1. 21 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  2. 18 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • D
      iomap: iomap that extends beyond EOF should be marked dirty · 7684e2c4
      Dave Chinner 提交于
      When doing a direct IO that spans the current EOF, and there are
      written blocks beyond EOF that extend beyond the current write, the
      only metadata update that needs to be done is a file size extension.
      
      However, we don't mark such iomaps as IOMAP_F_DIRTY to indicate that
      there is IO completion metadata updates required, and hence we may
      fail to correctly sync file size extensions made in IO completion
      when O_DSYNC writes are being used and the hardware supports FUA.
      
      Hence when setting IOMAP_F_DIRTY, we need to also take into account
      whether the iomap spans the current EOF. If it does, then we need to
      mark it dirty so that IO completion will call generic_write_sync()
      to flush the inode size update to stable storage correctly.
      
      Fixes: 3460cac1 ("iomap: Use FUA for pure data O_DSYNC DIO writes")
      Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      [darrick: removed the ext4 part; they'll handle it separately]
      Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      7684e2c4
  3. 15 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  4. 12 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 11 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • B
      SUNRPC: fix race to sk_err after xs_error_report · af84537d
      Benjamin Coddington 提交于
      Since commit 4f8943f8 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from
      softirq context") there has been a race to the value of the sk_err if both
      XPRT_SOCK_WAKE_ERROR and XPRT_SOCK_WAKE_DISCONNECT are set.  In that case,
      we may end up losing the sk_err value that existed when xs_error_report was
      called.
      
      Fix this by reverting to the previous behavior: instead of using SO_ERROR
      to retrieve the value at a later time (which might also return sk_err_soft),
      copy the sk_err value onto struct sock_xprt, and use that value to wake
      pending tasks.
      Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
      Fixes: 4f8943f8 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from softirq context")
      Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
      af84537d
  6. 09 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 08 10月, 2019 9 次提交
    • A
      lib/string: Make memzero_explicit() inline instead of external · bec50077
      Arvind Sankar 提交于
      With the use of the barrier implied by barrier_data(), there is no need
      for memzero_explicit() to be extern. Making it inline saves the overhead
      of a function call, and allows the code to be reused in arch/*/purgatory
      without having to duplicate the implementation.
      Tested-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NArvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
      Reviewed-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
      Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 906a4bb9 ("crypto: sha256 - Use get/put_unaligned_be32 to get input, memzero_explicit")
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007220000.GA408752@rani.riverdale.lanSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      bec50077
    • V
      mm, sl[aou]b: guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc(power-of-two) · 59bb4798
      Vlastimil Babka 提交于
      In most configurations, kmalloc() happens to return naturally aligned
      (i.e.  aligned to the block size itself) blocks for power of two sizes.
      
      That means some kmalloc() users might unknowingly rely on that
      alignment, until stuff breaks when the kernel is built with e.g.
      CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG or CONFIG_SLOB, and blocks stop being aligned.  Then
      developers have to devise workaround such as own kmem caches with
      specified alignment [1], which is not always practical, as recently
      evidenced in [2].
      
      The topic has been discussed at LSF/MM 2019 [3].  Adding a
      'kmalloc_aligned()' variant would not help with code unknowingly relying
      on the implicit alignment.  For slab implementations it would either
      require creating more kmalloc caches, or allocate a larger size and only
      give back part of it.  That would be wasteful, especially with a generic
      alignment parameter (in contrast with a fixed alignment to size).
      
      Ideally we should provide to mm users what they need without difficult
      workarounds or own reimplementations, so let's make the kmalloc()
      alignment to size explicitly guaranteed for power-of-two sizes under all
      configurations.  What this means for the three available allocators?
      
      * SLAB object layout happens to be mostly unchanged by the patch.  The
        implicitly provided alignment could be compromised with
        CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB due to redzoning, however SLAB disables redzoning for
        caches with alignment larger than unsigned long long.  Practically on at
        least x86 this includes kmalloc caches as they use cache line alignment,
        which is larger than that.  Still, this patch ensures alignment on all
        arches and cache sizes.
      
