1. 19 7月, 2012 2 次提交
    • R
      net: Statically initialize init_net.dev_base_head · 734b6541
      Rustad, Mark D 提交于
      This change eliminates an initialization-order hazard most
      recently seen when netprio_cgroup is built into the kernel.
      
      With thanks to Eric Dumazet for catching a bug.
      Signed-off-by: NMark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      734b6541
    • P
      cipso: don't follow a NULL pointer when setsockopt() is called · 89d7ae34
      Paul Moore 提交于
      As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
      attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
      tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
      pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
      the setsockopt() syscall).
      
      This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
      non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface.  In
      the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
      a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
      not something we want to allow.
      
      A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
      have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
      caught early in cipso_v4_validate():
      
      	#include <sys/types.h>
      	#include <sys/socket.h>
      	#include <linux/ip.h>
      	#include <linux/in.h>
      	#include <string.h>
      
      	struct local_tag {
      		char type;
      		char length;
      		char info[4];
      	};
      
      	struct cipso {
      		char type;
      		char length;
      		char doi[4];
      		struct local_tag local;
      	};
      
      	int main(int argc, char **argv)
      	{
      		int sockfd;
      		struct cipso cipso = {
      			.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
      			.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
      			.local = {
      				.type = 128,
      				.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
      			},
      		};
      
      		memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
      		cipso.doi[3] = 3;
      
      		sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
      		#define SOL_IP 0
      		setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
      			&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));
      
      		return 0;
      	}
      
      CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
      Reported-by: NAlan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      89d7ae34
  2. 17 7月, 2012 5 次提交
    • J
      ipvs: fix oops in ip_vs_dst_event on rmmod · 283283c4
      Julian Anastasov 提交于
      	After commit 39f618b4 (3.4)
      "ipvs: reset ipvs pointer in netns" we can oops in
      ip_vs_dst_event on rmmod ip_vs because ip_vs_control_cleanup
      is called after the ipvs_core_ops subsys is unregistered and
      net->ipvs is NULL. Fix it by exiting early from ip_vs_dst_event
      if ipvs is NULL. It is safe because all services and dests
      for the net are already freed.
      Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
      Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      283283c4
    • A
      ax25: Fix missing break · ef764a13
      Alan Cox 提交于
      At least there seems to be no reason to disallow ROSE sockets when
      NETROM is loaded.
      Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ef764a13
    • S
      caif: Fix access to freed pernet memory · 96f80d12
      Sjur Brændeland 提交于
      unregister_netdevice_notifier() must be called before
      unregister_pernet_subsys() to avoid accessing already freed
      pernet memory. This fixes the following oops when doing rmmod:
      
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffffa0f802bd>] caif_device_notify+0x4d/0x5a0 [caif]
       [<ffffffff81552ba9>] unregister_netdevice_notifier+0xb9/0x100
       [<ffffffffa0f86dcc>] caif_device_exit+0x1c/0x250 [caif]
       [<ffffffff810e7734>] sys_delete_module+0x1a4/0x300
       [<ffffffff810da82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x15d/0x1e0
       [<ffffffff813517de>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3
       [<ffffffff81696bad>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
      
      RIP
       [<ffffffffa0f7f561>] caif_get+0x51/0xb0 [caif]
      Signed-off-by: NSjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
      Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      96f80d12
    • G
      net: cgroup: fix access the unallocated memory in netprio cgroup · ef209f15
      Gao feng 提交于
      there are some out of bound accesses in netprio cgroup.
      
      now before accessing the dev->priomap.priomap array,we only check
      if the dev->priomap exist.and because we don't want to see
      additional bound checkings in fast path, so we should make sure
      that dev->priomap is null or array size of dev->priomap.priomap
      is equal to max_prioidx + 1;
      
      so in write_priomap logic,we should call extend_netdev_table when
      dev->priomap is null and dev->priomap.priomap_len < max_len.
      and in cgrp_create->update_netdev_tables logic,we should call
      extend_netdev_table only when dev->priomap exist and
      dev->priomap.priomap_len < max_len.
      
      and it's not needed to call update_netdev_tables in write_priomap,
      we can only allocate the net device's priomap which we change through
      net_prio.ifpriomap.
      
      this patch also add a return value for update_netdev_tables &
      extend_netdev_table, so when new_priomap is allocated failed,
      write_priomap will stop to access the priomap,and return -ENOMEM
      back to the userspace to tell the user what happend.
      
