- 12 12月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 Miles Chen 提交于
When we try to visit the pagemap of a tagged userspace pointer, we find that the start_vaddr is not correct because of the tag. To fix it, we should untag the userspace pointers in pagemap_read(). I tested with 5.10-rc4 and the issue remains. Explanation from Catalin in [1]: "Arguably, that's a user-space bug since tagged file offsets were never supported. In this case it's not even a tag at bit 56 as per the arm64 tagged address ABI but rather down to bit 47. You could say that the problem is caused by the C library (malloc()) or whoever created the tagged vaddr and passed it to this function. It's not a kernel regression as we've never supported it. Now, pagemap is a special case where the offset is usually not generated as a classic file offset but rather derived by shifting a user virtual address. I guess we can make a concession for pagemap (only) and allow such offset with the tag at bit (56 - PAGE_SHIFT + 3)" My test code is based on [2]: A userspace pointer which has been tagged by 0xb4: 0xb400007662f541c8 userspace program: uint64 OsLayer::VirtualToPhysical(void *vaddr) { uint64 frame, paddr, pfnmask, pagemask; int pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); off64_t off = ((uintptr_t)vaddr) / pagesize * 8; // off = 0xb400007662f541c8 / pagesize * 8 = 0x5a00003b317aa0 int fd = open(kPagemapPath, O_RDONLY); ... if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) != off || read(fd, &frame, 8) != 8) { int err = errno; string errtxt = ErrorString(err); if (fd >= 0) close(fd); return 0; } ... } kernel fs/proc/task_mmu.c: static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { ... src = *ppos; svpfn = src / PM_ENTRY_BYTES; // svpfn == 0xb400007662f54 start_vaddr = svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT; // start_vaddr == 0xb400007662f54000 end_vaddr = mm->task_size; /* watch out for wraparound */ // svpfn == 0xb400007662f54 // (mm->task_size >> PAGE) == 0x8000000 if (svpfn > mm->task_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) // the condition is true because of the tag 0xb4 start_vaddr = end_vaddr; ret = 0; while (count && (start_vaddr < end_vaddr)) { // we cannot visit correct entry because start_vaddr is set to end_vaddr int len; unsigned long end; ... } ... } [1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1343258/ [2] https://github.com/stressapptest/stressapptest/blob/master/src/os.cc#L158 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204024347.8295-1-miles.chen@mediatek.comSigned-off-by: NMiles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Song Bao Hua (Barry Song) <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.4-] Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 11 12月, 2020 3 次提交
-
-
由 Anna Schumaker 提交于
We've been seeing failures with xfstests generic/091 and generic/263 when using READ_PLUS. I've made some progress on these issues, and the tests fail later on but still don't pass. Let's disable READ_PLUS by default until we can work out what is going on. Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
-
由 Dai Ngo 提交于
Since commit b4868b44 ("NFSv4: Wait for stateid updates after CLOSE/OPEN_DOWNGRADE"), every inter server copy operation suffers 5 seconds delay regardless of the size of the copy. The delay is from nfs_set_open_stateid_locked when the check by nfs_stateid_is_sequential fails because the seqid in both nfs4_state and nfs4_stateid are 0. Fix __nfs42_ssc_open to delay setting of NFS_OPEN_STATE in nfs4_state, until after the call to update_open_stateid, to indicate this is the 1st open. This fix is part of a 2 patches, the other patch is the fix in the source server to return the stateid for COPY_NOTIFY request with seqid 1 instead of 0. Fixes: ce0887ac ("NFSD add nfs4 inter ssc to nfsd4_copy") Signed-off-by: NDai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
-
由 Chuck Lever 提交于
By switching to an XFS-backed export, I am able to reproduce the ibcomp worker crash on my client with xfstests generic/013. For the failing LISTXATTRS operation, xdr_inline_pages() is called with page_len=12 and buflen=128. - When ->send_request() is called, rpcrdma_marshal_req() does not set up a Reply chunk because buflen is smaller than the inline threshold. Thus rpcrdma_convert_iovs() does not get invoked at all and the transport's XDRBUF_SPARSE_PAGES logic is not invoked on the receive buffer. - During reply processing, rpcrdma_inline_fixup() tries to copy received data into rq_rcv_buf->pages because page_len is positive. But there are no receive pages because rpcrdma_marshal_req() never allocated them. The result is that the ibcomp worker faults and dies. Sometimes that causes a visible crash, and sometimes it results in a transport hang without other symptoms. RPC/RDMA's XDRBUF_SPARSE_PAGES support is not entirely correct, and should eventually be fixed or replaced. However, my preference is that upper-layer operations should explicitly allocate their receive buffers (using GFP_KERNEL) when possible, rather than relying on XDRBUF_SPARSE_PAGES. Reported-by: NOlga kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Suggested-by: NOlga kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Fixes: c10a7514 ("NFSv4.2: add the extended attribute proc functions.") Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NOlga kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Reviewed-by: NFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com> Tested-by: NOlga kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
-
- 10 12月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 Damien Le Moal 提交于
In zonefs_file_dio_append(), the pages obtained using bio_iov_iter_get_pages() are not released on completion of the REQ_OP_APPEND BIO, nor when bio_iov_iter_get_pages() fails. Furthermore, a call to bio_put() is missing when bio_iov_iter_get_pages() fails. Fix these resource leaks by adding BIO resource release code (bio_put()i and bio_release_pages()) at the end of the function after the BIO execution and add a jump to this resource cleanup code in case of bio_iov_iter_get_pages() failure. While at it, also fix the call to task_io_account_write() to be passed the correct BIO size instead of bio_iov_iter_get_pages() return value. Reported-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Fixes: 02ef12a6 ("zonefs: use REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND for sync DIO") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NDamien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: NChaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
