stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit b62d8b5c814be957ce164453ddf4852167908841
CVE: CVE-2021-28038

--------------------------------

commit 2991397d upstream.

Commit 3194a174 ("xen-netback: don't "handle" error by BUG()")
dropped respective a BUG_ON() without noticing that with this the
variable's value wouldn't be consumed anymore. With gnttab_set_map_op()
setting all status fields to a non-zero value, in case of an error no
slot should have a status of GNTST_okay (zero).

This is part of XSA-367.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d933f495-619a-0086-5fb4-1ec3cf81a8fc@suse.comSigned-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit 1a999d25ef536a14f6a7c25778836857adfba3f8
CVE: CVE-2021-28038

--------------------------------

commit 8310b77b upstream.

Bailing immediately from set_foreign_p2m_mapping() upon a p2m updating
error leaves the full batch in an ambiguous state as far as the caller
is concerned. Instead flags respective slots as bad, unmapping what
was mapped there right away.

HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op()'s return value and the individual unmap
slots' status fields get used only for a one-time - there's not much we
can do in case of a failure.

Note that there's no GNTST_enomem or alike, so GNTST_general_error gets
used.

The map ops' handle fields get overwritten just to be on the safe side.

This is part of XSA-367.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96cccf5d-e756-5f53-b91a-ea269bfb9be0@suse.comSigned-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2021-27365

---------------------------

It's introduced by 5bf67c8c2d947 ("sysfs: Add sysfs_emit and...").
Fix it by remove include mm.h.
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit 23e2942885e8db57311cb4f9a719fd0306073c40
CVE: CVE-2021-27365

--------------------------------

commit f9dbdf97 upstream.

Open-iSCSI sends passthrough PDUs over netlink, but the kernel should be
verifying that the provided PDU header and data lengths fall within the
netlink message to prevent accessing beyond that in memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NAdam Nichols <adam@grimm-co.com>
Reviewed-by: NLee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit b2957d7baff77b399c7408dc12bacc7f63765897
CVE: CVE-2021-27365

--------------------------------

commit ec98ea70 upstream.

As the iSCSI parameters are exported back through sysfs, it should be
enforcing that they never are more than PAGE_SIZE (which should be more
than enough) before accepting updates through netlink.

Change all iSCSI sysfs attributes to use sysfs_emit().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NAdam Nichols <adam@grimm-co.com>
Reviewed-by: NLee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NMike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit cb1f69d53ac8a417fc42df013526b54735194c14
CVE: CVE-2021-27365

Prepare for CVE-2021-27365
--------------------------------

commit 2efc459d upstream.

Output defects can exist in sysfs content using sprintf and snprintf.

sprintf does not know the PAGE_SIZE maximum of the temporary buffer
used for outputting sysfs content and it's possible to overrun the
PAGE_SIZE buffer length.

Add a generic sysfs_emit function that knows that the size of the
temporary buffer and ensures that no overrun is done.

Add a generic sysfs_emit_at function that can be used in multiple
call situations that also ensures that no overrun is done.

Validate the output buffer argument to be page aligned.
Validate the offset len argument to be within the PAGE_SIZE buf.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/884235202216d464d61ee975f7465332c86f76b2.1600285923.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.179
commit ae84b246a76c4ace5997e5ca7e9fde3e1a526bc3
CVE: CVE-2021-27364/CVE-2021-27363

--------------------------------

commit 688e8128 upstream.

Protect the iSCSI transport handle, available in sysfs, by requiring
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read it. Also protect the netlink socket by restricting
reception of messages to ones sent with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This disables
normal users from being able to end arbitrary iSCSI sessions.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NAdam Nichols <adam@grimm-co.com>
Reviewed-by: NChris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.11-rc1
commit b6650dab
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

In case the file cannot be opened with O_NOATIME because of lack of
capabilities, then clear O_NOATIME instead of failing.

Remove WARN_ON(), since it would now trigger if O_NOATIME was cleared.
Noticed by Amir Goldstein.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.8-rc1
commit 05acefb4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

Call inode_permission() on real inode before opening regular file on one of
the underlying layers.