      Change From v3:
      1. add rtnl protect when reading max_prioidx in write_priomap.
      
      2. only call extend_netdev_table when map->priomap_len < max_len,
         this will make sure array size of dev->map->priomap always
         bigger than any prioidx.
      
      3. add a function write_update_netdev_table to make codes clear.
      
      Change From v2:
      1. protect extend_netdev_table by RTNL.
      2. when extend_netdev_table failed,call dev_put to reduce device's refcount.
      Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ef209f15
    • N
      sctp: Fix list corruption resulting from freeing an association on a list · 2eebc1e1
      Neil Horman 提交于
      A few days ago Dave Jones reported this oops:
      
      [22766.294255] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
      [22766.295376] CPU 0
      [22766.295384] Modules linked in:
      [22766.387137]  ffffffffa169f292 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ffff880147c03a90
      ffff880147c03a74
      [22766.387135] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000000000
      [22766.387136] Process trinity-watchdo (pid: 10896, threadinfo ffff88013e7d2000,
      [22766.387137] Stack:
      [22766.387140]  ffff880147c03a10
      [22766.387140]  ffffffffa169f2b6
      [22766.387140]  ffff88013ed95728
      [22766.387143]  0000000000000002
      [22766.387143]  0000000000000000
      [22766.387143]  ffff880003fad062
      [22766.387144]  ffff88013c120000
      [22766.387144]
      [22766.387145] Call Trace:
      [22766.387145]  <IRQ>
      [22766.387150]  [<ffffffffa169f292>] ? __sctp_lookup_association+0x62/0xd0
      [sctp]
      [22766.387154]  [<ffffffffa169f2b6>] __sctp_lookup_association+0x86/0xd0 [sctp]
      [22766.387157]  [<ffffffffa169f597>] sctp_rcv+0x207/0xbb0 [sctp]
      [22766.387161]  [<ffffffff810d4da8>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xd0
      [22766.387163]  [<ffffffff815827e3>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x133/0x210
      [22766.387166]  [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
      [22766.387168]  [<ffffffff8159043d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x18d/0x4c0
      [22766.387169]  [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
      [22766.387171]  [<ffffffff81590a07>] ip_local_deliver+0x47/0x80
      [22766.387172]  [<ffffffff8158fd80>] ip_rcv_finish+0x150/0x680
      [22766.387174]  [<ffffffff81590c54>] ip_rcv+0x214/0x320
      [22766.387176]  [<ffffffff81558c07>] __netif_receive_skb+0x7b7/0x910
      [22766.387178]  [<ffffffff8155856c>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x11c/0x910
      [22766.387180]  [<ffffffff810d423e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.25+0xe/0x40
      [22766.387182]  [<ffffffff81558f83>] netif_receive_skb+0x23/0x1f0
      [22766.387183]  [<ffffffff815596a9>] ? dev_gro_receive+0x139/0x440
      [22766.387185]  [<ffffffff81559280>] napi_skb_finish+0x70/0xa0
      [22766.387187]  [<ffffffff81559cb5>] napi_gro_receive+0xf5/0x130
      [22766.387218]  [<ffffffffa01c4679>] e1000_receive_skb+0x59/0x70 [e1000e]
      [22766.387242]  [<ffffffffa01c5aab>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x28b/0x460 [e1000e]
      [22766.387266]  [<ffffffffa01c9c18>] e1000e_poll+0x78/0x430 [e1000e]
      [22766.387268]  [<ffffffff81559fea>] net_rx_action+0x1aa/0x3d0
      [22766.387270]  [<ffffffff810a495f>] ? account_system_vtime+0x10f/0x130
      [22766.387273]  [<ffffffff810734d0>] __do_softirq+0xe0/0x420
      [22766.387275]  [<ffffffff8169826c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
      [22766.387278]  [<ffffffff8101db15>] do_softirq+0xd5/0x110
      [22766.387279]  [<ffffffff81073bc5>] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0
      [22766.387281]  [<ffffffff81698b03>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xd0
      [22766.387283]  [<ffffffff8168ee2f>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
      [22766.387283]  <EOI>
      [22766.387284]
      [22766.387285]  [<ffffffff8168eed9>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
      [22766.387285] Code: c0 90 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 c8 5d c3 0f 1f 00 55 48
      89 e5 48 83
      ec 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 <0f> b7 87 98 00 00 00
      48 89 fb
      49 89 f5 66 c1 c0 08 66 39 46 02
      [22766.387307]
      [22766.387307] RIP
      [22766.387311]  [<ffffffffa168a2c9>] sctp_assoc_is_match+0x19/0x90 [sctp]
      [22766.387311]  RSP <ffff880147c039b0>
      [22766.387142]  ffffffffa16ab120
      [22766.599537] ---[ end trace 3f6dae82e37b17f5 ]---
      [22766.601221] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
      
