- 19 2月, 2020 7 次提交
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
These have no corresponding code in the kernel. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
The description of panic doesn’t cover all the supported scenarios; this patch fixes that, describing the three possibilities (no reboot, immediate reboot, reboot after a delay). Based on the implementation in kernel/panic.c. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
This describes the SPARC-specific stop-a sysctl entry, which was previously listed in kernel.rst but not documented. Base on the implementation in arch/sparc/kernel/setup_{32,64}.c and kernel/panic.c. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
This adds short descriptions of msgmax, msgmnb, msgmni, and shmmni, which were previously listed in kernel.rst but not described. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
The l2cr sysctl entry was removed in commit c2f3dabe ("sysctl: kill binary sysctl KERN_PPC_L2CR"), this removes the corresponding documentation. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
This fits nicely in sysctl/kernel.rst, merge it (and rephrase it) instead of linking to it. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Stephen Kitt 提交于
This updates sysctl/kernel.rst to use ReStructured Text more fully: * the list of files is now the table of contents (old entries with no corresponding sections are added as empty sections for now); * code references and commands are formatted as code, except for function names which end up linked to the appropriate documentation; * links are used to point to other documentation and other sections; * tables are used to make lists of values more readable (as already done for some sections); * in heavily-reworked paragraphs, sentences are wrapped individually, to make future diffs easier to read. The first mention of the kernel version is dropped. The second mention, saying that the document is accurate for 2.2, is preserved for now; I will update that once the document really is accurate for a current kernel release. Signed-off-by: NStephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 14 2月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 d.hatayama@fujitsu.com 提交于
There is somehow no description of %c corename format specifier for /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern. The %c corename format specifier is used by user-space application such as systemd-coredump, so it should be documented. To find where %c is handled in the kernel source code, look at function format_corename() in fs/coredump.c. Signed-off-by: NHATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@fujitsu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/TYAPR01MB4014714BB2ACE425BB6EC6B7951A0@TYAPR01MB4014.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.comSigned-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 08 11月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Masanari Iida 提交于
Since following path was merged in 5.4-rc3, auto-tuning feature in threads-max does not exist any more. Fix the admin-guide document as is. kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace b0f53dbc Fixes: b0f53dbc ("kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace") Signed-off-by: NMasanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com> Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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由 Masanari Iida 提交于
Since following patch was merged 5.4-rc3, minimum value for threads-max changed to 1. kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace b0f53dbc Fixes: b0f53dbc ("kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace") Signed-off-by: NMasanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com> Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 11 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Oleksandr Natalenko 提交于
The printk_ratelimit value accepts seconds, not jiffies (though it is converted into jiffies internally). Update documentation to reflect this. Also, remove the statement about allowing 1 message in 5 seconds since bursts up to 10 messages are allowed by default. Finally, while we are here, mention default value for printk_ratelimit_burst too. Signed-off-by: NOleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 15 7月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
There are lots of documents that belong to the admin-guide but are on random places (most under Documentation root dir). Move them to the admin guide. Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: NAlexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Acked-by: NBartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
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由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
The stuff under sysctl describes /sys interface from userspace point of view. So, add it to the admin-guide and remove the :orphan: from its index file. Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
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由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
Rename the /proc/sys/ documentation files to ReST, using the README file as a template for an index.rst, adding the other files there via TOC markup. Despite being written on different times with different styles, try to make them somewhat coherent with a similar look and feel, ensuring that they'll look nice as both raw text file and as via the html output produced by the Sphinx build system. At its new index.rst, let's add a :orphan: while this is not linked to the main index.rst file, in order to avoid build warnings. Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
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- 19 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Heiko Carstens 提交于