In some cases ovl_permission() already checks access to an underlying file,
but it misses the metacopy case, and possibly other ones as well.

Removing the redundant permission check from ovl_permission() should be
considered later.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
  fs/overlayfs/file.c
[yyl: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.8-rc1
commit 292f902a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

Verify LSM permissions for underlying file, since vfs_ioctl() doesn't do
it.

[Stephen Rothwell] export security_file_ioctl
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
  fs/overlayfs/file.c
[yyl: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.8-rc1
commit 56230d95
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

Check permission before opening a real file.

ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.

ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.

For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
underlying layer.  Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
topmost one as well.  Permission wasn't checked for these layers.

Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
complex and hence more bug prone.  The result is less precise permissions
returned in access(2).  If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
this bug.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.8-rc1
commit 48bd024b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

In preparation for more permission checking, override credentials for
directory operations on the underlying filesystems.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.8-rc1
commit 130fdbc3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2020-16120

--------------------------------

The three instances of ovl_path_open() in overlayfs/readdir.c do three
different things:

 - pass f_flags from overlay file
 - pass O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY
 - pass just O_RDONLY

The value of f_flags can be (other than O_RDONLY):

O_WRONLY	- not possible for a directory
O_RDWR		- not possible for a directory
O_CREAT		- masked out by dentry_open()
O_EXCL		- masked out by dentry_open()
O_NOCTTY	- masked out by dentry_open()
O_TRUNC		- masked out by dentry_open()
O_APPEND	- no effect on directory ops
O_NDELAY	- no effect on directory ops
O_NONBLOCK	- no effect on directory ops
__O_SYNC	- no effect on directory ops
O_DSYNC		- no effect on directory ops
FASYNC		- no effect on directory ops
O_DIRECT	- no effect on directory ops
O_LARGEFILE	- ?
O_DIRECTORY	- only affects lookup
O_NOFOLLOW	- only affects lookup
O_NOATIME	- overlay sets this unconditionally in ovl_path_open()
O_CLOEXEC	- only affects fd allocation
O_PATH		- no effect on directory ops
__O_TMPFILE	- not possible for a directory

Fon non-merge directories we use the underlying filesystem's iterate; in
this case honor O_LARGEFILE from the original file to make sure that open
doesn't get rejected.

For merge directories it's safe to pass O_LARGEFILE unconditionally since
userspace will only see the artificial offsets created by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

euleros/rtos inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA

--------------------------------

Register default sysfs groups during device_add_disk() to avoid a
race condition with udev during startup.
Signed-off-by: NWenchao Hao <haowenchao@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit 98f16e171e2849dba76e2e0346e914452c030dc5
CVE: CVE-2021-26930

--------------------------------

commit 871997bc upstream.

The function uses a goto-based loop, which may lead to an earlier error
getting discarded by a later iteration. Exit this ad-hoc loop when an
error was encountered.

The out-of-memory error path additionally fails to fill a structure
field looked at by xen_blkbk_unmap_prepare() before inspecting the
handle which does get properly set (to BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE).

Since the earlier exiting from the ad-hoc loop requires the same field
filling (invalidation) as that on the out-of-memory path, fold both
paths. While doing so, drop the pr_alert(), as extra log messages aren't
going to help the situation (the kernel will log oom conditions already
anyway).

This is XSA-365.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit f84c00fbd27b043fa42a56eaaa14e293877bc69b
CVE: CVE-2021-26931

--------------------------------

commit 7c77474b upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit 717faa776ca2163119239ea58bb78c4d732d8a4f
CVE: CVE-2021-26931

--------------------------------

commit 3194a174 upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit a01b49a9bf91a723f541139c063c1ff681ac536a
CVE: CVE-2021-26931

--------------------------------

commit 5a264285 upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit 271a3984f73c485f4c1b796a61cc5bd3994a0463
CVE: CVE-2021-26932

--------------------------------

commit 36bf1dfb upstream.

set_phys_to_machine can fail due to lack of memory, see the kzalloc call
in arch/arm/xen/p2m.c:__set_phys_to_machine_multi.