-
- 09 12月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 David Howells 提交于
There's a memory leak in afs_parse_source() whereby multiple source= parameters overwrite fc->source in the fs_context struct without freeing the previously recorded source. Fix this by only permitting a single source parameter and rejecting with an error all subsequent ones. This was caught by syzbot with the kernel memory leak detector, showing something like the following trace: unreferenced object 0xffff888114375440 (size 32): comm "repro", pid 5168, jiffies 4294923723 (age 569.948s) backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x42/0x79 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x125/0x16a kmemdup_nul+0x24/0x3c vfs_parse_fs_string+0x5a/0xa1 generic_parse_monolithic+0x9d/0xc5 do_new_mount+0x10d/0x15a do_mount+0x5f/0x8e __do_sys_mount+0xff/0x127 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 13fcc683 ("afs: Add fs_context support") Reported-by: syzbot+86dc6632faaca40133ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 08 12月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 Hillf Danton 提交于
Put file as part of error handling when setting up io ctx to fix memory leaks like the following one. BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888101ea2200 (size 256): comm "syz-executor355", pid 8470, jiffies 4294953658 (age 32.400s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 20 59 03 01 81 88 ff ff 80 87 a8 10 81 88 ff ff Y.............. backtrace: [<000000002e0a7c5f>] kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:654 [inline] [<000000002e0a7c5f>] __alloc_file+0x1f/0x130 fs/file_table.c:101 [<000000001a55b73a>] alloc_empty_file+0x69/0x120 fs/file_table.c:151 [<00000000fb22349e>] alloc_file+0x33/0x1b0 fs/file_table.c:193 [<000000006e1465bb>] alloc_file_pseudo+0xb2/0x140 fs/file_table.c:233 [<000000007118092a>] anon_inode_getfile fs/anon_inodes.c:91 [inline] [<000000007118092a>] anon_inode_getfile+0xaa/0x120 fs/anon_inodes.c:74 [<000000002ae99012>] io_uring_get_fd fs/io_uring.c:9198 [inline] [<000000002ae99012>] io_uring_create fs/io_uring.c:9377 [inline] [<000000002ae99012>] io_uring_setup+0x1125/0x1630 fs/io_uring.c:9411 [<000000008280baad>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [<00000000685d8cf0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reported-by: syzbot+71c4697e27c99fddcf17@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 0f212204 ("io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references") Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
- 07 12月, 2020 2 次提交
-
-
由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
After io_identity_cow() copies an work.identity it wants to copy creds to the new just allocated id, not the old one. Otherwise it's akin to req->work.identity->creds = req->work.identity->creds. Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
由 Menglong Dong 提交于
'format_corename()' will splite 'core_pattern' on spaces when it is in pipe mode, and take helper_argv[0] as the path to usermode executable. It works fine in most cases. However, if there is a space between '|' and '/file/path', such as '| /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-coredump %P %u %g', then helper_argv[0] will be parsed as '', and users will get a 'Core dump to | disabled'. It is not friendly to users, as the pattern above was valid previously. Fix this by ignoring the spaces between '|' and '/file/path'. Fixes: 315c6926 ("coredump: split pipe command whitespace before expanding template") Signed-off-by: NMenglong Dong <dong.menglong@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net> Cc: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net> [https://bugs.debian.org/924398] Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5fb62870.1c69fb81.8ef5d.af76@mx.google.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 04 12月, 2020 3 次提交
-
-
由 Ronnie Sahlberg 提交于
When mounting with "idsfromsid" mount option, Azure corrupted the owner SIDs due to excessive padding caused by placing the owner fields at the end of the security descriptor on create. Placing owners at the front of the security descriptor (rather than the end) is also safer, as the number of ACEs (that follow it) are variable. Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Suggested-by: NRohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8 Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-
由 Aurelien Aptel 提交于
In some scenarios (DFS and BAD_NETWORK_NAME) set_root_set() can be called with a NULL ses->tcon_ipc. Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NPaulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-
由 Namjae Jeon 提交于
For an operation compounded with an SMB2 CREATE request, client must set COMPOUND_FID(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) to FileID field of smb2 ioctl. Signed-off-by: NNamjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Fixes: 2e4564b3 ("smb3: add support stat of WSL reparse points for special file types") Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-
- 02 12月, 2020 2 次提交
-
-
由 Dominique Martinet 提交于
The default splice operations got removed recently, add it back to 9p with iter_file_splice_write like many other filesystems do. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1606837496-21717-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org Fixes: 36e2c742 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Acked-by: NToke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
-
由 Toke Høiland-Jørgensen 提交于
The v9fs file operations were missing the splice_read operations, which breaks sendfile() of files on such a filesystem. I discovered this while trying to load an eBPF program using iproute2 inside a 'virtme' environment which uses 9pfs for the virtual file system. iproute2 relies on sendfile() with an AF_ALG socket to hash files, which was erroring out in the virtual environment. Since generic_file_splice_read() seems to just implement splice_read in terms of the read_iter operation, I simply added the generic implementation to the file operations, which fixed the error I was seeing. A quick grep indicates that this is what most other file systems do as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201201135409.55510-1-toke@redhat.com Fixes: 36e2c742 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Signed-off-by: NToke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
