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  1. 05 10月, 2015 14 次提交
  3. 28 8月, 2015 3 次提交
  5. 14 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 11 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 08 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 01 8月, 2015 2 次提交
  13. 22 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • T
      vxlan: Flow based tunneling · ee122c79
      由 Thomas Graf 提交于 
      Allows putting a VXLAN device into a new flow-based mode in which
skbs with a ip_tunnel_info dst metadata attached will be encapsulated
according to the instructions stored in there with the VXLAN device
defaults taken into consideration.

Similar on the receive side, if the VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA flag is
set, the packet processing will populate a ip_tunnel_info struct for
each packet received and attach it to the skb using the new metadata
dst.  The metadata structure will contain the outer header and tunnel
header fields which have been stripped off. Layers further up in the
stack such as routing, tc or netfitler can later match on these fields
and perform forwarding. It is the responsibility of upper layers to
ensure that the flag is set if the metadata is needed. The flag limits
the additional cost of metadata collecting based on demand.

This prepares the VXLAN device to be steered by the routing and other
subsystems which allows to support encapsulation for a large number
of tunnel endpoints and tunnel ids through a single net_device which
improves the scalability.

It also allows for OVS to leverage this mode which in turn allows for
the removal of the OVS specific VXLAN code.

Because the skb is currently scrubed in vxlan_rcv(), the attachment of
the new dst metadata is postponed until after scrubing which requires
the temporary addition of a new member to vxlan_metadata. This member
is removed again in a later commit after the indirect VXLAN receive API
has been removed.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ee122c79
  15. 16 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 16 6月, 2015 3 次提交
  19. 02 6月, 2015 2 次提交
  21. 14 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 11 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 11 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 24 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • H
      ipv6: generation of stable privacy addresses for link-local and autoconf · 622c81d5
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      This patch implements the stable privacy address generation for
link-local and autoconf addresses as specified in RFC7217.

  RID = F(Prefix, Net_Iface, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, secret_key)

is the RID (random identifier). As the hash function F we chose one
round of sha1. Prefix will be either the link-local prefix or the
router advertised one. As Net_Iface we use the MAC address of the
device. DAD_Counter and secret_key are implemented as specified.

We don't use Network_ID, as it couples the code too closely to other
subsystems. It is specified as optional in the RFC.

As Net_Iface we only use the MAC address: we simply have no stable
identifier in the kernel we could possibly use: because this code might
run very early, we cannot depend on names, as they might be changed by
user space early on during the boot process.

A new address generation mode is introduced,
IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_STABLE_PRIVACY. With iproute2 one can switch back to
none or eui64 address configuration mode although the stable_secret is
already set.

We refuse writes to ipv6/conf/all/stable_secret but only allow
ipv6/conf/default/stable_secret and the interface specific file to be
written to. The default stable_secret is used as the parameter for the
namespace, the interface specific can overwrite the secret, e.g. when
switching a network configuration from one system to another while
inheriting the secret.

Cc: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Cc: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki/吉藤英明 <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      622c81d5
  29. 19 3月, 2015 2 次提交
  31. 06 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      bridge: Extend Proxy ARP design to allow optional rules for Wi-Fi · 842a9ae0
      由 Jouni Malinen 提交于 
      This extends the design in commit 95850116 ("bridge: Add support for
IEEE 802.11 Proxy ARP") with optional set of rules that are needed to
meet the IEEE 802.11 and Hotspot 2.0 requirements for ProxyARP. The
previously added BR_PROXYARP behavior is left as-is and a new
BR_PROXYARP_WIFI alternative is added so that this behavior can be
configured from user space when required.

In addition, this enables proxyarp functionality for unicast ARP
requests for both BR_PROXYARP and BR_PROXYARP_WIFI since it is possible
to use unicast as well as broadcast for these frames.

The key differences in functionality:

BR_PROXYARP:
- uses the flag on the bridge port on which the request frame was
  received to determine whether to reply
- block bridge port flooding completely on ports that enable proxy ARP

BR_PROXYARP_WIFI:
- uses the flag on the bridge port to which the target device of the
  request belongs
- block bridge port flooding selectively based on whether the proxyarp
  functionality replied
Signed-off-by: NJouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      842a9ae0
  33. 12 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  35. 20 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  37. 15 1月, 2015 2 次提交
    • T
      vxlan: Group Policy extension · 3511494c
      由 Thomas Graf 提交于 
      Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide
a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers
based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped
to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context
using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS,
tc, etc.

The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the
upper 16 bits are used for flags.

SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However,
distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This
is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the
original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that,
netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to
universal labels.  However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex.
This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network
environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol
is required.

           Host 1:                       Host 2:

      Group A        Group B        Group B     Group A
      +-----+   +-------------+    +-------+   +-----+
      | lxc |   | SELinux CTX |    | httpd |   | VM  |
      +--+--+   +--+----------+    +---+---+   +--+--+
	  \---+---/                     \----+---/
	      |                              |
	  +---+---+                      +---+---+
	  | vxlan |                      | vxlan |
	  +---+---+                      +---+---+
	      +------------------------------+

Backwards compatibility:
A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign
the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will
drop VXLAN-GBP  frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default
and needs to be specifically enabled:

   ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp

In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket
must run on a separate port number.

Examples:
 iptables:
  host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200
  host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP

 OVS:
  # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL'
  # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop'

[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy
[1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3511494c
    • T
      vxlan: Remote checksum offload · dfd8645e
      由 Tom Herbert 提交于 
      Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a
reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order
reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a
compressed manner.

Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1
so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only.
Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high
order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the
checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum
field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are
supported in this implementation.

Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00

Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4).

With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload
  IPv4
      Client
        11.84% CPU utilization
      Server
        12.96% CPU utilization
      9197 Mbps
  IPv6
      Client
        12.46% CPU utilization
      Server
        14.48% CPU utilization
      8963 Mbps

With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload
  IPv4
      Client
        15.67% CPU utilization
      Server
        14.83% CPU utilization
      9094 Mbps
  IPv6
      Client
        16.21% CPU utilization
      Server
        14.32% CPU utilization
      9058 Mbps

No UDP checksums
  IPv4
      Client
        15.03% CPU utilization
      Server
        23.09% CPU utilization
      9089 Mbps
  IPv6
      Client
        16.18% CPU utilization
      Server
        26.57% CPU utilization
       8954 Mbps
Signed-off-by: NTom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dfd8645e