This feature has never been used, so remove it. Acked-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: NHendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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- 09 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them. Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NWolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Reviewed-by: NSven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NBhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 25 3月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Jakub Wilk 提交于
The buffer size for core_pattern is 128, but one character is used for terminating null byte, so the actual limit is 127: # printf '%0999d' > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern # tr -d '\n' < /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern | wc -c 127 Signed-off-by: NJakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 27 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Quentin Perret 提交于
In its current state, Energy Aware Scheduling (EAS) starts automatically on asymmetric platforms having an Energy Model (EM). However, there are users who want to have an EM (for thermal management for example), but don't want EAS with it. In order to let users disable EAS explicitly, introduce a new sysctl called 'sched_energy_aware'. It is enabled by default so that EAS can start automatically on platforms where it makes sense. Flipping it to 0 rebuilds the scheduling domains and disables EAS. Signed-off-by: NQuentin Perret <quentin.perret@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: adharmap@codeaurora.org Cc: chris.redpath@arm.com Cc: currojerez@riseup.net Cc: dietmar.eggemann@arm.com Cc: edubezval@gmail.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: javi.merino@kernel.org Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org Cc: juri.lelli@redhat.com Cc: morten.rasmussen@arm.com Cc: patrick.bellasi@arm.com Cc: pkondeti@codeaurora.org Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: skannan@codeaurora.org Cc: smuckle@google.com Cc: srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Cc: thara.gopinath@linaro.org Cc: tkjos@google.com Cc: valentin.schneider@arm.com Cc: vincent.guittot@linaro.org Cc: viresh.kumar@linaro.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181203095628.11858-11-quentin.perret@arm.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 09 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Thorsten Leemhuis 提交于
Add a section about decoding /proc/sys/kernel/tainted, create a more understandable intro and a hopefully explain better the tainted flags in bugs, oops or panics messages. Only thing missing then is a table that quickly describes the various bits and taint flags before going into more detail, so add that as well. That table is partly based on a section from Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt, but a bit more compact. To avoid confusion I added the shortened version to kernel.txt; the same table is used in three different places now: ./tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint, Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst and Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt During review of v1 (see above) a number of existing issues with the text were raised, like outdated usages as well as incomplete or missing descriptions. Address most of those as well. Signed-off-by: NThorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info> [jc: tightened up changelog] Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 05 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Feng Tang 提交于
So that we can also runtime chose to print out the needed system info for panic, other than setting the kernel cmdline. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1543398842-19295-3-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.comSigned-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 9月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Alexander Popov 提交于
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAlexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 23 8月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Manfred Spraul 提交于
ipc_addid() initializes kern_ipc_perm.seq after having called idr_alloc() (within ipc_idr_alloc()). Thus a parallel semop() or msgrcv() that uses ipc_obtain_object_check() may see an uninitialized value. The patch moves the initialization of kern_ipc_perm.seq before the calls of idr_alloc(). Notes: 1) This patch has a user space visible side effect: If /proc/sys/kernel/*_next_id is used (i.e.: checkpoint/restore) and if semget()/msgget()/shmget() fails in the final step of adding the id to the rhash tree, then .._next_id is cleared. Before the patch, is remained unmodified. There is no change of the behavior after a successful ..get() call: It always clears .._next_id, there is no impact to non checkpoint/restore code as that code does not use .._next_id. 2) The patch correctly documents that after a call to ipc_idr_alloc(), the full tear-down sequence must be used. The callers of ipc_addid() do not fullfill that, i.e. more bugfixes are required. The patch is a squash of a patch from Dmitry and my own changes. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180712185241.4017-3-manfred@colorfullife.com Reported-by: syzbot+2827ef6b3385deb07eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Dmitry Vyukov 提交于
