- 06 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Jingoo Han 提交于
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be used. Signed-off-by: NJingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 07 1月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Hello. I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 . [ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call. ---------- >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error. unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk. backtrace: [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360 [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70 [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500 [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750 [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes. systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 03 1月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite in the second). Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init() as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned char. Fix commit: 4d7aeee7 ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation digests. Fix commit: 4d7aeee7 ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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- 01 1月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Eric Paris politely points out: Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK. And then use smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(). Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense. (and depending on how it's used fix a crash...) He is correct. This puts things in order. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet to be fully implemented and has never been used. The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until then, they get removed. The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing. It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts, effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options. Additionally, the root and default values are set to the label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects get the label of their creator. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 24 12月, 2013 4 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the simple repair. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The syslog control requires that the calling proccess have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label. This changes allows the admin to configure a specific label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*") label, effectively removing the restriction. The value can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants a more restrictive behavior. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Chad Hanson 提交于
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 20 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly. All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That is repaired. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 17 12月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Wei Yongjun 提交于
Remove duplicated include. Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 16 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
This reverts commit 102aefdd. Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965 and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in the rawhide kernel fixes the problem. Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more. Reported-by: NTom London <selinux@gmail.com> Bisected-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 14 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies" This reverts commit 102aefdd. Explanation from Eric Paris: SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount command, they will deadlock. I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the rule in question. The code is useless. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 13 12月, 2013 4 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 12 12月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Chad Hanson 提交于
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Jarkko Sakkinen 提交于
This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or object is not found the answer for access should be no. This patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing with -EINVAL. v2: cosmetic style fixes Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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- 11 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 10 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 05 12月, 2013 5 次提交
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由 Geyslan G. Bem 提交于
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary. Signed-off-by: NGeyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the request_sock directly. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel secattr whenever possible. However, we never check to ensure that the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr. This patch checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the cached secattr when the SID values match. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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- 03 12月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
The new templates management mechanism records information associated to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry' structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA). Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field), it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a 'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong. This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree() that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument with calls to the new function. Fixes: a71dc65d: ima: switch to new template management mechanism Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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由 Christoph Paasch 提交于
7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip). So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we should not attempt to free it. Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971) Fixes: 7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API) Signed-off-by: NChristoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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- 02 12月, 2013 5 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a shmem backed inode to hold the key contents. Because of this detail of implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode. The LSM checks are already being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a part of the security model) This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode has S_PRIVATE set. This means that all LSM checks for the inode in question are skipped. It should only be used for kernel internal operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper LSM checking. It is possible that some other users of shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been explored. Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult. The steps I used on Fedora are: (1) Turn off selinux enforcing: setenforce 0 (2) Create a huge key k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s` (3) Access the key in another context: runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null (4) Examine the audit logs: ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow If the last command's output includes a line that looks like: allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read }; There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem. With this patch no such denial will be seen. (NOTE! you should clear your audit log if you have tested for this previously) (Please return you box to enforcing) Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
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由 David Howells 提交于
If a keyring contains more than 16 keyrings (the capacity of a single node in the associative array) then those keyrings are split over multiple nodes arranged as a tree. If search_nested_keyrings() is called to search the keyring then it will attempt to manually walk over just the 0 branch of the associative array tree where all the keyring links are stored. This works provided the key is found before the algorithm steps from one node containing keyrings to a child node or if there are sufficiently few keyring links that the keyrings are all in one node. However, if the algorithm does need to step from a node to a child node, it doesn't change the node pointer unless a shortcut also gets transited. This means that the algorithm will keep scanning the same node over and over again without terminating and without returning. To fix this, move the internal-pointer-to-node translation from inside the shortcut transit handler so that it applies it to node arrival as well. This can be tested by: r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s` for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done for ((i=17; i<=20; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done The searches should all complete successfully (or with an error for 17-20), but instead one or more of them will hang. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