      * SLUB layout is also unchanged unless redzoning is enabled through
        CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and boot parameter for the particular kmalloc cache.
        With this patch, explicit alignment is guaranteed with redzoning as
        well.  This will result in more memory being wasted, but that should be
        acceptable in a debugging scenario.
      
      * SLOB has no implicit alignment so this patch adds it explicitly for
        kmalloc().  The potential downside is increased fragmentation.  While
        pathological allocation scenarios are certainly possible, in my testing,
        after booting a x86_64 kernel+userspace with virtme, around 16MB memory
        was consumed by slab pages both before and after the patch, with
        difference in the noise.
      
      [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c3157c8e8e0e7588312b40c853f65c02fe6c957a.1566399731.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
      [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190225040904.5557-1-ming.lei@redhat.com/
      [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/787740/
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: documentation fixlet, per Matthew]
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826111627.7505-3-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Acked-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      59bb4798
    • C
      mm, memcg: make scan aggression always exclude protection · 1bc63fb1
      Chris Down 提交于
      This patch is an incremental improvement on the existing
      memory.{low,min} relative reclaim work to base its scan pressure
      calculations on how much protection is available compared to the current
      usage, rather than how much the current usage is over some protection
      threshold.
      
      This change doesn't change the experience for the user in the normal
      case too much.  One benefit is that it replaces the (somewhat arbitrary)
      100% cutoff with an indefinite slope, which makes it easier to ballpark
      a memory.low value.
      
      As well as this, the old methodology doesn't quite apply generically to
      machines with varying amounts of physical memory.  Let's say we have a
      top level cgroup, workload.slice, and another top level cgroup,
      system-management.slice.  We want to roughly give 12G to
      system-management.slice, so on a 32GB machine we set memory.low to 20GB
      in workload.slice, and on a 64GB machine we set memory.low to 52GB.
      However, because these are relative amounts to the total machine size,
      while the amount of memory we want to generally be willing to yield to
      system.slice is absolute (12G), we end up putting more pressure on
      system.slice just because we have a larger machine and a larger workload
      to fill it, which seems fairly unintuitive.  With this new behaviour, we
      don't end up with this unintended side effect.
      
      Previously the way that memory.low protection works is that if you are
      50% over a certain baseline, you get 50% of your normal scan pressure.
      This is certainly better than the previous cliff-edge behaviour, but it
      can be improved even further by always considering memory under the
      currently enforced protection threshold to be out of bounds.  This means
      that we can set relatively low memory.low thresholds for variable or
      bursty workloads while still getting a reasonable level of protection,
      whereas with the previous version we may still trivially hit the 100%
      clamp.  The previous 100% clamp is also somewhat arbitrary, whereas this
      one is more concretely based on the currently enforced protection
      threshold, which is likely easier to reason about.
      
      There is also a subtle issue with the way that proportional reclaim
      worked previously -- it promotes having no memory.low, since it makes
      pressure higher during low reclaim.  This happens because we base our
      scan pressure modulation on how far memory.current is between memory.min
      and memory.low, but if memory.low is unset, we only use the overage
      method.  In most cromulent configurations, this then means that we end
      up with *more* pressure than with no memory.low at all when we're in low
      reclaim, which is not really very usable or expected.
      
      With this patch, memory.low and memory.min affect reclaim pressure in a
      more understandable and composable way.  For example, from a user
      standpoint, "protected" memory now remains untouchable from a reclaim
      aggression standpoint, and users can also have more confidence that
      bursty workloads will still receive some amount of guaranteed
      protection.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190322160307.GA3316@chrisdown.nameSigned-off-by: NChris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
      Reviewed-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1bc63fb1
    • C
      mm, memcg: make memory.emin the baseline for utilisation determination · 9de7ca46
      Chris Down 提交于
      Roman points out that when when we do the low reclaim pass, we scale the
      reclaim pressure relative to position between 0 and the maximum
      protection threshold.
      