      It appears from his analysis and some staring at the code that this is likely
      occuring because an association is getting freed while still on the
      sctp_assoc_hashtable.  As a result, we get a gpf when traversing the hashtable
      while a freed node corrupts part of the list.
      
      Nominally I would think that an mibalanced refcount was responsible for this,
      but I can't seem to find any obvious imbalance.  What I did note however was
      that the two places where we create an association using
      sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE (__sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg), have failure paths
      which free a newly created association after calling sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE.
      sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE brings us into the sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc path, which
      issues a SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC side effect, which in turn adds a new association to
      the aforementioned hash table.  the sctp command interpreter that process side
      effects has not way to unwind previously processed commands, so freeing the
      association from the __sctp_connect or sctp_sendmsg error path would lead to a
      freed association remaining on this hash table.
      
      I've fixed this but modifying sctp_[un]hash_established to use hlist_del_init,
      which allows us to proerly use hlist_unhashed to check if the node is on a
      hashlist safely during a delete.  That in turn alows us to safely call
      sctp_unhash_established in the __sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg error paths
      before freeing them, regardles of what the associations state is on the hash
      list.
      
      I noted, while I was doing this, that the __sctp_unhash_endpoint was using
      hlist_unhsashed in a simmilar fashion, but never nullified any removed nodes
      pointers to make that function work properly, so I fixed that up in a simmilar
      fashion.
      
      I attempted to test this using a virtual guest running the SCTP_RR test from
      netperf in a loop while running the trinity fuzzer, both in a loop.  I wasn't
      able to recreate the problem prior to this fix, nor was I able to trigger the
      failure after (neither of which I suppose is suprising).  Given the trace above
      however, I think its likely that this is what we hit.
      Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Reported-by: davej@redhat.com
      CC: davej@redhat.com
      CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      CC: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
      CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2eebc1e1
  3. 16 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  4. 12 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  5. 11 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  6. 10 7月, 2012 5 次提交
    • J
      net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c: remove invalid reference to list iterator variable · cae296c4
      Julia Lawall 提交于
      If list_for_each_entry, etc complete a traversal of the list, the iterator
      variable ends up pointing to an address at an offset from the list head,
      and not a meaningful structure.  Thus this value should not be used after
      the end of the iterator.  This seems to be a copy-paste bug from a previous
      debugging message, and so the meaningless value is just deleted.
      
      This problem was found using Coccinelle (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/).
      Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cae296c4
    • E
      net: cgroup: fix out of bounds accesses · 91c68ce2
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      dev->priomap is allocated by extend_netdev_table() called from
      update_netdev_tables().
      And this is only called if write_priomap() is called.
      
      But if write_priomap() is not called, it seems we can have out of bounds
      accesses in cgrp_destroy(), read_priomap() & skb_update_prio()
      
      With help from Gao Feng
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Acked-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      91c68ce2
    • E
      mac80211: destroy assoc_data correctly if assoc fails · 10a9109f
      Eliad Peller 提交于
      If association failed due to internal error (e.g. no
      supported rates IE), we call ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data()
      with assoc=true, while we actually reject the association.
      
      This results in the BSSID not being zeroed out.
      
      After passing assoc=false, we no longer have to call
      sta_info_destroy_addr() explicitly. While on it, move
      the "associated" message after the assoc_success check.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.4+]
      Signed-off-by: NEliad Peller <eliad@wizery.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
      10a9109f
    • S
      NFC: Prevent NULL deref when getting socket name · 147f20e3
      Sasha Levin 提交于
      llcp_sock_getname can be called without a device attached to the nfc_llcp_sock.
      
