If the rpcsec_gss_krb5 module cannot be loaded, the attempt to create
an rpc_client in nfs4_init_client will currently fail with an EINVAL.
Fix is to retry with AUTH_NULL.

Regression introduced by the commit "NFS: Use "krb5i" to establish NFSv4
state whenever possible"
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>

Since commit ec88f28d in 2009, checking if the user-specified flavor
is in the server's flavor list has been the source of a few
noticeable regressions (now fixed), but there is one that is still
vexing.

An NFS server can list AUTH_NULL in its flavor list, which suggests
a client should try to mount the server with the flavor of the
client's choice, but the server will squash all accesses.  In some
cases, our client fails to mount a server because of this check,
when the mount could have proceeded successfully.

Skip this check if the user has specified "sec=" on the mount
command line.  But do consult the server-provided flavor list to
choose a security flavor if no sec= option is specified on the mount
command.

If a server lists Kerberos pseudoflavors before "sys" in its export
options, our client now chooses Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX for mount
points, when no security flavor is specified by the mount command.
This could be surprising to some administrators or users, who would
then need to have Kerberos credentials to access the export.

Or, a client administrator may not have enabled rpc.gssd.  In this
case, auth_rpcgss.ko might still be loadable, which is enough for
the new logic to choose Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX.  But the mount
would fail since no GSS context can be created without rpc.gssd
running.

To retain the use of AUTH_UNIX by default:

  o  The server administrator can ensure that "sys" is listed before
     Kerberos flavors in its export security options (see
     exports(5)),

  o  The client administrator can explicitly specify "sec=sys" on
     its mount command line (see nfs(5)),

  o  The client administrator can use "Sec=sys" in an appropriate
     section of /etc/nfsmount.conf (see nfsmount.conf(5)), or

  o  The client administrator can blacklist auth_rpcgss.ko.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR is an invalid flavor, on purpose.  Don't allow
any processing whatsoever if a caller passes it to rpcauth_create()
or rpcauth_get_gssinfo().
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Currently our client uses AUTH_UNIX for state management on Kerberos
NFS mounts in some cases.  For example, if the first mount of a
server specifies "sec=sys," the SETCLIENTID operation is performed
with AUTH_UNIX.  Subsequent mounts using stronger security flavors
can not change the flavor used for lease establishment.  This might
be less security than an administrator was expecting.

Dave Noveck's migration issues draft recommends the use of an
integrity-protecting security flavor for the SETCLIENTID operation.
Let's ignore the mount's sec= setting and use krb5i as the default
security flavor for SETCLIENTID.

If our client can't establish a GSS context (eg. because it doesn't
have a keytab or the server doesn't support Kerberos) we fall back
to using AUTH_NULL.  For an operation that requires a
machine credential (which never represents a particular user)
AUTH_NULL is as secure as AUTH_UNIX.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Most NFSv4 servers implement AUTH_UNIX, and administrators will
prefer this over AUTH_NULL.  It is harmless for our client to try
this flavor in addition to the flavors mandated by RFC 3530/5661.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If the Linux NFS client receives an NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error while
trying to look up an NFS server's root file handle, it retries the
lookup operation with various security flavors to see what flavor
the NFS server will accept for pseudo-fs access.

The list of flavors the client uses during retry consists only of
flavors that are currently registered in the kernel RPC client.
This list may not include any GSS pseudoflavors if auth_rpcgss.ko
has not yet been loaded.

Let's instead use a static list of security flavors that the NFS
standard requires the server to implement (RFC 3530bis, section
3.2.1).  The RPC client should now be able to load support for
these dynamically; if not, they are skipped.