      However, if the maximum protection is based on memory.elow, and
      memory.emin is above zero, this means we still may get binary behaviour
      on second-pass low reclaim.  This is because we scale starting at 0, not
      starting at memory.emin, and since we don't scan at all below emin, we
      end up with cliff behaviour.
      
      This should be a fairly uncommon case since usually we don't go into the
      second pass, but it makes sense to scale our low reclaim pressure
      starting at emin.
      
      You can test this by catting two large sparse files, one in a cgroup
      with emin set to some moderate size compared to physical RAM, and
      another cgroup without any emin.  In both cgroups, set an elow larger
      than 50% of physical RAM.  The one with emin will have less page
      scanning, as reclaim pressure is lower.
      
      Rebase on top of and apply the same idea as what was applied to handle
      cgroup_memory=disable properly for the original proportional patch
      http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201045711.GA18302@chrisdown.name ("mm,
      memcg: Handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection").
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201051810.GA18895@chrisdown.nameSigned-off-by: NChris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
      Suggested-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9de7ca46
    • C
      mm, memcg: proportional memory.{low,min} reclaim · 9783aa99
      Chris Down 提交于
      cgroup v2 introduces two memory protection thresholds: memory.low
      (best-effort) and memory.min (hard protection).  While they generally do
      what they say on the tin, there is a limitation in their implementation
      that makes them difficult to use effectively: that cliff behaviour often
      manifests when they become eligible for reclaim.  This patch implements
      more intuitive and usable behaviour, where we gradually mount more
      reclaim pressure as cgroups further and further exceed their protection
      thresholds.
      
      This cliff edge behaviour happens because we only choose whether or not
      to reclaim based on whether the memcg is within its protection limits
      (see the use of mem_cgroup_protected in shrink_node), but we don't vary
      our reclaim behaviour based on this information.  Imagine the following
      timeline, with the numbers the lruvec size in this zone:
      
      1. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=999999. 0 pages may be scanned.
      2. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000000. 0 pages may be scanned.
      3. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000001. 1000001* pages may be
         scanned. (?!)
      
      * Of course, we won't usually scan all available pages in the zone even
        without this patch because of scan control priority, over-reclaim
        protection, etc.  However, as shown by the tests at the end, these
        techniques don't sufficiently throttle such an extreme change in input,
        so cliff-like behaviour isn't really averted by their existence alone.
      
      Here's an example of how this plays out in practice.  At Facebook, we are
      trying to protect various workloads from "system" software, like
      configuration management tools, metric collectors, etc (see this[0] case
      study).  In order to find a suitable memory.low value, we start by
      determining the expected memory range within which the workload will be
      comfortable operating.  This isn't an exact science -- memory usage deemed
      "comfortable" will vary over time due to user behaviour, differences in
      composition of work, etc, etc.  As such we need to ballpark memory.low,
      but doing this is currently problematic:
      
      1. If we end up setting it too low for the workload, it won't have
         *any* effect (see discussion above).  The group will receive the full
         weight of reclaim and won't have any priority while competing with the
         less important system software, as if we had no memory.low configured
         at all.
      
      2. Because of this behaviour, we end up erring on the side of setting
         it too high, such that the comfort range is reliably covered.  However,
         protected memory is completely unavailable to the rest of the system,
         so we might cause undue memory and IO pressure there when we *know* we
         have some elasticity in the workload.
      
      3. Even if we get the value totally right, smack in the middle of the
         comfort zone, we get extreme jumps between no pressure and full
         pressure that cause unpredictable pressure spikes in the workload due
         to the current binary reclaim behaviour.
      
      With this patch, we can set it to our ballpark estimation without too much
      worry.  Any undesirable behaviour, such as too much or too little reclaim
      pressure on the workload or system will be proportional to how far our
      estimation is off.  This means we can set memory.low much more
      conservatively and thus waste less resources *without* the risk of the
      workload falling off a cliff if we overshoot.
      