-
- 01 12月, 2020 4 次提交
-
-
由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于
In gfs2_create_inode and gfs2_inode_lookup, make sure to cancel any pending delete work before taking the inode glock. Otherwise, gfs2_cancel_delete_work may block waiting for delete_work_func to complete, and delete_work_func may block trying to acquire the inode glock in gfs2_inode_lookup. Reported-by: NAlexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Fixes: a0e3cc65 ("gfs2: Turn gl_delete into a delayed work") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+ Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
由 Paulo Alcantara 提交于
This patch fixes a potential use-after-free bug in cifs_echo_request(). For instance, thread 1 -------- cifs_demultiplex_thread() clean_demultiplex_info() kfree(server) thread 2 (workqueue) -------- apic_timer_interrupt() smp_apic_timer_interrupt() irq_exit() __do_softirq() run_timer_softirq() call_timer_fn() cifs_echo_request() <- use-after-free in server ptr Signed-off-by: NPaulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-
由 Paulo Alcantara 提交于
A customer has reported that several files in their multi-threaded app were left with size of 0 because most of the read(2) calls returned -EINTR and they assumed no bytes were read. Obviously, they could have fixed it by simply retrying on -EINTR. We noticed that most of the -EINTR on read(2) were due to real-time signals sent by glibc to process wide credential changes (SIGRT_1), and its signal handler had been established with SA_RESTART, in which case those calls could have been automatically restarted by the kernel. Let the kernel decide to whether or not restart the syscalls when there is a signal pending in __smb_send_rqst() by returning -ERESTARTSYS. If it can't, it will return -EINTR anyway. Signed-off-by: NPaulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-
由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
__io_compat_recvmsg_copy_hdr() with REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECT reads out iov len but never assigns it to iov/fast_iov, leaving sr->len with garbage. Hopefully, following io_buffer_select() truncates it to the selected buffer size, but the value is still may be under what was specified. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7 Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
- 30 11月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If the flexfiles mirroring is enabled, then the read code expects to be able to set pgio->pg_mirror_idx to point to the data server that is being used for this particular read. However it does not change the pg_mirror_count because we only need to send a single read. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
-
- 27 11月, 2020 1 次提交
-
-
由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于
Commit 20f82999 ("gfs2: Rework read and page fault locking") lifted the glock lock taking from the low-level ->readpage and ->readahead address space operations to the higher-level ->read_iter file and ->fault vm operations. The glocks are still taken in LM_ST_SHARED mode only. On filesystems mounted without the noatime option, ->read_iter sometimes needs to update the atime as well, though. Right now, this leads to a failed locking mode assertion in gfs2_dirty_inode. Fix that by introducing a new update_time inode operation. There, if the glock is held non-exclusively, upgrade it to an exclusive lock. Reported-by: NAlexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Fixes: 20f82999 ("gfs2: Rework read and page fault locking") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+ Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
- 26 11月, 2020 3 次提交
-
-
由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
When one task is in io_uring_cancel_files() and another is doing io_prep_async_work() a race may happen. That's because after accounting a request inflight in first call to io_grab_identity() it still may fail and go to io_identity_cow(), which migh briefly keep dangling work.identity and not only. Grab files last, so io_prep_async_work() won't fail if it did get into ->inflight_list. note: the bug shouldn't exist after making io_uring_cancel_files() not poking into other tasks' requests. Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
由 Bob Peterson 提交于
GFS2's freeze/thaw mechanism uses a special freeze glock to control its operation. It does this with a sync glock operation (glops.c) called freeze_go_sync. When the freeze glock is demoted (glock's do_xmote) the glops function causes the file system to be frozen. This is intended. However, GFS2's mount and unmount processes also hold the freeze glock to prevent other processes, perhaps on different cluster nodes, from mounting the frozen file system in read-write mode. Before this patch, there was no check in freeze_go_sync for whether a freeze in intended or whether the glock demote was caused by a normal unmount. So it was trying to freeze the file system it's trying to unmount, which ends up in a deadlock. This patch adds an additional check to freeze_go_sync so that demotes of the freeze glock are ignored if they come from the unmount process. Fixes: 20b32912 ("gfs2: Fix regression in freeze_go_sync") Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
由 Bob Peterson 提交于
If gfs2 tries to mount a (corrupt) file system that has no resource groups it still tries to set preferences on the first one, which causes a kernel null pointer dereference. This patch adds a check to function gfs2_ri_update so this condition is detected and reported back as an error. Reported-by: syzbot+e3f23ce40269a4c9053a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
- 25 11月, 2020 3 次提交
-
-
由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
