- 09 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ville Syrjälä 提交于
The caller expects %rdi to remain intact, push+pop it make that happen. Fixes the following kind of explosions on my core2duo machine when trying to reboot or shut down: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper cfbfillrect syscopyarea cfbimgblt sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cfbcopyarea drm netconsole configfs binfmt_misc iTCO_wdt psmouse pcspkr snd_hda_codec_idt e100 coretemp hwmon snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_i801 mii i2c_smbus lpc_ich mfd_core snd_hda_intel uhci_hcd snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ehci_pci 8250 ehci_hcd snd_pcm 8250_base usbcore evdev serial_core usb_common parport_pc parport snd_timer snd soundcore CPU: 0 PID: 3070 Comm: reboot Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1-perf-dirty #69 Hardware name: /D946GZIS, BIOS TS94610J.86A.0087.2007.1107.1049 11/07/2007 task: ffff88012a0b4080 task.stack: ffff880123850000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81003c92>] [<ffffffff81003c92>] x86_perf_event_update+0x52/0xc0 RSP: 0018:ffff880123853b60 EFLAGS: 00010087 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88012fc0a3c0 RCX: 000000000000001e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000040000000 RDI: ffff88012b014800 RBP: ffff880123853b88 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffea0004a012c0 R11: ffffea0004acedc0 R12: ffffffff80000001 R13: ffff88012b0149c0 R14: ffff88012b014800 R15: 0000000000000018 FS: 00007f8b155cd700(0000) GS:ffff88012fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8b155f5000 CR3: 000000012a2d7000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88012fc0a3c0 ffff88012b014800 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 ffff88012fc1b750 ffff880123853bb0 ffffffff81003d59 ffff88012b014800 ffff88012fc0a3c0 ffff88012b014800 ffff880123853bd8 ffffffff81003e13 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81003d59>] x86_pmu_stop+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81003e13>] x86_pmu_del+0x43/0x140 [<ffffffff8111705d>] event_sched_out.isra.105+0xbd/0x260 [<ffffffff8111738d>] __perf_remove_from_context+0x2d/0xb0 [<ffffffff8111745d>] __perf_event_exit_context+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff810c8826>] generic_exec_single+0xb6/0x140 [<ffffffff81117410>] ? __perf_remove_from_context+0xb0/0xb0 [<ffffffff81117410>] ? __perf_remove_from_context+0xb0/0xb0 [<ffffffff810c898f>] smp_call_function_single+0xdf/0x140 [<ffffffff81113d27>] perf_event_exit_cpu_context+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff81113d73>] perf_reboot+0x13/0x40 [<ffffffff8107578a>] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x70 [<ffffffff81075ad7>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x60 [<ffffffff81075b06>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff81076a1d>] kernel_restart_prepare+0x1d/0x40 [<ffffffff81076ae2>] kernel_restart+0x12/0x60 [<ffffffff81076d56>] SYSC_reboot+0xf6/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811a823c>] ? mntput_no_expire+0x2c/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811a83e4>] ? mntput+0x24/0x40 [<ffffffff811894fc>] ? __fput+0x16c/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811895ae>] ? ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81072fc3>] ? task_work_run+0x83/0xa0 [<ffffffff81001623>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x53/0xc0 [<ffffffff8100105a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [<ffffffff81076e6e>] SyS_reboot+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff814c4ba5>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa3 Code: 7c 4c 8d af c0 01 00 00 49 89 fe eb 10 48 09 c2 4c 89 e0 49 0f b1 55 00 4c 39 e0 74 35 4d 8b a6 c0 01 00 00 41 8b 8e 60 01 00 00 <0f> 33 8b 35 6e 02 8c 00 48 c1 e2 20 85 f6 7e d2 48 89 d3 89 cf RIP [<ffffffff81003c92>] x86_perf_event_update+0x52/0xc0 RSP <ffff880123853b60> ---[ end trace 7ec95181faf211be ]--- note: reboot[3070] exited with preempt_count 2 Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Fixes: f5967101 ("x86/hweight: Get rid of the special calling convention") Signed-off-by: NVille Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 04 8月, 2016 8 次提交
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由 Krzysztof Kozlowski 提交于
The dma-mapping core and the implementations do not change the DMA attributes passed by pointer. Thus the pointer can point to const data. However the attributes do not have to be a bitfield. Instead unsigned long will do fine: 1. This is just simpler. Both in terms of reading the code and setting attributes. Instead of initializing local attributes on the stack and passing pointer to it to dma_set_attr(), just set the bits. 2. It brings safeness and checking for const correctness because the attributes are passed by value. Semantic patches for this change (at least most of them): virtual patch virtual context @r@ identifier f, attrs; @@ f(..., - struct dma_attrs *attrs + unsigned long attrs , ...) { ... } @@ identifier r.f; @@ f(..., - NULL + 0 ) and // Options: --all-includes virtual patch virtual context @r@ identifier f, attrs; type t; @@ t f(..., struct dma_attrs *attrs); @@ identifier r.f; @@ f(..., - NULL + 0 ) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468399300-5399-2-git-send-email-k.kozlowski@samsung.comSigned-off-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com> Acked-by: NVineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Acked-by: NRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Acked-by: NHans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> [c6x] Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> [cris] Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> [drm] Reviewed-by: NBart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> [iommu] Acked-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@st.com> [bdisp] Reviewed-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> [vb2-core] Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [xen] Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [xen swiotlb] Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> [iommu] Acked-by: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> [hexagon] Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> [s390] Acked-by: NBjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Acked-by: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> [avr32] Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> [arc] Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> [arm64 and dma-iommu] Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Masahiro Yamada 提交于
