This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process.

This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path.  Instead of
just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the moment
the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify
infrastructure to manage this dynamically.  This means that if the filename
does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in
question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue to
work.  If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem is
unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically.  A future enhancement would be to
have the rule survive across directory disruptions.

This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric
Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.

Cc: Peter Moody <peter@hda3.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: minor whitespace clean to satisfy ./scripts/checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Since both ppc and ppc64 have LE variants which are now reported by uname, add
that flag (__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) to syscall_get_arch() and add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
variant.

Without this,  perf trace and auditctl fail.

Mainline kernel reports ppc64le (per a0588015) but there is no matching
AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE.

Since 32-bit PPC LE is not supported by audit, don't advertise it in
AUDIT_ARCH_PPC* variants.

See:
	https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-August/msg00082.html
	https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-December/msg00004.htmlSigned-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

The version field defined in the audit status structure was found to have
limitations in terms of its expressibility of features supported.  This is
distict from the get/set features call to be able to command those features
that are present.

Converting this field from a version number to a feature bitmap will allow
distributions to selectively backport and support certain features and will
allow upstream to be able to deprecate features in the future.  It will allow
userspace clients to first query the kernel for which features are actually
present and supported.  Currently, EINVAL is returned rather than EOPNOTSUP,
which isn't helpful in determining if there was an error in the command, or if
it simply isn't supported yet.  Past features are not represented by this
bitmap, but their use may be converted to EOPNOTSUP if needed in the future.

Since "version" is too generic to convert with a #define, use a union in the
struct status, introducing the member "feature_bitmap" unionized with
"version".

Convert existing AUDIT_VERSION_* macros over to AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP*
counterparts, leaving the former for backwards compatibility.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: minor whitespace tweaks]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

For all arches which support audit implement syscall_get_arch()
They are all pretty easy and straight forward, stolen from how the call
to audit_syscall_entry() determines the arch.
Based-on-patch-by: NRichard Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: microblaze-uclinux@itee.uq.edu.au
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux@lists.openrisc.net
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org

The kernel only uses struct audit_rule_data.  We dropped support for
struct audit_rule a long time ago.  Drop the definition in the header
file.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

On AArch64, audit is supported through generic lib/audit.c and
compat_audit.c, and so this patch adds arch specific definitions required.

Acked-by Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Missing a "|" in AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 macro definition.
Signed-off-by: NHuacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarkos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Cc: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com>
Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6978/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Missing a "|" in AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 macro definition.
Signed-off-by: NHuacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarkos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Cc: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com>
Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6978/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

A MIPS64 kernel may support ELF files for all 3 MIPS ABIs
(O32, N32, N64). Furthermore, the AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS{,EL}64 token
does not provide enough information about the ABI for the 64-bit
process. As a result of which, userland needs to use complex
seccomp filters to decide whether a syscall belongs to the o32 or n32
or n64 ABI. Therefore, a new arch token for MIPS64/n32 is added so it
can be used by seccomp to explicitely set syscall filters for this ABI.
Signed-off-by: NMarkos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Link: http://sourceforge.net/p/libseccomp/mailman/message/32239040/
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6818/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Add a netlink multicast socket with one group to kaudit for "best-effort"
delivery to read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the
existing bidirectional unicast auditd userspace client.

Currently, auditd is intended to use the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capabilities, but actually uses CAP_NET_ADMIN.  The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability
is added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG netlink multicast group
clients to the kaudit subsystem.

This will safely give access to services such as systemd to consume audit logs
while ensuring write access remains restricted for integrity.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1000-1099 is for configuring things.  So auditd ignored such messages.
This is about actually logging what was configured.  Move it into the
range for such types of messages.
Reported-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

We were exposing a function based on kernel config options to userspace.
This is wrong.  Move it to the audit internal header.
Suggested-by: NChris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

lib/audit.c provides a generic function for auditing system calls.
This patch extends it for compat syscall support on bi-architectures
(32/64-bit) by adding lib/compat_audit.c.
What is required to support this feature are:
 * add asm/unistd32.h for compat system call names
 * select CONFIG_AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_GENERIC
Signed-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

During an audit event, cache and print the value of the process's
proctitle value (proc/<pid>/cmdline). This is useful in situations
where processes are started via fork'd virtual machines where the
comm field is incorrect. Often times, setting the comm field still
is insufficient as the comm width is not very wide and most
virtual machine "package names" do not fit. Also, during execution,
many threads have their comm field set as well. By tying it back to
the global cmdline value for the process, audit records will be more
complete in systems with these properties. An example of where this
is useful and applicable is in the realm of Android. With Android,
their is no fork/exec for VM instances. The bare, preloaded Dalvik
VM listens for a fork and specialize request. When this request comes
in, the VM forks, and the loads the specific application (specializing).
This was done to take advantage of COW and to not require a load of
basic packages by the VM on very app spawn. When this spawn occurs,
the package name is set via setproctitle() and shows up in procfs.
Many of these package names are longer then 16 bytes, the historical
width of task->comm. Having the cmdline in the audit records will
couple the application back to the record directly. Also, on my
Debian development box, some audit records were more useful then
what was printed under comm.

The cached proctitle is tied to the life-cycle of the audit_context
structure and is built on demand.

