- 29 3月, 2023 10 次提交
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc3 commit ebb7fb15 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4KIAO CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ebb7fb1557b1d03b906b668aa2164b51e6b7d19a -------------------------------- Trond Myklebust reported soft lockups in XFS IO completion such as this: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 23s! [kworker/12:1:3106] CPU: 12 PID: 3106 Comm: kworker/12:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-305.10.2.el8_4.x86_64 #1 Workqueue: xfs-conv/md127 xfs_end_io [xfs] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x20 Call Trace: wake_up_page_bit+0x8a/0x110 iomap_finish_ioend+0xd7/0x1c0 iomap_finish_ioends+0x7f/0xb0 xfs_end_ioend+0x6b/0x100 [xfs] xfs_end_io+0xb9/0xe0 [xfs] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 worker_thread+0x1fa/0x390 kthread+0x116/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Ioends are processed as an atomic completion unit when all the chained bios in the ioend have completed their IO. Logically contiguous ioends can also be merged and completed as a single, larger unit. Both of these things can be problematic as both the bio chains per ioend and the size of the merged ioends processed as a single completion are both unbound. If we have a large sequential dirty region in the page cache, write_cache_pages() will keep feeding us sequential pages and we will keep mapping them into ioends and bios until we get a dirty page at a non-sequential file offset. These large sequential runs can will result in bio and ioend chaining to optimise the io patterns. The pages iunder writeback are pinned within these chains until the submission chaining is broken, allowing the entire chain to be completed. This can result in huge chains being processed in IO completion context. We get deep bio chaining if we have large contiguous physical extents. We will keep adding pages to the current bio until it is full, then we'll chain a new bio to keep adding pages for writeback. Hence we can build bio chains that map millions of pages and tens of gigabytes of RAM if the page cache contains big enough contiguous dirty file regions. This long bio chain pins those pages until the final bio in the chain completes and the ioend can iterate all the chained bios and complete them. OTOH, if we have a physically fragmented file, we end up submitting one ioend per physical fragment that each have a small bio or bio chain attached to them. We do not chain these at IO submission time, but instead we chain them at completion time based on file offset via iomap_ioend_try_merge(). Hence we can end up with unbound ioend chains being built via completion merging. XFS can then do COW remapping or unwritten extent conversion on that merged chain, which involves walking an extent fragment at a time and running a transaction to modify the physical extent information. IOWs, we merge all the discontiguous ioends together into a contiguous file range, only to then process them individually as discontiguous extents. This extent manipulation is computationally expensive and can run in a tight loop, so merging logically contiguous but physically discontigous ioends gains us nothing except for hiding the fact the fact we broke the ioends up into individual physical extents at submission and then need to loop over those individual physical extents at completion. Hence we need to have mechanisms to limit ioend sizes and to break up completion processing of large merged ioend chains: 1. bio chains per ioend need to be bound in length. Pure overwrites go straight to iomap_finish_ioend() in softirq context with the exact bio chain attached to the ioend by submission. Hence the only way to prevent long holdoffs here is to bound ioend submission sizes because we can't reschedule in softirq context. 2. iomap_finish_ioends() has to handle unbound merged ioend chains correctly. This relies on any one call to iomap_finish_ioend() being bound in runtime so that cond_resched() can be issued regularly as the long ioend chain is processed. i.e. this relies on mechanism #1 to limit individual ioend sizes to work correctly. 3. filesystems have to loop over the merged ioends to process physical extent manipulations. This means they can loop internally, and so we break merging at physical extent boundaries so the filesystem can easily insert reschedule points between individual extent manipulations. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reported-and-tested-by: NTrond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Conflicts: include/linux/iomap.h fs/iomap/buffered-io.c fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c [ 6e552494 ("iomap: remove unused private field from ioend") is not applied. 95c4cd05 ("iomap: Convert to_iomap_page to take a folio") is not applied. 8ffd74e9 ("iomap: Convert bio completions to use folios") is not applied. 044c6449 ("xfs: drop unused ioend private merge and setfilesize code") is not applied. ] Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Edward Lo 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 54e45702 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6OD4U CVE: CVE-2022-48423 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=54e45702b648b7c0000e90b3e9b890e367e16ea8 -------------------------------- Though we already have some sanity checks while enumerating attributes, resident attribute names aren't included. This patch checks the resident attribute names are in the valid ranges. [ 259.209031] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.210770] Write of size 426 at addr ffff88800632f2b2 by task exp/255 [ 259.211551] [ 259.212035] CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37 [ 259.212955] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 259.214387] Call Trace: [ 259.214640] <TASK> [ 259.214895] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 259.215284] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 259.215565] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.215778] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x60 [ 259.215991] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216270] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 259.216481] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216719] kasan_check_range+0x15a/0x1d0 [ 259.216939] memcpy+0x3c/0x70 [ 259.217136] ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.217945] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 [ 259.218384] ? ni_remove_attr+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.218712] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.219064] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.219434] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.219668] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [ 259.219904] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 259.220140] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 259.220561] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.220984] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x850/0x850 [ 259.221532] ? run_deallocate+0x120/0x120 [ 259.221972] ? vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.222688] ? setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.222921] ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.223431] ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.223828] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.224417] ? mi_find_attr+0x3c/0xf0 [ 259.224772] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.225216] ? ni_ins_attr_ext+0x5c0/0x5c0 [ 259.225504] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x119/0x450 [ 259.225775] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.226316] ? ni_insert_nonresident+0x400/0x400 [ 259.227001] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.227468] ? __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.227773] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.228216] ? ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x2a/0xb0 [ 259.228494] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.228838] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x450/0x450 [ 259.229098] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x24/0x40 [ 259.229418] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.229681] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.229948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60 [ 259.230271] ? write_profile+0x270/0x270 [ 259.230537] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.230836] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.231099] ? ntfs_set_acl_ex+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.231529] ? evm_protected_xattr_common+0x6d/0x100 [ 259.231817] ? posix_xattr_acl+0x13/0x80 [ 259.232073] ? evm_protect_xattr+0x1f7/0x440 [ 259.232351] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.232635] ? xattr_resolve_name+0x180/0x180 [ 259.232912] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.233219] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.233492] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.233744] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.234002] ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x160/0x160 [ 259.234837] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.235567] ? vmemdup_user+0x53/0x90 [ 259.236212] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.236491] ? do_setxattr+0x170/0x170 [ 259.236791] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.237232] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x57/0x180 [ 259.237605] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.237870] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 259.238234] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.238500] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0 [ 259.238775] ? __mnt_want_write+0xaa/0x100 [ 259.238990] ? mnt_want_write+0x8b/0x150 [ 259.239290] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.239605] ? setxattr+0x140/0x140 [ 259.239849] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.240174] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x67/0x80 [ 259.240411] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.240715] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.240934] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.241697] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6b26e4469 [ 259.242647] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 259.244512] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c7841f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [ 259.245086] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc6b26e4469 [ 259.246025] RDX: 00007ffc3c784380 RSI: 00007ffc3c7842e0 RDI: 00007ffc3c784238 [ 259.246961] RBP: 00007ffc3c788410 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc3c7884f8 [ 259.247775] R10: 000000000000007f R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004004e0 [ 259.248534] R13: 00007ffc3c7884f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 259.249368] </TASK> [ 259.249644] [ 259.249888] Allocated by task 255: [ 259.250283] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 259.250957] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.251826] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.252745] ni_create_attr_list+0x11e/0x850 [ 259.253298] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.253685] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.253974] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.254311] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.254629] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.254859] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.255155] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.255445] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.255862] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.256251] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.256522] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.256911] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.257308] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.257637] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.257970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.258550] [ 259.258772] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800632f000 [ 259.258772] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 259.260190] The buggy address is located 690 bytes inside of [ 259.260190] 1024-byte region [ffff88800632f000, ffff88800632f400) [ 259.261412] [ 259.261743] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 259.262354] page:0000000081e8cac9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x632c [ 259.263722] head:0000000081e8cac9 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 259.264284] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 259.265312] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000060d00 dead000000000004 ffff888001041dc0 [ 259.265772] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 259.266305] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 259.266588] [ 259.266728] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 259.267225] ffff88800632f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.267841] ffff88800632f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.269111] >ffff88800632f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.269626] ^ [ 259.270162] ffff88800632f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.270810] ffff88800632f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: NEdward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit 558564db44755dfb3e48b0d64de327d20981e950 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6KT9C CVE: CVE-2023-1249 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=558564db44755dfb3e48b0d64de327d20981e950 -------------------------------- commit 390031c9 upstream. Matthew Wilcox reported that there is a missing mmap_lock in file_files_note that could possibly lead to a user after free. Solve this by using the existing vma snapshot for consistency and to avoid the need to take the mmap_lock anywhere in the coredump code except for dump_vma_snapshot. Update the dump_vma_snapshot to capture vm_pgoff and vm_file that are neeeded by fill_files_note. Add free_vma_snapshot to free the captured values of vm_file. Reported-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220131153740.2396974-1-willy@infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a07279c9 ("binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot") Fixes: 2aa362c4 ("coredump: extend core dump note section to contain file names of mapped files") Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit b7933f145ad32bb5e084af55176ab6dcaa15a036 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6KT9C CVE: CVE-2023-1249 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b7933f145ad32bb5e084af55176ab6dcaa15a036 -------------------------------- commit 9ec7d323 upstream. Instead of individually passing cprm->siginfo and cprm->regs into fill_note_info pass all of struct coredump_params. This is preparation to allow fill_files_note to use the existing vma snapshot. Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit b043ae637a83585b2a497c2eb7ee49446fc68e98 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6KT9C CVE: CVE-2023-1249 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b043ae637a83585b2a497c2eb7ee49446fc68e98 -------------------------------- commit 49c18663 upstream. The condition is impossible and to the best of my knowledge has never triggered. We are in deep trouble if that conditions happens and we walk past the end of our allocated array. So delete the WARN_ON and the code that makes it look like the kernel can handle the case of walking past the end of it's vma_meta array. Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit 936c8be4d1447f36ac4d2a464bd03a5cd659c42f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6KT9C CVE: CVE-2023-1249 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=936c8be4d1447f36ac4d2a464bd03a5cd659c42f -------------------------------- commit 95c5436a upstream. Move the call of dump_vma_snapshot and kvfree(vma_meta) out of the individual coredump routines into do_coredump itself. This makes the code less error prone and easier to maintain. Make the vma snapshot available to the coredump routines in struct coredump_params. This makes it easier to change and update what is captures in the vma snapshot and will be needed for fixing fill_file_notes. Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Edward Lo 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188564, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6OD5R CVE: CVE-2022-48425 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/fs/ntfs3?id=467333af2f7b95eeaa61a5b5369a80063cd971fd ---------------------------------------- Log load and replay is part of the metadata handle flow during mount operation. The $MFT record will be loaded and used while replaying logs. However, a malformed $MFT record, say, has RECORD_FLAG_DIR flag set and contains an ATTR_ROOT attribute will misguide kernel to treat it as a directory, and try to free the allocated resources when the corresponding inode is freed, which will cause an invalid kfree because the memory hasn't actually been allocated. [ 101.368647] BUG: KASAN: invalid-free in kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.369457] [ 101.369986] CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7+ #5 [ 101.370529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 101.371362] Call Trace: [ 101.371795] <TASK> [ 101.372157] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 101.372658] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 101.373022] ? ni_write_inode+0x754/0xd90 [ 101.373378] ? kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.373698] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x77/0xf0 [ 101.374058] ? kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.374352] ? kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.374668] __kasan_slab_free+0x189/0x1b0 [ 101.374992] ? kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.375271] kfree+0x168/0x3b0 [ 101.375717] kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 101.376002] indx_clear+0x26/0x60 [ 101.376316] ni_clear+0xc5/0x290 [ 101.376661] ntfs_evict_inode+0x45/0x70 [ 101.377001] evict+0x199/0x280 [ 101.377432] iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 101.377819] iput+0x32/0x50 [ 101.378166] ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x143/0x320 [ 101.378656] ? ntfs_bio_fill_1+0x510/0x510 [ 101.378968] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 101.379367] ntfs_fill_super+0xecb/0x1ba0 [ 101.379729] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 101.380046] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 101.380542] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 101.380914] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 101.381597] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 101.382254] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 101.382699] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 101.383094] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 101.383675] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 101.384203] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 101.384540] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 101.384943] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 101.385362] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 101.385968] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 101.386666] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 101.387228] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 101.387585] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 101.387979] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 101.388436] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 101.388757] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 101.389289] RIP: 0033:0x7fa0f70e948a [ 101.390048] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 101.391297] RSP: 002b:00007ffc24fdecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 101.391988] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055932c183060 RCX: 00007fa0f70e948a [ 101.392494] RDX: 000055932c183260 RSI: 000055932c1832e0 RDI: 000055932c18bce0 [ 101.393053] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055932c183280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 101.393577] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055932c18bce0 [ 101.394044] R13: 000055932c183260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 101.394747] </TASK> [ 101.395402] [ 101.396047] Allocated by task 198: [ 101.396724] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 101.397400] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90 [ 101.397974] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x192/0x5a0 [ 101.398524] ntfs_alloc_inode+0x23/0x70 [ 101.399137] alloc_inode+0x3b/0xf0 [ 101.399534] iget5_locked+0x54/0xa0 [ 101.400026] ntfs_iget5+0xaf/0x1780 [ 101.400414] ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0xe5/0x320 [ 101.400883] ntfs_fill_super+0xecb/0x1ba0 [ 101.401313] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 101.401774] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 101.402224] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 101.402673] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 101.403160] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 101.403537] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 101.404058] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 101.404333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 101.404816] [ 101.405067] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888008cc9ea0 [ 101.405067] which belongs to the cache ntfs_inode_cache of size 992 [ 101.406171] The buggy address is located 232 bytes inside of [ 101.406171] 992-byte region [ffff888008cc9ea0, ffff888008cca280) [ 101.406995] [ 101.408559] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 101.409320] page:00000000dccf19dd refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cc8 [ 101.410654] head:00000000dccf19dd order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 101.411533] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 101.412665] raw: 000fffffc0010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888003695140 [ 101.413209] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800e000e 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 101.413799] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 101.414213] [ 101.414427] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 101.414991] ffff888008cc9e80: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 101.415785] ffff888008cc9f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 101.416933] >ffff888008cc9f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 101.417857] ^ [ 101.418566] ffff888008cca000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 101.419704] ffff888008cca080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Signed-off-by: NEdward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Edward Lo 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188564, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6OD4P CVE: CVE-2022-48424 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4f1dc7d9756e66f3f876839ea174df2e656b7f79 ---------------------------------------- Although the attribute name length is checked before comparing it to some common names (e.g., $I30), the offset isn't. This adds a sanity check for the attribute name offset, guarantee the validity and prevent possible out-of-bound memory accesses. [ 191.720056] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.721060] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 191.721586] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 191.722079] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 191.722571] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 191.723179] CPU: 0 PID: 244 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #28 [ 191.723749] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 191.724832] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.725870] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.727375] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.727897] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.728531] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.729183] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.729628] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.730158] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.730645] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.731328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.731667] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 191.732568] Call Trace: [ 191.733231] <TASK> [ 191.733860] kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 191.734632] ni_clear+0x180/0x290 [ 191.735085] ntfs_evict_inode+0x45/0x70 [ 191.735495] evict+0x199/0x280 [ 191.735996] iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 191.736438] iput+0x32/0x50 [ 191.736811] iget_failed+0x23/0x30 [ 191.737270] ntfs_iget5+0x337/0x1890 [ 191.737629] ? ntfs_clear_mft_tail+0x20/0x260 [ 191.738201] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 191.738482] ? ntfs_objid_init+0xf6/0x140 [ 191.738779] ? ntfs_reparse_init+0x140/0x140 [ 191.739266] ntfs_fill_super+0x121b/0x1b50 [ 191.739623] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.739984] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 191.740466] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.740787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6a/0x80 [ 191.741272] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 191.741829] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.742669] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 191.743132] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 191.743457] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 191.743938] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.744271] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 191.744582] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745053] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 191.745403] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745616] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 191.745887] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 