The memory leak addressed by commit fe5186cf is a false positive: all allocations are recorded in a linked list, and freed when the filesystem is unmounted. This leads to double frees, and as reported by David, leads to crashes if SLUB is configured to self destruct when double frees occur. So drop the redundant kfree() again, and instead, mark the offending pointer variable so the allocation is ignored by kmemleak. Cc: Vamshi K Sthambamkadi <vamshi.k.sthambamkadi@gmail.com> Fixes: fe5186cf ("efivarfs: fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()") Reported-by: NDavid Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
-
由 Alexander Aring 提交于
This patch introduce a new globs attribute to define the subclass of the glock lockref spinlock. This avoid the following lockdep warning, which occurs when we lock an inode lock while an iopen lock is held: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.10.0-rc3+ #4990 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/0:1/12 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9067d45672d8 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lockref_get+0x9/0x20 but task is already holding lock: ffff9067da308588 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: delete_work_func+0x164/0x260 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock); lock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/12: #0: ffff9067c1bfdd38 ((wq_completion)delete_workqueue){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b7/0x540 #1: ffffac594006be70 ((work_completion)(&(&gl->gl_delete)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b7/0x540 #2: ffff9067da308588 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: delete_work_func+0x164/0x260 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3+ #4990 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Workqueue: delete_workqueue delete_work_func Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 __lock_acquire.cold+0x19e/0x2e3 lock_acquire+0x150/0x410 ? lockref_get+0x9/0x20 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40 ? lockref_get+0x9/0x20 lockref_get+0x9/0x20 delete_work_func+0x188/0x260 process_one_work+0x237/0x540 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x540/0x540 kthread+0x127/0x140 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Suggested-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
由 Alexander Aring 提交于
Commit 0e539ca1 ("gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_rgrp_dump") introduced additional locking in gfs2_rgrp_go_dump, which is also used for dumping resource group glocks via debugfs. However, on that code path, the glock spin lock is already taken in dump_glock, and taking it again in gfs2_glock2rgrp leads to deadlock. This can be reproduced with: $ mkfs.gfs2 -O -p lock_nolock /dev/FOO $ mount /dev/FOO /mnt/foo $ touch /mnt/foo/bar $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/gfs2/FOO/glocks Fix that by not taking the glock spin lock inside the go_dump callback. Fixes: 0e539ca1 ("gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_rgrp_dump") Signed-off-by: NAlexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
-
- 24 11月, 2020 7 次提交
-
-
由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
iov_iter::type is a bitmask that also keeps direction etc., so it shouldn't be directly compared against ITER_*. Use proper helper. Fixes: ff6165b2 ("io_uring: retain iov_iter state over io_read/io_write calls") Reported-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9 Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
由 Joseph Qi 提交于
Abaci Fuzz reported a shift-out-of-bounds BUG in io_uring_create(): [ 59.598207] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 [ 59.599665] shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' [ 59.601230] CPU: 0 PID: 963 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #3 [ 59.602502] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 59.603673] Call Trace: [ 59.604286] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 [ 59.605237] ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a [ 59.606094] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb2/0x20e [ 59.607335] ? lock_downgrade+0x6c0/0x6c0 [ 59.608182] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xaf/0xe0 [ 59.609166] io_uring_create.cold+0x99/0x149 [ 59.610114] io_uring_setup+0xd6/0x140 [ 59.610975] ? io_uring_create+0x2510/0x2510 [ 59.611945] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 [ 59.613007] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x27/0x80 [ 59.614038] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x5b/0x180 [ 59.615056] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 59.615940] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 59.617007] RIP: 0033:0x7f2bb8a0b239 This is caused by roundup_pow_of_two() if the input entries larger enough, e.g. 2^32-1. For sq_entries, it will check first and we allow at most IORING_MAX_ENTRIES, so it is okay. But for cq_entries, we do round up first, that may overflow and truncate it to 0, which is not the expected behavior. So check the cq size first and then do round up. Fixes: 88ec3211 ("io_uring: round-up cq size before comparing with rounded sq size") Reported-by: NAbaci Fuzz <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NStefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
-
由 Filipe Manana 提交于
When running test case btrfs/017 from fstests, lockdep reported the following splat: [ 1297.067385] ====================================================== [ 1297.067708] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1297.068022] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted [ 1297.068322] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1297.068629] btrfs/189080 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1297.068929] ffff9f2725731690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.069274] but task is already holding lock: [ 1297.069868] ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.070219] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1297.071131] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1297.071721] -> #1 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 1297.072375] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 1297.072710] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 1297.073061] btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x59/0x6a0 [btrfs] [ 1297.073421] create_subvol+0x194/0x990 [btrfs] [ 1297.073780] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs] [ 1297.074133] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs] [ 1297.074498] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs] [ 