Proctitle is controllable by userspace, and thus should not be trusted.
It is meant as an aid to assist in debugging. The proctitle event is
emitted during syscall audits, and can be filtered with auditctl.

Example:
type=AVC msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1971 comm="mkdir" name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): arch=c000003e syscall=137 success=yes exit=0 a0=7f019dfc8bd7 a1=7fffa6aed2c0 a2=fffffffffff4bd25 a3=7fffa6aed050 items=0 ppid=1967 pid=1971 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1327] msg=audit(1391217013.924:386):  proctitle=6D6B646972002D70002F7661722F72756E2F636F6E736F6C65

Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> (wrt record formating)
Signed-off-by: NWilliam Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Give names to the audit versions.  Just something for a userspace
programmer to know what the version provides.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

reaahead-collector abuses the audit logging facility to discover which files
are accessed at boot time to make a pre-load list

Add a tuning option to audit_backlog_wait_time so that if auditd can't keep up,
or gets blocked, the callers won't be blocked.

Bump audit_status API version to "2".
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Re-named confusing local variable names (status_set and status_get didn't agree
with their command type name) and reduced their scope.

Future-proof API changes by not depending on the exact size of the audit_status
struct and by adding an API version field.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

This adds a new 'audit_feature' bit which allows userspace to set it
such that the loginuid is absolutely immutable, even if you have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid.  They cannot
directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid.  The ability to
unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of
container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed
inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

The audit_status structure was not designed with extensibility in mind.
Define a new AUDIT_SET_FEATURE message type which takes a new structure
of bits where things can be enabled/disabled/locked one at a time.  This
structure should be able to grow in the future while maintaining forward
and backward compatibility (based loosly on the ideas from capabilities
and prctl)

This does not actually add any features, but is just infrastructure to
allow new on/off types of audit system features.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

SFR reported this 2013-05-15:

> After merging the final tree, today's linux-next build (i386 defconfig)
> produced this warning:
>
> kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_data_to_entry':
> kernel/auditfilter.c:426:3: warning: this decimal constant is unsigned only
> in ISO C90 [enabled by default]
>
> Introduced by commit 780a7654 ("audit: Make testing for a valid
> loginuid explicit") from Linus' tree.

Replace this decimal constant in the code with a macro to make it more readable
(add to the unsigned cast to quiet the warning).

Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Messages of type AUDIT_USER_TTY were being formatted to 1024 octets,
truncating messages approaching MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH (8970 octets).

Set the formatting to 8560 characters, given maximum estimates for prefix and
suffix budgets.

See the problem discussion:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2009-January/msg00030.html

And the new size rationale:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2013-September/msg00016.html

Test ~8k messages with:
auditctl -m "$(for i in $(seq -w 001 820);do echo -n "${i}0______";done)"
Reported-by: NLC Bruzenak <lenny@magitekltd.com>
Reported-by: NJustin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

With the architecture gone, any references to it are no longer needed.

Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Acked-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd5.

Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
that.

In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.

So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
new idiom.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7
Reported-By: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Most commands are entered one line at a time and processed as complete lines
in non-canonical mode.  Commands that interactively require a password, enter
canonical mode to do this while shutting off echo.  This pair of features
(icanon and !echo) can be used to avoid logging passwords by audit while still
logging the rest of the command.

Adding a member (log_passwd) to the struct audit_tty_status passed in by
pam_tty_audit allows control of canonical mode without echo per task.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

While the kernel internals want pt_regs (and so it includes
linux/ptrace.h), the user version of audit.h does not need it.  So move
the include out of the uapi version.

This avoids issues where people want the audit defines and userland
ptrace api.  Including both the kernel ptrace and the userland ptrace
headers can easily lead to failure.
Signed-off-by: NMike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process.  While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors.

In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a
record if the process is under inspection.  This change also fixes
userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered
malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: NWill Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NMichael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>

Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.

Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.

If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.

Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.

While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

For now, we just have two possibilities:

UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else

In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.

Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Replace the #defines used when CONFIG_AUDIT or CONFIG_AUDIT_SYSCALLS are
disabled so we get type checking during those builds.
Suggested-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When using audit on OpenRISC, an audit arch is needed. This defines
it and fixes a compile-time bug uncovered in linux-next, likely from a
cut/paste from an arch with 64/32-bit modes that defined arch_arch():
arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c:190:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'audit_arch'

This replaces it with the newly defined AUDIT_ARCH_OPENRISC, since it
is only 32-bit, and currently only operates in big-endian mode.
Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>

Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.

Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.

Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.

Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.

Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.

Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

The audit filter code guarantees that uid are always compared with
uids and gids are always compared with gids, as the comparason
operations are type specific.  Take advantage of this proper to define
audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator which use the type safe
comparasons from uidgid.h.

Build on audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator and replace
audit_compare_id with audit_compare_uid and audit_compare_gid.  This
is one of those odd cases where being type safe and duplicating code
leads to simpler shorter and more concise code.

Don't allow bitmask operations in uid and gid comparisons in
audit_data_to_entry.  Bitmask operations are already denined in
audit_rule_to_entry.

Convert constants in audit_rule_to_entry and audit_data_to_entry into
kuids and kgids when appropriate.

Convert the uid and gid field in struct audit_names to be of type
kuid_t and kgid_t respectively, so that the new uid and gid comparators
can be applied in a type safe manner.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>