191.746287] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 191.746582] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 191.746850] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 191.747122] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 191.747517] RIP: 0033:0x7f351fee948a [ 191.748332] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 191.749341] RSP: 002b:00007ffd51cf3af8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 191.749960] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b903733060 RCX: 00007f351fee948a [ 191.750589] RDX: 000055b903733260 RSI: 000055b9037332e0 RDI: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b903733280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 191.751537] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751946] R13: 000055b903733260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 191.752519] </TASK> [ 191.752782] Modules linked in: [ 191.753785] CR2: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.754937] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 191.755429] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.755725] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.756744] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.757218] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.757580] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758016] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.758570] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758957] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.759317] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.759711] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.760118] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: NEdward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Ye Bin 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc2 commit f57886ca category: bugfix bugzilla: 188471,https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6MR1V CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=f57886ca1606ba74cc4ec4eb5cbf073934ffa559 -------------------------------- Now, jounral error number maybe cleared even though ext4_commit_super() failed. This may lead to error flag miss, then fsck will miss to check file system deeply. Signed-off-by: NYe Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230307061703.245965-3-yebin@huaweicloud.comSigned-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Ye Bin 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc2 commit eee00237 category: bugfix bugzilla: 188471,https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6MR1V CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=eee00237fa5ec8f704f7323b54e48cc34e2d9168 -------------------------------- Now, 'es->s_state' maybe covered by recover journal. And journal errno maybe not recorded in journal sb as IO error. ext4_update_super() only update error information when 'sbi->s_add_error_count' large than zero. Then 'EXT4_ERROR_FS' flag maybe lost. To solve above issue just recover 'es->s_state' error flag after journal replay like error info. Signed-off-by: NYe Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230307061703.245965-2-yebin@huaweicloud.comSigned-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 22 3月, 2023 2 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc2 commit c993799b category: bugfix bugzilla: 188522,https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6N7ZP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c993799baf9c5861f8df91beb80e1611b12efcbd -------------------------------- Apparently syzbot figured out that issuing this FSMAP call: struct fsmap_head cmd = { .fmh_count = ...; .fmh_keys = { { .fmr_device = /* ext4 dev */, .fmr_physical = 0, }, { .fmr_device = /* ext4 dev */, .fmr_physical = 0, }, }, ... }; ret = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GETFSMAP, &cmd); Produces this crash if the underlying filesystem is a 1k-block ext4 filesystem: kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3331! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 3227965 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G W O 6.2.0-rc8-achx Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp+0x47c/0x570 [ext4] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007c03998 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff888004978000 RBX: ffffc90007c03a20 RCX: ffff888041618000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005a4 RDI: ffffffffa0c99b11 RBP: ffff888012330000 R08: ffffffffa0c2b7d0 R09: 0000000000000400 R10: ffffc90007c03950 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000c40 R15: ffff88802678c398 FS: 00007fdf2020c880(0000) GS:ffff88807e100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffd318a5fe8 CR3: 000000007f80f001 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_mballoc_query_range+0x4b/0x210 [ext4 dfa189daddffe8fecd3cdfd00564e0f265a8ab80] ext4_getfsmap_datadev+0x713/0x890 [ext4 dfa189daddffe8fecd3cdfd00564e0f265a8ab80] ext4_getfsmap+0x2b7/0x330 [ext4 dfa189daddffe8fecd3cdfd00564e0f265a8ab80] ext4_ioc_getfsmap+0x153/0x2b0 [ext4 dfa189daddffe8fecd3cdfd00564e0f265a8ab80] __ext4_ioctl+0x2a7/0x17e0 [ext4 dfa189daddffe8fecd3cdfd00564e0f265a8ab80] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fdf20558aff RSP: 002b:00007ffd318a9e30 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000200c0 RCX: 00007fdf20558aff RDX: 00007fdf1feb2010 RSI: 00000000c0c0583b RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00005625c0634be0 R08: 00005625c0634c40 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdf1feb2010 R13: 00005625be70d994 R14: 0000000000000800 R15: 0000000000000000 For GETFSMAP calls, the caller selects a physical block device by writing its block number into fsmap_head.fmh_keys[01].fmr_device. To query mappings for a subrange of the device, the starting byte of the range is written to fsmap_head.fmh_keys[0].fmr_physical and the last byte of the range goes in fsmap_head.fmh_keys[1].fmr_physical. IOWs, to query what mappings overlap with bytes 3-14 of /dev/sda, you'd set the inputs as follows: fmh_keys[0] = { .fmr_device = major(8, 0), .fmr_physical = 3}, fmh_keys[1] = { .fmr_device = major(8, 0), .fmr_physical = 14}, Which would return you whatever is mapped in the 12 bytes starting at physical offset 3. The crash is due to insufficient range validation of keys[1] in ext4_getfsmap_datadev. On 1k-block filesystems, block 0 is not part of the filesystem, which means that s_first_data_block is nonzero. ext4_get_group_no_and_offset subtracts this quantity from the blocknr argument before cracking it into a group number and a block number within a group. IOWs, block group 0 spans blocks 1-8192 (1-based) instead of 0-8191 (0-based) like what happens with larger blocksizes. The net result of this encoding is that blocknr < s_first_data_block is not a valid input to this function. The end_fsb variable is set from the keys that are copied from userspace, which means that in the above example, its value is zero. That leads to an underflow here: blocknr = blocknr - le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block); The division then operates on -1: offset = do_div(blocknr, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)) >> EXT4_SB(sb)->s_cluster_bits; Leaving an impossibly large group number (2^32-1) in blocknr. ext4_getfsmap_check_keys checked that keys[0].fmr_physical and keys[1].fmr_physical are in increasing order, but ext4_getfsmap_datadev adjusts keys[0].fmr_physical to be at least s_first_data_block. This implies that we have to check it again after the adjustment, which is the piece that I forgot. Reported-by: syzbot+6be2b977c89f79b6b153@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 4a495624 ("ext4: fix off-by-one fsmap error on 1k block filesystems") Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=79d5768e9bfe362911ac1a5057a36fc6b5c30002 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y+58NPTH7VNGgzdd@magnoliaSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zhihao Cheng 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit e6b9bd72 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C5HV CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e6b9bd7290d334451ce054e98e752abc055e0034 -------------------------------- Following process will make data lost and could lead to a filesystem corrupted problem: 1. jh(bh) is inserted into T1->t_checkpoint_list, bh is dirty, and jh->b_transaction = NULL 2. T1 is added into journal->j_checkpoint_transactions. 3. Get bh prepare to write while doing checkpoing: PA PB do_get_write_access jbd2_log_do_checkpoint spin_lock(&jh->b_state_lock) if (buffer_dirty(bh)) clear_buffer_dirty(bh) // clear buffer dirty set_buffer_jbddirty(bh) transaction = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions jh = transaction->t_checkpoint_list if (!buffer_dirty(bh)) __jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh) // bh won't be flushed jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction, BJ_Reserved) 4. Aborting journal/Power-cut before writing latest bh on journal area. In this way we get a corrupted filesystem with bh's data lost. Fix it by moving the clearing of buffer_dirty bit just before the call to __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(), both bit clearing and jh->b_transaction assignment are under journal->j_list_lock locked, so that jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() will wait until jh's new transaction fininshed even bh is currently not dirty. And journal_shrink_one_cp_list() won't remove jh from checkpoint list if the buffer head is reused in do_get_write_access(). Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216898 Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nzhanchengbin <zhanchengbin1@huawei.com> Suggested-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110015327.1181863-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 15 3月, 2023 3 次提交
