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  1. 14 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  3. 11 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  5. 05 3月, 2020 2 次提交
  7. 03 3月, 2020 2 次提交
  9. 25 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  11. 19 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  13. 10 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  15. 05 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  17. 01 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  19. 25 1月, 2020 2 次提交
    • J
      rcu: Remove kfree_call_rcu_nobatch() · 189a6883
      由 Joel Fernandes (Google) 提交于 
      Now that the kfree_rcu() special-casing has been removed from tree RCU,
this commit removes kfree_call_rcu_nobatch() since it is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: NJoel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
      189a6883
    • J
      rcuperf: Add kfree_rcu() performance Tests · e6e78b00
      由 Joel Fernandes (Google) 提交于 
      This test runs kfree_rcu() in a loop to measure performance of the new
kfree_rcu() batching functionality.

The following table shows results when booting with arguments:
rcuperf.kfree_loops=20000 rcuperf.kfree_alloc_num=8000
rcuperf.kfree_rcu_test=1 rcuperf.kfree_no_batch=X

rcuperf.kfree_no_batch=X    # Grace Periods	Test Duration (s)
  X=1 (old behavior)              9133                 11.5
  X=0 (new behavior)              1732                 12.5

On a 16 CPU system with the above boot parameters, we see that the total
number of grace periods that elapse during the test drops from 9133 when
not batching to 1732 when batching (a 5X improvement). The kfree_rcu()
flood itself slows down a bit when batching, though, as shown.

Note that the active memory consumption during the kfree_rcu() flood
does increase to around 200-250MB due to the batching (from around 50MB
without batching). However, this memory consumption is relatively
constant. In other words, the system is able to keep up with the
kfree_rcu() load. The memory consumption comes down considerably if
KFREE_DRAIN_JIFFIES is increased from HZ/50 to HZ/80. A later patch will
reduce memory consumption further by using multiple lists.

Also, when running the test, please disable CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT and
CONFIG_PROVE_RCU for realistic comparisons with/without batching.
Signed-off-by: NJoel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
      e6e78b00
  21. 22 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • M
      genirq, sched/isolation: Isolate from handling managed interrupts · 11ea68f5
      由 Ming Lei 提交于 
      The affinity of managed interrupts is completely handled in the kernel and
cannot be changed via the /proc/irq/* interfaces from user space. As the
kernel tries to spread out interrupts evenly accross CPUs on x86 to prevent
vector exhaustion, it can happen that a managed interrupt whose affinity
mask contains both isolated and housekeeping CPUs is routed to an isolated
CPU. As a consequence IO submitted on a housekeeping CPU causes interrupts
on the isolated CPU.

Add a new sub-parameter 'managed_irq' for 'isolcpus' and the corresponding
logic in the interrupt affinity selection code.

The subparameter indicates to the interrupt affinity selection logic that
it should try to avoid the above scenario.

This isolation is best effort and only effective if the automatically
assigned interrupt mask of a device queue contains isolated and
housekeeping CPUs. If housekeeping CPUs are online then such interrupts are
directed to the housekeeping CPU so that IO submitted on the housekeeping
CPU cannot disturb the isolated CPU.

If a queue's affinity mask contains only isolated CPUs then this parameter
has no effect on the interrupt routing decision, though interrupts are only
happening when tasks running on those isolated CPUs submit IO. IO submitted
on housekeeping CPUs has no influence on those queues.

If the affinity mask contains both housekeeping and isolated CPUs, but none
of the contained housekeeping CPUs is online, then the interrupt is also
routed to an isolated CPU. Interrupts are only delivered when one of the
isolated CPUs in the affinity mask submits IO. If one of the contained
housekeeping CPUs comes online, the CPU hotplug logic migrates the
interrupt automatically back to the upcoming housekeeping CPU. Depending on
the type of interrupt controller, this can require that at least one
interrupt is delivered to the isolated CPU in order to complete the
migration.

[ tglx: Removed unused parameter, added and edited comments/documentation
  	and rephrased the changelog so it contains more details. ]
Signed-off-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120091625.17912-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
      11ea68f5
  23. 20 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/x86: Limit EFI old memory map to SGI UV machines · 1f299fad
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      We carry a quirk in the x86 EFI code to switch back to an older
method of mapping the EFI runtime services memory regions, because
it was deemed risky at the time to implement a new method without
providing a fallback to the old method in case problems arose.

Such problems did arise, but they appear to be limited to SGI UV1
machines, and so these are the only ones for which the fallback gets
enabled automatically (via a DMI quirk). The fallback can be enabled
manually as well, by passing efi=old_map, but there is very little
evidence that suggests that this is something that is being relied
upon in the field.

Given that UV1 support is not enabled by default by the distros
(Ubuntu, Fedora), there is no point in carrying this fallback code
all the time if there are no other users. So let's move it into the
UV support code, and document that efi=old_map now requires this
support code to be enabled.

