- 01 12月, 2022 12 次提交
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS. Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts, hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't sufficient architecturally.) For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that was executed in L2. Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL, perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is clear at emulated VM-exit. This is CVE-2022-2196. Fixes: 5c911bef ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02") Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-3-jmattson@google.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
At this point in time, most guests (in the default, out-of-the-box configuration) are likely to use IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Therefore, drop the compiler hint that it is unlikely for KVM to be intercepting WRMSR of IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-2-jmattson@google.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Inject #GP for if VMXON is attempting with a CR0/CR4 that fails the generic "is CRx valid" check, but passes the CR4.VMXE check, and do the generic checks _after_ handling the post-VMXON VM-Fail. The CR4.VMXE check, and all other #UD cases, are special pre-conditions that are enforced prior to pivoting on the current VMX mode, i.e. occur before interception if VMXON is attempted in VMX non-root mode. All other CR0/CR4 checks generate #GP and effectively have lower priority than the post-VMXON check. Per the SDM: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD; ELSIF not in VMX operation THEN IF (CPL > 0) or (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); ELSIF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; ELSIF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0); ELSE VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); FI; which, if re-written without ELSIF, yields: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD IF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; IF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0) IF in VMX operation THEN VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); IF (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); Note, KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits that occur in L2 to L1, i.e. there is no need to check the vCPU is not in VMX non-root mode. Add a comment to explain why unconditionally forwarding such exits is functionally correct. Reported-by: NEric Li <ercli@ucdavis.edu> Fixes: c7d855c2 ("KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006001956.329314-1-seanjc@google.com
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由 Zhao Liu 提交于
The use of kmap_atomic() is being deprecated in favor of kmap_local_page()[1]. The main difference between atomic and local mappings is that local mappings don't disable page faults or preemption. There're 2 reasons we can use kmap_local_page() here: 1. SEV is 64-bit only and kmap_local_page() doesn't disable migration in this case, but here the function clflush_cache_range() uses CLFLUSHOPT instruction to flush, and on x86 CLFLUSHOPT is not CPU-local and flushes the page out of the entire cache hierarchy on all CPUs (APM volume 3, chapter 3, CLFLUSHOPT). So there's no need to disable preemption to ensure CPU-local. 2. clflush_cache_range() doesn't need to disable pagefault and the mapping is still valid even if sleeps. This is also true for sched out/in when preempted. In addition, though kmap_local_page() is a thin wrapper around page_address() on 64-bit, kmap_local_page() should still be used here in preference to page_address() since page_address() isn't suitable to be used in a generic function (like sev_clflush_pages()) where the page passed in is not easy to determine the source of allocation. Keeping the kmap* API in place means it can be used for things other than highmem mappings[2]. Therefore, sev_clflush_pages() is a function that should use kmap_local_page() in place of kmap_atomic(). Convert the calls of kmap_atomic() / kunmap_atomic() to kmap_local_page() / kunmap_local(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220813220034.806698-1-ira.weiny@intel.com [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5d667258-b58b-3d28-3609-e7914c99b31b@intel.com/Suggested-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Suggested-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Suggested-by: NFabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NZhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928092748.463631-1-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Skip the WRMSR fastpath in SVM's VM-Exit handler if the next RIP isn't valid, e.g. because KVM is running with nrips=false. SVM must decode and emulate to skip the WRMSR if the CPU doesn't provide the next RIP. Getting the instruction bytes to decode the WRMSR requires reading guest memory, which in turn means dereferencing memslots, and that isn't safe because KVM doesn't hold SRCU when the fastpath runs. Don't bother trying to enable the fastpath for this case, e.g. by doing only the WRMSR and leaving the "skip" until later. NRIPS is supported on all modern CPUs (KVM has considered making it mandatory), and the next RIP will be valid the vast, vast majority of the time. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13 Tainted: G O ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:954 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by stable/206475: #0: ffff9d9dfebcc0f0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x620 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 152 PID: 206475 Comm: stable Tainted: G O 6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13 Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 10.48.0 01/27/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xaa dump_stack+0x10/0x12 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x11e/0x130 kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x155/0x190 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot+0x18/0x80 [kvm] paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x183/0x450 [kvm] paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x63/0xd0 [kvm] kvm_fetch_guest_virt+0x53/0xc0 [kvm] __do_insn_fetch_bytes+0x18b/0x1c0 [kvm] x86_decode_insn+0xf0/0xef0 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0xba/0x790 [kvm] kvm_emulate_instruction+0x17/0x20 [kvm] __svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x85/0x100 [kvm_amd] svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x13/0x20 [kvm_amd] handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff+0xae/0x180 [kvm] svm_vcpu_run+0x4b8/0x5a0 [kvm_amd] vcpu_enter_guest+0x16ca/0x22f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x39d/0x900 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x538/0x620 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x77/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1d/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: 404d5d7b ("KVM: X86: Introduce more exit_fastpath_completion enum values") Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930234031.1732249-1-seanjc@google.com
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Treat any exception during instruction decode for EMULTYPE_SKIP as a "full" emulation failure, i.e. signal failure instead of queuing the exception. When decoding purely to skip an instruction, KVM and/or the CPU has already done some amount of emulation that cannot be unwound, e.g. on an EPT misconfig VM-Exit KVM has already processeed the emulated MMIO. KVM already does this if a #UD is encountered, but not for other exceptions, e.g. if a #PF is encountered during fetch. In SVM's soft-injection use case, queueing the exception is particularly problematic as queueing exceptions while injecting events can put KVM into an infinite loop due to bailing from VM-Enter to service the newly pending exception. E.g. multiple warnings to detect such behavior fire: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9873 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm] Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1+ #220 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm] Call Trace: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9987 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm] Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc1+ #220 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm] Call Trace: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 6ea6e843 ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn") Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233632.1725475-1-seanjc@google.com
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由 Peng Hao 提交于
Acquire SRCU before taking the gpc spinlock in wait_pending_event() so as to be consistent with all other functions that acquire both locks. It's not illegal to acquire SRCU inside a spinlock, nor is there deadlock potential, but in general it's preferable to order locks from least restrictive to most restrictive, e.g. if wait_pending_event() needed to sleep for whatever reason, it could do so while holding SRCU, but would need to drop the spinlock. Signed-off-by: NPeng Hao <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAPm50a++Cb=QfnjMZ2EnCj-Sb9Y4UM-=uOEtHAcjnNLCAAf-dQ@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Resume the guest immediately when injecting a #GP on ECREATE due to an invalid enclave size, i.e. don't attempt ECREATE in the host. The #GP is a terminal fault, e.g. skipping the instruction if ECREATE is successful would result in KVM injecting #GP on the instruction following ECREATE. Fixes: 70210c04 ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233132.1723330-1-seanjc@google.com
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
If a triple fault was fixed by kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->triple_fault (by turning it into a vmexit), there is no need to leave vcpu_enter_guest(). Any vcpu->requests will be caught later before the actual vmentry, and in fact vcpu_enter_guest() was not initializing the "r" variable. Depending on the compiler's whims, this could cause the x86_64/triple_fault_event_test test to fail. Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Fixes: 92e7d5c8 ("KVM: x86: allow L1 to not intercept triple fault") Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Michal Luczaj 提交于
Remove the unused @kvm argument from gpc_unmap_khva(). Signed-off-by: NMichal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Michal Luczaj 提交于
Formalize "gpc" as the acronym and use it in function names. No functional change intended. Suggested-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NMichal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Torture test the cases where the runstate crosses a page boundary, and and especially the case where it's configured in 32-bit mode and doesn't, but then switching to 64-bit mode makes it go onto the second page. To simplify this, make the KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST ioctl also update the guest runstate area. It already did so if the actual runstate changed, as a side-effect of kvm_xen_update_runstate(). So doing it in the plain adjustment case is making it more consistent, as well as giving us a nice way to trigger the update without actually running the vCPU again and changing the values. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NPaul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 30 11月, 2022 2 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Closer inspection of the Xen code shows that we aren't supposed to be using the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag unconditionally. It should be explicitly enabled by guests through the HYPERVISOR_vm_assist hypercall. If we randomly set the top bit of ->state_entry_time for a guest that hasn't asked for it and doesn't expect it, that could make the runtimes fail to add up and confuse the guest. Without the flag it's perfectly safe for a vCPU to read its own vcpu_runstate_info; just not for one vCPU to read *another's*. I briefly pondered adding a word for the whole set of VMASST_TYPE_* flags but the only one we care about for HVM guests is this, so it seemed a bit pointless. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Message-Id: <20221127122210.248427-3-dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
The guest runstate area can be arbitrarily byte-aligned. In fact, even when a sane 32-bit guest aligns the overall structure nicely, the 64-bit fields in the structure end up being unaligned due to the fact that the 32-bit ABI only aligns them to 32 bits. So setting the ->state_entry_time field to something|XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE is buggy, because if it's unaligned then we can't update the whole field atomically; the low bytes might be observable before the _UPDATE bit is. Xen actually updates the *byte* containing that top bit, on its own. KVM should do the same. In addition, we cannot assume that the runstate area fits within a single page. One option might be to make the gfn_to_pfn cache cope with regions that cross a page — but getting a contiguous virtual kernel mapping of a discontiguous set of IOMEM pages is a distinctly non-trivial exercise, and it seems this is the *only* current use case for the GPC which would benefit from it. An earlier version of the runstate code did use a gfn_to_hva cache for this purpose, but it still had the single-page restriction because it used the uhva directly — because it needs to be able to do so atomically when the vCPU is being scheduled out, so it used pagefault_disable() around the accesses and didn't just use kvm_write_guest_cached() which has a fallback path. So... use a pair of GPCs for the first and potential second page covering the runstate area. We can get away with locking both at once because nothing else takes more than one GPC lock at a time so we can invent a trivial ordering rule. The common case where it's all in the same page is kept as a fast path, but in both cases, the actual guest structure (compat or not) is built up from the fields in @vx, following preset pointers to the state and times fields. The only difference is whether those pointers point to the kernel stack (in the split case) or to guest memory directly via the GPC. The fast path is also fixed to use a byte access for the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE bit, then the only real difference is the dual memcpy. Finally, Xen also does write the runstate area immediately when it's configured. Flip the kvm_xen_update_runstate() and …_guest() functions and call the latter directly when the runstate area is set. This means that other ioctls which modify the runstate also write it immediately to the guest when they do so, which is also intended. Update the xen_shinfo_test to exercise the pathological case where the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag in the top byte of the state_entry_time is actually in a different page to the rest of the 64-bit word. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 29 11月, 2022 12 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Merge tag 'kvm-s390-next-6.2-1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD - Second batch of the lazy destroy patches - First batch of KVM changes for kernel virtual != physical address support - Removal of a unused function
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由 Jiaxi Chen 提交于
Latest Intel platform Granite Rapids has introduced a new instruction - PREFETCHIT0/1, which moves code to memory (cache) closer to the processor depending on specific hints. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 14] PREFETCHIT0/1 is on a KVM-only subleaf. Plus an x86_FEATURE definition for this feature bit to direct it to the KVM entry. Advertise PREFETCHIT0/1 to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-9-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Jiaxi Chen 提交于
AVX-NE-CONVERT is a new set of instructions which can convert low precision floating point like BF16/FP16 to high precision floating point FP32, and can also convert FP32 elements to BF16. This instruction allows the platform to have improved AI capabilities and better compatibility. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 5] AVX-NE-CONVERT is on a KVM-only subleaf. Plus an x86_FEATURE definition for this feature bit to direct it to the KVM entry. Advertise AVX-NE-CONVERT to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-8-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Jiaxi Chen 提交于
AVX-VNNI-INT8 is a new set of instructions in the latest Intel platform Sierra Forest, aims for the platform to have superior AI capabilities. This instruction multiplies the individual bytes of two unsigned or unsigned source operands, then adds and accumulates the results into the destination dword element size operand. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 4] AVX-VNNI-INT8 is on a new and sparse CPUID leaf and all bits on this leaf have no truly kernel use case for now. Given that and to save space for kernel feature bits, move this new leaf to KVM-only subleaf and plus an x86_FEATURE definition for AVX-VNNI-INT8 to direct it to the KVM entry. Advertise AVX-VNNI-INT8 to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-7-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Jiaxi Chen 提交于
