1. 07 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  2. 15 1月, 2020 3 次提交
  3. 02 1月, 2020 1 次提交
  4. 16 12月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 14 12月, 2019 1 次提交
  6. 13 12月, 2019 4 次提交
  7. 22 11月, 2019 7 次提交
  8. 09 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 08 11月, 2019 5 次提交
  10. 11 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  11. 08 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  12. 04 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  13. 01 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  14. 11 9月, 2019 5 次提交
    • J
      mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization · 3e493173
      Jouni Malinen 提交于
      The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
      to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
      reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
      something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
      before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
      recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
      802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
      IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
      maintained amd should not be used anymore.
      
      Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
      fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
      authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
      association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
      RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
      fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
      authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
      triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
      behavior.
      
      Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
      station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
      authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
      entry has already been authorized.
      Signed-off-by: NJouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
      Reviewed-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3e493173
    • W
      mac80211: allow drivers to set max MTU · 06354665
      Wen Gong 提交于
      Make it possibly for drivers to adjust the default max_mtu
      by storing it in the hardware struct and using that value
      for all interfaces.
      Signed-off-by: NWen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1567738137-31748-1-git-send-email-wgong@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      06354665
    • J
      mac80211: IBSS: send deauth when expiring inactive STAs · 4b08d1b6
      Johannes Berg 提交于
      When we expire an inactive station, try to send it a deauth. This
      helps if it's actually still around, and just has issues with
      beacon distribution (or we do), and it will not also remove us.
      Then, if we have shared state, this may not be reset properly,
      causing problems; for example, we saw a case where aggregation
      sessions weren't removed properly (due to the TX start being
      offloaded to firmware and it relying on deauth for stop), causing
      a lot of traffic to get lost due to the SN reset after remove/add
      of the peer.
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-9-luca@coelho.fiSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      4b08d1b6
    • L
      mac80211: don't check if key is NULL in ieee80211_key_link() · 753a9a72
      Luca Coelho 提交于
      We already assume that key is not NULL and dereference it in a few
      other places before we check whether it is NULL, so the check is
      unnecessary.  Remove it.
      
      Fixes: 96fc6efb ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support")
      Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-8-luca@coelho.fiSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      753a9a72
    • L
      mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable · 624ff4b2
      Lior Cohen 提交于
      In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to
      non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending
      counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value.
      
      The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational
      for the delayed tailroom needed:
      
      	/*
      	* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
      	* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
      	* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
      	* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
      	* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
      	* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
      	* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
      	* zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
      	*
      	* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
      	* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
      	* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
      	* within an ESS this usually won't happen.
      	*/
      
      The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug:
      1. Disconnect from encrypted AP
      2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key
      3. Schedule work
      4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP
      5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1
      6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning
      
      While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into
      its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called
      ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
      and remove the counters warning as we just reset both.
      Signed-off-by: NLior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fiSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      624ff4b2