Note that efi=old_map has been used in the past on other SGI UV
machines to work around kernel regressions in production, so we
keep the option to enable it by hand, but only if the kernel was
built with UV support.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-8-ardb@kernel.org
      1f299fad
  25. 11 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • M
      efi: Allow disabling PCI busmastering on bridges during boot · 4444f854
      由 Matthew Garrett 提交于 
      Add an option to disable the busmaster bit in the control register on
all PCI bridges before calling ExitBootServices() and passing control
to the runtime kernel. System firmware may configure the IOMMU to prevent
malicious PCI devices from being able to attack the OS via DMA. However,
since firmware can't guarantee that the OS is IOMMU-aware, it will tear
down IOMMU configuration when ExitBootServices() is called. This leaves
a window between where a hostile device could still cause damage before
Linux configures the IOMMU again.

If CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA is enabled or "efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
is passed on the command line, the EFI stub will clear the busmaster bit
on all PCI bridges before ExitBootServices() is called. This will
prevent any malicious PCI devices from being able to perform DMA until
the kernel reenables busmastering after configuring the IOMMU.

This option may cause failures with some poorly behaved hardware and
should not be enabled without testing. The kernel commandline options
"efi=disable_early_pci_dma" or "efi=no_disable_early_pci_dma" may be
used to override the default. Note that PCI devices downstream from PCI
bridges are disconnected from their drivers first, using the UEFI
driver model API, so that DMA can be disabled safely at the bridge
level.

[ardb: disconnect PCI I/O handles first, as suggested by Arvind]
Co-developed-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-18-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      4444f854
  27. 08 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount point · d41415eb
      由 Stephen Smalley 提交于 
      selinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs and
kconfig help texts referred to nodes under it.  In Linux 3.0,
/sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs.
Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/.
While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameter
to reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 since
commit be6ec88f ("selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE")
and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      d41415eb
  29. 23 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  31. 19 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • Y
      ACPI: sysfs: Change ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100 · a7583e72
      由 Yunfeng Ye 提交于 
      The commit 0f27cff8 ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel
parameter cover all GPEs") says:
  "Use a bitmap of size 0xFF instead of a u64 for the GPE mask so 256
   GPEs can be masked"

But the masking of GPE 0xFF it not supported and the check condition
"gpe > ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" is not valid because the type of gpe is
u8.

So modify the macro ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX to 0x100, and drop the "gpe >
ACPI_MASKABLE_GPE_MAX" check. In addition, update the docs "Format" for
acpi_mask_gpe parameter.

Fixes: 0f27cff8 ("ACPI: sysfs: Make ACPI GPE mask kernel parameter cover all GPEs")
Signed-off-by: NYunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
[ rjw: Use u16 as gpe data type in acpi_gpe_apply_masked_gpes() ]
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      a7583e72
  33. 18 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  35. 16 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • W
      x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status · 64870ed1
      由 Waiman Long 提交于 
      For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
      64870ed1
  37. 13 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  39. 07 11月, 2019 2 次提交
    • D
      x86/efi: Add efi_fake_mem support for EFI_MEMORY_SP · 199c8471
      由 Dan Williams 提交于 
      Given that EFI_MEMORY_SP is platform BIOS policy decision for marking
memory ranges as "reserved for a specific purpose" there will inevitably
be scenarios where the BIOS omits the attribute in situations where it
is desired. Unlike other attributes if the OS wants to reserve this
memory from the kernel the reservation needs to happen early in init. So
early, in fact, that it needs to happen before e820__memblock_setup()
which is a pre-requisite for efi_fake_memmap() that wants to allocate
memory for the updated table.

Introduce an x86 specific efi_fake_memmap_early() that can search for
attempts to set EFI_MEMORY_SP via efi_fake_mem and update the e820 table
accordingly.

The KASLR code that scans the command line looking for user-directed
memory reservations also needs to be updated to consider
"efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:0x40000" requests.
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      199c8471
    • D
      efi: Common enable/disable infrastructure for EFI soft reservation · b617c526
      由 Dan Williams 提交于 
      UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose".

The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is
reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for
any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback.  Later, through udev
scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can
be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique
node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in
the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the
reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be
disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with
efi=nosoftreserve.

As for this patch, define the common helpers to determine if the
EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute should be honored. The determination needs to be
made early to prevent the kernel from being loaded into soft-reserved
memory, or otherwise allowing early allocations to land there. Follow-on
changes are needed per architecture to leverage these helpers in their
respective mem-init paths.
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      b617c526
  41. 05 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  43. 04 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation · b8e8c830
      由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于 
      With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: NJunaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      b8e8c830
  45. 28 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  47. 26 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  49. 23 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  51. 22 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      arm64: Retrieve stolen time as paravirtualized guest · e0685fa2
      由 Steven Price 提交于 
      Enable paravirtualization features when running under a hypervisor
supporting the PV_TIME_ST hypercall.