Recovery behavior here is prescribed by RFC 3530bis, section
15.33.5:

> For LOOKUPP, PUTROOTFH and PUTPUBFH, the client will be unable to
> use the SECINFO operation since SECINFO requires a current
> filehandle and none exist for these two [sic] operations.  Therefore,
> the client must iterate through the security triples available at
> the client and reattempt the PUTROOTFH or PUTPUBFH operation.  In
> the unfortunate event none of the MANDATORY security triples are
> supported by the client and server, the client SHOULD try using
> others that support integrity.  Failing that, the client can try
> using AUTH_NONE, but because such forms lack integrity checks,
> this puts the client at risk.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Currently, the compound operation the Linux NFS client sends to the
server to confirm a client ID looks like this:

	{ SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM; PUTROOTFH; GETATTR(lease_time) }

Once the lease is confirmed, it makes sense to know how long before
the client will have to renew it.  And, performing these operations
in the same compound saves a round trip.

Unfortunately, this arrangement assumes that the security flavor
used for establishing a client ID can also be used to access the
server's pseudo-fs.

If the server requires a different security flavor to access its
pseudo-fs than it allowed for the client's SETCLIENTID operation,
the PUTROOTFH in this compound fails with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.  Even
though the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM succeeded, our client's trunking
detection logic interprets the failure of the compound as a failure
by the server to confirm the client ID.

As part of server trunking detection, the client then begins another
SETCLIENTID pass with the same nfs4_client_id.  This fails with
NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE because the first SETCLIENTID/SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM
already succeeded in confirming that client ID -- it was the
PUTROOTFH operation that caused the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM compound to
fail.

To address this issue, separate the "establish client ID" step from
the "accessing the server's pseudo-fs root" step.  The first access
of the server's pseudo-fs may require retrying the PUTROOTFH
operation with different security flavors.  This access is done in
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh().

That leaves the matter of how to retrieve the server's lease time.
nfs4_proc_fsinfo() already retrieves the lease time value, though
none of its callers do anything with the retrieved value (nor do
they mark the lease as "renewed").

Note that NFSv4.1 state recovery invokes nfs4_proc_get_lease_time()
using the lease management security flavor.  This may cause some
heartburn if that security flavor isn't the same as the security
flavor the server requires for accessing the pseudo-fs.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The long lines with no vertical white space make this function
difficult for humans to read.  Add a proper documenting comment
while we're here.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When rpc.gssd is not running, any NFS operation that needs to use a
GSS security flavor of course does not work.

If looking up a server's root file handle results in an
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, nfs4_find_root_sec() is called to try a bunch of
security flavors until one works or all reasonable flavors have
been tried.  When rpc.gssd isn't running, this loop seems to fail
immediately after rpcauth_create() craps out on the first GSS
flavor.

When the rpcauth_create() call in nfs4_lookup_root_sec() fails
because rpc.gssd is not available, nfs4_lookup_root_sec()
unconditionally returns -EIO.  This prevents nfs4_find_root_sec()
from retrying any other flavors; it drops out of its loop and fails
immediately.

Having nfs4_lookup_root_sec() return -EACCES instead allows
nfs4_find_root_sec() to try all flavors in its list.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: Reduce the symbol table footprint for auth_rpcgss.ko by
removing exported symbols for functions that are no longer used
outside of auth_rpcgss.ko.

The remaining two EXPORTs in gss_mech_switch.c get documenting
comments.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

gss_mech_get() is no longer used outside of gss_mech_switch.c.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up.  This matches a similar API for the client side, and
keeps ULP fingers out the of the GSS mech switch.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The NFSv4 SECINFO operation returns a list of security flavors that
the server supports for a particular share.  An NFSv4 client is
supposed to pick a pseudoflavor it supports that corresponds to one
of the flavors returned by the server.

GSS flavors in this list have a GSS tuple that identify a specific
GSS pseudoflavor.

Currently our client ignores the GSS tuple's "qop" value.  A
matching pseudoflavor is chosen based only on the OID and service
value.

So far this omission has not had much effect on Linux.  The NFSv4
protocol currently supports only one qop value: GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
also known as zero.

