1. 06 2月, 2014 1 次提交
  2. 07 1月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy · 8ed81460
      Tetsuo Handa 提交于
      Hello.
      
      I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .
      
      [  681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
      
      Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
      ebitmap_set_bit() call.
      ----------
      >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
      From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
      Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
      Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
      
      Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
      check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
      memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.
      
        unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
          comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
          hex dump (first 8 bytes):
            57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5                          W...kkk.
          backtrace:
            [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
            [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
            [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
            [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
            [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
            [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
            [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
            [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
            [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
      show below message and the boot sequence freezes.
      
        systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
      Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
      Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      8ed81460
  3. 03 1月, 2014 3 次提交
  4. 01 1月, 2014 2 次提交
    • C
      Smack: File receive audit correction · 4482a44f
      Casey Schaufler 提交于
      Eric Paris politely points out:
      
          Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
          field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK.  And then use
          smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().
      
          Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense.  (and depending
          on how it's used fix a crash...)
      
      He is correct. This puts things in order.
      
      Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      4482a44f
    • C
      Smack: Rationalize mount restrictions · 24ea1b6e
      Casey Schaufler 提交于
      The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
      use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
      processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
      turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
      to be fully implemented and has never been used.
      
      The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
      filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
      be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
      then, they get removed.
      
      The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
      It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
      effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
      any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
      are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
      Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
      label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
      get the label of their creator.
      
      Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      24ea1b6e
  5. 24 12月, 2013 4 次提交
  6. 20 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 17 12月, 2013 2 次提交
  8. 16 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 14 12月, 2013 1 次提交
    • P
      selinux: revert 102aefdd · 4d546f81
      Paul Moore 提交于
      Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
      
      This reverts commit 102aefdd.
      
      Explanation from Eric Paris:
      
      	SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
      	xattrs or not.  In current policy we have a specification that
      	fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
      	xattrs.  This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
      	filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
      	use xattrs.  If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
      	question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
      	command, they will deadlock.
      
      	I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
      	revert is still the correct solution.  The reason I believe
      	that is because the code still does not work.  The s_subtype is
      	not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
      	the ".gluster" portion of the rule.  So we cannot match on the
      	rule in question.  The code is useless.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      4d546f81
  10. 13 12月, 2013 4 次提交
  11. 12 12月, 2013 2 次提交
  12. 11 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 10 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  14. 05 12月, 2013 5 次提交
  15. 03 12月, 2013 2 次提交
    • R
      ima: properly free ima_template_entry structures · a7ed7c60
      Roberto Sassu 提交于
      The new templates management mechanism records information associated
      to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it
      available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry'
      structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA).
      
      Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length
      varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field),
      it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a
      'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong.
      
      This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which
      walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory
      referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for
      the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree()
      that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument
      with calls to the new function.
      
      Fixes: a71dc65d: ima: switch to new template management mechanism
      Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
      Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
      a7ed7c60
    • C
      ima: Do not free 'entry' before it is initialized · 09ae6345
      Christoph Paasch 提交于
      7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to
      API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a
      bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip).
      
      So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we
      should not attempt to free it.
      
      Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971)
      
      Fixes: 7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API)
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
      Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
      09ae6345
  16. 02 12月, 2013 5 次提交
    • E
      security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes · c7277090
      Eric Paris 提交于
      We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a
      shmem backed inode to hold the key contents.  Because of this detail of
      implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to
      read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode.  The LSM checks are already
      being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at
      the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a
      part of the security model)
      
      This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which
      returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode
      has S_PRIVATE set.  This means that all LSM checks for the inode in
      question are skipped.  It should only be used for kernel internal
      operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper
      LSM checking.  It is possible that some other users of
      shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been
      explored.
      
      Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult.  The steps I used on
      Fedora are:
      
       (1) Turn off selinux enforcing:
      
      	setenforce 0
      
       (2) Create a huge key
      
      	k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s`
      
       (3) Access the key in another context:
      
      	runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null
      
       (4) Examine the audit logs:
      
      	ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow
      
      If the last command's output includes a line that looks like:
      
      	allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read };
      
      There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem.  With
      this patch no such denial will be seen.  (NOTE! you should clear your
      audit log if you have tested for this previously)
      
      (Please return you box to enforcing)
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      c7277090
    • D
      KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyrings · 9c5e45df
      David Howells 提交于
      If a keyring contains more than 16 keyrings (the capacity of a single node in
      the associative array) then those keyrings are split over multiple nodes
      arranged as a tree.
      
