- 21 9月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
This helper is useful for both THPs and for supporting block size larger than page size. Convert all users that I could find (we have a few different ways of writing this idiom, and I may have missed some). Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Acked-by: NDave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
If iomap_unshare_actor() unshares to an inline iomap, the page was not being flushed. block_write_end() and __iomap_write_end() already contain flushes, so adding it to iomap_write_end_inline() seems like the best place. That means we can remove it from iomap_write_actor(). Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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由 Nikolay Borisov 提交于
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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- 10 9月, 2020 4 次提交
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
When bringing (portions of) a page uptodate, we were marking blocks that were zeroed as being uptodate, but not blocks that were read from storage. Like the previous commit, this problem was found with generic/127 and a kernel which failed readahead I/Os. This bug causes writes to be silently lost when working with flaky storage. Fixes: 9dc55f13 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads") Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
If we find a page in write_begin which is !Uptodate, we need to clear any error on the page before starting to read data into it. This matches how filemap_fault(), do_read_cache_page() and generic_file_buffered_read() handle PageError on !Uptodate pages. When calling iomap_set_range_uptodate() in __iomap_write_begin(), blocks were not being marked as uptodate. This was found with generic/127 and a specially modified kernel which would fail (some) readahead I/Os. The test read some bytes in a prior page which caused readahead to extend into page 0x34. There was a subsequent write to page 0x34, followed by a read to page 0x34. Because the blocks were still marked as !Uptodate, the read caused all blocks to be re-read, overwriting the write. With this change, and the next one, the bytes which were written are marked as being Uptodate, so even though the page is still marked as !Uptodate, the blocks containing the written data are not re-read from storage. Fixes: 9dc55f13 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads") Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于
When a direct I/O write falls back to buffered I/O entirely, dio->size will be 0 in iomap_dio_complete. Function invalidate_inode_pages2_range will try to invalidate the rest of the address space. If there are any dirty pages in that range, the write will fail and a "Page cache invalidation failure on direct I/O" error will be logged. On gfs2, this can be reproduced as follows: xfs_io \ -c "open -ft foo" -c "pwrite 4k 4k" -c "close" \ -c "open -d foo" -c "pwrite 0 4k" Fix this by recognizing 0-length writes. Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Qian Cai 提交于
It is trivial to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(1) in iomap_dio_actor() by unprivileged users which would taint the kernel, or worse - panic if panic_on_warn or panic_on_taint is set. Hence, just convert it to pr_warn_ratelimited() to let users know their workloads are racing. Thank Dave Chinner for the initial analysis of the racing reproducers. Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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- 06 9月, 2020 4 次提交
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由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
While looking for ->files in ->defer_list, consider that requests there may actually be links. Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Pavel Begunkov 提交于
While trying to cancel requests with ->files, it also should look for requests in ->defer_list, otherwise it might end up hanging a thread. Cancel all requests in ->defer_list up to the last request there with matching ->files, that's needed to follow drain ordering semantics. Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Mikulas Patocka 提交于
When running in a dax mode, if the user maps a page with MAP_PRIVATE and PROT_WRITE, the xfs filesystem would incorrectly update ctime and mtime when the user hits a COW fault. This breaks building of the Linux kernel. How to reproduce: 1. extract the Linux kernel tree on dax-mounted xfs filesystem 2. run make clean 3. run make -j12 4. run make -j12 at step 4, make would incorrectly rebuild the whole kernel (although it was already built in step 3). The reason for the breakage is that almost all object files depend on objtool. When we run objtool, it takes COW page fault on its .data section, and these faults will incorrectly update the timestamp of the objtool binary. The updated timestamp causes make to rebuild the whole tree. Signed-off-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Mikulas Patocka 提交于
When running in a dax mode, if the user maps a page with MAP_PRIVATE and PROT_WRITE, the ext2 filesystem would incorrectly update ctime and mtime when the user hits a COW fault. This breaks building of the Linux kernel. How to reproduce: 1. extract the Linux kernel tree on dax-mounted ext2 filesystem 2. run make clean 3. run make -j12 4. run make -j12 at step 4, make would incorrectly rebuild the whole kernel (although it was already built in step 3). The reason for the breakage is that almost all object files depend on objtool. When we run objtool, it takes COW page fault on its .data section, and these faults will incorrectly update the timestamp of the objtool binary. The updated timestamp causes make to rebuild the whole tree. Signed-off-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 9月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
If we exceed UIO_FASTIOV, we don't handle the transition correctly between an allocated vec for requests that are queued with IOSQE_ASYNC. Store the iovec appropriately and re-set it in the iter iov in case it changed. Fixes: ff6165b2 ("io_uring: retain iov_iter state over io_read/io_write calls") Reported-by: NNick Hill <nick@nickhill.org> Tested-by: NNorman Maurer <norman.maurer@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 03 9月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
The realtime flag only applies to the data fork, so don't use the realtime block number checks on the attr fork of a realtime file. Fixes: 30b0984d ("xfs: refactor bmap record validation") Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
Actually two things that need fixing up here: - The io_rw_reissue() -EAGAIN retry is explicit to block devices and regular files, so don't ever attempt to do that on other types of files. - If we hit -EAGAIN on a nonblock marked file, don't arm poll handler for it. It should just complete with -EAGAIN. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NNorman Maurer <norman.maurer@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 02 9月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