Currently task hung checking interval is equal to timeout, as the result hung is detected anywhere between timeout and 2*timeout. This is fine for most interactive environments, but this hurts automated testing setups (syzbot). In an automated setup we need to strictly order CPU lockup < RCU stall < workqueue lockup < task hung < silent loss, so that RCU stall is not detected as task hung and task hung is not detected as silent machine loss. The large variance in task hung detection timeout requires setting silent machine loss timeout to a very large value (e.g. if task hung is 3 mins, then silent loss need to be set to ~7 mins). The additional 3 minutes significantly reduce testing efficiency because usually we crash kernel within a minute, and this can add hours to bug localization process as it needs to do dozens of tests. Allow setting checking interval separately from timeout. This allows to set timeout to, say, 3 minutes, but checking interval to 10 secs. The interval is controlled via a new hung_task_check_interval_secs sysctl, similar to the existing hung_task_timeout_secs sysctl. The default value of 0 results in the current behavior: checking interval is equal to timeout. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update hung_task_timeout_max's comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180611111004.203513-1-dvyukov@google.comSigned-off-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 08 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Sunil Muthuswamy 提交于
In the VM mode on Hyper-V, currently, when the kernel panics, an error code and few register values are populated in an MSR and the Hypervisor notified. This information is collected on the host. The amount of information currently collected is found to be limited and not very actionable. To gather more actionable data, such as stack trace, the proposal is to write one page worth of kmsg data on an allocated page and the Hypervisor notified of the page address through the MSR. - Sysctl option to control the behavior, with ON by default. Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSunil Muthuswamy <sunilmut@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NK. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 12 4月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Since the randstruct plugin can intentionally produce extremely unusual kernel structure layouts (even performance pathological ones), some maintainers want to be able to trivially determine if an Oops is coming from a randstruct-built kernel, so as to keep their sanity when debugging. This adds the new flag and initializes taint_mask immediately when built with randstruct. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This consolidates the taint bit documentation into a single place with both numeric and letter values. Additionally adds the missing TAINT_AUX documentation. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 22 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Tobin C. Harding 提交于
Recently the behaviour of printk specifier %pK was changed. The documentation does not currently mirror this. Update documentation for sysctl kptr_restrict. Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 12 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Scott Wood 提交于
Commit ac1f5912 ("kernel/watchdog.c: add sysctl knob hardlockup_panic") added the hardlockup_panic sysctl, but did not add it to Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt. Add this, and reference it from the corresponding entry in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt. Signed-off-by: NScott Wood <swood@redhat.com> Acked-by: NChristoph von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com> Acked-by: NDon Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 23 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Konstantin Khlebnikov 提交于
Fix misprint CAP_IOC_LOCK -> CAP_IPC_LOCK. This capability have nothing to do with raw tracepoints. This part is about bypassing mlock limits. Sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1 allows raw and ftrace function tracepoints without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150322916080.129746.11285255474738558340.stgit@buzzSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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- 15 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Tyler Hicks 提交于
This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value (allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for userspace code as well as the system administrator. The path to the sysctl is: /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel headers that were installed where the userspace code was built. In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this level of logging configuration will come in a future patch. Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 04 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Krzysztof Kozlowski 提交于
Commit 9d85025b ("docs-rst: create an user's manual book") moved the sysrq.txt leaving old paths in the kernel docs. Signed-off-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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- 26 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
For mostly historical reasons, the x86 oops dump shows the raw stack values: ... [registers] Stack: ffff880079af7350 ffff880079905400 0000000000000000 ffffc900008f3ae0 ffffffffa0196610 0000000000000001 00010000ffffffff 0000000087654321 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: ... This seems to be an artifact from long ago, and probably isn't needed anymore. It generally just adds noise to the dump, and it can be actively harmful because it leaks kernel addresses. Linus says: "The stack dump actually goes back to forever, and it used to be useful back in 1992 or so. But it used to be useful mainly because stacks were simpler and we didn't have very good call traces anyway. I definitely remember having used them - I just do not remember having used them in the last ten+ years. Of course, it's still true that if you can trigger an oops, you've likely already lost the security game, but since the stack dump is so useless, let's aim to just remove it and make games like the above harder." This also removes the related 'kstack=' cmdline option and the 'kstack_depth_to_print' sysctl. Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e83bd50df52d8fe88e94d2566426ae40d813bf8f.1477405374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 24 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