      As a more abstract technical description, this unintuitive behaviour
      results in having to give high-priority workloads a large protection
      buffer on top of their expected usage to function reliably, as otherwise
      we have abrupt periods of dramatically increased memory pressure which
      hamper performance.  Having to set these thresholds so high wastes
      resources and generally works against the principle of work conservation.
      In addition, having proportional memory reclaim behaviour has other
      benefits.  Most notably, before this patch it's basically mandatory to set
      memory.low to a higher than desirable value because otherwise as soon as
      you exceed memory.low, all protection is lost, and all pages are eligible
      to scan again.  By contrast, having a gradual ramp in reclaim pressure
      means that you now still get some protection when thresholds are exceeded,
      which means that one can now be more comfortable setting memory.low to
      lower values without worrying that all protection will be lost.  This is
      important because workingset size is really hard to know exactly,
      especially with variable workloads, so at least getting *some* protection
      if your workingset size grows larger than you expect increases user
      confidence in setting memory.low without a huge buffer on top being
      needed.
      
      Thanks a lot to Johannes Weiner and Tejun Heo for their advice and
      assistance in thinking about how to make this work better.
      
      In testing these changes, I intended to verify that:
      
      1. Changes in page scanning become gradual and proportional instead of
         binary.
      
         To test this, I experimented stepping further and further down
         memory.low protection on a workload that floats around 19G workingset
         when under memory.low protection, watching page scan rates for the
         workload cgroup:
      
         +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
         | memory.low | test (pgscan/s) | control (pgscan/s) | % of control |
         +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
         |        21G |               0 |                  0 | N/A          |
         |        17G |             867 |               3799 | 23%          |
         |        12G |            1203 |               3543 | 34%          |
         |         8G |            2534 |               3979 | 64%          |
         |         4G |            3980 |               4147 | 96%          |
         |          0 |            3799 |               3980 | 95%          |
         +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
      
         As you can see, the test kernel (with a kernel containing this
         patch) ramps up page scanning significantly more gradually than the
         control kernel (without this patch).
      
      2. More gradual ramp up in reclaim aggression doesn't result in
         premature OOMs.
      
         To test this, I wrote a script that slowly increments the number of
         pages held by stress(1)'s --vm-keep mode until a production system
         entered severe overall memory contention.  This script runs in a highly
         protected slice taking up the majority of available system memory.
         Watching vmstat revealed that page scanning continued essentially
         nominally between test and control, without causing forward reclaim
         progress to become arrested.
      
      [0]: https://facebookmicrosites.github.io/cgroup2/docs/overview.html#case-study-the-fbtax2-project
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comments to fit in 80 cols]
      [chris@chrisdown.name: handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection]
        Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201045711.GA18302@chrisdown.name
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124014455.GA6396@chrisdown.nameSigned-off-by: NChris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Reviewed-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9783aa99
    • B
      memcg: only record foreign writebacks with dirty pages when memcg is not disabled · 08d1d0e6
      Baoquan He 提交于
      In kdump kernel, memcg usually is disabled with 'cgroup_disable=memory'
      for saving memory.  Now kdump kernel will always panic when dump vmcore
      to local disk:
      
        BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ab8
        Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
        CPU: 0 PID: 598 Comm: makedumpfile Not tainted 5.3.0+ #26
        Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/02/2018
        RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath+0x38/0x140
        Call Trace:
         __set_page_dirty+0x52/0xc0
         iomap_set_page_dirty+0x50/0x90
         iomap_write_end+0x6e/0x270
         iomap_write_actor+0xce/0x170
         iomap_apply+0xba/0x11e
         iomap_file_buffered_write+0x62/0x90
         xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xca/0x320 [xfs]
         new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0
         vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0
         ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
         do_syscall_64+0x59/0x1e0
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      And this will corrupt the 1st kernel too with 'cgroup_disable=memory'.
      