epoll_loop_check_proc() can run into a file already committed to destruction; we can't grab a reference on those and don't need to add them to the set for reverse path check anyway. Tested-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Fixes: a9ed4a65 ("epoll: Keep a reference on files added to the check list") Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jiufei Xue 提交于
While io_sqe_file_register() failed in __io_sqe_files_update(), table->files[i] still point to the original file which may freed soon, and that will trigger use-after-free problems. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f3bd9dae ("io_uring: fix memleak in __io_sqe_files_update()") Signed-off-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 01 9月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Jiufei Xue 提交于
Index here is already the position of the file in fixed_file_table, we should not use io_file_from_index() again to get it. Otherwise, the wrong file which still in use may be released unexpectedly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6 Fixes: 05f3fb3c ("io_uring: avoid ring quiesce for fixed file set unregister and update") Signed-off-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 31 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Max Staudt 提交于
The basic permission bits (protection bits in AmigaOS) have been broken in Linux' AFFS - it would only set bits, but never delete them. Also, contrary to the documentation, the Archived bit was not handled. Let's fix this for good, and set the bits such that Linux and classic AmigaOS can coexist in the most peaceful manner. Also, update the documentation to represent the current state of things. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NMax Staudt <max@enpas.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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- 29 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Paulo Alcantara 提交于
For SMB1, the DFS flag should be checked against tcon->Flags rather than tcon->share_flags. While at it, add an is_tcon_dfs() helper to check for DFS capability in a more generic way. Signed-off-by: NPaulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NShyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
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- 28 8月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
These events happen inline from submission, so there's no need to bounce them through the original task. Just set them up for retry and issue retry directly instead of going over task_work. Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
This normally isn't hit, as polling is mostly done on NVMe with deep queue depths. But if we do run into request starvation, we need to ensure that retries are properly serialized. Reported-by: NAndres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
The fall through annotation comes after a return statement so it's not reachable. Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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- 27 8月, 2020 13 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Don't leak kernel memory contents into the shortform attr fork. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Qu Wenruo 提交于
The error message for inode transid is the same as for inode generation, which makes us unable to detect the real problem. Reported-by: NTyler Richmond <t.d.richmond@gmail.com> Fixes: 496245ca ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify inode item") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: NMarcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
These are special extent buffers that get rewound in order to lookup the state of the tree at a specific point in time. As such they do not go through the normal initialization paths that set their lockdep class, so handle them appropriately when they are created and before they are locked. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
When flipping over to the rw_semaphore I noticed I'd get a lockdep splat in replace_path(), which is weird because we're swapping the reloc root with the actual target root. Turns out this is because we're using the root->root_key.objectid as the root id for the newly allocated tree block when setting the lockdep class, however we need to be using the actual owner of this new block, which is saved in owner. The affected path is through btrfs_copy_root as all other callers of btrfs_alloc_tree_block (which calls init_new_buffer) have root_objectid == root->root_key.objectid . CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
I got the following lockdep splat while testing: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/229626 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff828513f0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 but task is already holding lock: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #7 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #6 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x49/0x480 commit_cowonly_roots+0xb5/0x2a0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x516/0xa60 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #5 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4bb/0xa60 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x43/0x70 start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x42/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640 do_mmap+0x376/0x580 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x68/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 perf_read+0x141/0x2c0 vfs_read+0xad/0x1b0 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 perf_event_init_cpu+0x88/0x150 perf_event_init+0x1db/0x20b start_kernel+0x3ae/0x53c secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 -> #1 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 perf_event_init_cpu+0x4f/0x150 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xb1/0x900 _cpu_up.constprop.26+0x9f/0x130 cpu_up+0x7b/0xc0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60 smp_init+0x26/0x71 kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x258 kernel_init+0xa/0x103 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex --> &fs_info->scrub_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by btrfs/229626: #0: ffff88bfe8bb86e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0xbd/0x630 #1: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 229626 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932 Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x165/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0 ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630 ? start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xca/0x160 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250 ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This happens because we're allocating the scrub workqueues under the scrub and device list mutex, which brings in a whole host of other dependencies. Because the work queue allocation is done with GFP_KERNEL, it can trigger reclaim, which can lead to a transaction commit, which in turns needs the device_list_mutex, it can lead to a deadlock. A different problem for which this fix is a solution. Fix this by moving the actual allocation outside of the scrub lock, and then only take the lock once we're ready to actually assign them to the fs_info. We'll now have to cleanup the workqueues in a few more places, so I've added a helper to do the refcount dance to safely free the workqueues. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ compsize/11122 is trying to acquire lock: ffff889fabca8768 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 but task is already holding lock: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x3b/0x70 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x120 btrfs_search_slot+0x756/0x990 btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xb4 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x270 btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x168/0x230 btrfs_work_helper+0xd4/0x570 process_one_work+0x2ad/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x3a/0x3d0 kthread+0x133/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0x50/0x440 btrfs_update_inode+0x8a/0xf0 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5b/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640 do_mmap+0x376/0x580 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 __might_fault+0x68/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300 search_ioctl+0x106/0x200 btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0 btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-fs-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-fs-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-fs-00); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by compsize/11122: #0: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 stack backtrace: CPU: 17 PID: 11122 Comm: compsize Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x165/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 ? find_held_lock+0x72/0x90 __might_fault+0x68/0x90 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300 ? btrfs_search_forward+0x2a6/0x360 search_ioctl+0x106/0x200 btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0 btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0 ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x5a/0x70 ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The problem is we're doing a copy_to_user() while holding tree locks, which can deadlock if we have to do a page fault for the copy_to_user(). This exists even without my locking changes, so it needs to be fixed. Rework the search ioctl to do the pre-fault and then copy_to_user_nofault for the copying. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc7-00167-g0d7ba0c5b375-dirty #925 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs-uuid/7955 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88bfbafec0f8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ffff88bfbafef2a8 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990 btrfs_uuid_tree_add+0x89/0x2d0 btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x330/0x390 kthread+0x133/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990 btrfs_find_root+0x45/0x1b0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x100 btrfs_get_root_ref.part.50+0x143/0x630 btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate+0x207/0x314 btrfs_uuid_rescan_kthread+0x12/0x50 kthread+0x133/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-uuid-00); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-uuid-00); lock(btrfs-root-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by btrfs-uuid/7955: #0: ffff88bfbafef2a8 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 stack backtrace: CPU: 73 PID: 7955 Comm: btrfs-uuid Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00167-g0d7ba0c5b375-dirty #925 Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x165/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 ? btrfs_root_node+0x1c/0x1d0 down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990 btrfs_find_root+0x45/0x1b0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x100 btrfs_get_root_ref.part.50+0x143/0x630 btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate+0x207/0x314 ? btree_readpage+0x20/0x20 btrfs_uuid_rescan_kthread+0x12/0x50 kthread+0x133/0x150 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This problem exists because we have two different rescan threads, btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread which creates the uuid tree, and btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate that goes through and updates or deletes any out of date roots. The problem is they both do things in different order. btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread() reads the tree_root, and then inserts entries into the uuid_root. btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate() scans the uuid_root, but then does a btrfs_get_fs_root() which can read from the tree_root. It's actually easy enough to not be holding the path in btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread() when we add a uuid entry, as we already drop it further down and re-start the search when we loop. So simply move the path release before we add our entry to the uuid tree. This also fixes a problem where we're holding a path open after we do btrfs_end_transaction(), which has it's own problems. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Marcos Paulo de Souza 提交于
[BUG] After commit 9afc6649 ("btrfs: block-group: refactor how we read one block group item"), cache->length is being assigned after calling btrfs_create_block_group_cache. This causes a problem since set_free_space_tree_thresholds calculates the free-space threshold to decide if the free-space tree should convert from extents to bitmaps. The current code calls set_free_space_tree_thresholds with cache->length being 0, which then makes cache->bitmap_high_thresh zero. This implies the system will always use bitmap instead of extents, which is not desired if the block group is not fragmented. This behavior can be seen by a test that expects to repair systems with FREE_SPACE_EXTENT and FREE_SPACE_BITMAP, but the current code only created FREE_SPACE_BITMAP. [FIX] Call set_free_space_tree_thresholds after setting cache->length. There is now a WARN_ON in set_free_space_tree_thresholds to help preventing the same mistake to happen again in the future. Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/251 Fixes: 9afc6649 ("btrfs: block-group: refactor how we read one block group item") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+ Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