The previous patch renamed several files that are cross-referenced along the Kernel documentation. Adjust the links to point to the right places. Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
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- 03 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
Add a "printk.devkmsg" kernel command line parameter which controls how userspace writes into /dev/kmsg. It has three options: * ratelimit - ratelimit logging from userspace. * on - unlimited logging from userspace * off - logging from userspace gets ignored The default setting is to ratelimit the messages written to it. This changes the kernel default setting of "on" to "ratelimit" and we do that because we want to keep userspace spamming /dev/kmsg to sane levels. This is especially moot when a small kernel log buffer wraps around and messages get lost. So the ratelimiting setting should be a sane setting where kernel messages should have a bit higher chance of survival from all the spamming. It additionally does not limit logging to /dev/kmsg while the system is booting if we haven't disabled it on the command line. Furthermore, we can control the logging from a lower priority sysctl interface - kernel.printk_devkmsg. That interface will succeed only if printk.devkmsg *hasn't* been supplied on the command line. If it has, then printk.devkmsg is a one-time setting which remains for the duration of the system lifetime. This "locking" of the setting is to prevent userspace from changing the logging on us through sysctl(2). This patch is based on previous patches from Linus and Steven. [bp@suse.de: fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160719072344.GC25563@nazgul.tnic Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160716061745.15795-3-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Franck Bui <fbui@suse.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 16 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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It is not always easy to determine the cause of an RCU stall just by analysing the RCU stall messages, mainly when the problem is caused by the indirect starvation of rcu threads. For example, when preempt_rcu is not awakened due to the starvation of a timer softirq. We have been hard coding panic() in the RCU stall functions for some time while testing the kernel-rt. But this is not possible in some scenarios, like when supporting customers. This patch implements the sysctl kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall. If set to 1, the system will panic() when an RCU stall takes place, enabling the capture of a vmcore. The vmcore provides a way to analyze all kernel/tasks states, helping out to point to the culprit and the solution for the stall. The kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall sysctl is disabled by default. Changes from v1: - Fixed a typo in the git log - The if(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall) panic() is in a static function - Fixed the CONFIG_TINY_RCU compilation issue - The var sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall is now __read_mostly Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Tested-by: N"Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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- 17 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
The perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr value includes all the entries in the ip_callchain->ip[] array, real addresses and PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc}, while what the user expects is that what is in the kernel.perf_event_max_stack sysctl or in the upcoming per event perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob be honoured in terms of IP addresses in the stack trace. So allocate a bunch of extra entries for contexts, and do the accounting via perf_callchain_entry_ctx struct members. A new sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack is also introduced for investigating possible bugs in the callchain implementation by some arch. Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-3b4wnqk340c4sg4gwkfdi9yk@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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- 10 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel control flow and dump kernel registers. This most likely allows trivial kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well. (Off the top of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads could be quite interesting.) Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 27 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+ deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby. And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One that is per event still needs to be put in place tho. The new file is: # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 127 Chaging it: # echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 256 But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get: # echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack -bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy # Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter of having no callchain users at that point. Reported-and-Tested-by: NBrendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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- 08 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Konstantin Khlebnikov 提交于
Logic has been changed in kernel 3.4 by commit e9aba515 ("tty: rework pty count limiting") but still not documented. Sysctl kernel.pty.max works as global limit, kernel.pty.reserve ptys are reserved for initial devpts instance (mounted without "newinstance"). Per-instance limit also could be set by mount option "max=%d". Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 09 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Mel Gorman 提交于
