- 19 7月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Rustad, Mark D 提交于
This change eliminates an initialization-order hazard most recently seen when netprio_cgroup is built into the kernel. With thanks to Eric Dumazet for catching a bug. Signed-off-by: NMark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com> Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via the setsockopt() syscall). This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is not something we want to allow. A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be caught early in cipso_v4_validate(): #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/in.h> #include <string.h> struct local_tag { char type; char length; char info[4]; }; struct cipso { char type; char length; char doi[4]; struct local_tag local; }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { int sockfd; struct cipso cipso = { .type = IPOPT_CIPSO, .length = sizeof(struct cipso), .local = { .type = 128, .length = sizeof(struct local_tag), }, }; memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4); cipso.doi[3] = 3; sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); #define SOL_IP 0 setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS, &cipso, sizeof(struct cipso)); return 0; } CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn> Reported-by: NAlan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 17 7月, 2012 5 次提交
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由 Julian Anastasov 提交于
After commit 39f618b4 (3.4) "ipvs: reset ipvs pointer in netns" we can oops in ip_vs_dst_event on rmmod ip_vs because ip_vs_control_cleanup is called after the ipvs_core_ops subsys is unregistered and net->ipvs is NULL. Fix it by exiting early from ip_vs_dst_event if ipvs is NULL. It is safe because all services and dests for the net are already freed. Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Alan Cox 提交于
At least there seems to be no reason to disallow ROSE sockets when NETROM is loaded. Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Sjur Brændeland 提交于
unregister_netdevice_notifier() must be called before unregister_pernet_subsys() to avoid accessing already freed pernet memory. This fixes the following oops when doing rmmod: Call Trace: [<ffffffffa0f802bd>] caif_device_notify+0x4d/0x5a0 [caif] [<ffffffff81552ba9>] unregister_netdevice_notifier+0xb9/0x100 [<ffffffffa0f86dcc>] caif_device_exit+0x1c/0x250 [caif] [<ffffffff810e7734>] sys_delete_module+0x1a4/0x300 [<ffffffff810da82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x15d/0x1e0 [<ffffffff813517de>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3 [<ffffffff81696bad>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f RIP [<ffffffffa0f7f561>] caif_get+0x51/0xb0 [caif] Signed-off-by: NSjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Gao feng 提交于
there are some out of bound accesses in netprio cgroup. now before accessing the dev->priomap.priomap array,we only check if the dev->priomap exist.and because we don't want to see additional bound checkings in fast path, so we should make sure that dev->priomap is null or array size of dev->priomap.priomap is equal to max_prioidx + 1; so in write_priomap logic,we should call extend_netdev_table when dev->priomap is null and dev->priomap.priomap_len < max_len. and in cgrp_create->update_netdev_tables logic,we should call extend_netdev_table only when dev->priomap exist and dev->priomap.priomap_len < max_len. and it's not needed to call update_netdev_tables in write_priomap, we can only allocate the net device's priomap which we change through net_prio.ifpriomap. this patch also add a return value for update_netdev_tables & extend_netdev_table, so when new_priomap is allocated failed, write_priomap will stop to access the priomap,and return -ENOMEM back to the userspace to tell the user what happend. Change From v3: 1. add rtnl protect when reading max_prioidx in write_priomap. 2. only call extend_netdev_table when map->priomap_len < max_len, this will make sure array size of dev->map->priomap always bigger than any prioidx. 3. add a function write_update_netdev_table to make codes clear. Change From v2: 1. protect extend_netdev_table by RTNL. 2. when extend_netdev_table failed,call dev_put to reduce device's refcount. Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Neil Horman 提交于
A few days ago Dave Jones reported this oops: [22766.294255] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [22766.295376] CPU 0 [22766.295384] Modules linked in: [22766.387137] ffffffffa169f292 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ffff880147c03a90 ffff880147c03a74 [22766.387135] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000000000 [22766.387136] Process trinity-watchdo (pid: 10896, threadinfo ffff88013e7d2000, [22766.387137] Stack: [22766.387140] ffff880147c03a10 [22766.387140] ffffffffa169f2b6 [22766.387140] ffff88013ed95728 [22766.387143] 0000000000000002 [22766.387143] 0000000000000000 [22766.387143] ffff880003fad062 [22766.387144] ffff88013c120000 [22766.387144] [22766.387145] Call Trace: [22766.387145] <IRQ> [22766.387150] [<ffffffffa169f292>] ? __sctp_lookup_association+0x62/0xd0 [sctp] [22766.387154] [<ffffffffa169f2b6>] __sctp_lookup_association+0x86/0xd0 [sctp] [22766.387157] [<ffffffffa169f597>] sctp_rcv+0x207/0xbb0 [sctp] [22766.387161] [<ffffffff810d4da8>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xd0 [22766.387163] [<ffffffff815827e3>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x133/0x210 [22766.387166] [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0 [22766.387168] [<ffffffff8159043d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x18d/0x4c0 [22766.387169] [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0 [22766.387171] [<ffffffff81590a07>] ip_local_deliver+0x47/0x80 [22766.387172] [<ffffffff8158fd80>] ip_rcv_finish+0x150/0x680 [22766.387174] [<ffffffff81590c54>] ip_rcv+0x214/0x320 [22766.387176] [<ffffffff81558c07>] __netif_receive_skb+0x7b7/0x910 [22766.387178] [<ffffffff8155856c>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x11c/0x910 [22766.387180] [<ffffffff810d423e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.25+0xe/0x40 [22766.387182] [<ffffffff81558f83>] netif_receive_skb+0x23/0x1f0 [22766.387183] [<ffffffff815596a9>] ? dev_gro_receive+0x139/0x440 [22766.387185] [<ffffffff81559280>] napi_skb_finish+0x70/0xa0 [22766.387187] [<ffffffff81559cb5>] napi_gro_receive+0xf5/0x130 [22766.387218] [<ffffffffa01c4679>] e1000_receive_skb+0x59/0x70 [e1000e] [22766.387242] [<ffffffffa01c5aab>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x28b/0x460 [e1000e] [22766.387266] [<ffffffffa01c9c18>] e1000e_poll+0x78/0x430 [e1000e] [22766.387268] [<ffffffff81559fea>] net_rx_action+0x1aa/0x3d0 [22766.387270] [<ffffffff810a495f>] ? account_system_vtime+0x10f/0x130 [22766.387273] [<ffffffff810734d0>] __do_softirq+0xe0/0x420 [22766.387275] [<ffffffff8169826c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [22766.387278] [<ffffffff8101db15>] do_softirq+0xd5/0x110 [22766.387279] [<ffffffff81073bc5>] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0 [22766.387281] [<ffffffff81698b03>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xd0 [22766.387283] [<ffffffff8168ee2f>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f [22766.387283] <EOI> [22766.387284] [22766.387285] [<ffffffff8168eed9>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [22766.387285] Code: c0 90 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 c8 5d c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 <0f> b7 87 98 00 00 00 48 89 fb 49 89 f5 66 c1 c0 08 66 39 46 02 [22766.387307] [22766.387307] RIP [22766.387311] [<ffffffffa168a2c9>] sctp_assoc_is_match+0x19/0x90 [sctp] [22766.387311] RSP <ffff880147c039b0> [22766.387142] ffffffffa16ab120 [22766.599537] ---[ end trace 3f6dae82e37b17f5 ]--- [22766.601221] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt It appears from his analysis and some staring at the code that this is likely occuring because an association is getting freed while still on the sctp_assoc_hashtable. As a result, we get a gpf when traversing the hashtable while a freed node corrupts part of the list. Nominally I would think that an mibalanced refcount was responsible for this, but I can't seem to find any obvious imbalance. What I did note however was that the two places where we create an association using sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE (__sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg), have failure paths which free a newly created association after calling sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE. sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE brings us into the sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc path, which issues a SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC side effect, which in turn adds a new association to the aforementioned hash table. the sctp command interpreter that process side effects has not way to unwind previously processed commands, so freeing the association from the __sctp_connect or sctp_sendmsg error path would lead to a freed association remaining on this hash table. I've fixed this but modifying sctp_[un]hash_established to use hlist_del_init, which allows us to proerly use hlist_unhashed to check if the node is on a hashlist safely during a delete. That in turn alows us to safely call sctp_unhash_established in the __sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg error paths before freeing them, regardles of what the associations state is on the hash list. I noted, while I was doing this, that the __sctp_unhash_endpoint was using hlist_unhsashed in a simmilar fashion, but never nullified any removed nodes pointers to make that function work properly, so I fixed that up in a simmilar fashion. I attempted to test this using a virtual guest running the SCTP_RR test from netperf in a loop while running the trinity fuzzer, both in a loop. I wasn't able to recreate the problem prior to this fix, nor was I able to trigger the failure after (neither of which I suppose is suprising). Given the trace above however, I think its likely that this is what we hit. Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: davej@redhat.com CC: davej@redhat.com CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com> CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 16 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Few drivers use GFP_DMA allocations, and netdev_alloc_frag() doesn't allocate pages in DMA zone. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 12 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Alan Cox 提交于
Resolves-bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44461Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 11 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Amir Hanania 提交于