Make sure we clear req->result, which was set to -EAGAIN for retry purposes, when moving it to the reissue list. Otherwise we can end up retrying a request more than once, which leads to weird results in the io-wq handling (and other spots). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NAndres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Eric Sandeen 提交于
The boundary test for the fixed-offset parts of xfs_attr_sf_entry in xfs_attr_shortform_verify is off by one, because the variable array at the end is defined as nameval[1] not nameval[]. Hence we need to subtract 1 from the calculation. This can be shown by: # touch file # setfattr -n root.a file and verifications will fail when it's written to disk. This only matters for a last attribute which has a single-byte name and no value, otherwise the combination of namelen & valuelen will push endp further out and this test won't fail. Fixes: 1e1bbd8e ("xfs: create structure verifier function for shortform xattrs") Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
The inode chunk allocation transaction reserves inobt_maxlevels-1 blocks to accommodate a full split of the inode btree. A full split requires an allocation for every existing level and a new root block, which means inobt_maxlevels is the worst case block requirement for a transaction that inserts to the inobt. This can lead to a transaction block reservation overrun when tmpfile creation allocates an inode chunk and expands the inobt to its maximum depth. This problem has been observed in conjunction with overlayfs, which makes frequent use of tmpfiles internally. The existing reservation code goes back as far as the Linux git repo history (v2.6.12). It was likely never observed as a problem because the traditional file/directory creation transactions also include worst case block reservation for directory modifications, which most likely is able to make up for a single block deficiency in the inode allocation portion of the calculation. tmpfile support is relatively more recent (v3.15), less heavily used, and only includes the inode allocation block reservation as tmpfiles aren't linked into the directory tree on creation. Fix up the inode alloc block reservation macro and a couple of the block allocator minleft parameters that enforce an allocation to leave enough free blocks in the AG for a full inobt split. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
The recent change to make insert range an atomic operation used the incorrect transaction rolling mechanism. The explicit transaction roll does not finish deferred operations. This means that intents for rmapbt updates caused by extent shifts are not logged until the final transaction commits. Thus if a crash occurs during an insert range, log recovery might leave the rmapbt in an inconsistent state. This was discovered by repeated runs of generic/455. Update insert range to finish dfops on every shift iteration. This is similar to collapse range and ensures that intents are logged with the transactions that make associated changes. Fixes: dd87f87d ("xfs: rework insert range into an atomic operation") Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
The man page for io_uring generally claims were consistent with what preadv2 and pwritev2 accept, but turns out there's a slight discrepancy in how offset == -1 is handled for pipes/streams. preadv doesn't allow it, but preadv2 does. This currently causes io_uring to return -EINVAL if that is attempted, but we should allow that as documented. This change makes us consistent with preadv2/pwritev2 for just passing in a NULL ppos for streams if the offset is -1. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+ Reported-by: NBenedikt Ames <wisp3rwind@posteo.eu> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 26 8月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
We need to call kiocb_done() for any ret < 0 to ensure that we always get the proper -ERESTARTSYS (and friends) transformation done. At some point this should be tied into general error handling, so we can get rid of the various (mostly network) related commands that check and perform this substitution. Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
There's no point in using the poll handler if we can't do a nonblocking IO attempt of the operation, since we'll need to go async anyway. In fact this is actively harmful, as reading from eg pipes won't return 0 to indicate EOF. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+ Reported-by: NBenedikt Ames <wisp3rwind@posteo.eu> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
We do the initial accounting of locked_vm and pinned_vm before we have setup ctx->sqo_mm, which means we can end up having not accounted the memory at setup time, but still decrement it when we exit. This causes an imbalance in the accounting. Setup ctx->sqo_mm earlier in io_uring_create(), before we do the first accounting of mm->{locked,pinned}_vm. This also unifies the state grabbing for the ctx, and eliminates a failure case in io_sq_offload_start(). Fixes: f74441e6 ("io_uring: account locked memory before potential error case") Reported-by: NRobert M. Muncrief <rmuncrief@humanavance.com> Reported-by: NNiklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: NNiklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: NRobert M. Muncrief <rmuncrief@humanavance.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 25 8月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Jens Axboe 提交于
Some consumers of the iov_iter will return an error, but still have bytes consumed in the iterator. This is an issue for -EAGAIN, since we rely on a sane iov_iter state across retries. Fix this by ensuring that we revert consumed bytes, if any, if the file operations have consumed any bytes from iterator. This is similar to what generic_file_read_iter() does, and is always safe as we have the previous bytes count handy already. Fixes: ff6165b2 ("io_uring: retain iov_iter state over io_read/io_write calls") Reported-by: NDmitry Shulyak <yashulyak@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NStefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Leases don't currently work correctly on kcephfs, as they are not broken when caps are revoked. They could eventually be implemented similarly to how we did them in libcephfs, but for now don't allow them. [ idryomov: no need for simple_nosetlease() in ceph_dir_fops and ceph_snapdir_fops ] Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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