Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

The newly introduced gss_seq_send64_fetch_and_inc() fails to build on
32-bit architectures:

net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c:144:14: note: in expansion of macro 'cmpxchg'
   seq_send = cmpxchg(&ctx->seq_send64, old, old + 1);
              ^~~~~~~
arch/x86/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:128:3: error: call to '__cmpxchg_wrong_size' declared with attribute error: Bad argument size for cmpxchg
   __cmpxchg_wrong_size();     \

As the message tells us, cmpxchg() cannot be used on 64-bit arguments,
that's what cmpxchg64() does.

Fixes: 571ed1fd ("SUNRPC: Replace krb5_seq_lock with a lockless scheme")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

Use RCU protected lookups for discovering the supported mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

If the RPC call relies on the receive call allocating pages as buffers,
then let's label it so that we
a) Don't leak memory by allocating pages for requests that do not expect
   this behaviour
b) Can optimise for the common case where calls do not require allocation.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

If a message has been encoded using RPCSEC_GSS, the server is
maintaining a window of sequence numbers that it considers valid.
The client should normally be tracking that window, and needs to
verify that the sequence number used by the message being transmitted
still lies inside the window of validity.

So far, we've been able to assume this condition would be realised
automatically, since the client has been encoding the message only
after taking the socket lock. Once we change that condition, we
will need the explicit check.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

During review, it was found that the target, service, and srchost
keywords are easily conflated. Add an explainer.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

NFSv4.0 callback needs to know the GSS target name the client used
when it established its lease. That information is available from
the GSS context created by gssproxy. Make it available in each
svc_cred.

Note this will also give us access to the real target service
principal name (which is typically "nfs", but spec does not require
that).
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

A multi-homed NFS server may have more than one "nfs" key in its
keytab. Enable the kernel to pick the key it wants as a machine
credential when establishing a GSS context.

This is useful for GSS-protected NFSv4.0 callbacks, which are
required by RFC 7530 S3.3.3 to use the same principal as the service
principal the client used when establishing its lease.

A complementary modification to rpc.gssd is required to fully enable
this feature.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Fedora got a bug report from NFS:

kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:143!
...
RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x7d/0x90
..
  make_checksum+0x4e7/0x760 [rpcsec_gss_krb5]
  gss_get_mic_kerberos+0x26e/0x310 [rpcsec_gss_krb5]
  gss_marshal+0x126/0x1a0 [auth_rpcgss]
  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80/0xe0
  ? call_transmit_status+0x1d0/0x1d0 [sunrpc]
  call_transmit+0x137/0x230 [sunrpc]
  __rpc_execute+0x9b/0x490 [sunrpc]
  rpc_run_task+0x119/0x150 [sunrpc]
  nfs4_run_exchange_id+0x1bd/0x250 [nfsv4]
  _nfs4_proc_exchange_id+0x2d/0x490 [nfsv4]
  nfs41_discover_server_trunking+0x1c/0xa0 [nfsv4]
  nfs4_discover_server_trunking+0x80/0x270 [nfsv4]
  nfs4_init_client+0x16e/0x240 [nfsv4]
  ? nfs_get_client+0x4c9/0x5d0 [nfs]
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30
  ? nfs_get_client+0x4c9/0x5d0 [nfs]
  nfs4_set_client+0xb2/0x100 [nfsv4]
  nfs4_create_server+0xff/0x290 [nfsv4]
  nfs4_remote_mount+0x28/0x50 [nfsv4]
  mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
  vfs_kern_mount.part.35+0x54/0x160
  nfs_do_root_mount+0x7f/0xc0 [nfsv4]
  nfs4_try_mount+0x43/0x70 [nfsv4]
  ? get_nfs_version+0x21/0x80 [nfs]
  nfs_fs_mount+0x789/0xbf0 [nfs]
  ? pcpu_alloc+0x6ca/0x7e0
  ? nfs_clone_super+0x70/0x70 [nfs]
  ? nfs_parse_mount_options+0xb40/0xb40 [nfs]
  mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
  vfs_kern_mount.part.35+0x54/0x160
  do_mount+0x1fd/0xd50
  ksys_mount+0xba/0xd0
  __x64_sys_mount+0x21/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

This is BUG_ON(!virt_addr_valid(buf)) triggered by using a stack
allocated buffer with a scatterlist. Convert the buffer for
rc4salt to be dynamically allocated instead.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1615258Signed-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Variables 'checksumlen','blocksize' and 'data' are being assigned,
but are never used, hence they are redundant and can be removed.