      Via the trace and with debugging, it is pointing to commit 97b27821
      ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") which introduced
      this regression.  Disabling memcg causes the null pointer dereference at
      uninitialized data in function mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath().
      
      Fix it by returning directly if memcg is disabled, but not trying to
      record the foreign writebacks with dirty pages.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924141928.GD31919@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
      Fixes: 97b27821 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing")
      Signed-off-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      08d1d0e6
    • L
      uaccess: implement a proper unsafe_copy_to_user() and switch filldir over to it · c512c691
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      In commit 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
      unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
      improves code generation on x86 enormously.
      
      But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
      copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
      turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
      unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
      
      Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
      will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally.  Which
      makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
      
      I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
      that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
      "user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
      __copy_to_user() interface.
      
      So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
      version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
      implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
      do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
      
      Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
      still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
      
      That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
      because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
      efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
      gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
      
      It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
      really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
      
      Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
      this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
      for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
      names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
      
      Fixes: 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
      Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      Reported-and-tested-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c512c691
    • M
      module: rename __kstrtab_ns_* to __kstrtabns_* to avoid symbol conflict · fa6643cd
      Masahiro Yamada 提交于
      The module namespace produces __strtab_ns_<sym> symbols to store
      namespace strings, but it does not guarantee the name uniqueness.
      This is a potential problem because we have exported symbols starting
      with "ns_".
      
      For example, kernel/capability.c exports the following symbols:
      
        EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
        EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
      
      Assume a situation where those are converted as follows:
      
        EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(ns_capable, some_namespace);
        EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(capable, some_namespace);
      
      The former expands to "__kstrtab_ns_capable" and "__kstrtab_ns_ns_capable",
      and the latter to "__kstrtab_capable" and "__kstrtab_ns_capable".
      Then, we have the duplicated "__kstrtab_ns_capable".
      
      To ensure the uniqueness, rename "__kstrtab_ns_*" to "__kstrtabns_*".
      Reviewed-by: NMatthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
      fa6643cd
    • M
      module: swap the order of symbol.namespace · bf70b050
      Masahiro Yamada 提交于
      Currently, EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(_GPL) constructs the kernel symbol as
      follows:
      
        __ksymtab_SYMBOL.NAMESPACE
      
      The sym_extract_namespace() in modpost allocates memory for the part
      SYMBOL.NAMESPACE when '.' is contained. One problem is that the pointer
      returned by strdup() is lost because the symbol name will be copied to
      malloc'ed memory by alloc_symbol(). No one will keep track of the
      pointer of strdup'ed memory.
      
      sym->namespace still points to the NAMESPACE part. So, you can free it
      with complicated code like this:
      
         free(sym->namespace - strlen(sym->name) - 1);
      
      It complicates memory free.
      
      To fix it elegantly, I swapped the order of the symbol and the
      namespace as follows:
      
        __ksymtab_NAMESPACE.SYMBOL
      
      then, simplified sym_extract_namespace() so that it allocates memory
      only for the NAMESPACE part.
      
      I prefer this order because it is intuitive and also matches to major
      languages. For example, NAMESPACE::NAME in C++, MODULE.NAME in Python.
      Reviewed-by: NMatthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
      bf70b050
  8. 07 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  9. 05 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  10. 04 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  11. 03 10月, 2019 3 次提交
    • M
      block: pg: add header include guard · 3a4b46c3
      Masahiro Yamada 提交于
      Add a header include guard just in case.
      Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      3a4b46c3
    • M
      drm/amdgpu: return tcc_disabled_mask to userspace · 815fb4c9
      Marek Olšák 提交于
      UMDs need this for correct programming of harvested chips.
      Signed-off-by: NMarek Olšák <marek.olsak@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
      815fb4c9
    • V
      net: dsa: sja1105: Fix sleeping while atomic in .port_hwtstamp_set · 3e8db7e5
      Vladimir Oltean 提交于
      Currently this stack trace can be seen with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y:
      