Don't ignore the potential return error in set_foreign_p2m_mapping,
returning it to the caller instead.

This is part of XSA-361.
Signed-off-by: NStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit e07f06f6bbeed5bf47fed79ac6a57ec62b33304a
CVE: CVE-2021-26932

--------------------------------

commit ebee0eab upstream.

Failure of the kernel part of the mapping operation should also be
indicated as an error to the caller, or else it may assume the
respective kernel VA is okay to access.

Furthermore gnttab_map_refs() failing still requires recording
successfully mapped handles, so they can be unmapped subsequently. This
in turn requires there to be a way to tell full hypercall failure from
partial success - preset map_op status fields such that they won't
"happen" to look as if the operation succeeded.

Also again use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit ba75f4393225c4049797388329313d1d9a5ef480
CVE: CVE-2021-26932

--------------------------------

commit dbe52836 upstream.

We may not skip setting the field in the unmap structure when
GNTMAP_device_map is in use - such an unmap would fail to release the
respective resources (a page ref in the hypervisor). Otoh the field
doesn't need setting at all when GNTMAP_device_map is not in use.

To record the value for unmapping, we also better don't use our local
p2m: In particular after a subsequent change it may not have got updated
for all the batch elements. Instead it can simply be taken from the
respective map's results.

We can additionally avoid playing this game altogether for the kernel
part of the mappings in (x86) PV mode.

This is part of XSA-361.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NStefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit c3d586afdb4474f9389eeddf6c9259e33cc0a321
CVE: CVE-2021-26932

--------------------------------

commit b512e1b0 upstream.

We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying
attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough.

Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.177
commit dfed59ee4b41b0937163dfed36752d29e72d0712
CVE: CVE-2021-26932

--------------------------------

commit a35f2ef3 upstream.

Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its
only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case
of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order
for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation
should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It
is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it
would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings
succeeded.

Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state
related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return.

This is part of XSA-361.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.173
commit 424838c0f727f1d11ce2ccaabba96f4346c03906
CVE: CVE-2021-3348

--------------------------------

commit b98e762e upstream.

When setting up a device, we can krealloc the config->socks array to add
new sockets to the configuration.  However if we happen to get a IO
request in at this point even though we aren't setup we could hit a UAF,
as we deref config->socks without any locking, assuming that the
configuration was setup already and that ->socks is safe to access it as
we have a reference on the configuration.

But there's nothing really preventing IO from occurring at this point of
the device setup, we don't want to incur the overhead of a lock to
access ->socks when it will never change while the device is running.
To fix this UAF scenario simply freeze the queue if we are adding
sockets.  This will protect us from this particular case without adding
any additional overhead for the normal running case.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit 6e7bfa046de83596c2a50f72e8ced1ee327db654
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit 34b1a1ce upstream

fixup_pi_state_owner() tries to ensure that the state of the rtmutex,
pi_state and the user space value related to the PI futex are consistent
before returning to user space. In case that the user space value update
faults and the fault cannot be resolved by faulting the page in via
fault_in_user_writeable() the function returns with -EFAULT and leaves
the rtmutex and pi_state owner state inconsistent.

A subsequent futex_unlock_pi() operates on the inconsistent pi_state and
releases the rtmutex despite not owning it which can corrupt the RB tree of
the rtmutex and cause a subsequent kernel stack use after free.

It was suggested to loop forever in fixup_pi_state_owner() if the fault
cannot be resolved, but that results in runaway tasks which is especially
undesired when the problem happens due to a programming error and not due
to malice.

As the user space value cannot be fixed up, the proper solution is to make
the rtmutex and the pi_state consistent so both have the same owner. This
leaves the user space value out of sync. Any subsequent operation on the
futex will fail because the 10th rule of PI futexes (pi_state owner and
user space value are consistent) has been violated.