Fix the following warning:

  net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c:443:7: warning: variable ‘blocksize’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c:376:15: warning: variable ‘checksumlen’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma.c:97:9: warning: variable ‘data’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

These semicolons are not needed.  Just remove them.
Signed-off-by: Nzhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Remove trailing whitespace and blank line at EOF
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

This turns rpc_auth_create_args into a const as it gets passed through the
auth stack.
Signed-off-by: NSargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

There is a 16-byte memory leak inside sunrpc/auth_gss on an nfs server when
a client mounts with 'sec=krb5' in a simple mount / umount loop.  The leak
is seen by either monitoring the kmalloc-16 slab or with kmemleak enabled

unreferenced object 0xffff92e6a045f030 (size 16):
  comm "nfsd", pid 1096, jiffies 4294936658 (age 761.110s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    2a 86 48 86 f7 12 01 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  *.H.............
  backtrace:
    [<000000004b2b79a7>] gssx_dec_buffer+0x79/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000002610ac1a>] gssx_dec_accept_sec_context+0x215/0x6dd [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000004fd0e81d>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xa9/0xe0 [sunrpc]
    [<000000002b099233>] call_decode+0x1e9/0x840 [sunrpc]
    [<00000000954fc846>] __rpc_execute+0x80/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
    [<00000000c83a961c>] rpc_run_task+0x10d/0x150 [sunrpc]
    [<000000002c2cdcd2>] rpc_call_sync+0x4d/0xa0 [sunrpc]
    [<000000000b74eea2>] gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall+0x196/0x470 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000003271273f>] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x188/0x520 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000001cf69f01>] svcauth_gss_accept+0x3a6/0xb50 [auth_rpcgss]

If you map the above to code you'll see the following call chain
  gssx_dec_accept_sec_context
    gssx_dec_ctx  (missing from kmemleak output)
      gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech)

Inside gssx_dec_buffer there is 'kmemdup' where we allocate memory for
any gssx_buffer (buf) and store into buf->data.  In the above instance,
'buf == &ctx->mech).

Further up in the chain in gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall we see ctx->mech
is part of a stack variable 'struct gssx_ctx rctxh'.  Now later inside
gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall after gssp_call, there is a number of
memcpy and kfree statements, but there is no kfree(rctxh.mech.data)
after the memcpy into data->mech_oid.data.

With this patch applied and the same mount / unmount loop, the kmalloc-16
slab is stable and kmemleak enabled no longer shows the above backtrace.
Signed-off-by: NDave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

make_checksum_hmac_md5() is allocating an HMAC transform and doing
crypto API calls in the following order:

    crypto_ahash_init()
    crypto_ahash_setkey()
    crypto_ahash_digest()

This is wrong because it makes no sense to init() the request before a
key has been set, given that the initial state depends on the key.  And
digest() is short for init() + update() + final(), so in this case
there's no need to explicitly call init() at all.

Before commit 9fa68f62 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes
without setting key") the extra init() had no real effect, at least for
the software HMAC implementation.  (There are also hardware drivers that
implement HMAC-MD5, and it's not immediately obvious how gracefully they
handle init() before setkey().)  But now the crypto API detects this
incorrect initialization and returns -ENOKEY.  This is breaking NFS
mounts in some cases.

Fix it by removing the incorrect call to crypto_ahash_init().
Reported-by: NMichael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Fixes: 9fa68f62 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Fixes: fffdaef2 ("gss_krb5: Add support for rc4-hmac encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Synchronous pernet_operations are not allowed anymore.
All are asynchronous. So, drop the structure member.
Signed-off-by: NKirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

These pernet_operations initialize and destroy sunrpc_net_id
refered per-net items. Only used global list is cache_list,
and accesses already serialized.

sunrpc_destroy_cache_detail() check for list_empty() without
cache_list_lock, but when it's called from unregister_pernet_subsys(),
there can't be callers in parallel, so we won't miss list_empty()
in this case.
Signed-off-by: NKirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions.

Done with checkpatch -f --types=SYMBOLIC_PERMS --fix-inplace
and some typing.

Miscellanea:

o Whitespace neatening around these conversions.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix unaligned access in gss_{get,verify}_mic_v2() on sparc64
Signed-off-by: NJames Ettle <james@ettle.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NThiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: N"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make these const as they are only getting passed to the function
cache_create_net having the argument as const.
Signed-off-by: NBhumika Goyal <bhumirks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

It would be kinder to WARN() and recover in several spots here instead
of BUG()ing.

Also, it looks like the read_u32_from_xdr_buf() call could actually
fail, though it might require a broken (or malicious) client, so convert
that to just an error return.
Reported-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@monkey.org>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

struct rpc_procinfo contains function pointers, and marking it as
constant avoids it being able to be used as an attach vector for
code injections.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

p_count is the only writeable memeber of struct rpc_procinfo, which is
a good candidate to be const-ified as it contains function pointers.