      [   41.568348] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:909
      [   41.576757] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 208, name: ptp4l
      [   41.583212] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
      [   41.587123] CPU: 1 PID: 208 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 5.3.0-rc6-01445-ge950f2d4bc7f-dirty #1827
      [   41.599873] [<c0313d7c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030e13c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
      [   41.607584] [<c030e13c>] (show_stack) from [<c1212d50>] (dump_stack+0xd4/0x100)
      [   41.614863] [<c1212d50>] (dump_stack) from [<c037dfc8>] (___might_sleep+0x1c8/0x2b4)
      [   41.622574] [<c037dfc8>] (___might_sleep) from [<c122ea90>] (__mutex_lock+0x48/0xab8)
      [   41.630368] [<c122ea90>] (__mutex_lock) from [<c122f51c>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24)
      [   41.638340] [<c122f51c>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c0c6fe08>] (sja1105_static_config_reload+0x30/0x27c)
      [   41.647779] [<c0c6fe08>] (sja1105_static_config_reload) from [<c0c7015c>] (sja1105_hwtstamp_set+0x108/0x1cc)
      [   41.657562] [<c0c7015c>] (sja1105_hwtstamp_set) from [<c0feb650>] (dev_ifsioc+0x18c/0x330)
      [   41.665788] [<c0feb650>] (dev_ifsioc) from [<c0febbd8>] (dev_ioctl+0x320/0x6e8)
      [   41.673064] [<c0febbd8>] (dev_ioctl) from [<c0f8b1f4>] (sock_ioctl+0x334/0x5e8)
      [   41.680340] [<c0f8b1f4>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c05404a8>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0xb0/0xa10)
      [   41.687789] [<c05404a8>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0540e3c>] (ksys_ioctl+0x34/0x58)
      [   41.695151] [<c0540e3c>] (ksys_ioctl) from [<c0301000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
      [   41.702768] Exception stack(0xe8495fa8 to 0xe8495ff0)
      [   41.707796] 5fa0:                   beff4a8c 00000001 00000011 000089b0 beff4a8c beff4a80
      [   41.715933] 5fc0: beff4a8c 00000001 0000000c 00000036 b6fa98c8 004e19c1 00000001 00000000
      [   41.724069] 5fe0: 004dcedc beff4a6c 004c0738 b6e7af4c
      [   41.729860] BUG: scheduling while atomic: ptp4l/208/0x00000002
      [   41.735682] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
      
      Enabling RX timestamping will logically disturb the fastpath (processing
      of meta frames). Replace bool hwts_rx_en with a bit that is checked
      atomically from the fastpath and temporarily unset from the sleepable
      context during a change of the RX timestamping process (a destructive
      operation anyways, requires switch reset).
      If found unset, the fastpath (net/dsa/tag_sja1105.c) will just drop any
      received meta frame and not take the meta_lock at all.
      
      Fixes: a602afd2 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Expose PTP timestamping ioctls to userspace")
      Signed-off-by: NVladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3e8db7e5
  12. 02 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  13. 01 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  14. 29 9月, 2019 3 次提交
    • C
      mm, tracing: Print symbol name for call_site in trace events · f7d6316f
      Changbin Du 提交于
      To improve the readability of raw slab trace points, print the call_site ip
      using '%pS'. Then we can grep events with function names.
      