1297.074872] btrfs_ioctl+0x1a90/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.075245] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 1297.075617] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 1297.075993] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1297.076380] -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 1297.077166] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 1297.077572] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 1297.077984] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 1297.078411] start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs] [ 1297.078853] btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.079323] btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.079789] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 1297.080232] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 1297.080680] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1297.081139] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1297.082536] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1297.083510] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1297.084005] ---- ---- [ 1297.084500] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock); [ 1297.084994] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 1297.085485] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock); [ 1297.085974] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 1297.086454] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1297.087880] 3 locks held by btrfs/189080: [ 1297.088324] #0: ffff9f2725731470 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0xa73/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.088799] #1: ffff9f2702b60cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.089284] #2: ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.089771] stack backtrace: [ 1297.090662] CPU: 5 PID: 189080 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [ 1297.091132] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1297.092123] Call Trace: [ 1297.092629] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 [ 1297.093115] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 [ 1297.093596] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 1297.094076] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 1297.094553] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [ 1297.095029] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 1297.095510] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 1297.095993] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.096476] start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs] [ 1297.096962] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.097451] btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs] [ 1297.097941] ? btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.098429] btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs] [ 1297.098904] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x430 [ 1297.099382] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 1297.099854] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [ 1297.100328] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [ 1297.100801] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0x180 [ 1297.101272] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 1297.101739] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 1297.102207] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 1297.102673] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1297.103148] RIP: 0033:0x7f773ff65d87 This is because during the quota enable ioctl we lock first the mutex qgroup_ioctl_lock and then start a transaction, and starting a transaction acquires a fs freeze semaphore (at the VFS level). However, every other code path, except for the quota disable ioctl path, we do the opposite: we start a transaction and then lock the mutex. So fix this by making the quota enable and disable paths to start the transaction without having the mutex locked, and then, after starting the transaction, lock the mutex and check if some other task already enabled or disabled the quotas, bailing with success if that was the case. Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-
由 Filipe Manana 提交于
When adding or removing a qgroup relation we are doing a GFP_KERNEL allocation which is not safe because we are holding a transaction handle open and that can make us deadlock if the allocator needs to recurse into the filesystem. So just surround those calls with a nofs context. Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-
由 Filipe Manana 提交于
Lockdep reported the following splat when running test btrfs/190 from fstests: [ 9482.126098] ====================================================== [ 9482.126184] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 9482.126281] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted [ 9482.126365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 9482.126456] mount/24187 is trying to acquire lock: [ 9482.126534] ffffa0c869a7dac0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.126647] but task is already holding lock: [ 9482.126777] ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.126886] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 9482.127078] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 9482.127213] -> #1 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 9482.127366] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.127436] down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 [ 9482.127528] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.127613] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x41/0x130 [btrfs] [ 9482.127702] btrfs_search_slot+0x514/0xc30 [btrfs] [ 9482.127788] update_qgroup_status_item+0x72/0x140 [btrfs] [ 9482.127877] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xde/0x680 [btrfs] [ 9482.127964] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs] [ 9482.128039] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0 [ 9482.128110] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 [ 9482.128181] kthread+0x153/0x170 [ 9482.128256] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 9482.128327] -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 