However, if an NFSv4 server happens to return something other than
zero in the qop field, our client won't notice.  This could cause
the client to behave in incorrect ways that could have security
implications.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The current GSS mech switch can find and load GSS pseudoflavor
modules by name ("krb5") or pseudoflavor number ("390003"), but
cannot find GSS modules by GSS tuple:

  [ "1.2.840.113554.1.2.2", GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE ]

This is important when dealing with a SECINFO request.  A SECINFO
reply contains a list of flavors the server supports for the
requested export, but GSS flavors also have a GSS tuple that maps
to a pseudoflavor (like 390003 for krb5).

If the GSS module that supports the OID in the tuple is not loaded,
our client is not able to load that module dynamically to support
that pseudoflavor.

Add a way for the GSS mech switch to load GSS pseudoflavor support
by OID before searching for the pseudoflavor that matches the OID
and service.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

A SECINFO reply may contain flavors whose kernel module is not
yet loaded by the client's kernel.  A new RPC client API, called
rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor(), is introduced to do proper checking
for support of a security flavor.

When this API is invoked, the RPC client now tries to load the
module for each flavor first before performing the "is this
supported?" check.  This means if a module is available on the
client, but has not been loaded yet, it will be loaded and
registered automatically when the SECINFO reply is processed.

The new API can take a full GSS tuple (OID, QoP, and service).
Previously only the OID and service were considered.

nfs_find_best_sec() is updated to verify all flavors requested in a
SECINFO reply, including AUTH_NULL and AUTH_UNIX.  Previously these
two flavors were simply assumed to be supported without consulting
the RPC client.

Note that the replaced version of nfs_find_best_sec() can return
RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if the server returns a recognized OID but an
unsupported "service" value.  nfs_find_best_sec() now returns
RPC_AUTH_UNIX in this case.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The NFSv4 SECINFO procedure returns a list of security flavors.  Any
GSS flavor also has a GSS tuple containing an OID, a quality-of-
protection value, and a service value, which specifies a particular
GSS pseudoflavor.

For simplicity and efficiency, I'd like to return each GSS tuple
from the NFSv4 SECINFO XDR decoder and pass it straight into the RPC
client.

Define a data structure that is visible to both the NFS client and
the RPC client.  Take structure and field names from the relevant
standards to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

I've built with NFSv4 enabled and disabled.  This forward
declaration does not seem to be required.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Commit f344f6df "SUNRPC: Auto-load RPC authentication kernel
modules", Mon Mar 20 13:44:08 2006, adds a request_module() call
in rpcauth_create() to auto-load RPC security modules when a ULP
tries to create a credential of that flavor.

In rpcauth_create(), the name of the module to load is built like
this:

	request_module("rpc-auth-%u", flavor);

This means that for, say, RPC_AUTH_GSS, request_module() is looking
for a module or alias called "rpc-auth-6".

The GSS module is named "auth_rpcgss", and commit f344f6df does not
add any new module aliases.  There is also no such alias provided in
/etc/modprobe.d on my system (Fedora 16).  Without this alias, the
GSS module is not loaded on demand.

This is used by rpcauth_create().  The pseudoflavor_to_flavor() call
can return RPC_AUTH_GSS, which is passed to request_module().
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If the server sends us a pathname with more components than the client
limit of NFS4_PATHNAME_MAXCOMPONENTS, more server entries than the client
limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATION_MAXSERVERS, or sends a total number of
fs_locations entries than the client limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATIONS_MAXENTRIES
then we will currently Oops because the limit checks are done _after_ we've
decoded the data into the arrays.

Reported-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If the open_context for the file is not yet fully initialised,
then open recovery cannot succeed, and since nfs4_state_find_open_context
returns an ENOENT, we end up treating the file as being irrecoverable.

