788@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      39f13ea2
  21. 09 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  23. 22 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  25. 02 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • C
      idr: fix overflow case for idr_for_each_entry_ul() · e33d2b74
      由 Cong Wang 提交于 
      idr_for_each_entry_ul() is buggy as it can't handle overflow
case correctly. When we have an ID == UINT_MAX, it becomes an
infinite loop. This happens when running on 32-bit CPU where
unsigned long has the same size with unsigned int.

There is no better way to fix this than casting it to a larger
integer, but we can't just 64 bit integer on 32 bit CPU. Instead
we could just use an additional integer to help us to detect this
overflow case, that is, adding a new parameter to this macro.
Fortunately tc action is its only user right now.

Fixes: 65a206c0 ("net/sched: Change act_api and act_xxx modules to use IDR")
Reported-by: NLi Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Mi <chrism@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e33d2b74
  27. 31 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  29. 25 5月, 2019 1 次提交
    • V
      net: sched: don't use tc_action->order during action dump · 4097e9d2
      由 Vlad Buslov 提交于 
      Function tcf_action_dump() relies on tc_action->order field when starting
nested nla to send action data to userspace. This approach breaks in
several cases:

- When multiple filters point to same shared action, tc_action->order field
  is overwritten each time it is attached to filter. This causes filter
  dump to output action with incorrect attribute for all filters that have
  the action in different position (different order) from the last set
  tc_action->order value.

- When action data is displayed using tc action API (RTM_GETACTION), action
  order is overwritten by tca_action_gd() according to its position in
  resulting array of nl attributes, which will break filter dump for all
  filters attached to that shared action that expect it to have different
  order value.

Don't rely on tc_action->order when dumping actions. Set nla according to
action position in resulting array of actions instead.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4097e9d2
  31. 28 4月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness · 8cb08174
      由 Johannes Berg 提交于 
      We currently have two levels of strict validation:

 1) liberal (default)
     - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
     - attribute length >= expected accepted
     - garbage at end of message accepted
 2) strict (opt-in)
     - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
     - attribute length >= expected accepted

Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
 * TRAILING     - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
                  attributes (in message or nested)
 * MAXTYPE      - reject attrs > max known type
 * UNSPEC       - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
 * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size

The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().

Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.

We end up with the following renames:
 * nla_parse           -> nla_parse_deprecated
 * nla_parse_strict    -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
 * nlmsg_parse         -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
 * nlmsg_parse_strict  -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
 * nla_parse_nested    -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
 * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated

Using spatch, of course:
    @@
    expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
    +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)

    @@
    expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
    +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)

    @@
    expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
    +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)

    @@
    expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
    +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)

    @@
    expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
    +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)

    @@
    expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
    @@
    -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
    +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)

For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.

Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.

Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.

In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8cb08174
    • M
      netlink: make nla_nest_start() add NLA_F_NESTED flag · ae0be8de
      由 Michal Kubecek 提交于 
      Even if the NLA_F_NESTED flag was introduced more than 11 years ago, most
netlink based interfaces (including recently added ones) are still not
setting it in kernel generated messages. Without the flag, message parsers
not aware of attribute semantics (e.g. wireshark dissector or libmnl's
mnl_nlmsg_fprintf()) cannot recognize nested attributes and won't display
the structure of their contents.

Unfortunately we cannot just add the flag everywhere as there may be
userspace applications which check nlattr::nla_type directly rather than
through a helper masking out the flags. Therefore the patch renames
nla_nest_start() to nla_nest_start_noflag() and introduces nla_nest_start()
as a wrapper adding NLA_F_NESTED. The calls which add NLA_F_NESTED manually
are rewritten to use nla_nest_start().

Except for changes in include/net/netlink.h, the patch was generated using
this semantic patch:

@@ expression E1, E2; @@
-nla_nest_start(E1, E2)
+nla_nest_start_noflag(E1, E2)

@@ expression E1, E2; @@
-nla_nest_start_noflag(E1, E2 | NLA_F_NESTED)
+nla_nest_start(E1, E2)
Signed-off-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ae0be8de
  33. 22 3月, 2019 2 次提交
    • D
      net/sched: let actions use RCU to access 'goto_chain' · ee3bbfe8
      由 Davide Caratti 提交于 
      use RCU when accessing the action chain, to avoid use after free in the
traffic path when 'goto chain' is replaced on existing TC actions (see
script below). Since the control action is read in the traffic path
without holding the action spinlock, we need to explicitly ensure that
a->goto_chain is not NULL before dereferencing (i.e it's not sufficient
to rely on the value of TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN bits). Not doing so caused NULL
dereferences in tcf_action_goto_chain_exec() when the following script:

 # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \
 > ip_proto udp action pass index 4
 # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress protocol ip flower \
 > ip_proto udp action csum udp goto chain 42 index 66
 # tc chain del dev dd0 chain 42 ingress
 (start UDP traffic towards dd0)
 # tc action replace action csum udp pass index 66

was run repeatedly for several hours.
Suggested-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: NVlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ee3bbfe8
    • D
      net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action · 85d0966f
      由 Davide Caratti 提交于 
      - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler,
  to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain
  exists and (eventually) refcounting it.
- remove code that validates the control action after a successful call
  to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids
  addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at
  the same time.
- add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action
  and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init()
  handler.
- add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and
  swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one.