9482.128464] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.128551] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.128623] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.130029] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.130590] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.131577] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.132175] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.132756] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.133325] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.133866] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.134392] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.134908] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.135428] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.135942] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.136444] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.136949] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.137438] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.137923] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.138400] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.138873] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.139346] other info that might help us debug this: [ 9482.140735] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 9482.141594] CPU0 CPU1 [ 9482.142011] ---- ---- [ 9482.142411] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.142806] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.143216] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.143629] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.144056] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 9482.145242] 2 locks held by mount/24187: [ 9482.145637] #0: ffffa0c8411c40e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb9/0x400 [ 9482.146061] #1: ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.146509] stack backtrace: [ 9482.147350] CPU: 1 PID: 24187 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [ 9482.147788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 9482.148709] Call Trace: [ 9482.149169] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 [ 9482.149628] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 [ 9482.150090] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.150561] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 9482.151017] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [ 9482.151470] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.151941] ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.152402] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.152887] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.153354] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.153826] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154301] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154768] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155226] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155690] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.156160] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.156643] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.157108] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.157567] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.158030] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.158489] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.158947] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.159403] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.159875] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.160335] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.160805] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.161260] ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.161714] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.162166] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.162616] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.163070] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.163525] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.163986] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.164437] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.164902] RIP: 0033:0x7f51e907caaa This happens because at btrfs_read_qgroup_config() we can call qgroup_rescan_init() while holding a read lock on a quota btree leaf, acquired by the previous call to btrfs_search_slot_for_read(), and qgroup_rescan_init() acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock. A qgroup rescan worker does the opposite: it acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock, at btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(), and then tries to update the qgroup status item in the quota btree through the call to update_qgroup_status_item(). This inversion of locking order between the qgroup_rescan_lock mutex and quota btree locks causes the splat. Fix this simply by releasing and freeing the path before calling qgroup_rescan_init() at btrfs_read_qgroup_config(). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-
由 David Sterba 提交于
There are sectorsize alignment checks that are reported but then check_extent_data_ref continues. This was not intended, wrong alignment is not a minor problem and we should return with error. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Fixes: 0785a9aa ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add EXTENT_DATA_REF check") Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-
由 Johannes Thumshirn 提交于
Syzbot reported a possible use-after-free when printing a duplicate device warning device_list_add(). At this point it can happen that a btrfs_device::fs_info is not correctly setup yet, so we're accessing stale data, when printing the warning message using the btrfs_printk() wrappers. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880878e06a8 by task syz-executor225/7068 CPU: 1 PID: 7068 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x66/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:383 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline] kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530 btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245 device_list_add+0x1a88/0x1d60 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:943 btrfs_scan_one_device+0x196/0x490 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1359 btrfs_mount_root+0x48f/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1634 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline] vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008 btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline] path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x44840a RSP: 002b:00007ffedfffd608 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffedfffd670 RCX: 000000000044840a RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffedfffd630 RBP: 00007ffedfffd630 R08: 00007ffedfffd670 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000001a R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000003 Allocated by task 6945: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x100/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:461 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:577 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x81/0x110 mm/util.c:574 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:757 [inline] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:765 [inline] btrfs_mount_root+0xd0/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1613 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline] vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008 btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline] path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 6945: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x17/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355 __kasan_slab_free+0xdd/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:422 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline] kfree+0x113/0x200 mm/slab.c:3756 deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:335 btrfs_mount_root+0x72b/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1678 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline] vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008 btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline] path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880878e0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16k of size 16384 The buggy address is located 1704 bytes inside of 16384-byte region [ffff8880878e0000, ffff8880878e4000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000060704f30 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x878e0 head:0000000060704f30 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfffe0000010200(slab|head) raw: 00fffe0000010200 ffffea00028e9a08 ffffea00021e3608 ffff8880aa440b00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880878e0000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880878e0580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880878e0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880878e0680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880878e0700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880878e0780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== The syzkaller reproducer for this use-after-free crafts a filesystem image and loop mounts it twice in a loop. The mount will fail as the crafted image has an invalid chunk tree. When this happens btrfs_mount_root() will call deactivate_locked_super(), which then cleans up fs_info and fs_info::sb. If a second thread now adds the same block-device to the filesystem, it will get detected as a duplicate device and device_list_add() will reject the duplicate and print a warning. But as the fs_info pointer passed in is non-NULL this will result in a use-after-free. Instead of printing possibly uninitialized or already freed memory in btrfs_printk(), explicitly pass in a NULL fs_info so the printing of the device name will be skipped altogether. There was a slightly different approach discussed in https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20200114060920.4527-1-anand.jain@oracle.com/t/#u Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000c9e14b05afcc41ba@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+582e66e5edf36a22c7b0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-
- 23 11月, 2020 2 次提交
-
-
由 David Howells 提交于
When doing a lookup in a directory, the afs filesystem uses a bulk status fetch to speculatively retrieve the statuses of up to 48 other vnodes found in the same directory and it will then either update extant inodes or create new ones - effectively doing 'lookup ahead'. To avoid the possibility of deadlocking itself, however, the filesystem doesn't lock all of those inodes; rather just the directory inode is locked (by the VFS). When the operation completes, afs_inode_init_from_status() or afs_apply_status() is called, depending on whether the inode already exists, to commit the new status. A case exists, however, where the speculative status fetch operation may straddle a modification operation on one of those vnodes. What can then happen is that the speculative bulk status RPC retrieves the old status, and whilst that is happening, the modification happens - which returns an updated status, then the modification status is committed, then we attempt to commit the speculative status. This results in something like the following being seen in dmesg: kAFS: vnode modified {100058:861} 8->9 YFS.InlineBulkStatus showing that for vnode 861 on volume 100058, we saw YFS.InlineBulkStatus say that the vnode had data version 8 when we'd already recorded version 9 due to a local modification. This was causing the cache to be invalidated for that vnode when it shouldn't have been. If it happens on a data file, this might lead to local changes being lost. Fix this by ignoring speculative status updates if the data version doesn't match the expected value. Note that it is possible to get a DV regression if a volume gets restored from a backup - but we should get a callback break in such a case that should trigger a recheck anyway. It might be worth checking the volume creation time in the volsync info and, if a change is observed in that (as would happen on a restore), invalidate all caches associated with the volume. Fixes: 5cf9dd55 ("afs: Prospectively look up extra files when doing a single lookup") Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Yicong Yang 提交于
