- 28 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
xen_setup_stackprotector() ends up trying to set page protections, so we need to have vm_mmu_ops set up before trying to do so. Failing to do so causes an early boot crash. [ Impact: Fix early crash under Xen. ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 22 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
x86-64 assumes NX is available by default, so we need to explicitly check for it before using NX. Some first-generation Intel x86-64 processors didn't support NX, and even recent systems allow it to be disabled in BIOS. [ Impact: prevent Xen crash on NX-less 64-bit machines ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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- 16 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Feng Tang 提交于
get/set_wallclock() have already a set of platform dependent implementations (default, EFI, paravirt). MRST will add another variant. Moving them to platform ops simplifies the existing code and minimizes the effort to integrate new variants. Signed-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 10 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
-fstack-protector uses a special per-cpu "stack canary" value. gcc generates special code in each function to test the canary to make sure that the function's stack hasn't been overrun. On x86-64, this is simply an offset of %gs, which is the usual per-cpu base segment register, so setting it up simply requires loading %gs's base as normal. On i386, the stack protector segment is %gs (rather than the usual kernel percpu %fs segment register). This requires setting up the full kernel GDT and then loading %gs accordingly. We also need to make sure %gs is initialized when bringing up secondary cpus too. To keep things consistent, we do the full GDT/segment register setup on both architectures. Because we need to avoid -fstack-protected code before setting up the GDT and because there's no way to disable it on a per-function basis, several files need to have stack-protector inhibited. [ Impact: allow Xen booting with stack-protector enabled ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 01 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于
For some reason, the _safe MSR functions returned -EFAULT, not -EIO. However, the only user which cares about the return code as anything other than a boolean is the MSR driver, which wants -EIO. Change it to -EIO across the board. Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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- 31 8月, 2009 7 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
TSC calibration is modified by the vmware hypervisor and paravirt by separate means. Moorestown wants to add its own calibration routine as well. So make calibrate_tsc a proper x86_init_ops function and override it by paravirt or by the early setup of the vmware hypervisor. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The timer init code is convoluted with several quirks and the paravirt timer chooser. Figuring out which code path is actually taken is not for the faint hearted. Move the numaq TSC quirk to tsc_pre_init x86_init_ops function and replace the paravirt time chooser and the remaining x86 quirk with a simple x86_init_ops function. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
paravirt overrides the setup of the default apic timers as per cpu timers. Moorestown needs to override that as well. Move it to x86_init_ops setup and create a separate x86_cpuinit struct which holds the function for the secondary evtl. hotplugabble CPUs. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
We really do not need two paravirt/x86_init_ops functions which are called in two consecutive source lines. Move the only user of post_allocator_init into the already existing pagetable_setup_done function. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace more paravirt hackery by proper x86_init_ops. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace another obscure paravirt magic and move it to x86_init_ops. Such a hook is also useful for embedded and special hardware. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
ARCH_SETUP is a horrible leftover from the old arch/i386 mach support code. It still has a lonely user in xen. Move it to x86_init_ops. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 27 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
memory_setup is overridden by x86_quirks and by paravirts with weak functions and quirks. Unify the whole mess and make it an unconditional x86_init_ops function which defaults to the standard function and can be overridden by the early platform code. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 26 8月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于
Initialize cx before calling xen_cpuid(), in order to suppress the "may be used uninitialized in this function" warning. Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Xen always runs on CPUs which properly support WP enforcement in privileged mode, so there's no need to test for it. This also works around a crash reported by Arnd Hannemann, though I think its just a band-aid for that case. Reported-by: NArnd Hannemann <hannemann@nets.rwth-aachen.de> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NPekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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- 20 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Make sure the stack-protector segment registers are properly set up before calling any functions which may have stack-protection compiled into them. [ Impact: prevent Xen early-boot crash when stack-protector is enabled ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 09 5月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