      If search_nested_keyrings() is called to search the keyring then it will
      attempt to manually walk over just the 0 branch of the associative array tree
      where all the keyring links are stored.  This works provided the key is found
      before the algorithm steps from one node containing keyrings to a child node
      or if there are sufficiently few keyring links that the keyrings are all in
      one node.
      
      However, if the algorithm does need to step from a node to a child node, it
      doesn't change the node pointer unless a shortcut also gets transited.  This
      means that the algorithm will keep scanning the same node over and over again
      without terminating and without returning.
      
      To fix this, move the internal-pointer-to-node translation from inside the
      shortcut transit handler so that it applies it to node arrival as well.
      
      This can be tested by:
      
      	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
      	for ((i=17; i<=20; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
      
      The searches should all complete successfully (or with an error for 17-20),
      but instead one or more of them will hang.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
      9c5e45df
    • D
      KEYS: Fix multiple key add into associative array · 23fd78d7
      David Howells 提交于
      If sufficient keys (or keyrings) are added into a keyring such that a node in
      the associative array's tree overflows (each node has a capacity N, currently
      16) and such that all N+1 keys have the same index key segment for that level
      of the tree (the level'th nibble of the index key), then assoc_array_insert()
      calls ops->diff_objects() to indicate at which bit position the two index keys
      vary.
      
      However, __key_link_begin() passes a NULL object to assoc_array_insert() with
      the intention of supplying the correct pointer later before we commit the
      change.  This means that keyring_diff_objects() is given a NULL pointer as one
      of its arguments which it does not expect.  This results in an oops like the
      attached.
      
      With the previous patch to fix the keyring hash function, this can be forced
      much more easily by creating a keyring and only adding keyrings to it.  Add any
      other sort of key and a different insertion path is taken - all 16+1 objects
      must want to cluster in the same node slot.
      
      This can be tested by:
      
      	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
      
      This should work fine, but oopses when the 17th keyring is added.
      
      Since ops->diff_objects() is always called with the first pointer pointing to
      the object to be inserted (ie. the NULL pointer), we can fix the problem by
      changing the to-be-inserted object pointer to point to the index key passed
      into assoc_array_insert() instead.
      
      Whilst we're at it, we also switch the arguments so that they are the same as
      for ->compare_object().
      
      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000088
      IP: [<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
      ...
      RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
      ...
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff81191f9d>] keyring_diff_objects+0x21/0xd2
       [<ffffffff811f09ef>] assoc_array_insert+0x3b6/0x908
       [<ffffffff811929a7>] __key_link_begin+0x78/0xe5
       [<ffffffff81191a2e>] key_create_or_update+0x17d/0x36a
       [<ffffffff81192e0a>] SyS_add_key+0x123/0x183
       [<ffffffff81400ddb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
      23fd78d7
    • D
      KEYS: Fix the keyring hash function · d54e58b7
      David Howells 提交于
      The keyring hash function (used by the associative array) is supposed to clear
      the bottommost nibble of the index key (where the hash value resides) for
      keyrings and make sure it is non-zero for non-keyrings.  This is done to make
      keyrings cluster together on one branch of the tree separately to other keys.
      
      Unfortunately, the wrong mask is used, so only the bottom two bits are
      examined and cleared and not the whole bottom nibble.  This means that keys
      and keyrings can still be successfully searched for under most circumstances
      as the hash is consistent in its miscalculation, but if a keyring's
      associative array bottom node gets filled up then approx 75% of the keyrings
      will not be put into the 0 branch.
      
      The consequence of this is that a key in a keyring linked to by another
      keyring, ie.
      
      	keyring A -> keyring B -> key
      
      may not be found if the search starts at keyring A and then descends into
      keyring B because search_nested_keyrings() only searches up the 0 branch (as it
      "knows" all keyrings must be there and not elsewhere in the tree).
      
      The fix is to use the right mask.
      
      This can be tested with:
      
      	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
      	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
      
      This creates a sandbox keyring, then creates 17 keyrings therein (labelled
      ring0..ring16).  This causes the root node of the sandbox's associative array
      to overflow and for the tree to have extra nodes inserted.
      
      Each keyring then is given a user key (labelled aN for ringN) for us to search
      for.
      