What we really want to do, is just defer the recovery until later.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

With unlink is an asynchronous operation in the sillyrename case, it
expects nfs4_async_handle_error() to map the error correctly.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Now that we do CLAIM_FH opens, we may run into situations where we
get a delegation but don't have perfect knowledge of the file path.
When returning the delegation, we might therefore not be able to
us CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR opens to convert the delegation into OPEN
stateids and locks.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Sometimes, we actually _want_ to do open-by-filehandle, for instance
when recovering opens after a network partition, or when called
from nfs4_file_open.
Enable that functionality using a new capability NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1,
and which is only enabled for NFSv4.1 servers that support it.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Follow the practice described in section 8.2.2 of RFC5661: When sending a
read/write or setattr stateid, set the seqid field to zero in order to
signal that the NFS server should apply the most recent locking state.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up the setting of the nfs_server->caps, by shoving it all
into nfs4_server_common_setup().
Then add an 'initial capabilities' field into struct nfs4_minor_version_ops.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Adds logic to ensure that if the server returns a BAD_STATEID,
or other state related error, then we check if the stateid has
already changed. If it has, then rather than start state recovery,
we should just resend the failed RPC call with the new stateid.

Allow nfs4_select_rw_stateid to notify that the stateid is unstable by
having it return -EWOULDBLOCK if an RPC is underway that might change the
stateid.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If we replay a READ or WRITE call, we should not be changing the
stateid. Currently, we may end up doing so, because the stateid
is only selected at xdr encode time.

This patch ensures that we select the stateid after we get an NFSv4.1
session slot, and that we keep that same stateid across retries.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Currently, we're forcing an unnecessary duplication of the
initial nfs_lock_context in calls to nfs_get_lock_context, since
__nfs_find_lock_context ignores the ctx->lock_context.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If the state recovery failed, we want to ensure that the application
doesn't try to use the same file descriptor for more reads or writes.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If state recovery fails with an ESTALE or a ENOENT, then we shouldn't
keep retrying. Instead, mark the stateid as being invalid and
fail the I/O with an EIO error.
For other operations such as POSIX and BSD file locking, truncate
etc, fail with an EBADF to indicate that this file descriptor is no
longer valid.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

In the case of a SOFTCONN rpc task, we really want to ensure that it
reports errors like ENETUNREACH back to the caller. Currently, only
some of these errors are being reported back (connect errors are not),
and they are being converted by the RPC layer into EIO.
Reported-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

We need to be careful when testing task->tk_waitqueue in
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked, because it can be changed while we
are holding the queue->lock.
By adding appropriate memory barriers, we can ensure that it is safe to
test task->tk_waitqueue for equality if the RPC_TASK_QUEUED bit is set.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

In order to be able to safely return the layout in nfs4_proc_setattr,
we need to block new uses of the layout, wait for all outstanding
users of the layout to complete, commit the layout and then return it.

This patch adds a helper in order to do all this safely.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>

Note that clearing NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT is tricky, since it requires
you to also clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits from the layout
segments.
The only two sites that need to do this are the ones that call
pnfs_return_layout() without first doing a layout commit.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

We need to clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits atomically with the
NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit, otherwise we may end up with situations
where the two are out of sync.
The first half of the problem is to ensure that pnfs_layoutcommit_inode
clears the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit through pnfs_list_write_lseg.
We still need to keep the reference to those segments until the RPC call
is finished, so in order to make it clear _where_ those references come
from, we add a helper pnfs_list_write_lseg_done() that cleans up after
pnfs_list_write_lseg.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

when pnfs block using device mapper,if umounting later,it maybe
cause oops. we apply "1 + sizeof(bl_umount_request)" memory for
msg->data, the memory maybe overflow when we do "memcpy(&dataptr
[sizeof(bl_msg)], &bl_umount_request, sizeof(bl_umount_request))",
because the size of bl_msg is more than 1 byte.

Signed-off-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Functions like nfs_map_uid_to_name() and nfs_map_gid_to_group() are
expected to return a string without any terminating NUL character.
Regression introduced by commit 57e62324
(NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring).
Reported-by: NDave Chiluk <dave.chiluk@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.4]