For each (v)CPU, we ask the hypervisor for the location of a shared
page which the hypervisor will use to report stolen time to us. We set
pv_time_ops to the stolen time function which simply reads the stolen
value from the shared page for a VCPU. We guarantee single-copy
atomicity using READ_ONCE which means we can also read the stolen
time for another VCPU than the currently running one while it is
potentially being updated by the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
      e0685fa2
  53. 16 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  55. 11 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  57. 08 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • B
      x86/xen: Return from panic notifier · c6875f3a
      由 Boris Ostrovsky 提交于 
      Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.

This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.

There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.

Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.
Reported-by: NJames Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      c6875f3a
  59. 04 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      of: property: Add functional dependency link from DT bindings · a3e1d1a7
      由 Saravana Kannan 提交于 
      Add device links after the devices are created (but before they are
probed) by looking at common DT bindings like clocks and
interconnects.

Automatically adding device links for functional dependencies at the
framework level provides the following benefits:

- Optimizes device probe order and avoids the useless work of
  attempting probes of devices that will not probe successfully
  (because their suppliers aren't present or haven't probed yet).

  For example, in a commonly available mobile SoC, registering just
  one consumer device's driver at an initcall level earlier than the
  supplier device's driver causes 11 failed probe attempts before the
  consumer device probes successfully. This was with a kernel with all
  the drivers statically compiled in. This problem gets a lot worse if
  all the drivers are loaded as modules without direct symbol
  dependencies.

- Supplier devices like clock providers, interconnect providers, etc
  need to keep the resources they provide active and at a particular
  state(s) during boot up even if their current set of consumers don't
  request the resource to be active. This is because the rest of the
  consumers might not have probed yet and turning off the resource
  before all the consumers have probed could lead to a hang or
  undesired user experience.

  Some frameworks (Eg: regulator) handle this today by turning off
  "unused" resources at late_initcall_sync and hoping all the devices
  have probed by then. This is not a valid assumption for systems with
  loadable modules. Other frameworks (Eg: clock) just don't handle
  this due to the lack of a clear signal for when they can turn off
  resources. This leads to downstream hacks to handle cases like this
  that can easily be solved in the upstream kernel.

  By linking devices before they are probed, we give suppliers a clear
  count of the number of dependent consumers. Once all of the
  consumers are active, the suppliers can turn off the unused
  resources without making assumptions about the number of consumers.

By default we just add device-links to track "driver presence" (probe
succeeded) of the supplier device. If any other functionality provided
by device-links are needed, it is left to the consumer/supplier
devices to change the link when they probe.

kbuild test robot reported clang error about missing const
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSaravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904211126.47518-4-saravanak@google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a3e1d1a7
  61. 01 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  63. 25 9月, 2019 1 次提交
    • V
      mm, page_owner, debug_pagealloc: save and dump freeing stack trace · 8974558f
      由 Vlastimil Babka 提交于 
      The debug_pagealloc functionality is useful to catch buggy page allocator
users that cause e.g.  use after free or double free.  When page
inconsistency is detected, debugging is often simpler by knowing the call
stack of process that last allocated and freed the page.  When page_owner
is also enabled, we record the allocation stack trace, but not freeing.

This patch therefore adds recording of freeing process stack trace to page
owner info, if both page_owner and debug_pagealloc are configured and
enabled.  With only page_owner enabled, this info is not useful for the
memory leak debugging use case.  dump_page() is adjusted to print the
info.  An example result of calling __free_pages() twice may look like
this (note the page last free stack trace):

BUG: Bad page state in process bash  pfn:13d8f8
page:ffffc31984f63e00 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x1affff800000000()
raw: 01affff800000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL)
 prep_new_page+0x143/0x150
 get_page_from_freelist+0x289/0x380
 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
 khugepaged+0x6e/0xc10
 kthread+0xf9/0x130
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
page last free stack trace:
 free_pcp_prepare+0x134/0x1e0
 free_unref_page+0x18/0x90
 khugepaged+0x7b/0xc10
 kthread+0xf9/0x130
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 271 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4-2.g07a1a73-default+ #57
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x85/0xc0
 bad_page.cold+0xba/0xbf
 rmqueue_pcplist.isra.0+0x6c5/0x6d0
 rmqueue+0x2d/0x810
 get_page_from_freelist+0x191/0x380
 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
 __get_free_pages+0xd/0x30
 __pud_alloc+0x2c/0x110
 copy_page_range+0x4f9/0x630
 dup_mmap+0x362/0x480
 dup_mm+0x68/0x110
 copy_process+0x19e1/0x1b40
 _do_fork+0x73/0x310
 __x64_sys_clone+0x75/0x80
 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f10af854a10
...

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820131828.22684-5-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8974558f
  65. 14 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  67. 11 9月, 2019 1 次提交