      We then search for the user keys we added, starting from the sandbox.  If
      working correctly, it should return the same ordered list of key IDs as
      for...keyctl add... did.  Without this patch, it reports ENOKEY "Required key
      not available" for some of the keys.  Just which keys get this depends as the
      kernel pointer to the key type forms part of the hash function.
      Reported-by: NNalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
      d54e58b7
    • D
      KEYS: Pre-clear struct key on allocation · 2480f57f
      David Howells 提交于
      The second word of key->payload does not get initialised in key_alloc(), but
      the big_key type is relying on it having been cleared.  The problem comes when
      big_key fails to instantiate a large key and doesn't then set the payload.  The
      big_key_destroy() op is called from the garbage collector and this assumes that
      the dentry pointer stored in the second word will be NULL if instantiation did
      not complete.
      
      Therefore just pre-clear the entire struct key on allocation rather than trying
      to be clever and only initialising to 0 only those bits that aren't otherwise
      initialised.
      
      The lack of initialisation can lead to a bug report like the following if
      big_key failed to initialise its file:
      
      	general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
      	Modules linked in: ...
      	CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.10.0-53.el7.x86_64 #1
      	Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1955/0HC513, BIOS 1.4.4 12/09/2008
      	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
      	task: ffff8801294f5680 ti: ffff8801296e2000 task.ti: ffff8801296e2000
      	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b4a51>] dput+0x21/0x2d0
      	...
      	Call Trace:
      	 [<ffffffff811a7b06>] path_put+0x16/0x30
      	 [<ffffffff81235604>] big_key_destroy+0x44/0x60
      	 [<ffffffff8122dc4b>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.2+0x5b/0xe0
      	 [<ffffffff8122df2f>] key_garbage_collector+0x1df/0x3c0
      	 [<ffffffff8107759b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460
      	 [<ffffffff8107834b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400
      	 [<ffffffff81078230>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3e0/0x3e0
      	 [<ffffffff8107eb00>] kthread+0xc0/0xd0
      	 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110
      	 [<ffffffff815c4bec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
      	 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110
      Reported-by: NPatrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NStephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
      2480f57f
  17. 30 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  18. 26 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • G
      selinux: fix possible memory leak · 8e645c34
      Geyslan G. Bem 提交于
      Free 'ctx_str' when necessary.
      Signed-off-by: NGeyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      8e645c34
    • R
      ima: make a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields() · dbc335d2
      Roberto Sassu 提交于
      This patch makes a copy of the 'template_fmt' function argument so that
      the latter will not be modified by strsep(), which does the splitting by
      replacing the given separator with '\0'.
      
       IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
       Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address 0000000000842000
       Oops: 0004 [#1] SMP
       Modules linked in:
       CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc2-00098-g3ce1217d #17
       task: 000000003ffa0000 ti: 000000003ff84000 task.ti: 000000003ff84000
       Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000000044bf88 (strsep+0x7c/0xa0)
                  R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 EA:3
       Krnl GPRS: 000000000000007c 000000000000007c 000000003ff87d90 0000000000821fd8
                  0000000000000000 000000000000007c 0000000000aa37e0 0000000000aa9008
                  0000000000000051 0000000000a114d8 0000000100000002 0000000000842bde
                  0000000000842bdf 00000000006f97f0 000000000040062c 000000003ff87cf0
       Krnl Code: 000000000044bf7c: a7f4000a           brc     15,44bf90
                  000000000044bf80: b90200cc           ltgr    %r12,%r12
                 #000000000044bf84: a7840006           brc     8,44bf90
                 >000000000044bf88: 9200c000           mvi     0(%r12),0
                  000000000044bf8c: 41c0c001           la      %r12,1(%r12)
                  000000000044bf90: e3c020000024       stg     %r12,0(%r2)
                  000000000044bf96: b904002b           lgr     %r2,%r11
                  000000000044bf9a: ebbcf0700004       lmg     %r11,%r12,112(%r15)
       Call Trace:
       ([<00000000004005fe>] ima_init_template+0xa2/0x1bc)
        [<0000000000a7c896>] ima_init+0x7a/0xa8
        [<0000000000a7c938>] init_ima+0x24/0x40
        [<00000000001000e8>] do_one_initcall+0x68/0x128
        [<0000000000a4eb56>] kernel_init_freeable+0x20a/0x2b4
        [<00000000006a1ff4>] kernel_init+0x30/0x178
        [<00000000006b69fe>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
        [<00000000006b69f8>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc
       Last Breaking-Event-Address:
        [<000000000044bf42>] strsep+0x36/0xa0
      
      Fixes commit: adf53a77 ima: new templates management mechanism
      
      Changelog v1:
      - make template_fmt 'const char *' (reported-by James Morris)
      - fix kstrdup memory leak (reported-by James Morris)
      Reported-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
      Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Tested-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      dbc335d2
  19. 25 11月, 2013 1 次提交