This patch moves it into out out struct rpc_procinfo, and into a
separate writable array that is pointed to by struct rpc_version and
indexed by p_statidx.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Declare the p_decode callbacks with the proper prototype instead of
casting to kxdrdproc_t and losing all type safety.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Declare the p_encode callbacks with the proper prototype instead of
casting to kxdreproc_t and losing all type safety.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Running a multi-threaded 8KB fio test (70/30 mix), three or four out
of twelve of the jobs fail when using krb5i. The failure is an EIO
on a read.

Troubleshooting confirmed the EIO results when the client fails to
verify the MIC of an NFS READ reply. Bruce suggested the problem
could be due to the data payload changing between the time the
reply's MIC was computed on the server and the time the reply was
actually sent.

krb5p gets around this problem by disabling RQ_SPLICE_OK. Use the
same mechanism for krb5i RPCs.

"iozone -i0 -i1 -s128m -y1k -az -I", export is tmpfs, mount is
sec=krb5i,vers=3,proto=rdma. The important numbers are the
read / reread column.

Here's without the RQ_SPLICE_OK patch:

              kB  reclen    write  rewrite    read    reread
          131072       1     7546     7929     8396     8267
          131072       2    14375    14600    15843    15639
          131072       4    19280    19248    21303    21410
          131072       8    32350    31772    35199    34883
          131072      16    36748    37477    49365    51706
          131072      32    55669    56059    57475    57389
          131072      64    74599    75190    74903    75550
          131072     128    99810   101446   102828   102724
          131072     256   122042   122612   124806   125026
          131072     512   137614   138004   141412   141267
          131072    1024   146601   148774   151356   151409
          131072    2048   180684   181727   293140   292840
          131072    4096   206907   207658   552964   549029
          131072    8192   223982   224360   454493   473469
          131072   16384   228927   228390   654734   632607

And here's with it:

              kB  reclen    write  rewrite    read    reread
          131072       1     7700     7365     7958     8011
          131072       2    13211    13303    14937    14414
          131072       4    19001    19265    20544    20657
          131072       8    30883    31097    34255    33566
          131072      16    36868    34908    51499    49944
          131072      32    56428    55535    58710    56952
          131072      64    73507    74676    75619    74378
          131072     128   100324   101442   103276   102736
          131072     256   122517   122995   124639   124150
          131072     512   137317   139007   140530   140830
          131072    1024   146807   148923   151246   151072
          131072    2048   179656   180732   292631   292034
          131072    4096   206216   208583   543355   541951
          131072    8192   223738   224273   494201   489372
          131072   16384   229313   229840   691719   668427

I would say that there is not much difference in this test.

For good measure, here's the same test with sec=krb5p:

              kB  reclen    write  rewrite    read    reread
          131072       1     5982     5881     6137     6218
          131072       2    10216    10252    10850    10932
          131072       4    12236    12575    15375    15526
          131072       8    15461    15462    23821    22351
          131072      16    25677    25811    27529    27640
          131072      32    31903    32354    34063    33857
          131072      64    42989    43188    45635    45561
          131072     128    52848    53210    56144    56141
          131072     256    59123    59214    62691    62933
          131072     512    63140    63277    66887    67025
          131072    1024    65255    65299    69213    69140
          131072    2048    76454    76555   133767   133862
          131072    4096    84726    84883   251925   250702
          131072    8192    89491    89482   270821   276085
          131072   16384    91572    91597   361768   336868

BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=307Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

struct rpc_procinfo contains function pointers, and marking it as
constant avoids it being able to be used as an attach vector for
code injections.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

p_count is the only writeable memeber of struct rpc_procinfo, which is
a good candidate to be const-ified as it contains function pointers.

This patch moves it into out out struct rpc_procinfo, and into a
separate writable array that is pointed to by struct rpc_version and
indexed by p_statidx.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Declare the p_decode callbacks with the proper prototype instead of
casting to kxdrdproc_t and losing all type safety.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Declare the p_encode callbacks with the proper prototype instead of
casting to kxdreproc_t and losing all type safety.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Now that %z is standartised in C99 there is no reason to support %Z.
Unlike %L it doesn't even make format strings smaller.

Use BUILD_BUG_ON in a couple ATM drivers.

In case anyone didn't notice lib/vsprintf.o is about half of SLUB which
is in my opinion is quite an achievement.  Hopefully this patch inspires
someone else to trim vsprintf.c more.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103230126.GA30170@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>