As a consequence this removes the inept attempts of 'fixing' the situation
in case that the current task owns the rtmutex when returning with an
unresolvable fault by unlocking the rtmutex which left pi_state::owner and
rtmutex::owner out of sync in a different and only slightly less dangerous
way.

Fixes: 1b7558e4 ("futexes: fix fault handling in futex_lock_pi")
Reported-by: gzobqq@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit a4649185a98eb7adbdbdfdbf61237d518861e877
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit f2dac39d upstream

Too many gotos already and an upcoming fix would make it even more
unreadable.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit 9d5dbf57d66f410d35da822a115dfd57531950dc
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit 6ccc84f9 upstream

No point in open coding it. This way it gains the extra sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit 29013e4f4b73e2f5ef39a443b05c231ac29c690f
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit 2156ac19 upstream

Nothing uses the argument. Remove it as preparation to use
pi_state_update_owner().
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit 0e1501f7b1eea94991e60cc51fadb3838bb2c7cb
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit c5cade20 upstream

Updating pi_state::owner is done at several places with the same
code. Provide a function for it and use that at the obvious places.

This is also a preparation for a bug fix to avoid yet another copy of the
same code or alternatively introducing a completely unpenetratable mess of
gotos.
Originally-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit f03b21494da1ebf4ecfcb34ab647f35dc7fb7d92
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit 04b79c55 upstream

If that unexpected case of inconsistent arguments ever happens then the
futex state is left completely inconsistent and the printk is not really
helpful. Replace it with a warning and make the state consistent.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.172
commit 72f38fffa4758b878f819f8a47761b3f03443f36
CVE: CVE-2021-3347

--------------------------------

commit 12bb3f7f upstream

In case that futex_lock_pi() was aborted by a signal or a timeout and the
task returned without acquiring the rtmutex, but is the designated owner of
the futex due to a concurrent futex_unlock_pi() fixup_owner() is invoked to
establish consistent state. In that case it invokes fixup_pi_state_owner()
which in turn tries to acquire the rtmutex again. If that succeeds then it
does not propagate this success to fixup_owner() and futex_lock_pi()
returns -EINTR or -ETIMEOUT despite having the futex locked.

Return success from fixup_pi_state_owner() in all cases where the current
task owns the rtmutex and therefore the futex and propagate it correctly
through fixup_owner(). Fixup the other callsite which does not expect a
positive return value.

Fixes: c1e2f0ea ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.5-rc1
commit 51210ad5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2021-20177

--------------------------------

syzbot triggered struct net NULL deref in NF_HOOK_LIST:
RIP: 0010:NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:331 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ip6_sublist_rcv+0x5c9/0x930 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:292
 ipv6_list_rcv+0x373/0x4b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:328
 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5274 [inline]

Reason:
void ipv6_list_rcv(struct list_head *head, struct packet_type *pt,
                   struct net_device *orig_dev)
[..]
        list_for_each_entry_safe(skb, next, head, list) {
		/* iterates list */
                skb = ip6_rcv_core(skb, dev, net);
		/* ip6_rcv_core drops skb -> NULL is returned */
                if (skb == NULL)
                        continue;
	[..]
	}
	/* sublist is empty -> curr_net is NULL */
        ip6_sublist_rcv(&sublist, curr_dev, curr_net);

Before the recent change NF_HOOK_LIST did a list iteration before
struct net deref, i.e. it was a no-op in the empty list case.

List iteration now happens after *net deref, causing crash.

Follow the same pattern as the ip(v6)_list_rcv loop and add a list_empty
test for the final sublist dispatch too.

Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c54f457cad330e57e967@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: ca58fbe0 ("netfilter: add and use nf_hook_slow_list()")
Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Tested-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.5-rc1
commit ca58fbe0
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2021-20177

--------------------------------

At this time, NF_HOOK_LIST() macro will iterate the list and then calls
nf_hook() for each individual skb.

This makes it so the entire list is passed into the netfilter core.
The advantage is that we only need to fetch the rule blob once per list
instead of per-skb.