      This would lead to the following BUG:
      
      [  362.341807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
      [  362.341815] IP: [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0
      [  362.341818] PGD 31b35067 PUD 30631067 PMD 0
      [  362.341821] Oops: 0000 [#627] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
      [  362.341826] CPU 3
      [  362.341827] Pid: 7816, comm: trinity-child55 Tainted: G      D W    3.5.0-rc4-next-20120628-sasha-00005-g9f23eb7 #479
      [  362.341831] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff836258e5>]  [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0
      [  362.341832] RSP: 0018:ffff8800304fde88  EFLAGS: 00010286
      [  362.341834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880033cb8000 RCX: 0000000000000001
      [  362.341835] RDX: ffff8800304fdec4 RSI: ffff8800304fdec8 RDI: ffff8800304fdeda
      [  362.341836] RBP: ffff8800304fdea8 R08: 7ebcebcb772b7ffb R09: 5fbfcb9c35bdfd53
      [  362.341838] R10: 4220020c54326244 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800304fdec8
      [  362.341839] R13: ffff8800304fdec4 R14: ffff8800304fdec8 R15: 0000000000000044
      [  362.341841] FS:  00007effa376e700(0000) GS:ffff880035a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  362.341843] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  362.341844] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000030438000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
      [  362.341851] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [  362.341856] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      [  362.341858] Process trinity-child55 (pid: 7816, threadinfo ffff8800304fc000, task ffff880031270000)
      [  362.341858] Stack:
      [  362.341862]  ffff8800304fdea8 ffff880035156780 0000000000000000 0000000000001000
      [  362.341865]  ffff8800304fdf78 ffffffff83183b40 00000000304fdec8 0000006000000000
      [  362.341868]  ffff8800304f0027 ffffffff83729649 ffff8800304fdee8 ffff8800304fdf48
      [  362.341869] Call Trace:
      [  362.341874]  [<ffffffff83183b40>] sys_getpeername+0xa0/0x110
      [  362.341877]  [<ffffffff83729649>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x59/0x80
      [  362.341882]  [<ffffffff810f342b>] ? do_setitimer+0x23b/0x290
      [  362.341886]  [<ffffffff81985ede>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
      [  362.341889]  [<ffffffff8372a539>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [  362.341921] Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 b3 ff ff ff 48 85 db 74 54 66 41 c7 04 24 27 00 49 8d 7c 24 12 41 c7 45 00 60 00 00 00 48 8b 83 28 05 00 00 <8b> 00 41 89 44 24 04 0f b6 83 41 05 00 00 41 88 44 24 10 0f b6
      [  362.341924] RIP  [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0
      [  362.341925]  RSP <ffff8800304fde88>
      [  362.341926] CR2: 0000000000000000
      [  362.341928] ---[ end trace 6d450e935ee18bf3 ]---
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
      147f20e3
    • T
      mac80211: correct size the argument to kzalloc in minstrel_ht · 472dd35c
      Thomas Huehn 提交于
      msp has type struct minstrel_ht_sta_priv not struct minstrel_ht_sta.
      
      (This incorporates the fixup originally posted as "mac80211: fix kzalloc
      memory corruption introduced in minstrel_ht". -- JWL)
      Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <wfg@linux.intel.com>
      Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Huehn <thomas@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
      472dd35c
  7. 09 7月, 2012 4 次提交
  8. 06 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  9. 01 7月, 2012 1 次提交
    • N
      sctp: be more restrictive in transport selection on bundled sacks · 4244854d
      Neil Horman 提交于
      It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that
      we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport.  While this isn't
      a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC
      2960:
      
       An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK,
         etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it
         received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying.  This
         rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks
         together with the reply chunk.
      
      This patch seeks to correct that.  It restricts the bundling of sack operations
      to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward
      since the last sack.  By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound
      saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack.  This brings
      us into stricter compliance with the RFC.
      
      Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the
      transport that last moved the ctsn forward.  While this makes sense, I was
      concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had
      received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports.  In those cases, the
      RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle
      the sack on.  so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state
      variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the
      last sack.  This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to
      our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to
      enable/disable it.
      Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
      Reported-by: NMichele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: Nsorin serban <sserban@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4244854d
  10. 29 6月, 2012 3 次提交
  11. 28 6月, 2012 2 次提交
  12. 27 6月, 2012 2 次提交
    • S
      bridge: Assign rtnl_link_ops to bridge devices created via ioctl (v2) · 149ddd83
      stephen hemminger 提交于
      This ensures that bridges created with brctl(8) or ioctl(2) directly
      also carry IFLA_LINKINFO when dumped over netlink. This also allows
      to create a bridge with ioctl(2) and delete it with RTM_DELLINK.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      149ddd83
    • E
      net: l2tp_eth: use LLTX to avoid LOCKDEP splats · a2842a1e
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Denys Fedoryshchenko reported a LOCKDEP issue with l2tp code.
      
      [ 8683.927442] ======================================================
      [ 8683.927555] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
      [ 8683.927672] 3.4.1-build-0061 #14 Not tainted
      [ 8683.927782] -------------------------------------------------------
      [ 8683.927895] swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock:
      [ 8683.928007]  (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<e0fc73ec>]
      l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core]
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] but task is already holding lock:
      [ 8683.928121]  (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<c02f062d>]
      sch_direct_xmit+0x36/0x119
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] which lock already depends on the new lock.
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] -> #1 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}:
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0304e0c>] ip_send_reply+0xf2/0x1ce
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0317dbc>] tcp_v4_send_reset+0x153/0x16f
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0317f4a>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x172/0x194
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031929b>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x387/0x5a0
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c03001d0>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x13a/0x1e9
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0300645>] NF_HOOK.clone.11+0x46/0x4d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c030075b>] ip_local_deliver+0x41/0x45
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c03005dd>] ip_rcv_finish+0x31a/0x33c
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0300645>] NF_HOOK.clone.11+0x46/0x4d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0300960>] ip_rcv+0x201/0x23d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02deae8>] netif_receive_skb+0x4e/0x7d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<e08d5ef3>] rtl8139_poll+0x243/0x33d [8139too]
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] -> #0 (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}:
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c0159f1b>] __lock_acquire+0x9a3/0xc27
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40
      [ 8683.928121]        [<e0fc73ec>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e
      [l2tp_core]
      [ 8683.928121]        [<e0fe31fb>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x1a/0x2f
      [l2tp_eth]
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02e01e7>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x333/0x3f2
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02f064c>] sch_direct_xmit+0x55/0x119
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02e0528>] dev_queue_xmit+0x282/0x418
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031f524>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x24
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031f567>] arp_send+0x41/0x48
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031fa7d>] arp_process+0x289/0x491
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c031f7a0>] arp_rcv+0xb1/0xc3
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02de9d3>] process_backlog+0x69/0x130
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d
      [ 8683.928121]        [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] other info that might help us debug this:
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121]        CPU0                    CPU1
      [ 8683.928121]        ----                    ----
      [ 8683.928121]   lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
      [ 8683.928121]                                lock(slock-AF_INET);
      [ 8683.928121]                                lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
      [ 8683.928121]   lock(slock-AF_INET);
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121]  *** DEADLOCK ***
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] 3 locks held by swapper/0/0:
      [ 8683.928121]  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<c02dbc10>]
      rcu_lock_acquire+0x0/0x30
      [ 8683.928121]  #1:  (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<c02dbc10>]
      rcu_lock_acquire+0x0/0x30
      [ 8683.928121]  #2:  (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<c02f062d>]
      sch_direct_xmit+0x36/0x119
      [ 8683.928121]
      [ 8683.928121] stack backtrace:
      [ 8683.928121] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.4.1-build-0061 #14
      [ 8683.928121] Call Trace:
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c034bdd2>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0158904>] print_circular_bug+0x1ac/0x1b6
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0159f1b>] __lock_acquire+0x9a3/0xc27
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85
      [ 8683.928121]  [<e0fc73ec>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core]
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40
      [ 8683.928121]  [<e0fc73ec>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core]
      [ 8683.928121]  [<e0fc73ec>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core]
      [ 8683.928121]  [<e0fe31fb>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x1a/0x2f [l2tp_eth]
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02e01e7>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x333/0x3f2
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02f064c>] sch_direct_xmit+0x55/0x119
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02e0528>] dev_queue_xmit+0x282/0x418
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02e02a6>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f2/0x3f2
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f524>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x24
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02e02a6>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f2/0x3f2
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f567>] arp_send+0x41/0x48
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031fa7d>] arp_process+0x289/0x491
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f7f4>] ? __neigh_lookup.clone.20+0x42/0x42
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f7a0>] arp_rcv+0xb1/0xc3
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c031f7f4>] ? __neigh_lookup.clone.20+0x42/0x42
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02de9d3>] process_backlog+0x69/0x130
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c012b23a>] ? local_bh_enable+0xd/0xd
      [ 8683.928121]  <IRQ>  [<c012b4d0>] ? irq_exit+0x41/0x91
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0103c6f>] ? do_IRQ+0x79/0x8d
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0157ea1>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x2e/0x86
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c034ef6e>] ? common_interrupt+0x2e/0x34
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0108a33>] ? default_idle+0x23/0x38
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c01091a8>] ? cpu_idle+0x55/0x6f
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c033df25>] ? rest_init+0xa1/0xa7
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c033de84>] ? __read_lock_failed+0x14/0x14
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0498745>] ? start_kernel+0x303/0x30a
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c0498209>] ? repair_env_string+0x51/0x51
      [ 8683.928121]  [<c04980a8>] ? i386_start_kernel+0xa8/0xaf
      
