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  1. 20 9月, 2022 1 次提交
  3. 29 7月, 2022 1 次提交
    • F
      x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock · c8db5890
      由 Fenghua Yu 提交于 
      mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc4
commit ebb1064e
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/intel-kernel/issues/I5G10C
CVE: NA
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
commit/?id=ebb1064e

Intel-SIG: commit ebb1064e x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock

--------------------------------

Bus locks degrade performance for the whole system, not just for the CPU
that requested the bus lock. Two CPU features "#AC for split lock" and
"#DB for bus lock" provide hooks so that the operating system may choose
one of several mitigation strategies.

bus lock feature to cover additional situations with new options to
mitigate.

split_lock_detect=
		#AC for split lock		#DB for bus lock

off		Do nothing			Do nothing

warn		Kernel OOPs			Warn once per task and
		Warn once per task and		and continues to run.
		disable future checking
	 	When both features are
		supported, warn in #AC

fatal		Kernel OOPs			Send SIGBUS to user.
		Send SIGBUS to user
		When both features are
		supported, fatal in #AC

ratelimit:N	Do nothing			Limit bus lock rate to
						N per second in the
						current non-root user.

Default option is "warn".

Hardware only generates #DB for bus lock detect when CPL>0 to avoid
nested #DB from multiple bus locks while the first #DB is being handled.
So no need to handle #DB for bus lock detected in the kernel.

while #AC for split lock is enabled by split lock detection bit 29 in
TEST_CTRL MSR.

Both breakpoint and bus lock in the same instruction can trigger one #DB.
The bus lock is handled before the breakpoint in the #DB handler.

Delivery of #DB for bus lock in userspace clears DR6[11], which is set by
the #DB handler right after reading DR6.
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322135325.682257-3-fenghua.yu@intel.com

(cherry picked from commit ebb1064e)
Signed-off-by: NEthan Zhao <haifeng.zhao@linux.intel.com>
      c8db5890
  5. 08 7月, 2022 1 次提交
  7. 06 7月, 2022 2 次提交
  9. 22 2月, 2022 2 次提交
  11. 29 12月, 2021 2 次提交
  13. 18 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  15. 10 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  17. 08 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  19. 18 8月, 2020 2 次提交
    • K
      perf/x86/intel: Support TopDown metrics on Ice Lake · 59a854e2
      由 Kan Liang 提交于 
      Ice Lake supports the hardware TopDown metrics feature, which can free
up the scarce GP counters.

Update the event constraints for the metrics events. The metric counters
do not exist, which are mapped to a dummy offset. The sharing between
multiple users of the same metric without multiplexing is not allowed.

Implement set_topdown_event_period for Ice Lake. The values in
PERF_METRICS MSR are derived from the fixed counter 3. Both registers
should start from zero.

Implement update_topdown_event for Ice Lake. The metric is reported by
multiplying the metric (fraction) with slots. To maintain accurate
measurements, both registers are cleared for each update. The fixed
counter 3 should always be cleared before the PERF_METRICS.

Implement td_attr for the new metrics events and the new slots fixed
counter. Make them visible to the perf user tools.
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200723171117.9918-11-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
      59a854e2
    • K
      perf/x86/intel: Generic support for hardware TopDown metrics · 7b2c05a1
      由 Kan Liang 提交于 
      Intro
=====

The TopDown Microarchitecture Analysis (TMA) Method is a structured
analysis methodology to identify critical performance bottlenecks in
out-of-order processors. Current perf has supported the method.

The method works well, but there is one problem. To collect the TopDown
events, several GP counters have to be used. If a user wants to collect
other events at the same time, the multiplexing probably be triggered,
which impacts the accuracy.

To free up the scarce GP counters, the hardware TopDown metrics feature
is introduced from Ice Lake. The hardware implements an additional
"metrics" register and a new Fixed Counter 3 that measures pipeline
"slots". The TopDown events can be calculated from them instead.

Events
======

The level 1 TopDown has four metrics. There is no event-code assigned to
the TopDown metrics. Four metric events are exported as separate perf
events, which map to the internal "metrics" counter register. Those
events do not exist in hardware, but can be allocated by the scheduler.

For the event mapping, a special 0x00 event code is used, which is
reserved for fake events. The metric events start from umask 0x10.