The attr->set() receive a value of u64, but simple_strtoll() is used for doing the conversion. It will lead to the error cast if user inputs a negative value. Use kstrtoull() instead of simple_strtoll() to convert a string got from the user to an unsigned value. The former will return '-EINVAL' if it gets a negetive value, but the latter can't handle the situation correctly. Make 'val' unsigned long long as what kstrtoull() takes, this will eliminate the compile warning on no 64-bit architectures. Fixes: f7b88631 ("fs/libfs.c: fix simple_attr_write() on 32bit machines") Signed-off-by: NYicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1605341356-11872-1-git-send-email-yangyicong@hisilicon.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 20 11月, 2020 5 次提交
-
-
由 Jan Kara 提交于
The idea of the warning in ext4_update_dx_flag() is that we should warn when we are clearing EXT4_INODE_INDEX on a filesystem with metadata checksums enabled since after clearing the flag, checksums for internal htree nodes will become invalid. So there's no need to warn (or actually do anything) when EXT4_INODE_INDEX is not set. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118153032.17281-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: 48a34311 ("ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs") Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
-
由 Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
Kernel-doc markup should use this format: identifier - description They should not have any type before that, as otherwise the parser won't do the right thing. Also, some identifiers have different names between their prototypes and the kernel-doc markup. Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/72f5c6628f5f278d67625f60893ffbc2ca28d46e.1605521731.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
-
由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
This reverts commit 6ff646b2. Your maintainer committed a major braino in the rmap code by adding the attr fork, bmbt, and unwritten extent usage bits into rmap record key comparisons. While XFS uses the usage bits *in the rmap records* for cross-referencing metadata in xfs_scrub and xfs_repair, it only needs the owner and offset information to distinguish between reverse mappings of the same physical extent into the data fork of a file at multiple offsets. The other bits are not important for key comparisons for index lookups, and never have been. Eric Sandeen reports that this causes regressions in generic/299, so undo this patch before it does more damage. Reported-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net> Fixes: 6ff646b2 ("xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions") Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
-
由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The options in /proc/mounts must be valid mount options --- and fast_commit is not a mount option. Otherwise, command sequences like this will fail: # mount /dev/vdc /vdc # mkdir -p /vdc/phoronix_test_suite /pts # mount --bind /vdc/phoronix_test_suite /pts # mount -o remount,nodioread_nolock /pts mount: /pts: mount point not mounted or bad option. And in the system logs, you'll find: EXT4-fs (vdc): Unrecognized mount option "fast_commit" or missing value Fixes: 995a3ed6 ("ext4: add fast_commit feature and handling for extended mount options") Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
-
由 Dave Chinner 提交于
Jens has reported a situation where partial direct IOs can be issued and completed yet still return -EAGAIN. We don't want this to report a short IO as we want XFS to complete user DIO entirely or not at all. This partial IO situation can occur on a write IO that is split across an allocated extent and a hole, and the second mapping is returning EAGAIN because allocation would be required. The trivial reproducer: $ sudo xfs_io -fdt -c "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite -V 1 -b 8k -N 0 8k" /mnt/scr/foo wrote 4096/4096 bytes at offset 0 4 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0001 sec (27.509 MiB/sec and 7042.2535 ops/sec) pwrite: Resource temporarily unavailable $ The pwritev2(0, 8kB, RWF_NOWAIT) call returns EAGAIN having done the first 4kB write: xfs_file_direct_write: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 size 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 0x2000 iomap_apply: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 pos 0 length 8192 flags WRITE|DIRECT|NOWAIT (0x31) ops xfs_direct_write_iomap_ops caller iomap_dio_rw actor iomap_dio_actor xfs_ilock_nowait: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_ilock_for_iomap xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin xfs_iomap_found: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 size 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 8192 fork data startoff 0x0 startblock 24 blockcount 0x1 iomap_apply_dstmap: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 bdev 259:1 addr 102400 offset 0 length 4096 type MAPPED flags DIRTY Here the first iomap loop has mapped the first 4kB of the file and issued the IO, and we enter the second iomap_apply loop: iomap_apply: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 pos 4096 length 4096 flags WRITE|DIRECT|NOWAIT (0x31) ops xfs_direct_write_iomap_ops caller iomap_dio_rw actor iomap_dio_actor xfs_ilock_nowait: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_ilock_for_iomap xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags ILOCK_SHARED caller xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin And we exit with -EAGAIN out because we hit the allocate case trying to make the second 4kB block. Then IO completes on the first 4kB and the original IO context completes and unlocks the inode, returning -EAGAIN to userspace: xfs_end_io_direct_write: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 isize 0x1000 disize 0x1000 offset 0x0 count 4096 xfs_iunlock: dev 259:1 ino 0x83 flags IOLOCK_SHARED caller xfs_file_dio_aio_write There are other vectors to the same problem when we re-enter the mapping code if we have to make multiple mappinfs under NOWAIT conditions. e.g. failing trylocks, COW extents being found, allocation being required, and so on. Avoid all these potential problems by only allowing IOMAP_NOWAIT IO to go ahead if the mapping we retrieve for the IO spans an entire allocated extent. This avoids the possibility of subsequent mappings to complete the IO from triggering NOWAIT semantics by any means as NOWAIT IO will now only enter the mapping code once per NOWAIT IO. Reported-and-tested-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
-