In driver reload test there is a memory leak. The structure vlan_info was not freed when the driver was removed. It was not released since the nr_vids var is one after last vlan was removed. The nr_vids is one, since vlan zero is added to the interface when the interface is being set, but the vlan zero is not deleted at unregister. Fix - delete vlan zero when we unregister the device. Signed-off-by: NAmir Hanania <amir.hanania@intel.com> Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com> Tested-by: NAaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 10 7月, 2012 5 次提交
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由 Julia Lawall 提交于
If list_for_each_entry, etc complete a traversal of the list, the iterator variable ends up pointing to an address at an offset from the list head, and not a meaningful structure. Thus this value should not be used after the end of the iterator. This seems to be a copy-paste bug from a previous debugging message, and so the meaningless value is just deleted. This problem was found using Coccinelle (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/). Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
dev->priomap is allocated by extend_netdev_table() called from update_netdev_tables(). And this is only called if write_priomap() is called. But if write_priomap() is not called, it seems we can have out of bounds accesses in cgrp_destroy(), read_priomap() & skb_update_prio() With help from Gao Feng Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eliad Peller 提交于
If association failed due to internal error (e.g. no supported rates IE), we call ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data() with assoc=true, while we actually reject the association. This results in the BSSID not being zeroed out. After passing assoc=false, we no longer have to call sta_info_destroy_addr() explicitly. While on it, move the "associated" message after the assoc_success check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.4+] Signed-off-by: NEliad Peller <eliad@wizery.com> Reviewed-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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由 Sasha Levin 提交于
llcp_sock_getname can be called without a device attached to the nfc_llcp_sock. This would lead to the following BUG: [ 362.341807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 362.341815] IP: [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341818] PGD 31b35067 PUD 30631067 PMD 0 [ 362.341821] Oops: 0000 [#627] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 362.341826] CPU 3 [ 362.341827] Pid: 7816, comm: trinity-child55 Tainted: G D W 3.5.0-rc4-next-20120628-sasha-00005-g9f23eb7 #479 [ 362.341831] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff836258e5>] [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341832] RSP: 0018:ffff8800304fde88 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 362.341834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880033cb8000 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 362.341835] RDX: ffff8800304fdec4 RSI: ffff8800304fdec8 RDI: ffff8800304fdeda [ 362.341836] RBP: ffff8800304fdea8 R08: 7ebcebcb772b7ffb R09: 5fbfcb9c35bdfd53 [ 362.341838] R10: 4220020c54326244 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800304fdec8 [ 362.341839] R13: ffff8800304fdec4 R14: ffff8800304fdec8 R15: 0000000000000044 [ 362.341841] FS: 00007effa376e700(0000) GS:ffff880035a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 362.341843] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 362.341844] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000030438000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 362.341851] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 362.341856] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 362.341858] Process trinity-child55 (pid: 7816, threadinfo ffff8800304fc000, task ffff880031270000) [ 362.341858] Stack: [ 362.341862] ffff8800304fdea8 ffff880035156780 0000000000000000 0000000000001000 [ 362.341865] ffff8800304fdf78 ffffffff83183b40 00000000304fdec8 0000006000000000 [ 362.341868] ffff8800304f0027 ffffffff83729649 ffff8800304fdee8 ffff8800304fdf48 [ 362.341869] Call Trace: [ 362.341874] [<ffffffff83183b40>] sys_getpeername+0xa0/0x110 [ 362.341877] [<ffffffff83729649>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x59/0x80 [ 362.341882] [<ffffffff810f342b>] ? do_setitimer+0x23b/0x290 [ 362.341886] [<ffffffff81985ede>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [ 362.341889] [<ffffffff8372a539>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 362.341921] Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 b3 ff ff ff 48 85 db 74 54 66 41 c7 04 24 27 00 49 8d 7c 24 12 41 c7 45 00 60 00 00 00 48 8b 83 28 05 00 00 <8b> 00 41 89 44 24 04 0f b6 83 41 05 00 00 41 88 44 24 10 0f b6 [ 362.341924] RIP [<ffffffff836258e5>] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341925] RSP <ffff8800304fde88> [ 362.341926] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 362.341928] ---[ end trace 6d450e935ee18bf3 ]--- Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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由 Thomas Huehn 提交于
msp has type struct minstrel_ht_sta_priv not struct minstrel_ht_sta. (This incorporates the fixup originally posted as "mac80211: fix kzalloc memory corruption introduced in minstrel_ht". -- JWL) Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <wfg@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Huehn <thomas@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de> Acked-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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- 09 7月, 2012 4 次提交