The use of config_enabled() against config options is ambiguous. In practical terms, config_enabled() is equivalent to IS_BUILTIN(), but the author might have used it for the meaning of IS_ENABLED(). Using IS_ENABLED(), IS_BUILTIN(), IS_MODULE() etc. makes the intention clearer. This commit replaces config_enabled() with IS_ENABLED() where possible. This commit is only touching bool config options. I noticed two cases where config_enabled() is used against a tristate option: - config_enabled(CONFIG_HWMON) [ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/thermal.c ] - config_enabled(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE) [ drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/opregion.c ] I did not touch them because they should be converted to IS_BUILTIN() in order to keep the logic, but I was not sure it was the authors' intention. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465215656-20569-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru> Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com> Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org> Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Nikolay Martynov <mar.kolya@gmail.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@imgtec.com> Cc: Rafal Milecki <zajec5@gmail.com> Cc: James Cowgill <James.Cowgill@imgtec.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Alex Smith <alex.smith@imgtec.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@imgtec.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: Tony Wu <tung7970@gmail.com> Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Bandan Das 提交于
Commit 4b855078 ("KVM: nVMX: Don't advertise single context invalidation for invept") removed advertising single context invalidation since the spec does not mandate it. However, some hypervisors (such as ESX) require it to be present before willing to use ept in a nested environment. Advertise it and fallback to the global case. Signed-off-by: NBandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Bandan Das 提交于
Nested vpid is already supported and both single/global modes are advertised to the guest Signed-off-by: NBandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Wanpeng Li 提交于
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000008c IP: [<ffffffffc04e0180>] kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use+0x10/0x20 [kvm] PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Call Trace: kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x86/0x260 [kvm] vcpu_load+0x46/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x79/0x7c0 [kvm] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70 do_vfs_ioctl+0x96/0x6a0 ? __fget_light+0x2a/0x90 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP [<ffffffffc04e0180>] kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use+0x10/0x20 [kvm] RSP <ffff8800db1f3d70> CR2: 000000000000008c ---[ end trace a55fb79d2b3b4ee8 ]--- This can be reproduced steadily by kernel_irqchip=off. We should not access preemption timer stuff if lapic is emulated in userspace. This patch fix it by avoiding access preemption timer stuff when kernel_irqchip=off. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
The new simplified __pvclock_read_cycles does the same computation as vread_pvclock, except that (because it takes the pvclock_vcpu_time_info pointer) it has to be moved inside the loop. Since the loop is expected to never roll, this makes no difference. Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
The version field in struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info basically implements a seqcount. Wrap it with the usual read_begin and read_retry functions, and use these APIs instead of peppering the code with smp_rmb()s. While at it, change it to the more pedantically correct virt_rmb(). With this change, __pvclock_read_cycles can be simplified noticeably. Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Vegard Nossum 提交于
This adds support for kcov to UML. There is a small problem where UML will randomly segfault during boot; this is because current_thread_info() occasionally returns an invalid (non-NULL) pointer and we try to dereference it in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). I consider this a bug in UML itself and this patch merely exposes it. [v2: disable instrumentation in UML-specific code] Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel <user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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- 03 8月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于
When CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is set on x86-64, __PAGE_OFFSET becomes a variable and using it as a symbol in the image memory restoration assembly code under core_restore_code is not correct any more. To avoid that problem, modify set_up_temporary_mappings() to compute the physical address of the temporary page tables and store it in temp_level4_pgt, so that the value of that variable is ready to be written into CR3. Then, the assembly code doesn't have to worry about converting that value into a physical address and things work regardless of whether or not CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is set. Reported-and-tested-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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由 Petr Tesarik 提交于
If a crash kernel is loaded, do not crash the running domain. This is needed if the kernel is loaded with crash_kexec_post_notifiers, because panic notifiers are run before __crash_kexec() in that case, and this Xen hook prevents its being called later. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix: unconditionally include kexec.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160713122000.14969.99963.stgit@hananiah.suse.czSigned-off-by: NPetr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
In general, there's no need for the "restore sigmask" flag to live in ti->flags. alpha, ia64, microblaze, powerpc, sh, sparc (64-bit only), tile, and x86 use essentially identical alternative implementations, placing the flag in ti->status. Replace those optimized implementations with an equally good common implementation that stores it in a bitfield in struct task_struct and drop the custom implementations. Additional architectures can opt in by removing their TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK defines. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8a14321d64a28e40adfddc90e18a96c086a6d6f9.1468522723.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Fabian Frederick 提交于
There was only one use of __initdata_refok and __exit_refok __init_refok was used 46 times against 82 for __ref. Those definitions are obsolete since commit 312b1485 ("Introduce new section reference annotations tags: __ref, __refdata, __refconst") This patch removes the following compatibility definitions and replaces them treewide. /* compatibility defines */ #define __init_refok __ref #define __initdata_refok __refdata #define __exit_refok __ref I can also provide separate patches if necessary. (One patch per tree and check in 1 month or 2 to remove old definitions) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466796271-3043-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.beSigned-off-by: NFabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 01 8月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
Kexec needs to know the addresses of all VMCSs that are active on each CPU, so that it can flush them from the VMCS caches. It is safe to record superfluous addresses that are not associated with an active VMCS, but it is not safe to omit an address associated with an active VMCS. After a call to vmcs_load, the VMCS that was loaded is active on the CPU. The VMCS should be added to the CPU's list of active VMCSs before it is loaded. Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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由 David Matlack 提交于
KVM maintains L1's current VMCS in guest memory, at the guest physical page identified by the argument to VMPTRLD. This makes hairy time-of-check to time-of-use bugs possible,as VCPUs can be writing the the VMCS page in memory while KVM is emulating VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME. The spec documents that writing to the VMCS page while it is loaded is "undefined". Therefore it is reasonable to load the entire VMCS into an internal cache during VMPTRLD and ignore writes to the VMCS page -- the guest should be using VMREAD and VMWRITE to access the current VMCS. To adhere to the spec, KVM should flush the current VMCS during VMPTRLD, and the target VMCS during VMCLEAR (as given by the operand to VMCLEAR). Since this implementation of VMCS caching only maintains the the current VMCS, VMCLEAR will only do a flush if the operand to VMCLEAR is the current VMCS pointer. KVM will also flush during VMXOFF, which is not mandated by the spec, but also not in conflict with the spec. Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
It is known that PMU isn't working in some virtualized environments. Modify the message issued in that case to mention why hardware PMU isn't usable instead of reporting it to be broken. As a side effect this will correct a little bug in the error message: The error message was meant to be either of level err or info depending on the environment (native or virtualized). As the level is taken from the format string and not the printed string, specifying it via %s and a conditional argument didn't work the way intended. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470051427-16795-1-git-send-email-jgross@suse.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
x86_64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than calling sys_keyctl(). The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby hiding the issue. Reported-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Tested-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/146961615805.14395.5581949237156769439.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 29 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