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由 Ye Bin 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6K53I Reference: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20230116020015.1506120-1-yebin@huaweicloud.com/ -------------------------------- Syzbot found the following issue: EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting with data=journal disables delayed allocation, dioread_nolock, O_DIRECT and fast_commit support! EXT4-fs (loop0): orphan cleanup on readonly fs ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5067 at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1869 mb_find_extent+0x8a1/0xe30 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5067 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 RIP: 0010:mb_find_extent+0x8a1/0xe30 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1869 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003c9e098 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff82405731 RBX: 0000000000000041 RCX: ffff8880783457c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000041 RDI: 0000000000000040 RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: ffffffff82405723 R09: ffffed10053c9402 R10: ffffed10053c9402 R11: 1ffff110053c9401 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90003c9e538 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc90003c9e2cc FS: 0000555556665300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000056312f6796f8 CR3: 0000000022437000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_mb_complex_scan_group+0x353/0x1100 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2307 ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x1533/0x3860 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2735 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0xddf/0x3db0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5605 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1868/0x6880 fs/ext4/extents.c:4286 ext4_map_blocks+0xa49/0x1cc0 fs/ext4/inode.c:651 ext4_getblk+0x1b9/0x770 fs/ext4/inode.c:864 ext4_bread+0x2a/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:920 ext4_quota_write+0x225/0x570 fs/ext4/super.c:7105 write_blk fs/quota/quota_tree.c:64 [inline] get_free_dqblk+0x34a/0x6d0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:130 do_insert_tree+0x26b/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:340 do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375 do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375 do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375 dq_insert_tree fs/quota/quota_tree.c:401 [inline] qtree_write_dquot+0x3b6/0x530 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:420 v2_write_dquot+0x11b/0x190 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:358 dquot_acquire+0x348/0x670 fs/quota/dquot.c:444 ext4_acquire_dquot+0x2dc/0x400 fs/ext4/super.c:6740 dqget+0x999/0xdc0 fs/quota/dquot.c:914 __dquot_initialize+0x3d0/0xcf0 fs/quota/dquot.c:1492 ext4_process_orphan+0x57/0x2d0 fs/ext4/orphan.c:329 ext4_orphan_cleanup+0xb60/0x1340 fs/ext4/orphan.c:474 __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5516 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x81cd/0x8700 fs/ext4/super.c:5644 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Add some debug information: mb_find_extent: mb_find_extent block=41, order=0 needed=64 next=0 ex=0/41/1@3735929054 64 64 7 block_bitmap: ff 3f 0c 00 fc 01 00 00 d2 3d 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff Acctually, blocks per group is 64, but block bitmap indicate at least has 128 blocks. Now, ext4_validate_block_bitmap() didn't check invalid block's bitmap if set. To resolve above issue, add check like fsck "Padding at end of block bitmap is not set". Reported-by: syzbot+68223fe9f6c95ad43bed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NYe Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc6 commit d2d7c047 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4KIAO CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d2d7c0473586d2f22e85d615275f34cf19f94447 -------------------------------- Most buffer io list operations are run with the bp->b_lock held, but xfs_iflush_abort() can be called without the buffer lock being held resulting in inodes being removed from the buffer list while other list operations are occurring. This causes problems with corrupted bp->b_io_list inode lists during filesystem shutdown, leading to traversals that never end, double removals from the AIL, etc. Fix this by passing the buffer to xfs_iflush_abort() if we have it locked. If the inode is attached to the buffer, we're going to have to remove it from the buffer list and we'd have to get the buffer off the inode log item to do that anyway. If we don't have a buffer passed in (e.g. from xfs_reclaim_inode()) then we can determine if the inode has a log item and if it is attached to a buffer before we do anything else. If it does have an attached buffer, we can lock it safely (because the inode has a reference to it) and then perform the inode abort. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> conflicts: fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c Signed-off-by: NLong Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zhang Yi 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6D5XF Reference: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/20230130111138.76tp6pij3yhh4brh@quack3/T/#t -------------------------------- Current _ext4_show_options() do not distinguish MOPT_2 flag, so it mixed extend sbi->s_mount_opt2 options with sbi->s_mount_opt, it could lead to show incorrect options, e.g. show fc_debug_force if we mount with errors=continue mode and miss it if we set. $ mkfs.ext4 /dev/pmem0 $ mount -o errors=remount-ro /dev/pmem0 /mnt $ cat /proc/fs/ext4/pmem0/options | grep fc_debug_force #empty $ mount -o remount,errors=continue /mnt $ cat /proc/fs/ext4/pmem0/options | grep fc_debug_force fc_debug_force $ mount -o remount,errors=remount-ro,fc_debug_force /mnt $ cat /proc/fs/ext4/pmem0/options | grep fc_debug_force #empty Fixes: 995a3ed6 ("ext4: add fast_commit feature and handling for extended mount options") Signed-off-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Conflict: fs/ext4/super.c Reviewed-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 08 3月, 2023 3 次提交
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由 Hawkins Jiawei 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.155 commit 6322dda483344abe47d17335809f7bbb730bd88b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6HWOS CVE: CVE-2023-26607 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=tags/v5.10.156&id=6322dda483344abe47d17335809f7bbb730bd88b -------------------------------- commit 36a4d82d upstream. Kernel iterates over ATTR_RECORDs in mft record in ntfs_attr_find(). To ensure access on these ATTR_RECORDs are within bounds, kernel will do some checking during iteration. The problem is that during checking whether ATTR_RECORD's name is within bounds, kernel will dereferences the ATTR_RECORD name_offset field, before checking this ATTR_RECORD strcture is within bounds. This problem may result out-of-bounds read in ntfs_attr_find(), reported by Syzkaller: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_attr_find+0xc02/0xce0 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:597 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807e352009 by task syz-executor153/3607 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 ntfs_attr_find+0xc02/0xce0 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:597 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x1056/0x2070 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:1193 ntfs_read_inode_mount+0x89a/0x2580 fs/ntfs/inode.c:1845 ntfs_fill_super+0x1799/0x9320 fs/ntfs/super.c:2854 mount_bdev+0x34d/0x410 fs/super.c:1400 legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [...] </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0001f8d400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7e350 head:ffffea0001f8d400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888011842140 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88807e351f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88807e351f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88807e352000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88807e352080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88807e352100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== This patch solves it by moving the ATTR_RECORD strcture's bounds checking earlier, then checking whether ATTR_RECORD's name is within bounds. What's more, this patch also add some comments to improve its maintainability. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220831160935.3409-3-yin31149@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1636796c-c85e-7f47-e96f-e074fee3c7d3@huawei.com/ Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-bugs/c/t_XdeKPGTR4/m/LECAuIGcBgAJSigned-off-by: Nchenxiaosong (A) <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NHawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+5f8dcabe4a3b2c51c607@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+5f8dcabe4a3b2c51c607@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLong Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.12-rc1 commit 0f1d344f category: bugfix bugzilla: 188445,https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6J5NZ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0f1d344feb534555a0dcd0beafb7211a37c5355e -------------------------------- iter_file_splice_write() may spawn bvec segments with zero-length. In preparation for prohibiting them, filter out by hand at splice level. Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Chen Zhongjin 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.163 commit 740c537f52c1f54aff9094744483d1515c7c8b7b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6GCCV Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=740c537f52c1f54aff9094744483d1515c7c8b7b -------------------------------- commit 672e4268 upstream. ovl_dentry_revalidate_common() can be called in rcu-walk mode. As document said, "in rcu-walk mode, d_parent and d_inode should not be used without care". Check inode here to protect access under rcu-walk mode. Fixes: bccece1e ("ovl: allow remote upper") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a4055c78774bbf3498bb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NChen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.7 Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 28 2月, 2023 18 次提交
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 788d0824269bef539fe31a785b1517882eafed93 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: CVE-2023-0240 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=788d0824269bef539fe31a785b1517882eafed93 -------------------------------- No upstream commit exists. This imports the io_uring codebase from 5.15.85, wholesale. Changes from that code base: - Drop IOCB_ALLOC_CACHE, we don't have that in 5.10. - Drop MKDIRAT/SYMLINKAT/LINKAT. Would require further VFS backports, and we don't support these in 5.10 to begin with. - sock_from_file() old style calling convention. - Use compat_get_bitmap() only for CONFIG_COMPAT=y Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 4b4d2c79921a8327e9e853dc93c06b27edb3a859 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.168&id=4b4d2c79921a8327e9e853dc93c06b27edb3a859 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 06af8679 ] Olivier Langlois has been struggling with coredumps being incompletely written in processes using io_uring. Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com> writes: > io_uring is a big user of task_work and any event that io_uring made a > task waiting for that occurs during the core dump generation will > generate a TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL. > > Here are the detailed steps of the problem: > 1. io_uring calls vfs_poll() to install a task to a file wait queue > with io_async_wake() as the wakeup function cb from io_arm_poll_handler() > 2. wakeup function ends up calling task_work_add() with TWA_SIGNAL > 3. task_work_add() sets the TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL bit by calling > set_notify_signal() The coredump code deliberately supports being interrupted by SIGKILL, and depends upon prepare_signal to filter out all other signals. Now that signal_pending includes wake ups for TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL this hack in dump_emitted by the coredump code no longer works. Make the coredump code more robust by explicitly testing for all of the wakeup conditions the coredump code supports. This prevents new wakeup conditions from breaking the coredump code, as well as fixing the current issue. The filesystem code that the coredump code uses already limits itself to only aborting on fatal_signal_pending. So it should not develop surprising wake-up reasons either. v2: Don't remove the now unnecessary code in prepare_signal. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 12db8b69 ("entry: Add support for TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL") Reported-by: NOlivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Acked-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit d2136fc145be417e851dfe50703fac2af6aabe46 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.168&id=d2136fc145be417e851dfe50703fac2af6aabe46 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 53dec2ea ] Assumes current->files->file_lock is already held on invocation. Helps the caller check the file before removing the fd, if it needs to. Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.150 commit 67cbc8865a66533fa08c1c13fe9acbaaae63c403 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.168&id=67cbc8865a66533fa08c1c13fe9acbaaae63c403 -------------------------------- [ upstream commit 42b6419d ] ->mm_account should be released only after we free all registered buffers, otherwise __io_sqe_buffers_unregister() will see a NULL ->mm_account and skip locked_vm accounting. Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6d798f65ed4ab8db3664c4d3397d4af16ca98846.1664849932.git.asml.silence@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 57b20530363d127ab6a82e336275769258eb5f37 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.168&id=57b20530363d127ab6a82e336275769258eb5f37 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9fe83c43 ] The function close_fd_get_file is explicitly a variant of __close_fd[1]. Now that __close_fd has been renamed close_fd, rename close_fd_get_file to be consistent with close_fd. When __alloc_fd, __close_fd and __fd_install were introduced the double underscore indicated that the function took a struct files_struct parameter. The function __close_fd_get_file never has so the naming has always been inconsistent. This just cleans things up so there are not any lingering mentions or references __close_fd left in the code. [1] 80cd7956 ("binder: fix use-after-free due to ksys_close() during fdget()") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-23-ebiederm@xmission.comSigned-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Hao Xu 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.158 commit a2efc465245e535fefcad8c4ed5967254344257d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.168&id=a2efc465245e535fefcad8c4ed5967254344257d -------------------------------- commit 8bad28d8 upstream. Abaci reported the below issue: [ 141.400455] hrtimer: interrupt took 205853 ns [ 189.869316] process 'usr/local/ilogtail/ilogtail_0.16.26' started with executable stack [ 250.188042] [ 250.188327] ============================================ [ 250.189015] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 250.189732] 5.11.0-rc4 #1 Not tainted [ 250.190267] -------------------------------------------- [ 250.190917] a.out/7363 is trying to acquire lock: [ 250.191506] ffff888114dbcbe8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.192599] [ 250.192599] but task is already holding lock: [ 250.193309] ffff888114dbfbe8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0xad/0x210 [ 250.194426] [ 250.194426] other info that might help us debug this: [ 250.195238] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 250.195238] [ 250.196019] CPU0 [ 250.196411] ---- [ 250.196803] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 250.197420] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 250.197966] [ 250.197966] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 250.197966] [ 250.198837] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 250.198837] [ 250.199780] 1 lock held by a.out/7363: [ 250.200373] #0: ffff888114dbfbe8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0xad/0x210 [ 250.201645] [ 250.201645] stack backtrace: [ 250.202298] CPU: 0 PID: 7363 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4 #1 [ 250.203144] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 250.203887] Call Trace: [ 250.204302] dump_stack+0xac/0xe3 [ 250.204804] __lock_acquire+0xab6/0x13a0 [ 250.205392] lock_acquire+0x2c3/0x390 [ 250.205928] ? __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.206541] __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0 [ 250.207071] ? __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.207745] ? 