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由 Jozsef Kadlecsik 提交于
The patch "127f5591 netfilter: ipset: fix timeout value overflow bug" broke the SET target when no timeout was specified. Reported-by: NJean-Philippe Menil <jean-philippe.menil@univ-nantes.fr> Signed-off-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Gao feng 提交于
we set max_prioidx to the first zero bit index of prioidx_map in function get_prioidx. So when we delete the low index netprio cgroup and adding a new netprio cgroup again,the max_prioidx will be set to the low index. when we set the high index cgroup's net_prio.ifpriomap,the function write_priomap will call update_netdev_tables to alloc memory which size is sizeof(struct netprio_map) + sizeof(u32) * (max_prioidx + 1), so the size of array that map->priomap point to is max_prioidx +1, which is low than what we actually need. fix this by adding check in get_prioidx,only set max_prioidx when max_prioidx low than the new prioidx. Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Fix two netem bugs : 1) When a frame was dropped by tfifo_enqueue(), drop counter was incremented twice. 2) When reordering is triggered, we enqueue a packet without checking queue limit. This can OOM pretty fast when this is repeated enough, since skbs are orphaned, no socket limit can help in this situation. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Mark Gordon <msg@google.com> Cc: Andreas Terzis <aterzis@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Sasha Levin 提交于
Currently when sending data over datagram, the send function will attempt to allocate any size passed on from the userspace. We should make sure that this size is checked and limited. We'll limit it to the MTU of the device, which is checked later anyway. Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 06 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Simon Wunderlich 提交于
If the gateway functionality is used, some broadcast packets (DHCP requests) may be transmitted as unicast packets. As the bridge loop avoidance code now only considers the payload Ethernet destination, it may drop the DHCP request for clients which are claimed by other backbone gateways, because it falsely infers from the broadcast address that the right backbone gateway should havehandled the broadcast. Fix this by checking and delegating the batman-adv packet type used for transmission. Reported-by: NGuido Iribarren <guidoiribarren@buenosaireslibre.org> Signed-off-by: NSimon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de>
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- 01 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Neil Horman 提交于
It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport. While this isn't a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC 2960: An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk. This patch seeks to correct that. It restricts the bundling of sack operations to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward since the last sack. By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack. This brings us into stricter compliance with the RFC. Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the transport that last moved the ctsn forward. While this makes sense, I was concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports. In those cases, the RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle the sack on. so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the last sack. This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to enable/disable it. Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NMichele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com> Reported-by: Nsorin serban <sserban@redhat.com> Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 29 6月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Tomasz Bursztyka 提交于
Bug added in commit 6b75e3e8 (netfilter: nfnetlink: add RCU in nfnetlink_rcv_msg()) Signed-off-by: NTomasz Bursztyka <tomasz.bursztyka@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Tomasz Bursztyka 提交于
This patch fixes a crash if that ipset command is sent over nfnetlink. Signed-off-by: NTomasz Bursztyka <tomasz.bursztyka@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Vinson Lee 提交于
Make logging level consistent with other deprecation messages in net subsystem. Signed-off-by: NVinson Lee <vlee@twitter.com> Cc: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 28 6月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
I don't think we're actually likely to hit this limit but if we do then the comparison should be done as size_t. The original code is equivalent to: len = strlen(sptr) % USHRT_MAX; Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Johannes Berg 提交于
When receiving an "individually addressed" action frame, the receiver is required to return it to the sender. mac80211 gets this wrong as it also returns group addressed (mcast) frames to the sender. Fix this and update the reference to the new 802.11 standards version since things were shuffled around significantly. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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- 27 6月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 stephen hemminger 提交于
