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  1. 22 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 10 8月, 2009 2 次提交
  5. 03 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 07 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 31 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • M
      proc: fix sparse warnings in pagemap_read() · 09729a99
      由 Milind Arun Choudhary 提交于 
      fs/proc/task_mmu.c:696:12: warning: cast removes address space of expression
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:696:9: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:696:9:    expected unsigned long long [noderef] [usertype] <asn:1>*out
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:696:9:    got unsigned long long [usertype] *<noident>
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:697:12: warning: cast removes address space of expression
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:697:9: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:697:9:    expected unsigned long long [noderef] [usertype] <asn:1>*end
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:697:9:    got unsigned long long [usertype] *<noident>
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:723:12: warning: cast removes address space of expression
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:723:26: error: subtraction of different types can't work (different address spaces)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c:725:24: error: subtraction of different types can't work (different address spaces)
Signed-off-by: NMilind Arun Choudhary <milindchoudhary@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      09729a99
  11. 07 1月, 2009 2 次提交
  13. 11 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  15. 23 10月, 2008 1 次提交
    • J
      proc: fix vma display mismatch between /proc/pid/{maps,smaps} · 7c88db0c
      由 Joe Korty 提交于 
      Commit 4752c369 aka
"maps4: simplify interdependence of maps and smaps" broke /proc/pid/smaps,
causing it to display some vmas twice and other vmas not at all.  For example:

    grep .- /proc/1/smaps >/tmp/smaps; diff /proc/1/maps /tmp/smaps

    1  25d24
    2  < 7fd7e23aa000-7fd7e23ac000 rw-p 7fd7e23aa000 00:00 0
    3  28a28
    4  > ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0  [vsyscall]

The bug has something to do with setting m->version before all the
seq_printf's have been performed.  show_map was doing this correctly,
but show_smap was doing this in the middle of its seq_printf sequence.
This patch arranges things so that the setting of m->version in show_smap
is also done at the end of its seq_printf sequence.

Testing: in addition to the above grep test, for each process I summed
up the 'Rss' fields of /proc/pid/smaps and compared that to the 'VmRSS'
field of /proc/pid/status.  All matched except for Xorg (which has a
/dev/mem mapping which Rss accounts for but VmRSS does not).  This result
gives us some confidence that neither /proc/pid/maps nor /proc/pid/smaps
are any longer skipping or double-counting vmas.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Korty <joe.korty@ccur.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      7c88db0c
  17. 10 10月, 2008 1 次提交
  19. 21 8月, 2008 1 次提交
    • C
      /proc/self/maps doesn't display the real file offset · 1804dc6e
      由 Clement Calmels 提交于 
      This addresses

	http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11318

In function show_map (file: fs/proc/task_mmu.c), if vma->vm_pgoff > 2^20
than (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SIZE) is greater than 2^32 (with PAGE_SIZE
equal to 4096 (i.e.  2^12).  The next seq_printf use an unsigned long for
the conversion of (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SIZE), as a result the offset
value displayed in /proc/self/maps is truncated if the page offset is
greater than 2^20.

A test that shows this issue:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>

#define PAGE_SIZE (getpagesize())

#if __i386__
#   define U64_STR "%llx"
#elif __x86_64
#   define U64_STR "%lx"
#else
#   error "Architecture Unsupported"
#endif

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	int fd;
	char *addr;
	off64_t offset = 0x10000000;
	char *filename = "/dev/zero";

	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd < 0) {
		perror("open");
		return 1;
	}

	offset *= 0x10;
	printf("offset = " U64_STR "\n", offset);

	addr = (char*)mmap64(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd,
			     offset);
	if ((void*)addr == MAP_FAILED) {
		perror("mmap64");
		return 1;
	}

	{
		FILE *fmaps;
		char *line = NULL;
		size_t len = 0;
		ssize_t read;
		size_t filename_len = strlen(filename);

		fmaps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
		if (!fmaps) {
			perror("fopen");
			return 1;
		}
		while ((read = getline(&line, &len, fmaps)) != -1) {
			if ((read > filename_len + 1)
			    && (strncmp(&line[read - filename_len - 1], filename, filename_len) == 0))
				printf("%s", line);
		}

		if (line)
			free(line);

		fclose(fmaps);
	}

	close(fd);
	return 0;
}

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NClement Calmels <cboulte@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1804dc6e
  21. 23 7月, 2008 1 次提交
  23. 14 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • S
      Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach · 006ebb40
      由 Stephen Smalley 提交于 
      Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      006ebb40
  25. 06 7月, 2008 2 次提交
  27. 13 6月, 2008 2 次提交
  29. 07 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  31. 09 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  33. 29 4月, 2008 1 次提交
    • M
      procfs task exe symlink · 925d1c40
      由 Matt Helsley 提交于 
      The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
the first executable VMA.  Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
reported as the result.

Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems.  Instead of
walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.

That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs.  So we track the number
of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
unmapped.  This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
[yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
Signed-off-by: NMatt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NYAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      925d1c40
  35. 28 4月, 2008 2 次提交
  37. 23 3月, 2008 1 次提交
  39. 14 3月, 2008 1 次提交
  41. 24 2月, 2008 1 次提交
  43. 15 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  45. 09 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  47. 06 2月, 2008 7 次提交
  49. 03 1月, 2008 1 次提交
  51. 09 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • K
      proc: maps protection · 5096add8
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes.  Issues:

- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
  kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
  check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
  process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file.  (For reference
  see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
  non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.

This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents.  To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5096add8
  53. 08 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • D
      smaps: add clear_refs file to clear reference · b813e931
      由 David Rientjes 提交于 
      Adds /proc/pid/clear_refs.  When any non-zero number is written to this file,
pte_mkold() and ClearPageReferenced() is called for each pte and its
corresponding page, respectively, in that task's VMAs.  This file is only
writable by the user who owns the task.

It is now possible to measure _approximately_ how much memory a task is using
by clearing the reference bits with

	echo 1 > /proc/pid/clear_refs

and checking the reference count for each VMA from the /proc/pid/smaps output
at a measured time interval.  For example, to observe the approximate change
in memory footprint for a task, write a script that clears the references
(echo 1 > /proc/pid/clear_refs), sleeps, and then greps for Pgs_Referenced and
extracts the size in kB.  Add the sizes for each VMA together for the total
referenced footprint.  Moments later, repeat the process and observe the
difference.

For example, using an efficient Mozilla:

	accumulated time		referenced memory
	----------------		-----------------
		 0 s				 408 kB
		 1 s				 408 kB
		 2 s				 556 kB
		 3 s				1028 kB
		 4 s				 872 kB
		 5 s				1956 kB
		 6 s				 416 kB
		 7 s				1560 kB
		 8 s				2336 kB
		 9 s				1044 kB
		10 s				 416 kB

This is a valuable tool to get an approximate measurement of the memory
footprint for a task.

Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[mpm@selenic.com: rename for_each_pmd]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b813e931