      It appears that like most virtual devices, l2tp should be converted to
      LLTX mode.
      
      This patch takes care of statistics using atomic_long in both RX and TX
      paths, and fix a bug in l2tp_eth_dev_recv(), which was caching skb->data
      before a pskb_may_pull() call.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NDenys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
      Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
      Cc: Hong zhi guo <honkiko@gmail.com>
      Cc: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a2842a1e
  13. 26 6月, 2012 6 次提交
    • A
      mac802154: add missed braces · 8a8e28b8
      alex.bluesman.smirnov@gmail.com 提交于
      Add missed braces after 'if' operator.
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Smirnov <alex.bluesman.smirnov@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8a8e28b8
    • E
      NFC: Return from rawsock_release when sk is NULL · 03e934f6
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Sasha Levin reported following panic :
      
      [ 2136.383310] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
      00000000000003b0
      [ 2136.384022] IP: [<ffffffff8114e400>] __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0
      [ 2136.384022] PGD 131c4067 PUD 11c0c067 PMD 0
      [ 2136.388106] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
      [ 2136.388106] CPU 1
      [ 2136.388106] Pid: 24855, comm: trinity-child1 Tainted: G        W
      3.5.0-rc2-sasha-00015-g7b268f7 #374
      [ 2136.388106] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8114e400>]  [<ffffffff8114e400>]
      __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0
      [ 2136.388106] RSP: 0018:ffff8800130b3ca8  EFLAGS: 00010046
      [ 2136.388106] RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff88001186b000 RCX:
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] RBP: ffff8800130b3d08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
      0000000000000002
      [ 2136.388106] R13: 00000000000003b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] FS:  00007fa5b1bd4700(0000) GS:ffff88001b800000(0000)
      knlGS:0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [ 2136.388106] CR2: 00000000000003b0 CR3: 0000000011d1f000 CR4:
      00000000000406e0
      [ 2136.388106] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7:
      0000000000000400
      [ 2136.388106] Process trinity-child1 (pid: 24855, threadinfo
      ffff8800130b2000, task ffff88001186b000)
      [ 2136.388106] Stack:
      [ 2136.388106]  ffff8800130b3cd8 ffffffff81121785 ffffffff81236774
      000080d000000001
      [ 2136.388106]  ffff88001b9d6c00 00000000001d6c00 ffffffff130b3d08
      ffff88001186b000
      [ 2136.388106]  0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
      0000000000000000
      [ 2136.388106] Call Trace:
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff81121785>] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0x90
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff81236774>] ? get_empty_filp+0x74/0x220
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff8114e97a>] lock_acquire+0x18a/0x1e0
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff836b37df>] ? rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff837c0ef0>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x40/0x80
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff836b37df>] ? rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff836b37df>] rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff8321cfe8>] sock_release+0x18/0x70
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff8321d069>] sock_close+0x29/0x30
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff81236bca>] __fput+0x11a/0x2c0
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff81236d85>] fput+0x15/0x20
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff8321de34>] sys_accept4+0x1b4/0x200
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff837c165c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x4c/0x80
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff837c1669>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x59/0x80
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff837c2565>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff8321de8b>] sys_accept+0xb/0x10
      [ 2136.388106]  [<ffffffff837c2539>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [ 2136.388106] Code: ec 04 00 0f 85 ea 03 00 00 be d5 0b 00 00 48 c7 c7
      8a c1 40 84 e8 b1 a5 f8 ff 31 c0 e9 d4 03 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00
      00 00 <49> 81 7d 00 60 73 5e 85 b8 01 00 00 00 44 0f 44 e0 83 fe 01 77
      [ 2136.388106] RIP  [<ffffffff8114e400>] __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0
      [ 2136.388106]  RSP <ffff8800130b3ca8>
      [ 2136.388106] CR2: 00000000000003b0
      [ 2136.388106] ---[ end trace 6d450e935ee18982 ]---
      [ 2136.388106] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
      