AVX-IFMA is a new instruction in the latest Intel platform Sierra Forest. This instruction packed multiplies unsigned 52-bit integers and adds the low/high 52-bit products to Qword Accumulators. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 23] AVX-IFMA is on an expected-dense CPUID leaf and some other bits on this leaf have kernel usages. Given that, define this feature bit like X86_FEATURE_<name> in kernel. Considering AVX-IFMA itself has no truly kernel usages and /proc/cpuinfo has too much unreadable flags, hide this one in /proc/cpuinfo. Advertise AVX-IFMA to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-6-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Chang S. Bae 提交于
Latest Intel platform Granite Rapids has introduced a new instruction - AMX-FP16, which performs dot-products of two FP16 tiles and accumulates the results into a packed single precision tile. AMX-FP16 adds FP16 capability and also allows a FP16 GPU trained model to run faster without loss of accuracy or added SW overhead. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 21] AMX-FP16 is on an expected-dense CPUID leaf and some other bits on this leaf have kernel usages. Given that, define this feature bit like X86_FEATURE_<name> in kernel. Considering AMX-FP16 itself has no truly kernel usages and /proc/cpuinfo has too much unreadable flags, hide this one in /proc/cpuinfo. Advertise AMX-FP16 to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NChang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-5-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Jiaxi Chen 提交于
CMPccXADD is a new set of instructions in the latest Intel platform Sierra Forest. This new instruction set includes a semaphore operation that can compare and add the operands if condition is met, which can improve database performance. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 7] CMPccXADD is on an expected-dense CPUID leaf and some other bits on this leaf have kernel usages. Given that, define this feature bit like X86_FEATURE_<name> in kernel. Considering CMPccXADD itself has no truly kernel usages and /proc/cpuinfo has too much unreadable flags, hide this one in /proc/cpuinfo. Advertise CMPCCXADD to KVM userspace. This is safe because there are no new VMX controls or additional host enabling required for guests to use this feature. Signed-off-by: NJiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-4-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Rename kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered() to kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined() in anticipation of adding KVM-only CPUID leafs that aren't recognized by the kernel and thus not scattered, i.e. for leafs that are 100% KVM-defined. Adjust/add comments to kvm_only_cpuid_leafs and KVM_X86_FEATURE to document how to create new kvm_only_cpuid_leafs entries for scattered features as well as features that are entirely unknown to the kernel. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-3-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Add a compile-time assert in the SF() macro to detect improper usage, i.e. to detect passing in an X86_FEATURE_* flag that isn't actually scattered by the kernel. Upcoming feature flags will be 100% KVM-only and will have X86_FEATURE_* macros that point at a kvm_only_cpuid_leafs word, not a kernel-defined word. Using SF() and thus boot_cpu_has() for such feature flags would access memory beyond x86_capability[NCAPINTS] and at best incorrectly hide a feature, and at worst leak kernel state to userspace. Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20221125125845.1182922-2-jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Adding Paul as co-maintainer of Xen support to help ensure that things don't fall through the cracks when I spend three months at a time travelling... Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NPaul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Architecture code might want to use it even if CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING is false; for example PPC XICS has KVM_IRQ_LINE and wants to use kvm_arch_irqchip_in_kernel from there, but it does not have KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING so the prototype was not provided. Fixes: d663b8a2 ("KVM: replace direct irq.h inclusion") Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 24 11月, 2022 4 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
This brings in a few important fixes for Xen emulation. While nobody should be enabling it, the bug effectively allows userspace to read arbitrary memory. Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
In the case where a GPC is refreshed to a different location within the same page, we didn't bother to update it. Mostly we don't need to, but since the ->khva field also includes the offset within the page, that does have to be updated. Fixes: 3ba2c95e ("KVM: Do not incorporate page offset into gfn=>pfn cache user address") Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NPaul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
There are almost no hypercalls which are valid from CPL > 0, and definitely none which are handled by the kernel. Fixes: 2fd6df2f ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests") Reported-by: NMichal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