In kernel bug 150021, a kernel panic was reported when restoring a hibernate image. Only a picture of the oops was reported, so I can't paste the whole thing here. But here are the most interesting parts: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8804615cfd78 ... RIP: ffff8804615cfd78 RSP: ffff8804615f0000 RBP: ffff8804615cfdc0 ... Call Trace: do_signal+0x23 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x64 ... The RIP is on the same page as RBP, so it apparently started executing on the stack. The bug was bisected to commit ef0f3ed5 (x86/asm/power: Create stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S), which in retrospect seems quite dangerous, since that code saves and restores the stack pointer from a global variable ('saved_context'). There are a lot of moving parts in the hibernate save and restore paths, so I don't know exactly what caused the panic. Presumably, a FRAME_END was executed without the corresponding FRAME_BEGIN, or vice versa. That would corrupt the return address on the stack and would be consistent with the details of the above panic. [ rjw: One major problem is that by the time the FRAME_BEGIN in restore_registers() is executed, the stack pointer value may not be valid any more. Namely, the stack area pointed to by it previously may have been overwritten by some image memory contents and that page frame may now be used for whatever different purpose it had been allocated for before hibernation. In that case, the FRAME_BEGIN will corrupt that memory. ] Instead of doing the frame pointer save/restore around the bounds of the affected functions, just do it around the call to swsusp_save(). That has the same effect of ensuring that if swsusp_save() sleeps, the frame pointers will be correct. It's also a much more obviously safe way to do it than the original patch. And objtool still doesn't report any warnings. Fixes: ef0f3ed5 (x86/asm/power: Create stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S) Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=150021 Cc: 4.6+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+ Reported-by: NAndre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org> Tested-by: NAndre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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- 27 7月, 2016 9 次提交
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
... in order to avoid #ifdeffery in code computing the ASLR randomization offset. Remove that #ifdeffery in the microcode loader. Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160727120939.GA18911@nazgul.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit. (The former isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently entirely insecure if a malicious ptracer is attached.) As a minimal fix, this patch adds a new flag TS_I386_REGS_POKED that handles the ptrace special case. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5383ebed38b39fa37462139e337aff7f2314d1ca.1469599803.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
We always have vma->vm_mm around. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-8-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Vladimir Davydov 提交于
Page tables can bite a relatively big chunk off system memory and their allocations are easy to trigger from userspace, so they should be accounted to kmemcg. This patch marks page table allocations as __GFP_ACCOUNT for x86. Note we must not charge allocations of kernel page tables, because they can be shared among processes from different cgroups so accounting them to a particular one can pin other cgroups for indefinitely long. So we clear __GFP_ACCOUNT flag if a page table is allocated for the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7d5c54f6a2bcbe76f03171689440003d87e6c742.1464079538.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Before, the stack protector flag was sanity checked before .config had been reprocessed. This meant the build couldn't be aborted early, and only a warning could be emitted followed later by the compiler blowing up with an unknown flag. This has caused a lot of confusion over time, so this splits the flag selection from sanity checking and performs the sanity checking after the make has been restarted from a reprocessed .config, so builds can be aborted as early as possible now. Additionally moves the x86-specific sanity check to the same location, since it suffered from the same warn-then-wait-for-compiler-failure problem. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160712223043.GA11664@www.outflux.netSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Before, the stack protector flag was sanity checked before .config had been reprocessed. This meant the build couldn't be aborted early, and only a warning could be emitted followed later by the compiler blowing up with an unknown flag. This has caused a lot of confusion over time, so this splits the flag selection from sanity checking and performs the sanity checking after the make has been restarted from a reprocessed .config, so builds can be aborted as early as possible now. Additionally moves the x86-specific sanity check to the same location, since it suffered from the same warn-then-wait-for-compiler-failure problem. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user(). Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: NValdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This creates per-architecture function arch_within_stack_frames() that should validate if a given object is contained by a kernel stack frame. Initial implementation is on x86. This is based on code from PaX. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y randomizes the physical memmap and thus the address where the initrd is located. Therefore, we need to add the offset KASLR put us to in order to find the initrd again on the AP path. In the future, we will get rid of the initrd address caching and query the address on both the BSP and AP paths but that would need more work. Thanks to Nicolai Stange for the good bisection and debugging work. Reported-and-tested-by: NNicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160726095138.3470-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 26 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
pv_time_ops might be overwritten with xen_time_ops after the steal_clock operation has been initialized already. To prevent calling a now uninitialized function pointer add the steal_clock static initialization to xen_time_ops. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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- 25 7月, 2016 7 次提交