This ensures that bridges created with brctl(8) or ioctl(2) directly also carry IFLA_LINKINFO when dumped over netlink. This also allows to create a bridge with ioctl(2) and delete it with RTM_DELLINK. Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported a LOCKDEP issue with l2tp code. [ 8683.927442] ====================================================== [ 8683.927555] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 8683.927672] 3.4.1-build-0061 #14 Not tainted [ 8683.927782] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 8683.927895] swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 8683.928007] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<e0fc73ec>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core] [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] but task is already holding lock: [ 8683.928121] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<c02f062d>] sch_direct_xmit+0x36/0x119 [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] -> #1 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}: [ 8683.928121] [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85 [ 8683.928121] [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40 [ 8683.928121] [<c0304e0c>] ip_send_reply+0xf2/0x1ce [ 8683.928121] [<c0317dbc>] tcp_v4_send_reset+0x153/0x16f [ 8683.928121] [<c0317f4a>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x172/0x194 [ 8683.928121] [<c031929b>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x387/0x5a0 [ 8683.928121] [<c03001d0>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x13a/0x1e9 [ 8683.928121] [<c0300645>] NF_HOOK.clone.11+0x46/0x4d [ 8683.928121] [<c030075b>] ip_local_deliver+0x41/0x45 [ 8683.928121] [<c03005dd>] ip_rcv_finish+0x31a/0x33c [ 8683.928121] [<c0300645>] NF_HOOK.clone.11+0x46/0x4d [ 8683.928121] [<c0300960>] ip_rcv+0x201/0x23d [ 8683.928121] [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378 [ 8683.928121] [<c02deae8>] netif_receive_skb+0x4e/0x7d [ 8683.928121] [<e08d5ef3>] rtl8139_poll+0x243/0x33d [8139too] [ 8683.928121] [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d [ 8683.928121] [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118 [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] -> #0 (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}: [ 8683.928121] [<c0159f1b>] __lock_acquire+0x9a3/0xc27 [ 8683.928121] [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85 [ 8683.928121] [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40 [ 8683.928121] [<e0fc73ec>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core] [ 8683.928121] [<e0fe31fb>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x1a/0x2f [l2tp_eth] [ 8683.928121] [<c02e01e7>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x333/0x3f2 [ 8683.928121] [<c02f064c>] sch_direct_xmit+0x55/0x119 [ 8683.928121] [<c02e0528>] dev_queue_xmit+0x282/0x418 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c [ 8683.928121] [<c031f524>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x24 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f567>] arp_send+0x41/0x48 [ 8683.928121] [<c031fa7d>] arp_process+0x289/0x491 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c [ 8683.928121] [<c031f7a0>] arp_rcv+0xb1/0xc3 [ 8683.928121] [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378 [ 8683.928121] [<c02de9d3>] process_backlog+0x69/0x130 [ 8683.928121] [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d [ 8683.928121] [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118 [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] CPU0 CPU1 [ 8683.928121] ---- ---- [ 8683.928121] lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); [ 8683.928121] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 8683.928121] lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); [ 8683.928121] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] 3 locks held by swapper/0/0: [ 8683.928121] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<c02dbc10>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x0/0x30 [ 8683.928121] #1: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<c02dbc10>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x0/0x30 [ 8683.928121] #2: (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<c02f062d>] sch_direct_xmit+0x36/0x119 [ 8683.928121] [ 8683.928121] stack backtrace: [ 8683.928121] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.4.1-build-0061 #14 [ 8683.928121] Call Trace: [ 8683.928121] [<c034bdd2>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a [ 8683.928121] [<c0158904>] print_circular_bug+0x1ac/0x1b6 [ 8683.928121] [<c0159f1b>] __lock_acquire+0x9a3/0xc27 [ 8683.928121] [<c015a561>] lock_acquire+0x71/0x85 [ 8683.928121] [<e0fc73ec>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core] [ 8683.928121] [<c034da2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x40 [ 8683.928121] [<e0fc73ec>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core] [ 8683.928121] [<e0fc73ec>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x173/0x47e [l2tp_core] [ 8683.928121] [<e0fe31fb>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x1a/0x2f [l2tp_eth] [ 8683.928121] [<c02e01e7>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x333/0x3f2 [ 8683.928121] [<c02f064c>] sch_direct_xmit+0x55/0x119 [ 8683.928121] [<c02e0528>] dev_queue_xmit+0x282/0x418 [ 8683.928121] [<c02e02a6>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f2/0x3f2 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c [ 8683.928121] [<c031f524>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x24 [ 8683.928121] [<c02e02a6>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f2/0x3f2 