If sufficient keys (or keyrings) are added into a keyring such that a node in the associative array's tree overflows (each node has a capacity N, currently 16) and such that all N+1 keys have the same index key segment for that level of the tree (the level'th nibble of the index key), then assoc_array_insert() calls ops->diff_objects() to indicate at which bit position the two index keys vary. However, __key_link_begin() passes a NULL object to assoc_array_insert() with the intention of supplying the correct pointer later before we commit the change. This means that keyring_diff_objects() is given a NULL pointer as one of its arguments which it does not expect. This results in an oops like the attached. With the previous patch to fix the keyring hash function, this can be forced much more easily by creating a keyring and only adding keyrings to it. Add any other sort of key and a different insertion path is taken - all 16+1 objects must want to cluster in the same node slot. This can be tested by: r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s` for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done This should work fine, but oopses when the 17th keyring is added. Since ops->diff_objects() is always called with the first pointer pointing to the object to be inserted (ie. the NULL pointer), we can fix the problem by changing the to-be-inserted object pointer to point to the index key passed into assoc_array_insert() instead. Whilst we're at it, we also switch the arguments so that they are the same as for ->compare_object(). BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000088 IP: [<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0 ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81191f9d>] keyring_diff_objects+0x21/0xd2 [<ffffffff811f09ef>] assoc_array_insert+0x3b6/0x908 [<ffffffff811929a7>] __key_link_begin+0x78/0xe5 [<ffffffff81191a2e>] key_create_or_update+0x17d/0x36a [<ffffffff81192e0a>] SyS_add_key+0x123/0x183 [<ffffffff81400ddb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
The keyring hash function (used by the associative array) is supposed to clear the bottommost nibble of the index key (where the hash value resides) for keyrings and make sure it is non-zero for non-keyrings. This is done to make keyrings cluster together on one branch of the tree separately to other keys. Unfortunately, the wrong mask is used, so only the bottom two bits are examined and cleared and not the whole bottom nibble. This means that keys and keyrings can still be successfully searched for under most circumstances as the hash is consistent in its miscalculation, but if a keyring's associative array bottom node gets filled up then approx 75% of the keyrings will not be put into the 0 branch. The consequence of this is that a key in a keyring linked to by another keyring, ie. keyring A -> keyring B -> key may not be found if the search starts at keyring A and then descends into keyring B because search_nested_keyrings() only searches up the 0 branch (as it "knows" all keyrings must be there and not elsewhere in the tree). The fix is to use the right mask. This can be tested with: r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s` for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done This creates a sandbox keyring, then creates 17 keyrings therein (labelled ring0..ring16). This causes the root node of the sandbox's associative array to overflow and for the tree to have extra nodes inserted. Each keyring then is given a user key (labelled aN for ringN) for us to search for. We then search for the user keys we added, starting from the sandbox. If working correctly, it should return the same ordered list of key IDs as for...keyctl add... did. Without this patch, it reports ENOKEY "Required key not available" for some of the keys. Just which keys get this depends as the kernel pointer to the key type forms part of the hash function. Reported-by: NNalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
The second word of key->payload does not get initialised in key_alloc(), but the big_key type is relying on it having been cleared. The problem comes when big_key fails to instantiate a large key and doesn't then set the payload. The big_key_destroy() op is called from the garbage collector and this assumes that the dentry pointer stored in the second word will be NULL if instantiation did not complete. Therefore just pre-clear the entire struct key on allocation rather than trying to be clever and only initialising to 0 only those bits that aren't otherwise initialised. The lack of initialisation can lead to a bug report like the following if big_key failed to initialise its file: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.10.0-53.el7.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1955/0HC513, BIOS 1.4.4 12/09/2008 Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector task: ffff8801294f5680 ti: ffff8801296e2000 task.ti: ffff8801296e2000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b4a51>] dput+0x21/0x2d0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff811a7b06>] path_put+0x16/0x30 [<ffffffff81235604>] big_key_destroy+0x44/0x60 [<ffffffff8122dc4b>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.2+0x5b/0xe0 [<ffffffff8122df2f>] key_garbage_collector+0x1df/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8107759b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460 [<ffffffff8107834b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400 [<ffffffff81078230>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3e0/0x3e0 [<ffffffff8107eb00>] kthread+0xc0/0xd0 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110 [<ffffffff815c4bec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110 Reported-by: NPatrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
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- 30 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
This patch stores the address of the 'template_fmt_copy' variable in a new variable, called 'template_fmt_ptr', so that the latter is passed as an argument of strsep() instead of the former. This modification is needed in order to correctly free the memory area referenced by 'template_fmt_copy' (strsep() modifies the pointer of the passed string). Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Reported-by: NSebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 26 11月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Geyslan G. Bem 提交于
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary. Signed-off-by: NGeyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
This patch makes a copy of the 'template_fmt' function argument so that the latter will not be modified by strsep(), which does the splitting by replacing the given separator with '\0'. IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address 0000000000842000 Oops: 0004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc2-00098-g3ce1217d #17 task: 000000003ffa0000 ti: 000000003ff84000 task.ti: 000000003ff84000 Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000000044bf88 (strsep+0x7c/0xa0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000000000000007c 000000000000007c 000000003ff87d90 0000000000821fd8 0000000000000000 000000000000007c 0000000000aa37e0 0000000000aa9008 0000000000000051 0000000000a114d8 0000000100000002 0000000000842bde 0000000000842bdf 00000000006f97f0 000000000040062c 000000003ff87cf0 Krnl Code: 000000000044bf7c: a7f4000a brc 15,44bf90 000000000044bf80: b90200cc ltgr %r12,%r12 #000000000044bf84: a7840006 brc 8,44bf90 >000000000044bf88: 9200c000 mvi 0(%r12),0 000000000044bf8c: 41c0c001 la %r12,1(%r12) 000000000044bf90: e3c020000024 stg %r12,0(%r2) 000000000044bf96: b904002b lgr %r2,%r11 000000000044bf9a: ebbcf0700004 lmg %r11,%r12,112(%r15) Call Trace: ([<00000000004005fe>] ima_init_template+0xa2/0x1bc) [<0000000000a7c896>] ima_init+0x7a/0xa8 [<0000000000a7c938>] init_ima+0x24/0x40 [<00000000001000e8>] do_one_initcall+0x68/0x128 [<0000000000a4eb56>] kernel_init_freeable+0x20a/0x2b4 [<00000000006a1ff4>] kernel_init+0x30/0x178 [<00000000006b69fe>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc [<00000000006b69f8>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000000000044bf42>] strsep+0x36/0xa0 Fixes commit: adf53a77 ima: new templates management mechanism Changelog v1: - make template_fmt 'const char *' (reported-by James Morris) - fix kstrdup memory leak (reported-by James Morris) Reported-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
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- 25 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
This patch defines a new value for the 'ima_show_type' enumerator (IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) to prevent that the field length is transmitted through the 'binary_runtime_measurements' interface for the digest field of the 'ima' template. Fixes commit: 3ce1217d ima: define template fields library and new helpers Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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