We shouldn't allow guests to poll on arbitrary port numbers off the end of the event channel table. Fixes: 1a65105a ("KVM: x86/xen: handle PV spinlocks slowpath") [dwmw2: my bug though; the original version did check the validity as a side-effect of an idr_find() which I ripped out in refactoring.] Reported-by: NMichal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 23 11月, 2022 8 次提交
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由 Heiko Carstens 提交于
clang warns about an unused function: arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c:317:20: error: unused function 'gisa_clear_ipm_gisc' [-Werror,-Wunused-function] static inline void gisa_clear_ipm_gisc(struct kvm_s390_gisa *gisa, u32 gisc) Remove gisa_clear_ipm_gisc(), since it is unused and get rid of this warning. Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118151133.2974602-1-hca@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Nico Boehr 提交于
Fix virtual vs physical address confusion (which currently are the same) for the GISA when enabling the IRQ. Signed-off-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NHalil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118100429.70453-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221118100429.70453-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
Add the module parameter "async_destroy", to allow the asynchronous destroy mechanism to be switched off. This might be useful for debugging purposes. The parameter is enabled by default since the feature is opt-in anyway. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
Add support for the Destroy Secure Configuration Fast Ultravisor call, and take advantage of it for asynchronous destroy. When supported, the protected guest is destroyed immediately using the new UVC, leaving only the memory to be cleaned up asynchronously. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
If the appropriate UV feature bit is set, there is no need to perform an export before import. The misc feature indicates, among other things, that importing a shared page from a different protected VM will automatically also transfer its ownership. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-5-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-5-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
Add KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_ASYNC_DISABLE to signal that the KVM_PV_ASYNC_DISABLE and KVM_PV_ASYNC_DISABLE_PREPARE commands for the KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl are available. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
Add documentation for the new commands added to the KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Claudio Imbrenda 提交于
Until now, destroying a protected guest was an entirely synchronous operation that could potentially take a very long time, depending on the size of the guest, due to the time needed to clean up the address space from protected pages. This patch implements an asynchronous destroy mechanism, that allows a protected guest to reboot significantly faster than previously. This is achieved by clearing the pages of the old guest in background. In case of reboot, the new guest will be able to run in the same address space almost immediately. The old protected guest is then only destroyed when all of its memory has been destroyed or otherwise made non protected. Two new PV commands are added for the KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl: KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE: set aside the current protected VM for later asynchronous teardown. The current KVM VM will then continue immediately as non-protected. If a protected VM had already been set aside for asynchronous teardown, but without starting the teardown process, this call will fail. There can be at most one VM set aside at any time. Once it is set aside, the protected VM only exists in the context of the Ultravisor, it is not associated with the KVM VM anymore. Its protected CPUs have already been destroyed, but not its memory. This command can be issued again immediately after starting KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM, without having to wait for completion. KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM: tears down the protected VM previously set aside using KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE. Ideally the KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM PV command should be issued by userspace from a separate thread. If a fatal signal is received (or if the process terminates naturally), the command will terminate immediately without completing. All protected VMs whose teardown was interrupted will be put in the need_cleanup list. The rest of the normal KVM teardown process will take care of properly cleaning up all remaining protected VMs, including the ones on the need_cleanup list. Signed-off-by: NClaudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NNico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NSteffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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- 21 11月, 2022 2 次提交
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
Conform to the rest of Hyper-V emulation selftests which have 'hyperv' prefix. Get rid of '_test' suffix as well as the purpose of this code is fairly obvious. Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-49-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于
Enable Hyper-V L2 TLB flush and check that Hyper-V TLB flush hypercalls from L2 don't exit to L1 unless 'TlbLockCount' is set in the Partition assist page. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-48-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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