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f567>] arp_send+0x41/0x48 [ 8683.928121] [<c031fa7d>] arp_process+0x289/0x491 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f7f4>] ? __neigh_lookup.clone.20+0x42/0x42 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f4fb>] NF_HOOK.clone.19+0x45/0x4c [ 8683.928121] [<c031f7a0>] arp_rcv+0xb1/0xc3 [ 8683.928121] [<c031f7f4>] ? __neigh_lookup.clone.20+0x42/0x42 [ 8683.928121] [<c02de91b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x329/0x378 [ 8683.928121] [<c02de9d3>] process_backlog+0x69/0x130 [ 8683.928121] [<c02df103>] net_rx_action+0x90/0x15d [ 8683.928121] [<c012b2b5>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0x118 [ 8683.928121] [<c012b23a>] ? local_bh_enable+0xd/0xd [ 8683.928121] <IRQ> [<c012b4d0>] ? irq_exit+0x41/0x91 [ 8683.928121] [<c0103c6f>] ? do_IRQ+0x79/0x8d [ 8683.928121] [<c0157ea1>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x2e/0x86 [ 8683.928121] [<c034ef6e>] ? common_interrupt+0x2e/0x34 [ 8683.928121] [<c0108a33>] ? default_idle+0x23/0x38 [ 8683.928121] [<c01091a8>] ? cpu_idle+0x55/0x6f [ 8683.928121] [<c033df25>] ? rest_init+0xa1/0xa7 [ 8683.928121] [<c033de84>] ? __read_lock_failed+0x14/0x14 [ 8683.928121] [<c0498745>] ? start_kernel+0x303/0x30a [ 8683.928121] [<c0498209>] ? repair_env_string+0x51/0x51 [ 8683.928121] [<c04980a8>] ? i386_start_kernel+0xa8/0xaf It appears that like most virtual devices, l2tp should be converted to LLTX mode. This patch takes care of statistics using atomic_long in both RX and TX paths, and fix a bug in l2tp_eth_dev_recv(), which was caching skb->data before a pskb_may_pull() call. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: NDenys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb> Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Cc: Hong zhi guo <honkiko@gmail.com> Cc: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 26 6月, 2012 6 次提交
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Add missed braces after 'if' operator. Signed-off-by: NAlexander Smirnov <alex.bluesman.smirnov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Sasha Levin reported following panic : [ 2136.383310] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000003b0 [ 2136.384022] IP: [<ffffffff8114e400>] __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0 [ 2136.384022] PGD 131c4067 PUD 11c0c067 PMD 0 [ 2136.388106] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 2136.388106] CPU 1 [ 2136.388106] Pid: 24855, comm: trinity-child1 Tainted: G W 3.5.0-rc2-sasha-00015-g7b268f7 #374 [ 2136.388106] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8114e400>] [<ffffffff8114e400>] __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0 [ 2136.388106] RSP: 0018:ffff8800130b3ca8 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 2136.388106] RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff88001186b000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] RBP: ffff8800130b3d08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 2136.388106] R13: 00000000000003b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] FS: 00007fa5b1bd4700(0000) GS:ffff88001b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2136.388106] CR2: 00000000000003b0 CR3: 0000000011d1f000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 2136.388106] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2136.388106] Process trinity-child1 (pid: 24855, threadinfo ffff8800130b2000, task ffff88001186b000) [ 2136.388106] Stack: [ 2136.388106] ffff8800130b3cd8 ffffffff81121785 ffffffff81236774 000080d000000001 [ 2136.388106] ffff88001b9d6c00 00000000001d6c00 ffffffff130b3d08 ffff88001186b000 [ 2136.388106] 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 2136.388106] Call Trace: [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff81121785>] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0x90 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff81236774>] ? get_empty_filp+0x74/0x220 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff8114e97a>] lock_acquire+0x18a/0x1e0 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff836b37df>] ? rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff837c0ef0>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x40/0x80 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff836b37df>] ? rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff836b37df>] rawsock_release+0x4f/0xa0 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff8321cfe8>] sock_release+0x18/0x70 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff8321d069>] sock_close+0x29/0x30 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff81236bca>] __fput+0x11a/0x2c0 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff81236d85>] fput+0x15/0x20 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff8321de34>] sys_accept4+0x1b4/0x200 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff837c165c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x4c/0x80 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff837c1669>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x59/0x80 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff837c2565>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff8321de8b>] sys_accept+0xb/0x10 [ 2136.388106] [<ffffffff837c2539>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 2136.388106] Code: ec 04 00 0f 85 ea 03 00 00 be d5 0b 00 00 48 c7 c7 8a c1 40 84 e8 b1 a5 f8 ff 31 c0 e9 d4 03 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <49> 81 7d 00 60 73 5e 85 b8 01 00 00 00 44 0f 44 e0 83 fe 01 77 [ 2136.388106] RIP [<ffffffff8114e400>] __lock_acquire+0xc0/0x4b0 [ 2136.388106] RSP <ffff8800130b3ca8> [ 2136.388106] CR2: 00000000000003b0 [ 2136.388106] ---[ end trace 6d450e935ee18982 ]--- [ 2136.388106] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt rawsock_release() should test if sock->sk is NULL before calling sock_orphan()/sock_put() Reported-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NSamuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Its illegal to dereference skb after giving it to l2tp_xmit_skb() as it might be already freed/reused. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Sjur Brændeland 提交于