0xffffffffa0006083 [ 250.208248] ? __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.208845] ? __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.209452] ? __io_req_task_submit+0x5/0xa0 [ 250.210083] __io_req_task_submit+0x29/0xa0 [ 250.210687] io_async_task_func+0x23d/0x4c0 [ 250.211278] task_work_run+0x89/0xd0 [ 250.211884] io_run_task_work_sig+0x50/0xc0 [ 250.212464] io_sqe_files_unregister+0xb2/0x1f0 [ 250.213109] __io_uring_register+0x115a/0x1750 [ 250.213718] ? __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0xad/0x210 [ 250.214395] ? __fget_files+0x15a/0x260 [ 250.214956] __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0xbe/0x210 [ 250.215620] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x110 [ 250.216205] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 250.216731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 250.217455] RIP: 0033:0x7f0fa17e5239 [ 250.218034] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 27 ec 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 250.220343] RSP: 002b:00007f0fa1eeac48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001ab [ 250.221360] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0fa17e5239 [ 250.222272] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000008 [ 250.223185] RBP: 00007f0fa1eeae20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 250.224091] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 250.224999] R13: 0000000000021000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007f0fa1eeb700 This is caused by calling io_run_task_work_sig() to do work under uring_lock while the caller io_sqe_files_unregister() already held uring_lock. To fix this issue, briefly drop uring_lock when calling io_run_task_work_sig(), and there are two things to concern: - hold uring_lock in io_ring_ctx_free() around io_sqe_files_unregister() this is for consistency of lock/unlock. - add new fixed rsrc ref node before dropping uring_lock it's not safe to do io_uring_enter-->percpu_ref_get() with a dying one. - check if rsrc_data->refs is dying to avoid parallel io_sqe_files_unregister Reported-by: NAbaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Fixes: 1ffc5422 ("io_uring: fix io_sqe_files_unregister() hangs") Suggested-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com> [axboe: fixes from Pavel folded in] Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NSamiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.77 commit 3f2c12ec8a3f992c528c7ad83f7272122dfe8d84 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=3f2c12ec8a3f992c528c7ad83f7272122dfe8d84 -------------------------------- commit 792bb6eb upstream. [ 97.866748] a.out/2890 is trying to acquire lock: [ 97.867829] ffff8881046763e8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_wq_submit_work+0x155/0x240 [ 97.869735] [ 97.869735] but task is already holding lock: [ 97.871033] ffff88810dfe0be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0 [ 97.873074] [ 97.873074] other info that might help us debug this: [ 97.874520] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 97.874520] [ 97.875845] CPU0 [ 97.876440] ---- [ 97.877048] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 97.877961] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 97.878881] [ 97.878881] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 97.878881] [ 97.880341] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 97.880341] [ 97.881952] 1 lock held by a.out/2890: [ 97.882873] #0: ffff88810dfe0be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0 [ 97.885108] [ 97.885108] stack backtrace: [ 97.890457] Call Trace: [ 97.891121] dump_stack+0xac/0xe3 [ 97.891972] __lock_acquire+0xab6/0x13a0 [ 97.892940] lock_acquire+0x2c3/0x390 [ 97.894894] __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0 [ 97.901101] io_wq_submit_work+0x155/0x240 [ 97.902112] io_wq_cancel_cb+0x162/0x490 [ 97.904126] io_async_find_and_cancel+0x3b/0x140 [ 97.905247] io_issue_sqe+0x86d/0x13e0 [ 97.909122] __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550 [ 97.913971] io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470 [ 97.914894] io_submit_sqes+0xcce/0xf10 [ 97.917872] __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3fb/0x5b0 [ 97.921424] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 97.922329] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 While holding uring_lock, e.g. from inline execution, async cancel request may attempt cancellations through io_wq_submit_work, which may try to grab a lock. Delay it to task_work, so we do it from a clean context and don't have to worry about locking. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.5+ Fixes: c07e6719 ("io_uring: hold uring_lock while completing failed polled io in io_wq_submit_work()") Reported-by: NAbaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: NHao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> [Lee: The first hunk solves a different (double free) issue in v5.10. Only the first hunk of the original patch is relevant to v5.10 AND the first hunk of the original patch is only relevant to v5.10] Reported-by: syzbot+59d8a1f4e60c20c066cf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NLee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 214f80e25176eb4d756bc9fe528ef7bf23d2f9a1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=214f80e25176eb4d756bc9fe528ef7bf23d2f9a1 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e886663c ] Pass in the struct filename pointers instead of the user string, and update the three callers to do the same. This behaves like do_unlinkat(), which also takes a filename struct and puts it when it is done. Converting callers is then trivial. Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 5683caa7350f389d099b72bfdb289d2073286e32 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=5683caa7350f389d099b72bfdb289d2073286e32 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 99668f61 ] Now that we support non-blocking path resolution internally, expose it via openat2() in the struct open_how ->resolve flags. This allows applications using openat2() to limit path resolution to the extent that it is already cached. If the lookup cannot be satisfied in a non-blocking manner, openat2(2) will return -1/-EAGAIN. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 0cf0ce8fb5b10d669072345ea855de112d0e0a43 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=0cf0ce8fb5b10d669072345ea855de112d0e0a43 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7d01ef75 ] Initialize them in set_nameidata() and make sure that terminate_walk() clears them once the pointers become potentially invalid (i.e. we leave RCU mode or drop them in non-RCU one). Currently we have "path_init() always initializes them and nobody accesses them outside of path_init()/terminate_walk() segments", which is asking for trouble. With that change we would have nd->path.{mnt,dentry} 1) always valid - NULL or pointing to currently allocated objects. 2) non-NULL while we are successfully walking 3) NULL when we are not walking at all 4) contributing to refcounts whenever non-NULL outside of RCU mode. Fixes: 6c6ec2b0 ("fs: add support for LOOKUP_CACHED") Reported-by: syzbot+c88a7030da47945a3cc3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflict: fs/namei.c Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit 146fe79fff13fea7b5f3a9e913689e07fd4e6432 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=146fe79fff13fea7b5f3a9e913689e07fd4e6432 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit eacd9aa8 ] After switching to non-RCU mode, we want nd->depth to match the number of entries in nd->stack[] that need eventual path_put(). legitimize_links() takes care of that on failures; unfortunately, failure exits added for LOOKUP_CACHED do not. We could add the logics for that into those failure exits, both in try_to_unlazy() and in try_to_unlazy_next(), but since both checks are immediately followed by legitimize_links() and there's no calls of legitimize_links() other than those two... It's easier to move the check (and required handling of nd->depth on failure) into legitimize_links() itself. [caught by Jens: ... and since we are zeroing ->depth here, we need to do drop_links() first] Fixes: 6c6ec2b0 "fs: add support for LOOKUP_CACHED" Tested-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.162 commit c1fe7bd3e1aa85865396b464b31f28b094a4353c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=v5.10.167&id=c1fe7bd3e1aa85865396b464b31f28b094a4353c -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6c6ec2b0 ] io_uring always punts opens to async context, since there's no control over whether the lookup blocks or not. Add LOOKUP_CACHED to support just doing the fast RCU based lookups, which we know will not block. If we can do a cached path resolution of the filename, then we don't have to always punt lookups for a worker. During path resolution, we always do LOOKUP_RCU first. If that fails and we terminate LOOKUP_RCU, then fail a LOOKUP_CACHED attempt as well. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflict: fs/namei.c Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit 4222bec0. We need to apply patch 788d0824269bef (io_uring: import 5.15-stable io_uring) to move io_uring to separate directory and solve the problem of CVE-2023-0240. This patch can be reverted since patch 788d0824269bef contains it. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit 62ca1710. This patch extracts a function for patch 792bb6eb (io_uring: don't take uring_lock during iowq cancel). We can revert it since patch 792bb6eb has been replaced by the one from stable/5.10. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit c5562a26. We need to apply patch 788d0824269bef (io_uring: import 5.15-stable io_uring) to move io_uring to separate directory and solve the problem of CVE-2023-0240. This patch can be replaced by the same one from stable/5.10 to eliminate conflicts. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit f7dc15c2. We need to apply patch 788d0824269bef (io_uring: import 5.15-stable io_uring) to move io_uring to separate directory and solve the problem of CVE-2023-0240. This patch can be reverted since patch 788d0824269bef contains it. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit a5e9a872. We need to apply patch 788d0824269bef (io_uring: import 5.15-stable io_uring) to move io_uring to separate directory and solve the problem of CVE-2023-0240. Revert this patch and add it again after patch 788d0824269bef to reduce conflicts. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Li Lingfeng 提交于
Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6BTWC ------------------------------- This reverts commit ab459213. We need to apply patch 788d0824269bef (io_uring: import 5.15-stable io_uring) to move io_uring to separate directory and solve the problem of CVE-2023-0240. This patch fix a uaf problem of io_identity, and it can be reverted since io_identity is removed in patch 788d0824269bef. Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 22 2月, 2023 1 次提交
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由 ZhaoLong Wang 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc8 commit aa5465ae category: bugfix bugzilla: 188381, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I644ST CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=aa5465aeca3c66fecdf7efcf554aed79b4c4b211 ------------------------------------------------------ When the network status is unstable, use-after-free may occur when read data from the server. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x4c print_report+0x16f/0x4a6 kasan_report+0xb7/0x130 readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0 cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 </TASK> Allocated by task 2535: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 cifs_readdata_direct_alloc+0x2c/0x110 cifs_readdata_alloc+0x2d/0x60 cifs_readahead+0x393/0xfe0 read_pages+0x12f/0x470 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1b1/0x240 filemap_get_pages+0x1c8/0x9a0 filemap_read+0x1c0/0x540 cifs_strict_readv+0x21b/0x240 vfs_read+0x395/0x4b0 ksys_read+0xb8/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 79: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x10e/0x1a0 __kmem_cache_free+0x7a/0x1a0 cifs_readdata_release+0x49/0x60 process_one_work+0x46c/0x760 worker_thread+0x2a4/0x6f0 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x95/0xb0 insert_work+0x2b/0x130 __queue_work+0x1fe/0x660 queue_work_on+0x4b/0x60 smb2_readv_callback+0x396/0x800 cifs_abort_connection+0x474/0x6a0 cifs_reconnect+0x5cb/0xa50 cifs_readv_from_socket.cold+0x22/0x6c cifs_read_page_from_socket+0xc1/0x100 readpages_fill_pages.cold+0x2f/0x46 cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490 kthread+0x16b/0x1a0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 The following function calls will cause UAF of the rdata pointer. readpages_fill_pages cifs_read_page_from_socket cifs_readv_from_socket cifs_reconnect __cifs_reconnect cifs_abort_connection mid->callback() --> smb2_readv_callback queue_work(&rdata->work) # if the worker completes first, # the rdata is freed cifs_readv_complete kref_put cifs_readdata_release kfree(rdata) return rdata->... # UAF in readpages_fill_pages() Similarly, this problem also occurs in the uncache_fill_pages(). Fix this by adjusts the order of condition judgment in the return statement. Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: NPaulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 14 2月, 2023 3 次提交
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由 Zhihao Cheng 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6D1Y2 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=b83cff7f4920e4e636041940f8c1dfb1131ebc5b -------------------------------- Dirty znodes will be written on flash in committing process with following states: process A | znode state ------------------------------------------------------ do_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE ubifs_tnc_start_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE get_znodes_to_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE | COW_ZNODE layout_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE | COW_ZNODE fill_gap | 0 write master | 0 or OBSOLETE_ZNODE process B | znode state ------------------------------------------------------ do_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE[1] ubifs_tnc_start_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE get_znodes_to_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE | COW_ZNODE ubifs_tnc_end_commit | DIRTY_ZNODE | COW_ZNODE write_index | 0 write master | 0 or OBSOLETE_ZNODE[2] or | DIRTY_ZNODE[3] [1] znode is dirtied without concurrent committing process [2] znode is copied up (re-dirtied by other process) before cleaned up in committing process [3] znode is re-dirtied after cleaned up in committing process Currently, the clean znode count is updated in free_obsolete_znodes(), which is called only in normal path. If do_commit failed, clean znode count won't be updated, which triggers a failure ubifs assertion[4] in ubifs_tnc_close(): ubifs_assert_failed [ubifs]: UBIFS assert failed: freed == n [4] Commit 380347e9 ("UBIFS: Add an assertion for clean_zn_cnt"). Fix it by re-statisticing cleaned znode count in tnc_destroy_cnext(). Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216704 Fixes: 1e51764a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zhihao Cheng 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6D1E3 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Following process will cause a memleak for copied up znode: dirty_cow_znode zn = copy_znode(c, znode); err = insert_old_idx(c, zbr->lnum, zbr->offs); if (unlikely(err)) return ERR_PTR(err); // No one refers to zn. Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216705 Fixes: 1e51764a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Thiago Rafael Becker 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc6 commit a3108089 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6D6RL CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=a31080899d5fdafcccf7f39dd214a814a2c82626 -------------------------------- mount.cifs can pass a device with multiple delimiters in it. This will cause rename(2) to fail with ENOENT. V2: - Make sanitize_path more readable. - Fix multiple delimiters between UNC and prepath. - Avoid a memory leak if a bad user starts putting a lot of delimiters in the path on purpose. BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2031200 Fixes: 24e0a1ef ("cifs: switch to new mount api") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+ Acked-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NThiago Rafael Becker <trbecker@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> conflicts: fs/cifs/fs_context.c Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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