Skip to content

K
Kernel

openeuler / Kernel
1 年多 前同步成功

通知 8
Star 0
Fork 0
K
Kernel
切换分支/标签
  1. 22 10月, 2013 32 次提交
  3. 20 10月, 2013 8 次提交
    • D
      Merge tag 'batman-adv-for-davem' of git://git.open-mesh.org/linux-merge · 5bf47256
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Antonio Quartulli says:

====================
this is another batch intended for net-next/linux-3.13.

This pull request is a bit bigger than usual, but 6 patches are very small
(three of them are about email updates)..

Patch 1 is fixing a previous merge conflict resolution that went wrong
(I realised that only now while checking other patches..).
Patches from 2 to 4 that are updating our emails in all the proper files
(Documentation/, headers and MAINTAINERS).

Patches 5, 6 and 7 are bringing a big improvement to the TranslationTable
component: it is now able to group non-mesh clients based on the VLAN they
belong to. In this way a lot a new enhancements are now possible thanks to the
fact that each batman-adv behaviour can be applied on a per VLAN basis.

And, of course, in patches from 8 to 12 you have some of the enhancements I was
talking about:
- make the batman-Gateway selection VLAN dependent
- make DAT (Distributed ARP Table) group ARP entries on a VLAN basis (this
  allows DAT to work even when the admin decided to use the same IP subnet on
  different VLANs)
- make the AP-Isolation behaviour switchable on each VLAN independently
- export VLAN specific attributes via sysfs. Switches like the AP-Isolation are
  now exported once per VLAN (backward compatibility of the sysfs interface has
  been preserved)

Patches 13 and 14 are small code cleanups.
Patch 15 is a minor improvement in the TT locking mechanism.

Patches 16 and 17 are other enhancements to the TT component. Those allow a
node to parse a "non-mesh client announcement message" and accept only those
TT entries belonging to certain VLANs.

Patch 18 exploits this parse&accept mechanism to make the Bridge Loop Avoidance
component reject only TT entries connected to the VLAN where it is operating.
Previous to this change, BLA was rejecting all the entries coming from any other
Backbone node, regardless of the VLAN (for more details about how the Bridge
Loop Avoidance works please check [1]).

[1] http://www.open-mesh.org/projects/batman-adv/wiki/Bridge-loop-avoidance-II
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5bf47256
    • D
      Merge branch 'net_get_random_once' · 7dcade39
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Hannes Frederic Sowa says:

====================
This series implements support for delaying the initialization of secret
keys, e.g. used for hashing, for as long as possible. This functionality
is implemented by a new macro, net_get_random_bytes.

I already used it to protect the socket hashes, the syncookie secret
(most important) and the tcp_fastopen secrets.

Changelog:
v2) Use static_keys in net_get_random_once to have as minimal impact to
    the fast-path as possible.
v3) added patch "static_key: WARN on usage before jump_label_init was called":
    Patch "x86/jump_label: expect default_nop if static_key gets enabled
    on boot-up" relaxes the checks for using static_key primitives before
    jump_label_init. So tighten them first.
v4) Update changelog on the patch "static_key: WARN on usage before
    jump_label_init was called"

Included patches:
 ipv4: split inet_ehashfn to hash functions per compilation unit
 ipv6: split inet6_ehashfn to hash functions per compilation unit
 static_key: WARN on usage before jump_label_init was called
 x86/jump_label: expect default_nop if static_key gets enabled on boot-up
 net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once
 inet: split syncookie keys for ipv4 and ipv6 and initialize with net_get_random_once
 inet: convert inet_ehash_secret and ipv6_hash_secret to net_get_random_once
 tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once
 net: switch net_secret key generation to net_get_random_once
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7dcade39
    • H
      net: switch net_secret key generation to net_get_random_once · e34c9a69
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e34c9a69
    • H
      tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once · 222e83d2
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      Changed key initialization of tcp_fastopen cookies to net_get_random_once.