      [002] ....   808.188897: kmem_cache_free: call_site=putname+0x47/0x50 ptr=00000000cef40c80
      [002] ....   808.188898: kfree: call_site=security_cred_free+0x42/0x50 ptr=0000000062400820
      [002] ....   808.188904: kmem_cache_free: call_site=put_cred_rcu+0x88/0xa0 ptr=0000000058d74ef8
      [002] ....   808.188913: kmem_cache_alloc: call_site=prepare_creds+0x26/0x100 ptr=0000000058d74ef8 bytes_req=168 bytes_alloc=576 gfp_flags=GFP_KERNEL
      [002] ....   808.188917: kmalloc: call_site=security_prepare_creds+0x77/0xa0 ptr=0000000062400820 bytes_req=8 bytes_alloc=336 gfp_flags=GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO
      [002] ....   808.188920: kmem_cache_alloc: call_site=getname_flags+0x4f/0x1e0 ptr=00000000cef40c80 bytes_req=4096 bytes_alloc=4480 gfp_flags=GFP_KERNEL
      [002] ....   808.188925: kmem_cache_free: call_site=putname+0x47/0x50 ptr=00000000cef40c80
      [002] ....   808.188926: kfree: call_site=security_cred_free+0x42/0x50 ptr=0000000062400820
      [002] ....   808.188931: kmem_cache_free: call_site=put_cred_rcu+0x88/0xa0 ptr=0000000058d74ef8
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190914103215.23301-1-changbin.du@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NChangbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      f7d6316f
    • D
      Revert "Revert "Revert "mm, thp: consolidate THP gfp handling into alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask"" · 19deb769
      David Rientjes 提交于
      This reverts commit 92717d42.
      
      Since commit a8282608 ("Revert "mm, thp: restore node-local hugepage
      allocations"") is reverted in this series, it is better to restore the
      previous 5.2 behavior between the thp allocation and the page allocator
      rather than to attempt any consolidation or cleanup for a policy that is
      now reverted.  It's less risky during an rc cycle and subsequent patches
      in this series further modify the same policy that the pre-5.3 behavior
      implements.
      
      Consolidation and cleanup can be done subsequent to a sane default page
      allocation strategy, so this patch reverts a cleanup done on a strategy
      that is now reverted and thus is the least risky option.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Stefan Priebe - Profihost AG <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
      Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      19deb769
    • D
      Revert "Revert "mm, thp: restore node-local hugepage allocations"" · ac79f78d
      David Rientjes 提交于
      This reverts commit a8282608.
      
      The commit references the original intended semantic for MADV_HUGEPAGE
      which has subsequently taken on three unique purposes:
      
       - enables or disables thp for a range of memory depending on the system's
         config (is thp "enabled" set to "always" or "madvise"),
      
       - determines the synchronous compaction behavior for thp allocations at
         fault (is thp "defrag" set to "always", "defer+madvise", or "madvise"),
         and
      
       - reverts a previous MADV_NOHUGEPAGE (there is no madvise mode to only
         clear previous hugepage advice).
      
      These are the three purposes that currently exist in 5.2 and over the
      past several years that userspace has been written around.  Adding a
      NUMA locality preference adds a fourth dimension to an already conflated
      advice mode.
      
      Based on the semantic that MADV_HUGEPAGE has provided over the past
      several years, there exist workloads that use the tunable based on these
      principles: specifically that the allocation should attempt to
      defragment a local node before falling back.  It is agreed that remote
      hugepages typically (but not always) have a better access latency than
      remote native pages, although on Naples this is at parity for
      intersocket.
      
      The revert commit that this patch reverts allows hugepage allocation to
      immediately allocate remotely when local memory is fragmented.  This is
      contrary to the semantic of MADV_HUGEPAGE over the past several years:
      that is, memory compaction should be attempted locally before falling
      back.
      
      The performance degradation of remote hugepages over local hugepages on
      Rome, for example, is 53.5% increased access latency.  For this reason,
      the goal is to revert back to the 5.2 and previous behavior that would
      attempt local defragmentation before falling back.  With the patch that
      is reverted by this patch, we see performance degradations at the tail
      because the allocator happily allocates the remote hugepage rather than
      even attempting to make a local hugepage available.
      
      zone_reclaim_mode is not a solution to this problem since it does not
      only impact hugepage allocations but rather changes the memory
      allocation strategy for *all* page allocations.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Stefan Priebe - Profihost AG <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
      Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ac79f78d