Clear caif sockets's shutdown mask at (re)connect. Signed-off-by: NSjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Neal Cardwell 提交于
If security_inet_conn_request() returns non-zero then TCP/IPv6 should drop the request, just as in TCP/IPv4 and DCCP in both IPv4 and IPv6. Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Commit 2bec5a36 (ipv6: fib: fix crash when changing large fib while dumping it) introduced ability to restart the dump at tree root, but failed to skip correctly a count of already dumped entries. Code didn't match Patrick intent. We must skip exactly the number of already dumped entries. Note that like other /proc/net files or netlink producers, we could still dump some duplicates entries. Reported-by: NDebabrata Banerjee <dbavatar@gmail.com> Reported-by: NJosh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 25 6月, 2012 4 次提交
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由 Henrik Rydberg 提交于
The generic HID driver is obviously not a special driver, so move it outside of the special drivers menu. Explain the usage and make the default follow the HID setting. This should simplify migration from older kernels. While at it, remove the redundant HID_SUPPORT option and modify the HID and USB_HID entries to better explain the bus structure. Reported-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NHenrik Rydberg <rydberg@euromail.se> Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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由 Dan Rosenberg 提交于
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and copying too much data into statically-sized arrays. Signed-off-by: NDan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org> Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org> Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: NIlan Elias <ilane@ti.com> Signed-off-by: NSamuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
After call to ip6_route_output() we must release dst or we leak it. Also should test dst->error, as ip6_route_output() never returns NULL. Use boolean while we are at it. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
ifname_compare() assumes that skb->dev is zero-padded, e.g 'eth1\0\0\0\0\0...'. This isn't always the case. e1000 driver does strncpy(netdev->name, pci_name(pdev), sizeof(netdev->name) - 1); in e1000_probe(), so once device is registered dev->name memory contains 'eth1\0:0:3\0\0\0' (or something like that), which makes eth1 compare fail. Use plain strcmp() instead. Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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- 23 6月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Antonio Quartulli 提交于
bug introduced with cea194d90b11aff7fc289149e4c7f305fad3535a In the current TT code, when a TT_Response containing a full table is received from an originator, first the node purges all the clients for that originator in the global translation-table and then merges the newly received table. During the purging phase each client deletion is done by means of a call_rcu() invocation and at the end of this phase the global entry counter for that originator is set to 0. However the invoked rcu function decreases the global entry counter for that originator by one too and since the rcu invocation is likely to be postponed, the node will end up in first setting the counter to 0 and then decreasing it one by one for each deleted client. This bug leads to having a wrong global entry counter for the related node, say X. Then when the node with the broken counter will answer to a TT_REQUEST on behalf of node X, it will create faulty TT_RESPONSE that will generate an unrecoverable situation on the node that asked for the full table recover. The non-recoverability is given by the fact that the node with the broken counter will keep answering on behalf of X because its knowledge about X's state (ttvn + tt_crc) is correct. To solve this problem the counter is not explicitly set to 0 anymore and the counter decrement is performed right before the invocation of call_rcu(). Signed-off-by: NAntonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org>
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由 Marek Lindner 提交于
bug introduced with 59b699cd If the source or destination mac address of an ethernet packet could not be found in the translation table the packet was dropped if AP isolation was turned on. This behavior would make it impossible to send broadcast packets over the mesh as the broadcast address will never enter the translation table. Signed-off-by: NMarek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de> Acked-by: NAntonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org>
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