      rawsock_release() should test if sock->sk is NULL before calling
      sock_orphan()/sock_put()
      Reported-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
      Tested-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSamuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
      03e934f6
    • E
      net: l2tp_eth: fix l2tp_eth_dev_xmit race · aa214de0
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Its illegal to dereference skb after giving it to l2tp_xmit_skb()
      as it might be already freed/reused.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      aa214de0
    • S
      caif: Clear shutdown mask to zero at reconnect. · eaa8c5f3
      Sjur Brændeland 提交于
      Clear caif sockets's shutdown mask at (re)connect.
      Signed-off-by: NSjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      eaa8c5f3
    • N
      tcp: heed result of security_inet_conn_request() in tcp_v6_conn_request() · 437c5b53
      Neal Cardwell 提交于
      If security_inet_conn_request() returns non-zero then TCP/IPv6 should
      drop the request, just as in TCP/IPv4 and DCCP in both IPv4 and IPv6.
      Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      437c5b53
    • E
      ipv6: fib: fix fib dump restart · fa809e2f
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Commit 2bec5a36 (ipv6: fib: fix crash when changing large fib
      while dumping it) introduced ability to restart the dump at tree root,
      but failed to skip correctly a count of already dumped entries. Code
      didn't match Patrick intent.
      
      We must skip exactly the number of already dumped entries.
      
      Note that like other /proc/net files or netlink producers, we could
      still dump some duplicates entries.
      Reported-by: NDebabrata Banerjee <dbavatar@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: NJosh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      fa809e2f
  14. 25 6月, 2012 4 次提交
  15. 23 6月, 2012 2 次提交
    • A
      batman-adv: fix race condition in TT full-table replacement · 8b8e4bc0
      Antonio Quartulli 提交于
      bug introduced with cea194d90b11aff7fc289149e4c7f305fad3535a
      
      In the current TT code, when a TT_Response containing a full table is received
      from an originator, first the node purges all the clients for that originator in
      the global translation-table and then merges the newly received table.
      During the purging phase each client deletion is done by means of a call_rcu()
      invocation and at the end of this phase the global entry counter for that
      originator is set to 0. However the invoked rcu function decreases the global
      entry counter for that originator by one too and since the rcu invocation is
      likely to be postponed, the node will end up in first setting the counter to 0
      and then decreasing it one by one for each deleted client.
      
      This bug leads to having a wrong global entry counter for the related node, say
      X. Then when the node with the broken counter will answer to a TT_REQUEST on
      behalf of node X, it will create faulty TT_RESPONSE that will generate an
      unrecoverable situation on the node that asked for the full table recover.
      
      The non-recoverability is given by the fact that the node with the broken
      counter will keep answering on behalf of X because its knowledge about X's state
      (ttvn + tt_crc) is correct.
      
      To solve this problem the counter is not explicitly set to 0 anymore and the
      counter decrement is performed right before the invocation of call_rcu().
      Signed-off-by: NAntonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org>
      8b8e4bc0
    • M
      batman-adv: only drop packets of known wifi clients · 5870adc6
      Marek Lindner 提交于
      bug introduced with 59b699cd
      
      If the source or destination mac address of an ethernet packet
      could not be found in the translation table the packet was
      dropped if AP isolation was turned on. This behavior would
      make it impossible to send broadcast packets over the mesh as
      the broadcast address will never enter the translation table.
      Signed-off-by: NMarek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
      Acked-by: NAntonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org>
      5870adc6