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由 Stephen Rothwell 提交于
To be clear: this is a ppc64le hosted, x86_64 target cross build. Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160723150845.3af8e452@canb.auug.org.auSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
Historically we didn't call VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info for CPU0 for PVHVM guests (while we had it for PV and ARM guests). This is usually fine as we can use vcpu info in the shared_info page but when we try booting on a vCPU with Xen's vCPU id > 31 (e.g. when we try to kdump after crashing on this CPU) we're not able to boot. Switch to always doing VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info for the boot CPU. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
shared_info page has space for 32 vcpu info slots for first 32 vCPUs but these are the first 32 vCPUs from Xen's perspective and we should map them accordingly with the newly introduced xen_vcpu_id mapping. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op() passes Linux's idea of vCPU id as a parameter while Xen's idea is expected. In some cases these ideas diverge so we need to do remapping. Convert all callers of HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op() to use xen_vcpu_nr(). Leave xen_fill_possible_map() and xen_filter_cpu_maps() intact as they're only being called by PV guests before perpu areas are initialized. While the issue could be solved by switching to early_percpu for xen_vcpu_id I think it's not worth it: PV guests will probably never get to the point where their idea of vCPU id diverges from Xen's. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
It may happen that Xen's and Linux's ideas of vCPU id diverge. In particular, when we crash on a secondary vCPU we may want to do kdump and unlike plain kexec where we do migrate_to_reboot_cpu() we try booting on the vCPU which crashed. This doesn't work very well for PVHVM guests as we have a number of hypercalls where we pass vCPU id as a parameter. These hypercalls either fail or do something unexpected. To solve the issue introduce percpu xen_vcpu_id mapping. ARM and PV guests get direct mapping for now. Boot CPU for PVHVM guest gets its id from CPUID. With secondary CPUs it is a bit more trickier. Currently, we initialize IPI vectors before these CPUs boot so we can't use CPUID. Use ACPI ids from MADT instead. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
Currently we don't save ACPI ids (unlike LAPIC ids which go to x86_cpu_to_apicid) from MADT and we may need this information later. Particularly, ACPI ids is the only existent way for a PVHVM Xen guest to figure out Xen's idea of its vCPUs ids before these CPUs boot and in some cases these ids diverge from Linux's cpu ids. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
Update cpuid.h header from xen hypervisor tree to get XEN_HVM_CPUID_VCPU_ID_PRESENT definition. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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- 24 7月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
In commit: 21cbc2822aa1 ("x86/mm/cpa: Unbreak populate_pgd(): stop trying to deallocate failed PUDs") I intended to add this comment, but I failed at using git. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/242baf8612394f4e31216f96d13c4d2e9b90d1b7.1469293159.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Valdis Kletnieks bisected a boot failure back to this recent commit: 360cb4d1 ("x86/mm/cpa: In populate_pgd(), don't set the PGD entry until it's populated") I broke the case where a PUD table got allocated -- populate_pud() would wander off a pgd_none entry and get lost. I'm not sure how this survived my testing. Fix the original issue in a much simpler way. The problem was that, if we allocated a PUD table, failed to populate it, and freed it, another CPU could potentially keep using the PGD entry we installed (either by copying it via vmalloc_fault or by speculatively caching it). There's a straightforward fix: simply leave the top-level entry in place if this happens. This can't waste any significant amount of memory -- there are at most 256 entries like this systemwide and, as a practical matter, if we hit this failure path repeatedly, we're likely to reuse the same page anyway. For context, this is a reversion with this hunk added in: if (ret < 0) { + /* + * Leave the PUD page in place in case some other CPU or thread + * already found it, but remove any useless entries we just + * added to it. + */ - unmap_pgd_range(cpa->pgd, addr, + unmap_pud_range(pgd_entry, addr, addr + (cpa->numpages << PAGE_SHIFT)); return ret; } This effectively open-codes what the now-deleted unmap_pgd_range() function used to do except that unmap_pgd_range() used to try to free the page as well. Reported-by: NValdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/21cbc2822aa18aa812c0215f4231dbf5f65afa7f.1469249789.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Dan Williams 提交于
The pcommit instruction is being deprecated in favor of either ADR (asynchronous DRAM refresh: flush-on-power-fail) at the platform level, or posted-write-queue flush addresses as defined by the ACPI 6.x NFIT (NVDIMM Firmware Interface Table). Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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由 Dan Williams 提交于
This reverts commit 8b3e34e4. Given the deprecation of the pcommit instruction, the relevant VMX features and CPUID bits are not going to be rolled into the SDM. Remove their usage from KVM. Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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