When setting up the metric events, they point to the Fixed Counter 3.
They have to be specially handled.
- Add the update_topdown_event() callback to read the additional metrics
  MSR and generate the metrics.
- Add the set_topdown_event_period() callback to initialize metrics MSR
  and the fixed counter 3.
- Add a variable n_metric_event to track the number of the accepted
  metrics events. The sharing between multiple users of the same metric
  without multiplexing is not allowed.
- Only enable/disable the fixed counter 3 when there are no other active
  TopDown events, which avoid the unnecessary writing of the fixed
  control register.
- Disable the PMU when reading the metrics event. The metrics MSR and
  the fixed counter 3 are read separately. The values may be modified by
  an NMI.

All four metric events don't support sampling. Since they will be
handled specially for event update, a flag PERF_X86_EVENT_TOPDOWN is
introduced to indicate this case.

The slots event can support both sampling and counting.
For counting, the flag is also applied.
For sampling, it will be handled normally as other normal events.

Groups
======

The slots event is required in a Topdown group.
To avoid reading the METRICS register multiple times, the metrics and
slots value can only be updated by slots event in a group.
All active slots and metrics events will be updated one time.
Therefore, the slots event must be before any metric events in a Topdown
group.

NMI
======

The METRICS related register may be overflow. The bit 48 of the STATUS
register will be set. If so, PERF_METRICS and Fixed counter 3 are
required to be reset. The patch also update all active slots and
metrics events in the NMI handler.

The update_topdown_event() has to read two registers separately. The
values may be modified by an NMI. PMU has to be disabled before calling
the function.

RDPMC
======

RDPMC is temporarily disabled. A later patch will enable it.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200723171117.9918-9-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
      7b2c05a1
  21. 08 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  23. 02 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      cpufreq: intel_pstate: Allow enable/disable energy efficiency · ed7bde7a
      由 Srinivas Pandruvada 提交于 
      By default intel_pstate the driver disables energy efficiency by setting
MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL bit 19 for Kaby Lake desktop CPU model in HWP mode.
This CPU model is also shared by Coffee Lake desktop CPUs. This allows
these systems to reach maximum possible frequency. But this adds power
penalty, which some customers don't want. They want some way to enable/
disable dynamically.

So, add an additional attribute "energy_efficiency" under
/sys/devices/system/cpu/intel_pstate/ for these CPU models. This allows
to read and write bit 19 ("Disable Energy Efficiency Optimization") in
the MSR IA32_POWER_CTL.

This attribute is present in both HWP and non-HWP mode as this has an
effect in both modes. Refer to Intel Software Developer's manual for
details.

The scope of this bit is package wide. Also these systems are single
package systems. So read/write MSR on the current CPU is enough.

The energy efficiency (EE) bit setting needs to be preserved during
suspend/resume and CPU offline/online operation. To do this:
- Restoring the EE setting from the cpufreq resume() callback, if there
is change from the system default.
- By default, don't disable EE from cpufreq init() callback for matching
CPU models. Since the scope is package wide and is a single package
system, move the disable EE calls from init() callback to
intel_pstate_init() function, which is called only once.
Suggested-by: NLen Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSrinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      ed7bde7a
  25. 22 6月, 2020 1 次提交
    • B
      x86/msr: Move the F15h MSRs where they belong · 99e40204
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      1068ed45 ("x86/msr: Lift AMD family 0x15 power-specific MSRs")

moved the three F15h power MSRs to the architectural list but that was
wrong as they belong in the family 0x15 list. That also caused:

  In file included from trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.c:10:
  perf/trace/beauty/generated/x86_arch_MSRs_array.c:292:45: error: initialized field overwritten [-Werror=override-init]
    292 |  [0xc0010280 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "F15H_PTSC",
        |                                             ^~~~~~~~~~~
  perf/trace/beauty/generated/x86_arch_MSRs_array.c:292:45: note: (near initialization for 'x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs[640]')

due to MSR_F15H_PTSC ending up being defined twice. Move them where they
belong and drop the duplicate.

Also, drop the respective tools/ changes of the msr-index.h copy the
above commit added because perf tool developers prefer to go through
those changes themselves in order to figure out whether changes to the
kernel headers would need additional handling in perf.

Fixes: 1068ed45 ("x86/msr: Lift AMD family 0x15 power-specific MSRs")
Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200621163323.14e8533f@canb.auug.org.au
      99e40204
  27. 16 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  29. 28 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  31. 20 4月, 2020 1 次提交
    • M
      x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation · 7e5b3c26
      由 Mark Gross 提交于 
      SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]
Signed-off-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
      7e5b3c26
  33. 21 2月, 2020 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel · 6650cdd9
      由 Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 提交于 
      A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans
two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus
lock.

