1. 20 1月, 2015 6 次提交
  2. 18 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      net: sctp: fix race for one-to-many sockets in sendmsg's auto associate · 2061dcd6
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      I.e. one-to-many sockets in SCTP are not required to explicitly
      call into connect(2) or sctp_connectx(2) prior to data exchange.
      Instead, they can directly invoke sendmsg(2) and the SCTP stack
      will automatically trigger connection establishment through 4WHS
      via sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(). However, this in its current
      implementation is racy: INIT is being sent out immediately (as
      it cannot be bundled anyway) and the rest of the DATA chunks are
      queued up for later xmit when connection is established, meaning
      sendmsg(2) will return successfully. This behaviour can result
      in an undesired side-effect that the kernel made the application
      think the data has already been transmitted, although none of it
      has actually left the machine, worst case even after close(2)'ing
      the socket.
      
      Instead, when the association from client side has been shut down
      e.g. first gracefully through SCTP_EOF and then close(2), the
      client could afterwards still receive the server's INIT_ACK due
      to a connection with higher latency. This INIT_ACK is then considered
      out of the blue and hence responded with ABORT as there was no
      alive assoc found anymore. This can be easily reproduced f.e.
      with sctp_test application from lksctp. One way to fix this race
      is to wait for the handshake to actually complete.
      
      The fix defers waiting after sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE() and
      sctp_primitive_SEND() succeeded, so that DATA chunks cooked up
      from sctp_sendmsg() have already been placed into the output
      queue through the side-effect interpreter, and therefore can then
      be bundeled together with COOKIE_ECHO control chunks.
      
      strace from example application (shortened):
      
      socket(PF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
      sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
                 msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
      sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
                 msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
      sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
                 msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
      sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
                 msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
      sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
                 msg_iov(0)=[], msg_controllen=48, {cmsg_len=48, cmsg_level=0x84 /* SOL_??? */, cmsg_type=, ...},
                 msg_flags=0}, 0) = 0 // graceful shutdown for SOCK_SEQPACKET via SCTP_EOF
      close(3) = 0
      
      tcpdump before patch (fooling the application):
      
      22:33:36.306142 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3879023686] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3139201684]
      22:33:36.316619 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.41462: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3345394793] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3380109591]
      22:33:36.317600 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [ABORT]
      
      tcpdump after patch:
      
      14:28:58.884116 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 438593213] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3092969729]
      14:28:58.888414 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 381429855] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 2141904492]
      14:28:58.888638 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969729] [...]
      14:28:58.893278 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK] , (2) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969729] [a_rwnd 106491] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      14:28:58.893591 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969730] [...]
      14:28:59.096963 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969730] [a_rwnd 106496] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      14:28:59.097086 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969731] [...] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969732] [...]
      14:28:59.103218 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969732] [a_rwnd 106486] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      14:28:59.103330 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN]
      14:28:59.107793 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN ACK]
      14:28:59.107890 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN COMPLETE]
      
      Looks like this bug is from the pre-git history museum. ;)
      
      Fixes: 08707d5482df ("lksctp-2_5_31-0_5_1.patch")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2061dcd6
  3. 17 1月, 2015 3 次提交
    • J
      genetlink: synchronize socket closing and family removal · ee1c2442
      Johannes Berg 提交于
      In addition to the problem Jeff Layton reported, I looked at the code
      and reproduced the same warning by subscribing and removing the genl
      family with a socket still open. This is a fairly tricky race which
      originates in the fact that generic netlink allows the family to go
      away while sockets are still open - unlike regular netlink which has
      a module refcount for every open socket so in general this cannot be
      triggered.
      
      Trying to resolve this issue by the obvious locking isn't possible as
      it will result in deadlocks between unregistration and group unbind
      notification (which incidentally lockdep doesn't find due to the home
      grown locking in the netlink table.)
      
      To really resolve this, introduce a "closing socket" reference counter
      (for generic netlink only, as it's the only affected family) in the
      core netlink code and use that in generic netlink to wait for all the
      sockets that are being closed at the same time as a generic netlink
      family is removed.
      
      This fixes the race that when a socket is closed, it will should call
      the unbind, but if the family is removed at the same time the unbind
      will not find it, leading to the warning. The real problem though is
      that in this case the unbind could actually find a new family that is
      registered to have a multicast group with the same ID, and call its
      mcast_unbind() leading to confusing.
      
      Also remove the warning since it would still trigger, but is now no
      longer a problem.
      
      This also moves the code in af_netlink.c to before unreferencing the
      module to avoid having the same problem in the normal non-genl case.
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ee1c2442
    • J
      genetlink: disallow subscribing to unknown mcast groups · 5ad63005
      Johannes Berg 提交于
      Jeff Layton reported that he could trigger the multicast unbind warning
      in generic netlink using trinity. I originally thought it was a race
      condition between unregistering the generic netlink family and closing
      the socket, but there's a far simpler explanation: genetlink currently
      allows subscribing to groups that don't (yet) exist, and the warning is
      triggered when unsubscribing again while the group still doesn't exist.
      
      Originally, I had a warning in the subscribe case and accepted it out of
      userspace API concerns, but the warning was of course wrong and removed
      later.
      
      However, I now think that allowing userspace to subscribe to groups that
      don't exist is wrong and could possibly become a security problem:
      Consider a (new) genetlink family implementing a permission check in
      the mcast_bind() function similar to the like the audit code does today;
      it would be possible to bypass the permission check by guessing the ID
      and subscribing to the group it exists. This is only possible in case a
      family like that would be dynamically loaded, but it doesn't seem like a
      huge stretch, for example wireless may be loaded when you plug in a USB
      device.
      
      To avoid this reject such subscription attempts.
      
      If this ends up causing userspace issues we may need to add a workaround
      in af_netlink to deny such requests but not return an error.
      Reported-by: NJeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5ad63005
    • J
      genetlink: document parallel_ops · f555f3d7
      Johannes Berg 提交于
      The kernel-doc for the parallel_ops family struct member is
      missing, add it.
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f555f3d7
  4. 16 1月, 2015 16 次提交
  5. 15 1月, 2015 14 次提交