stts() is implemented in terms of read_cr0/write_cr0 to update the state of the TS bit. This happens during context switch, and so is fairly performance critical. Rather than falling back to a trap-and-emulate native read_cr0, implement our own by caching the last-written value from write_cr0 (the TS bit is the only one we really care about). Impact: optimise Xen context switches Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Ignore known IST-using traps. Aside from the debugger traps, they're low-level faults which Xen will handle for us, so the kernel needn't worry about them. Keep warning in case unknown trap starts using IST. Impact: suppress spurious warnings Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Native x86-64 uses the IST mechanism to run int3 and debug traps on an alternative stack. Xen does not do this, and so the frames were being misinterpreted by the ptrace code. This change special-cases these two exceptions by using Xen variants which run on the normal kernel stack properly. Impact: avoid crash or bad data when IST trap is invoked under Xen Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 09 4月, 2009 6 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Use GATE_INTERRUPT/TRAP rather than 0xe/f. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Some 64-bit machines don't support the NX flag in ptes. Check for NX before constructing the kernel pagetables. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Xen leaves XSAVE set in cpuid, but doesn't allow cr4.OSXSAVE to be set. This confuses the kernel and it ends up crashing on an xsetbv instruction. At boot time, try to set cr4.OSXSAVE, and mask XSAVE out of cpuid it we can't. This will produce a spurious error from Xen, but allows us to support XSAVE if/when Xen does. This also factors out the cpuid mask decisions to boot time. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Don't need the noise. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Remove use of multicall machinery which is unused (gdt loading is never performance critical). This removes the implicit use of percpu variables, which simplifies understanding how the percpu code's use of load_gdt interacts with this code. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Makes the logic a bit clearer. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 31 3月, 2009 6 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Use GATE_INTERRUPT/TRAP rather than 0xe/f. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Some 64-bit machines don't support the NX flag in ptes. Check for NX before constructing the kernel pagetables. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Xen leaves XSAVE set in cpuid, but doesn't allow cr4.OSXSAVE to be set. This confuses the kernel and it ends up crashing on an xsetbv instruction. At boot time, try to set cr4.OSXSAVE, and mask XSAVE out of cpuid it we can't. This will produce a spurious error from Xen, but allows us to support XSAVE if/when Xen does. This also factors out the cpuid mask decisions to boot time. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Don't need the noise. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Remove use of multicall machinery which is unused (gdt loading is never performance critical). This removes the implicit use of percpu variables, which simplifies understanding how the percpu code's use of load_gdt interacts with this code. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Makes the logic a bit clearer. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 30 3月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Impact: fix lazy context switch API Pass the previous and next tasks into the context switch start end calls, so that the called functions can properly access the task state (esp in end_context_switch, in which the next task is not yet completely current). Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Impact: allow preemption during lazy mmu updates If we're in lazy mmu mode when context switching, leave lazy mmu mode, but remember the task's state in TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES. When we resume the task, check this flag and re-enter lazy mmu mode if its set. This sets things up for allowing lazy mmu mode while preemptible, though that won't actually be active until the next change. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
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- 02 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
The virtually mapped percpu space causes us two problems: - for hypercalls which take an mfn, we need to do a full pagetable walk to convert the percpu va into an mfn, and - when a hypercall requires a page to be mapped RO via all its aliases, we need to make sure its RO in both the percpu mapping and in the linear mapping This primarily affects the gdt and the vcpu info structure. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 26 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
This avoids a lockdep warning from: if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(unlikely(!early_boot_irqs_enabled))) return; in trace_hardirqs_on_caller(); Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 18 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
Impact: cleanup Remove genapic.h and remove all references to it. Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 17 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Yinghai Lu 提交于
Impact: cleanup make it simpler, don't need have one extra struct. v2: fix the sgi_uv build Signed-off-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 10 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Tejun Heo 提交于
Impact: pt_regs changed, lazy gs handling made optional, add slight overhead to SAVE_ALL, simplifies error_code path a bit On x86_32, %gs hasn't been used by kernel and handled lazily. pt_regs doesn't have place for it and gs is saved/loaded only when necessary. In preparation for stack protector support, this patch makes lazy %gs handling optional by doing the followings. * Add CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and place for gs in pt_regs. * Save and restore %gs along with other registers in entry_32.S unless LAZY_GS. Note that this unfortunately adds "pushl $0" on SAVE_ALL even when LAZY_GS. However, it adds no overhead to common exit path and simplifies entry path with error code. * Define different user_gs accessors depending on LAZY_GS and add lazy_save_gs() and lazy_load_gs() which are noop if !LAZY_GS. The lazy_*_gs() ops are used to save, load and clear %gs lazily. * Define ELF_CORE_COPY_KERNEL_REGS() which always read %gs directly. xen and lguest changes need to be verified. Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 05 2月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Enable the use of the direct vcpu-access operations on 64-bit. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
We need to access percpu data fairly early, so set up the percpu registers as soon as possible. We only need to load the appropriate segment register. We already have a GDT, but its hard to change it early because we need to manipulate the pagetable to do so, and that hasn't been set up yet. Also, set the kernel stack when bringing up secondary CPUs. If we don't they all end up sharing the same stack... Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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