schedstats is very useful during debugging and performance tuning but it incurs overhead to calculate the stats. As such, even though it can be disabled at build time, it is often enabled as the information is useful. This patch adds a kernel command-line and sysctl tunable to enable or disable schedstats on demand (when it's built in). It is disabled by default as someone who knows they need it can also learn to enable it when necessary. The benefits are dependent on how scheduler-intensive the workload is. If it is then the patch reduces the number of cycles spent calculating the stats with a small benefit from reducing the cache footprint of the scheduler. These measurements were taken from a 48-core 2-socket machine with Xeon(R) E5-2670 v3 cpus although they were also tested on a single socket machine 8-core machine with Intel i7-3770 processors. netperf-tcp 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean 64 560.45 ( 0.00%) 575.98 ( 2.77%) Hmean 128 766.66 ( 0.00%) 795.79 ( 3.80%) Hmean 256 950.51 ( 0.00%) 981.50 ( 3.26%) Hmean 1024 1433.25 ( 0.00%) 1466.51 ( 2.32%) Hmean 2048 2810.54 ( 0.00%) 2879.75 ( 2.46%) Hmean 3312 4618.18 ( 0.00%) 4682.09 ( 1.38%) Hmean 4096 5306.42 ( 0.00%) 5346.39 ( 0.75%) Hmean 8192 10581.44 ( 0.00%) 10698.15 ( 1.10%) Hmean 16384 18857.70 ( 0.00%) 18937.61 ( 0.42%) Small gains here, UDP_STREAM showed nothing intresting and neither did the TCP_RR tests. The gains on the 8-core machine were very similar. tbench4 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean mb/sec-1 500.85 ( 0.00%) 522.43 ( 4.31%) Hmean mb/sec-2 984.66 ( 0.00%) 1018.19 ( 3.41%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1827.91 ( 0.00%) 1847.78 ( 1.09%) Hmean mb/sec-8 3561.36 ( 0.00%) 3611.28 ( 1.40%) Hmean mb/sec-16 5824.52 ( 0.00%) 5929.03 ( 1.79%) Hmean mb/sec-32 10943.10 ( 0.00%) 10802.83 ( -1.28%) Hmean mb/sec-64 15950.81 ( 0.00%) 16211.31 ( 1.63%) Hmean mb/sec-128 15302.17 ( 0.00%) 15445.11 ( 0.93%) Hmean mb/sec-256 14866.18 ( 0.00%) 15088.73 ( 1.50%) Hmean mb/sec-512 15223.31 ( 0.00%) 15373.69 ( 0.99%) Hmean mb/sec-1024 14574.25 ( 0.00%) 14598.02 ( 0.16%) Hmean mb/sec-2048 13569.02 ( 0.00%) 13733.86 ( 1.21%) Hmean mb/sec-3072 12865.98 ( 0.00%) 13209.23 ( 2.67%) Small gains of 2-4% at low thread counts and otherwise flat. The gains on the 8-core machine were slightly different tbench4 on 8-core i7-3770 single socket machine Hmean mb/sec-1 442.59 ( 0.00%) 448.73 ( 1.39%) Hmean mb/sec-2 796.68 ( 0.00%) 794.39 ( -0.29%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1322.52 ( 0.00%) 1343.66 ( 1.60%) Hmean mb/sec-8 2611.65 ( 0.00%) 2694.86 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-16 2537.07 ( 0.00%) 2609.34 ( 2.85%) Hmean mb/sec-32 2506.02 ( 0.00%) 2578.18 ( 2.88%) Hmean mb/sec-64 2511.06 ( 0.00%) 2569.16 ( 2.31%) Hmean mb/sec-128 2313.38 ( 0.00%) 2395.50 ( 3.55%) Hmean mb/sec-256 2110.04 ( 0.00%) 2177.45 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-512 2072.51 ( 0.00%) 2053.97 ( -0.89%) In constract, this shows a relatively steady 2-3% gain at higher thread counts. Due to the nature of the patch and the type of workload, it's not a surprise that the result will depend on the CPU used. hackbench-pipes 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Amean 1 0.0637 ( 0.00%) 0.0660 ( -3.59%) Amean 4 0.1229 ( 0.00%) 0.1181 ( 3.84%) Amean 7 0.1921 ( 0.00%) 0.1911 ( 0.52%) Amean 12 0.3117 ( 0.00%) 0.2923 ( 6.23%) Amean 21 0.4050 ( 0.00%) 0.3899 ( 3.74%) Amean 30 0.4586 ( 0.00%) 0.4433 ( 3.33%) Amean 48 0.5910 ( 0.00%) 0.5694 ( 3.65%) Amean 79 0.8663 ( 0.00%) 0.8626 ( 0.43%) Amean 110 1.1543 ( 0.00%) 1.1517 ( 0.22%) Amean 141 1.4457 ( 0.00%) 1.4290 ( 1.16%) Amean 172 1.7090 ( 0.00%) 1.6924 ( 0.97%) Amean 192 1.9126 ( 0.00%) 1.9089 ( 0.19%) Some small gains and losses and while the variance data is not included, it's close to the noise. The UMA machine did not show anything particularly different pipetest 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v2r2 Min Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 3.99 ( 3.39%) 1st-qrtle Time 4.38 ( 0.00%) 4.27 ( 2.51%) 2nd-qrtle Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.57%) 3rd-qrtle Time 4.56 ( 0.00%) 4.51 ( 1.10%) Max-90% Time 4.67 ( 0.00%) 4.60 ( 1.50%) Max-93% Time 4.71 ( 0.00%) 4.65 ( 1.27%) Max-95% Time 4.74 ( 0.00%) 4.71 ( 0.63%) Max-99% Time 4.88 ( 0.00%) 4.79 ( 1.84%) Max Time 4.93 ( 0.00%) 4.83 ( 2.03%) Mean Time 4.48 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best99%Mean Time 4.47 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best95%Mean Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.38 ( 1.93%) Best90%Mean Time 4.45 ( 0.00%) 4.36 ( 1.98%) Best50%Mean Time 4.36 ( 0.00%) 4.25 ( 2.49%) Best10%Mean Time 4.23 ( 0.00%) 4.10 ( 3.13%) Best5%Mean Time 4.19 ( 0.00%) 4.06 ( 3.20%) Best1%Mean Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 4.00 ( 3.39%) Small improvement and similar gains were seen on the UMA machine. The gain is small but it stands to reason that doing less work in the scheduler is a good thing. The downside is that the lack of schedstats and tracepoints may be surprising to experts doing performance analysis until they find the existence of the schedstats= parameter or schedstats sysctl. It will be automatically activated for latencytop and sleep profiling to alleviate the problem. For tracepoints, there is a simple warning as it's not safe to activate schedstats in the context when it's known the tracepoint may be wanted but is unavailable. Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Reviewed-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NSrikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454663316-22048-1-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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