This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly
in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after
successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact()
to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently.

By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid
'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats
like the following one:

 # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \
 > ip_proto tcp action drop
 # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \
 > ip_proto udp action drop
 # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \
 > action gact goto chain 42 index 66
 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \
 > action gact goto chain 43 index 66
 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 <...>
 unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024):
 comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s)
 hex dump (first 32 bytes):
   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
   00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
 backtrace:
   [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0
   [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
   [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110
   [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250
   [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0
   [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
   [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0
   [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
   [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
   [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
   [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Fixes: db50514f ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain")
Fixes: 97763dc0 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values")
Signed-off-by: NDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      85d0966f
  35. 11 2月, 2019 1 次提交
  37. 11 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  39. 09 10月, 2018 1 次提交
  41. 05 10月, 2018 1 次提交
    • C
      net_sched: convert idrinfo->lock from spinlock to a mutex · 95278dda
      由 Cong Wang 提交于 
      In commit ec3ed293 ("net_sched: change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock")
we move fl_hw_destroy_tmplt() to a workqueue to avoid blocking
with the spinlock held. Unfortunately, this causes a lot of
troubles here:

1. tcf_chain_destroy() could be called right after we queue the work
   but before the work runs. This is a use-after-free.

2. The chain refcnt is already 0, we can't even just hold it again.
   We can check refcnt==1 but it is ugly.

3. The chain with refcnt 0 is still visible in its block, which means
   it could be still found and used!

4. The block has a refcnt too, we can't hold it without introducing a
   proper API either.

We can make it working but the end result is ugly. Instead of wasting
time on reviewing it, let's just convert the troubling spinlock to
a mutex, which allows us to use non-atomic allocations too.

Fixes: ec3ed293 ("net_sched: change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock")
Reported-by: NIdo Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NIdo Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      95278dda
  43. 25 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  45. 21 9月, 2018 1 次提交
    • V
      net_sched: change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock · ec3ed293
      由 Vlad Buslov 提交于 
      Action API was changed to work with actions and action_idr in concurrency
safe manner, however tcf_del_walker() still uses actions without taking a
reference or idrinfo->lock first, and deletes them directly, disregarding
possible concurrent delete.

Change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock while iterating over actions
and use new tcf_idr_release_unsafe() to release them while holding the
lock.

And the blocking function fl_hw_destroy_tmplt() could be called when we
put a filter chain, so defer it to a work queue.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
[xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com: heavily modify the code and changelog]
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ec3ed293
  47. 04 9月, 2018 1 次提交
    • V
      net: sched: null actions array pointer before releasing action · c10bbfae
      由 Vlad Buslov 提交于 
      Currently, tcf_action_delete() nulls actions array pointer after putting
and deleting it. However, if tcf_idr_delete_index() returns an error,
pointer to action is not set to null. That results it being released second
time in error handling code of tca_action_gd().

Kasan error:

[  807.367755] ==================================================================
[  807.375844] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[  807.382763] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88033e636000 by task tc/2732

[  807.391289] CPU: 0 PID: 2732 Comm: tc Tainted: G        W         4.19.0-rc1+ #799
[  807.399542] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECR/X10DRT-P, BIOS 2.0b 03/30/2017
[  807.407948] Call Trace:
[  807.410763]  dump_stack+0x92/0xeb
[  807.414456]  print_address_description+0x70/0x360
[  807.419549]  kasan_report+0x14d/0x300
[  807.423582]  ? tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[  807.428150]  tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[  807.432539]  ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0
[  807.436146]  fl_dump+0x394/0x3f0 [cls_flower]
[  807.440890]  ? fl_tmplt_dump+0x140/0x140 [cls_flower]
[  807.446327]  ? lock_downgrade+0x320/0x320
[  807.450702]  ? lock_acquire+0xe2/0x220
[  807.454819]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0x140
[  807.459475]  ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[  807.462980]  ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0
[  807.466582]  tcf_fill_node+0x341/0x430
[  807.470717]  ? tcf_block_put+0xe0/0xe0
[  807.474859]  tcf_node_dump+0xdb/0xf0
[  807.478821]  fl_walk+0x8e/0x170 [cls_flower]
[  807.483474]  tcf_chain_dump+0x35a/0x4d0
[  807.487703]  ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170
[  807.492091]  ? tcf_fill_node+0x430/0x430
[  807.496411]  tc_dump_tfilter+0x362/0x3f0
[  807.500712]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[  807.505104]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[  807.509940]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xcf/0x410
[  807.515031]  netlink_dump+0x263/0x4f0
[  807.519077]  __netlink_dump_start+0x2a0/0x300
[  807.523817]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[  807.528198]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46a/0x6d0
[  807.532671]  ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0
[  807.536878]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[  807.541280]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[  807.545570]  ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0
[  807.549773]  ? netlink_ack+0x500/0x500
[  807.553913]  netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[  807.558212]  ? netlink_attachskb+0x340/0x340
[  807.562855]  ? _copy_from_iter_full+0xe9/0x3e0
[  807.567677]  ? import_iovec+0x11e/0x1c0
[  807.571890]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[  807.576192]  ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370
[  807.580684]  ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370
[  807.585154]  sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[  807.589015]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[  807.593230]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x210/0x210
[  807.598232]  ? do_wp_page+0x174/0x880
[  807.602276]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x749/0x1c10
[  807.607021]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1046/0x1c10
[  807.611849]  ? __pmd_alloc+0x320/0x320
[  807.615973]  ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0
[  807.620450]  ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0
[  807.624929]  ? __fget_light+0xbc/0xd0
[  807.628970]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[  807.633172]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[  807.637201]  ? __ia32_sys_shutdown+0x30/0x30
[  807.641846]  ? up_read+0x53/0x90
[  807.645442]  ? __do_page_fault+0x484/0x780
[  807.649949]  ? do_syscall_64+0x1e/0x2c0
[  807.654164]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[  807.658198]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  807.663625] RIP: 0033:0x7f42e9870150
[  807.667568] Code: 8b 15 3c 7d 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb cd 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d b9 d5 2b 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be cd 00 00 48 89 04 24
[  807.687328] RSP: 002b:00007ffdbf595b58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  807.695564] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f42e9870150
[  807.703083] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdbf595b80 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  807.710605] RBP: 00007ffdbf599d90 R08: 0000000000679bc0 R09: 000000000000000f
[  807.718127] R10: 00000000000005e7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdbf599d88
[  807.725651] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