This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a
cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait
for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other
systems it may just be very annoying.

Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is
attempted.

Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle
this:

split_lock_detect=
	off	- not enabled (no traps for split locks)
	warn	- warn once when an application does a
		  split lock, but allow it to continue
		  running.
	fatal	- Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock

On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note
that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will
OOPs.

One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock
detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short
lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one
thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson:

  - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode.  Worst case
    scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple
    #AC exceptions on the same instruction.  And this race will only occur
    if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g.
    a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only
    occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is
    re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC.
  - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported
    and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady
    state that matches the configured mode.  I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to
    be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
      6650cdd9
  35. 20 2月, 2020 1 次提交
    • K
      x86/cpu/amd: Enable the fixed Instructions Retired counter IRPERF · 21b5ee59
      由 Kim Phillips 提交于 
      Commit

  aaf24884 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired)
		  performance counter")

added support for access to the free-running counter via 'perf -e
msr/irperf/', but when exercised, it always returns a 0 count:

BEFORE:

  $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true

   Performance counter stats for 'true':

             624,833      instructions
                   0      msr/irperf/

Simply set its enable bit - HWCR bit 30 - to make it start counting.

Enablement is restricted to all machines advertising IRPERF capability,
except those susceptible to an erratum that makes the IRPERF return
bad values.

That erratum occurs in Family 17h models 00-1fh [1], but not in F17h
models 20h and above [2].

AFTER (on a family 17h model 31h machine):

  $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true

   Performance counter stats for 'true':

             621,690      instructions
             622,490      msr/irperf/

[1] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 00h-0Fh Processors
[2] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 30h-3Fh Processors

The revision guides are available from the bugzilla Link below.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: aaf24884 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired) performance counter")
Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214201805.13830-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
      21b5ee59
  37. 14 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      x86/msr-index: Clean up bit defines for IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR · 32ad73db
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      As pointed out by Boris, the defines for bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
are quite a mouthful, especially the VMX bits which must differentiate
between enabling VMX inside and outside SMX (TXT) operation.  Rename the
MSR and its bit defines to abbreviate FEATURE_CONTROL as FEAT_CTL to
make them a little friendlier on the eyes.

Arguably, the MSR itself should keep the full IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL name
to match Intel's SDM, but a future patch will add a dedicated Kconfig,
file and functions for the MSR. Using the full name for those assets is
rather unwieldy, so bite the bullet and use IA32_FEAT_CTL so that its
nomenclature is consistent throughout the kernel.

Opportunistically, fix a few other annoyances with the defines:

  - Relocate the bit defines so that they immediately follow the MSR
    define, e.g. aren't mistaken as belonging to MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL.
  - Add whitespace around the block of feature control defines to make
    it clear they're all related.
  - Use BIT() instead of manually encoding the bit shift.
  - Use "VMX" instead of "VMXON" to match the SDM.
  - Append "_ENABLED" to the LMCE (Local Machine Check Exception) bit to
    be consistent with the kernel's verbiage used for all other feature
    control bits.  Note, the SDM refers to the LMCE bit as LMCE_ON,
    likely to differentiate it from IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL.LMCE_EN.  Ignore
    the (literal) one-off usage of _ON, the SDM is simply "wrong".
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
      32ad73db
  39. 14 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  41. 04 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  43. 28 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • P
      x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort · 1b42f017
      由 Pawan Gupta 提交于 
      TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.

This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.

A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:

* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).

* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.

The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work.  More
details on this approach can be found here:

  https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html

The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.

 [ bp:
   - massage + comments cleanup
   - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
   - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
   - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
 ]
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      1b42f017
    • P
      x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR · c2955f27
      由 Pawan Gupta 提交于 
      Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack.  A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.

The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.

  [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
    support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]

Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.

TSX has two sub-features:

1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
   where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
   "old" style locks are used by software.

Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.

There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:

  Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
         sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
	 XBEGIN instruction).

  Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
         (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
	  CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      c2955f27
  45. 28 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  47. 20 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h · c49a0a80
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.

RDRAND support is indicated by CPUID Fn00000001_ECX[30]. This bit can be
reset by clearing MSR C001_1004[62]. Any software that checks for RDRAND
support using CPUID, including the kernel, will believe that RDRAND is
not supported.

Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "rdrand=force" kernel parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.

Additionally, update the suspend and resume path to save and restore the
MSR C001_1004 value to ensure that the RDRAND CPUID setting remains in
place after resuming from suspend.

Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7543af91666f491547bd86cebb1e17c66824ab9f.1566229943.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
      c49a0a80
  49. 19 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  51. 24 6月, 2019 1 次提交
    • F
      x86/umwait: Initialize umwait control values · bd688c69
      由 Fenghua Yu 提交于 
      umwait or tpause allows the processor to enter a light-weight
power/performance optimized state (C0.1 state) or an improved
power/performance optimized state (C0.2 state) for a period specified by
the instruction or until the system time limit or until a store to the
monitored address range in umwait.

IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR register allows the OS to enable/disable C0.2 on
the processor and to set the maximum time the processor can reside in C0.1
or C0.2.

By default C0.2 is enabled so the user wait instructions can enter the
C0.2 state to save more power with slower wakeup time.

Andy Lutomirski proposed to set the maximum umwait time to 100000 cycles by
default. A quote from Andy:

  "What I want to avoid is the case where it works dramatically differently
   on NO_HZ_FULL systems as compared to everything else. Also, UMWAIT may
   behave a bit differently if the max timeout is hit, and I'd like that
   path to get exercised widely by making it happen even on default
   configs."

A sysfs interface to adjust the time and the C0.2 enablement is provided in
a follow up change.

[ tglx: Renamed MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_MAX_TIME to
  	MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK because the constant is used as
  	mask throughout the code.
	Massaged comments and changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
      bd688c69
  53. 01 5月, 2019 2 次提交
  55. 16 4月, 2019 1 次提交
    • K
      perf/x86/intel: Support adaptive PEBS v4 · c22497f5
      由 Kan Liang 提交于 
      Adaptive PEBS is a new way to report PEBS sampling information. Instead
of a fixed size record for all PEBS events it allows to configure the
PEBS record to only include the information needed. Events can then opt
in to use such an extended record, or stay with a basic record which
only contains the IP.

The major new feature is to support LBRs in PEBS record.
Besides normal LBR, this allows (much faster) large PEBS, while still
supporting callstacks through callstack LBR. So essentially a lot of
profiling can now be done without frequent interrupts, dropping the
overhead significantly.

The main requirement still is to use a period, and not use frequency
mode, because frequency mode requires reevaluating the frequency on each
overflow.

The floating point state (XMM) is also supported, which allows efficient
profiling of FP function arguments.

Introduce specific drain function to handle variable length records.
Use a new callback to parse the new record format, and also handle the
STATUS field now being at a different offset.

Add code to set up the configuration register. Since there is only a
single register, all events either get the full super set of all events,
or only the basic record.
Originally-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: jolsa@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190402194509.2832-6-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
[ Renamed GPRS => GP. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c22497f5
  57. 07 3月, 2019 2 次提交
    • A
      x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS · ed5194c2
      由 Andi Kleen 提交于 
      Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:

 - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
 - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
 - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)

MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.

MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.

MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.

All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.

Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      ed5194c2
    • T
      x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines · d8eabc37
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.

Clean it up.

[ Josh Poimboeuf: Fix tools build ]
Reported-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      d8eabc37
  59. 06 3月, 2019 1 次提交
  61. 21 12月, 2018 2 次提交
    • C
      KVM: x86: Add Intel PT virtualization work mode · f99e3daf
      由 Chao Peng 提交于 
      Intel Processor Trace virtualization can be work in one
of 2 possible modes:

a. System-Wide mode (default):
   When the host configures Intel PT to collect trace packets
   of the entire system, it can leave the relevant VMX controls
   clear to allow VMX-specific packets to provide information
   across VMX transitions.
   KVM guest will not aware this feature in this mode and both
   host and KVM guest trace will output to host buffer.

b. Host-Guest mode:
   Host can configure trace-packet generation while in
   VMX non-root operation for guests and root operation
   for native executing normally.
   Intel PT will be exposed to KVM guest in this mode, and
   the trace output to respective buffer of host and guest.
   In this mode, tht status of PT will be saved and disabled
   before VM-entry and restored after VM-exit if trace
   a virtual machine.
Signed-off-by: NChao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLuwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      f99e3daf
    • L
      perf/x86/intel/pt: Add new bit definitions for PT MSRs · 69843a91
      由 Luwei Kang 提交于 
      Add bit definitions for Intel PT MSRs to support trace output
directed to the memeory subsystem and holds a count if packet
bytes that have been sent out.

These are required by the upcoming PT support in KVM guests
for MSRs read/write emulation.
Signed-off-by: NLuwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      69843a91