Signed-off-by: NYangtao Li <tiny.windzz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Trivial fix to clean up an indentation issue, remove space
Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Fix missed spacing error reported by checkpatch for
9caafbe2 ("Parse secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.

In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.

 (*) Query an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
		    key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
		    struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);

     Get information about an asymmetric key.  The information is returned
     in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:

	__u32	supported_ops;

     A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported.  This is
     constructed from a bitwise-OR of:

	KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}

	__u32	key_size;

     The size in bits of the key.

	__u16	max_data_size;
	__u16	max_sig_size;
	__u16	max_enc_size;
	__u16	max_dec_size;

     The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
     blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.

     reserved must be set to 0.  This is intended for future use to hand
     over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.

     If successful, 0 is returned.  If the key is not an asymmetric key,
     EOPNOTSUPP is returned.

 (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    const void *in2);

     Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
     a blob of data.

     The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
     values:

	__s32		key_id;
	__u32		in_len;
	__u32		out_len;
	__u32		in2_len;

     For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:

	Operation ID		in,in_len	out,out_len	in2,in2_len
	=======================	===============	===============	===========
	KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT	Raw data	Encrypted data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT	Encrypted data	Raw data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN	Raw data	Signature	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY	Raw data	-		Signature

     info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
     information.

     The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0.  This is
     intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
     required to unlock a key.

     If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
     written into the output buffer.  Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The newly added code fails to build when either SECMARK or
NETFILTER are disabled:

security/apparmor/lsm.c: In function 'apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb':
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1138:12: error: 'struct sk_buff' has no member named 'secmark'; did you mean 'mark'?

security/apparmor/lsm.c:1671:21: error: 'struct nf_hook_state' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]

Add a set of #ifdef checks around it to only enable the code that
we can compile and that makes sense in that configuration.

Fixes: ab9f2115 ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

LSM initialization failures have traditionally been ignored. We should
at least WARN when something goes wrong.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering
decisions are being made.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

This partially reverts commit 58eacfff ("init, tracing: instrument
security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

In preparation for switching from initcall to just a regular set of
pointers in a section, rename the internal section name.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

For a while now, the LSM core has said it was "initializED", rather than
"initializING". This adjust the report to be more accurate (i.e. before
this was reported before any LSMs had been initialized.)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when
the file is not readable.  This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change.  The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file.  So, any file->f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file.  Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.
Signed-off-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value.  Increase it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The 'init_keyring' variable actually just gave the value of
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.  We should check the config option
directly instead.  No change in behavior; this just simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Constify some static data that is never modified,
so that it is placed in .rodata.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.

The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.

So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo.  Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition.  While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.

The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h

A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.

To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo.  The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Syzkaller reported a OOB-read with the stacktrace below. This occurs
inside __aa_lookupn_ns as `n` is not initialized. `n` is obtained from
aa_splitn_fqname. In cases where `name` is invalid, aa_splitn_fqname
returns without initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`.

Fix this by always initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`.

	__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
	dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
	print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
	kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
	kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
	__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
	memcmp+0xe3/0x160 lib/string.c:861
	strnstr+0x4b/0x70 lib/string.c:934
	__aa_lookupn_ns+0xc1/0x570 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:209
	aa_lookupn_ns+0x88/0x1e0 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:240
	aa_fqlookupn_profile+0x1b9/0x1010 security/apparmor/policy.c:468
	fqlookupn_profile+0x80/0xc0 security/apparmor/label.c:1844
	aa_label_strn_parse+0xa3a/0x1230 security/apparmor/label.c:1908
	aa_label_parse+0x42/0x50 security/apparmor/label.c:1943
	aa_change_profile+0x513/0x3510 security/apparmor/domain.c:1362
	apparmor_setprocattr+0xaa4/0x1150 security/apparmor/lsm.c:658
	security_setprocattr+0x66/0xc0 security/security.c:1298
	proc_pid_attr_write+0x301/0x540 fs/proc/base.c:2555
	__vfs_write+0x119/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:485
	vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
	ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
	__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
	__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
	__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
	do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
	entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 3b0aaf58 ("apparmor: add lib fn to find the "split" for fqnames")
Reported-by: syzbot+61e4b490d9d2da591b50@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NZubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.

Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held)
violated this rule.

Fixes: b2d09ae4 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Reported-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

lockdep_assert_held() is better suited to checking locking requirements,
since it won't get confused when someone else holds the lock. This is
also a step towards possibly removing spin_is_locked().
Signed-off-by: NLance Roy <ldr709@gmail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Add support for dropping or accepting packets based on their secmark
tags.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to
define policy that's expected to match against all secids.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:

  ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
  ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
    struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
                                        ^~~~~~~
                                        dh_private

This reverts commit 8a2336e5.