If the user sets a custom key net_get_random_once must be called at
least once to ensure we don't overwrite the user provided key when the
first cookie is generated later on.

Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      222e83d2
    • H
      inet: convert inet_ehash_secret and ipv6_hash_secret to net_get_random_once · 1bbdceef
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      Initialize the ehash and ipv6_hash_secrets with net_get_random_once.

Each compilation unit gets its own secret now:
  ipv4/inet_hashtables.o
  ipv4/udp.o
  ipv6/inet6_hashtables.o
  ipv6/udp.o
  rds/connection.o

The functions still get inlined into the hashing functions. In the fast
path we have at most two (needed in ipv6) if (unlikely(...)).

Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1bbdceef
    • H
      inet: split syncookie keys for ipv4 and ipv6 and initialize with net_get_random_once · b23a002f
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      This patch splits the secret key for syncookies for ipv4 and ipv6 and
initializes them with net_get_random_once. This change was the reason I
did this series. I think the initialization of the syncookie_secret is
way to early.

Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b23a002f
    • H
      net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once · a48e4292
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      net_get_random_once is a new macro which handles the initialization
of secret keys. It is possible to call it in the fast path. Only the
initialization depends on the spinlock and is rather slow. Otherwise
it should get used just before the key is used to delay the entropy
extration as late as possible to get better randomness. It returns true
if the key got initialized.

The usage of static_keys for net_get_random_once is a bit uncommon so
it needs some further explanation why this actually works:

=== In the simple non-HAVE_JUMP_LABEL case we actually have ===
no constrains to use static_key_(true|false) on keys initialized with
STATIC_KEY_INIT_(FALSE|TRUE). So this path just expands in favor of
the likely case that the initialization is already done. The key is
initialized like this:

___done_key = { .enabled = ATOMIC_INIT(0) }

The check

                if (!static_key_true(&___done_key))                     \

expands into (pseudo code)

                if (!likely(___done_key > 0))

, so we take the fast path as soon as ___done_key is increased from the
helper function.

=== If HAVE_JUMP_LABELs are available this depends ===
on patching of jumps into the prepared NOPs, which is done in
jump_label_init at boot-up time (from start_kernel). It is forbidden
and dangerous to use net_get_random_once in functions which are called
before that!

At compilation time NOPs are generated at the call sites of
net_get_random_once. E.g. net/ipv6/inet6_hashtable.c:inet6_ehashfn (we
need to call net_get_random_once two times in inet6_ehashfn, so two NOPs):

      71:       0f 1f 44 00 00          nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
      76:       0f 1f 44 00 00          nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)

Both will be patched to the actual jumps to the end of the function to
call __net_get_random_once at boot time as explained above.

arch_static_branch is optimized and inlined for false as return value and
actually also returns false in case the NOP is placed in the instruction
stream. So in the fast case we get a "return false". But because we
initialize ___done_key with (enabled != (entries & 1)) this call-site
will get patched up at boot thus returning true. The final check looks
like this:

                if (!static_key_true(&___done_key))                     \
                        ___ret = __net_get_random_once(buf,             \

expands to

                if (!!static_key_false(&___done_key))                     \
                        ___ret = __net_get_random_once(buf,             \

So we get true at boot time and as soon as static_key_slow_inc is called
on the key it will invert the logic and return false for the fast path.
static_key_slow_inc will change the branch because it got initialized
with .enabled == 0. After static_key_slow_inc is called on the key the
branch is replaced with a nop again.

=== Misc: ===
The helper defers the increment into a workqueue so we don't
have problems calling this code from atomic sections. A seperate boolean
(___done) guards the case where we enter net_get_random_once again before
the increment happend.

Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a48e4292
    • H
      x86/jump_label: expect default_nop if static_key gets enabled on boot-up · a8fab074
      由 Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于 
      net_get_random_once(intrduced in the next patch) uses static_keys in
a way that they get enabled on boot-up instead of replaced with an
ideal_nop. So check for default_nop on initial enabling.

Other architectures don't check for this.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a8fab074