NF_HOOK_LIST now only works for ipv4 and ipv6, as those are the only
callers.

v2: use skb_list_del_init() instead of list_del (Edward Cree)
Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Conflicts:
  include/linux/netfilter.h
  net/netfilter/core.c
[yyl: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.161
commit 5460d62d661c0fc53bfe83493821b1dc3dc969f4

--------------------------------

NF_HOOK_LIST() uses list_del() to remove skb from the linked list,
however, it is not sufficient as skb->next still points to other
skb. We should just call skb_list_del_init() to clear skb->next,
like the rest places which using skb list.

This has been fixed in upstream by commit ca58fbe0
("netfilter: add and use nf_hook_slow_list()").

Fixes: 9f17dbf0 ("netfilter: fix use-after-free in NF_HOOK_LIST")
Reported-by: liuzx@knownsec.com
Tested-by: liuzx@knownsec.com
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # between 4.19 and 5.4
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.167
commit fff1180d24e68d697f98642d71444316036a81ff
CVE: CVE-2020-28374

--------------------------------

commit 2896c938 upstream.

When attempting to match EXTENDED COPY CSCD descriptors with corresponding
se_devices, target_xcopy_locate_se_dev_e4() currently iterates over LIO's
global devices list which includes all configured backstores.

This change ensures that only initiator-accessible backstores are
considered during CSCD descriptor lookup, according to the session's
se_node_acl LUN list.

To avoid LUN removal race conditions, device pinning is changed from being
configfs based to instead using the se_node_acl lun_ref.

Reference: CVE-2020-28374
Fixes: cbf031f4 ("target: Add support for EXTENDED_COPY copy offload emulation")
Reviewed-by: NLee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.11
commit 51b2ee7d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2021-3178

--------------------------------

If you export a subdirectory of a filesystem, a READDIRPLUS on the root
of that export will return the filehandle of the parent with the ".."
entry.

The filehandle is optional, so let's just not return the filehandle for
".." if we're at the root of an export.

Note that once the client learns one filehandle outside of the export,
they can trivially access the rest of the export using further lookups.

However, it is also not very difficult to guess filehandles outside of
the export.  So exporting a subdirectory of a filesystem should
considered equivalent to providing access to the entire filesystem.  To
avoid confusion, we recommend only exporting entire filesystems.
Reported-by: NYoujipeng <wangzhibei1999@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.144
commit abae259fdccc5e41ff302dd80a2b944ce385c970
CVE: CVE-2020-0465

--------------------------------

commit bce1305c upstream.

It appears that a ReportSize value of zero is legal, even if a bit
non-sensical. Most of the HID code seems to handle that gracefully,
except when computing the total size in bytes. When fed as input to
memset, this leads to some funky outcomes.

Detect the corner case and correctly compute the size.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.144
commit 37d933e8b41b83bb8278815e366aec5a542b7e31
CVE: CVE-2020-0466

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 77f4689d ]

epoll_loop_check_proc() can run into a file already committed to destruction;
we can't grab a reference on those and don't need to add them to the set for
reverse path check anyway.
Tested-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Fixes: a9ed4a65 ("epoll: Keep a reference on files added to the check list")
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.142
commit dcb6e6efb3298e59d90ee05c6ed33de810314892
CVE: CVE-2020-0466

--------------------------------

commit 52c47969 upstream.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from linux-4.19.142
commit 4957d56414ff5ca8fe62f8f11f0f9814f35b1d11
CVE: CVE-2020-0466

--------------------------------

commit a9ed4a65 upstream.

When adding a new fd to an epoll, and that this new fd is an
epoll fd itself, we recursively scan the fds attached to it
to detect cycles, and add non-epool files to a "check list"
that gets subsequently parsed.

However, this check list isn't completely safe when deletions
can happen concurrently. To sidestep the issue, make sure that
a struct file placed on the check list sees its f_count increased,
ensuring that a concurrent deletion won't result in the file
disapearing from under our feet.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>