Fixes: 8a2336e5 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: NLubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.

Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a
proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting
to find.

Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch")
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks
related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported
by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather
than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions.
In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being
checked for capabilities.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:

security/smack/smackfs.c: In function 'smk_fill_super':
security/smack/smackfs.c:2856:16: warning:
 variable 'root_inode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This reverts commit 1f40a46c.

It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit
systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page
PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to
the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the
kernel and in the user page-table.

That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in
this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs
changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit
legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway,
remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used.

Fixes: 7757d607 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: NMeelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains,
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held)
violated this rule.

Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(),
because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments.

Fixes: b2d09ae4 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The netperf benchmark shows a 5.73% reduction in throughput for
small (64 byte) transfers by unconfined tasks.

DEFINE_AUDIT_SK() in aa_label_sk_perm() should not be performed
unconditionally, rather only when the label is confined.

netperf-tcp
                            56974a6f^              56974a6f
Min       64         563.48 (   0.00%)      531.17 (  -5.73%)
Min       128       1056.92 (   0.00%)      999.44 (  -5.44%)
Min       256       1945.95 (   0.00%)     1867.97 (  -4.01%)
Min       1024      6761.40 (   0.00%)     6364.23 (  -5.87%)
Min       2048     11110.53 (   0.00%)    10606.20 (  -4.54%)
Min       3312     13692.67 (   0.00%)    13158.41 (  -3.90%)
Min       4096     14926.29 (   0.00%)    14457.46 (  -3.14%)
Min       8192     18399.34 (   0.00%)    18091.65 (  -1.67%)
Min       16384    21384.13 (   0.00%)    21158.05 (  -1.06%)
Hmean     64         564.96 (   0.00%)      534.38 (  -5.41%)
Hmean     128       1064.42 (   0.00%)     1010.12 (  -5.10%)
Hmean     256       1965.85 (   0.00%)     1879.16 (  -4.41%)
Hmean     1024      6839.77 (   0.00%)     6478.70 (  -5.28%)
Hmean     2048     11154.80 (   0.00%)    10671.13 (  -4.34%)
Hmean     3312     13838.12 (   0.00%)    13249.01 (  -4.26%)
Hmean     4096     15009.99 (   0.00%)    14561.36 (  -2.99%)
Hmean     8192     18975.57 (   0.00%)    18326.54 (  -3.42%)
Hmean     16384    21440.44 (   0.00%)    21324.59 (  -0.54%)
Stddev    64           1.24 (   0.00%)        2.85 (-130.64%)
Stddev    128          4.51 (   0.00%)        6.53 ( -44.84%)
Stddev    256         11.67 (   0.00%)        8.50 (  27.16%)
Stddev    1024        48.33 (   0.00%)       75.07 ( -55.34%)
Stddev    2048        54.82 (   0.00%)       65.16 ( -18.86%)
Stddev    3312       153.57 (   0.00%)       56.29 (  63.35%)
Stddev    4096       100.25 (   0.00%)       88.50 (  11.72%)
Stddev    8192       358.13 (   0.00%)      169.99 (  52.54%)
Stddev    16384       43.99 (   0.00%)      141.82 (-222.39%)
Signed-off-by: NTony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Fixes: 56974a6f ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation")
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.

As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
parts of the range are extracted before the rest of the parsing. Because
now we don't have to scan for two different separators simultaneously
everywhere, we can actually switch to strchr() everywhere instead of the
open-coded loops that scan for two separators at once.

mls_context_to_sid() used to signal how much of the input string was parsed
by updating `*scontext`. However, there is actually no case in which
mls_context_to_sid() only parses a subset of the input and still returns
a success (other than the buggy case with a second '-' in which it
incorrectly claims to have consumed the entire string). Turn `scontext`
into a simple pointer argument and stop redundantly checking whether the
entire input was consumed in string_to_context_struct(). This also lets us
remove the `scontext_len` argument from `string_to_context_struct()`.
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzz in convert_context()]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to
use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones.  However, the header
uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private"
instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace.

Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org
Fixes: ddbb4114 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 901ef845 ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
broke mounting of cgroup2 under older SELinux policies which lacked
a genfscon rule for cgroup2.  This prevents mounting of cgroup2 even
when SELinux is permissive.

Change the handling when there is no genfscon rule in policy to
just mark the inode unlabeled and not return an error to the caller.
This permits mounting and access if allowed by policy, e.g. to
unconfined domains.

I also considered changing the behavior of security_genfs_sid() to
never return -ENOENT, but the current behavior is relied upon by
other callers to perform caller-specific handling.

Fixes: 901ef845 ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

simple_strtoul is obsolete, and use kstrtouint instead
Signed-off-by: NDing Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>