[  807.735048] Allocated by task 2687:
[  807.738902]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[  807.742852]  __kmalloc+0x118/0x2d0
[  807.746615]  tcf_idr_create+0x44/0x320
[  807.750738]  tcf_nat_init+0x41e/0x530 [act_nat]
[  807.755638]  tcf_action_init_1+0x4e0/0x650
[  807.760104]  tcf_action_init+0x1ce/0x2d0
[  807.764395]  tcf_exts_validate+0x1d8/0x200
[  807.768861]  fl_change+0x55a/0x26b4 [cls_flower]
[  807.773845]  tc_new_tfilter+0x748/0xa20
[  807.778051]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0
[  807.782517]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[  807.786804]  netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[  807.791095]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[  807.795387]  sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[  807.799240]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[  807.803445]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[  807.807473]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[  807.811506]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

[  807.818776] Freed by task 2728:
[  807.822283]  __kasan_slab_free+0x122/0x180
[  807.826752]  kfree+0xf4/0x2f0
[  807.830080]  __tcf_action_put+0x5a/0xb0
[  807.834281]  tcf_action_put_many+0x46/0x70
[  807.838747]  tca_action_gd+0x232/0xc40
[  807.842862]  tc_ctl_action+0x215/0x230
[  807.846977]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0
[  807.851444]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[  807.855731]  netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[  807.860021]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[  807.864312]  sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[  807.868166]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[  807.872372]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[  807.876401]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[  807.880431]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

[  807.887704] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88033e636000
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[  807.900909] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                256-byte region [ffff88033e636000, ffff88033e636100)
[  807.913155] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  807.918322] page:ffffea000cf98d80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88036f80ee00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[  807.928831] flags: 0x5fff8000008100(slab|head)
[  807.933647] raw: 005fff8000008100 ffffea000db44f00 0000000400000004 ffff88036f80ee00
[  807.942050] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  807.950456] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  807.958240] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  807.963405]  ffff88033e635f00: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb
[  807.971288]  ffff88033e635f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  807.979166] >ffff88033e636000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  807.994882]                    ^
[  807.998477]  ffff88033e636080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  808.006352]  ffff88033e636100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  808.014230] ==================================================================
[  808.022108] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Fixes: edfaf94f ("net_sched: improve and refactor tcf_action_put_many()")
Signed-off-by: NVlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c10bbfae
  49. 01 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  51. 30 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  53. 22 8月, 2018 5 次提交
  55. 31 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • P
      net/sched: user-space can't set unknown tcfa_action values · 802bfb19
      由 Paolo Abeni 提交于 
      Currently, when initializing an action, the user-space can specify
and use arbitrary values for the tcfa_action field. If the value
is unknown by the kernel, is implicitly threaded as TC_ACT_UNSPEC.

This change explicitly checks for unknown values at action creation
time, and explicitly convert them to TC_ACT_UNSPEC. No functional
changes are introduced, but this will allow introducing tcfa_action
values not exposed to user-space in a later patch.

Note: we can't use the above to hide TC_ACT_REDIRECT from user-space,
as the latter is already part of uAPI.

v3 -> v4:
 - use an helper to check for action validity (JiriP)
 - emit an extack for invalid actions (JiriP)
v4 -> v5:
 - keep messages on a single line, drop net_warn (Marcelo)
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      802bfb19
  57. 28 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  59. 12 7月, 2018 1 次提交