The last caller of vmbus_are_subchannels_present() was removed in commit
c9675904 ("scsi: storvsc: Fix a race in sub-channel creation that can cause panic").

Remove this dead code, and the utility function invoke_sc_cb() that it is
the only caller of.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1635191674-34407-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Mark vmbus ring buffer visible with set_memory_decrypted() when
establish gpadl handle.
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NTianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025122116.264793-5-ltykernel@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

There are some unused inline functions in hyper.h.

Remove those unused functions.
Signed-off-by: NSonia Sharma <sonia.sharma@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1626903663-23615-1-git-send-email-sosha@linux.microsoft.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Use blk_mq_unique_tag() to generate requestIDs for StorVSC, avoiding
all issues with allocating enough entries in the VMbus requestor.
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210510210841.370472-1-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Pointers to ring-buffer packets sent by Hyper-V are used within the
guest VM. Hyper-V can send packets with erroneous values or modify
packet fields after they are processed by the guest. To defend
against these scenarios, return a copy of the incoming VMBus packet
after validating its length and offset fields in hv_pkt_iter_first().
In this way, the packet can no longer be modified by the host.
Signed-off-by: NAndres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408161439.341988-1-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Introduce the CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL_RESPONSE message type, and code
to receive and process such a message.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210416143449.16185-3-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Hyper-V has added VMBus protocol version 5.3.  Allow Linux guests to
negotiate the new version on version of Hyper-V that support it.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210416143449.16185-2-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

s/sructure/structure/
s/extention/extension/
s/offerred/offered/
s/adversley/adversely/
Signed-off-by: NBhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210321233108.3885240-1-unixbhaskar@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

storvsc currently sets .dma_boundary to limit scatterlist entries to 4
Kbytes, which is less efficient with huge pages that offer large chunks of
contiguous physical memory. Improve the algorithm for creating the Hyper-V
guest physical address PFN array so that scatterlist entries with lengths >
4Kbytes are handled.  As a result, remove the .dma_boundary setting.

The improved algorithm also adds support for scatterlist entries with
offsets >= 4Kbytes, which is supported by many other SCSI low-level
drivers.  And it retains support for architectures where possibly PAGE_SIZE
!= HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (such as ARM64).

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614120294-1930-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.comReviewed-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

This reverts commit a8c32099.

It is reported that the said commit caused regression in netvsc.
Reported-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having
a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code
should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older
style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

Refactor the code according to the use of a flexible-array member in
struct icmsg_negotiate, instead of a one-element array.

Also, this helps the ongoing efforts to enable -Warray-bounds and fix the
following warnings:

drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c:315:23: warning: array subscript 1 is above array bounds of ‘struct ic_version[1]’ [-Warray-bounds]
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c:316:23: warning: array subscript 1 is above array bounds of ‘struct ic_version[1]’ [-Warray-bounds]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/79
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201174334.GA171933@embeddedorSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Only the VSCs or ICs that have been hardened and that are critical for
the successful adoption of Confidential VMs should be allowed if the
guest is running isolated.  This change reduces the footprint of the
code that will be exercised by Confidential VMs and hence the exposure
to bugs and vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201144814.2701-3-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

An erroneous or malicious host could send multiple rescind messages for
a same channel.  In vmbus_onoffer_rescind(), the guest maps the channel
ID to obtain a pointer to the channel object and it eventually releases
such object and associated data.  The host could time rescind messages
and lead to an use-after-free.  Add a new flag to the channel structure
to make sure that only one instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() can get
the reference to the channel object.
Reported-by: NJuan Vazquez <juvazq@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209070827.29335-6-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause indexing off the end of the icversion_data
array in vmbus_prep_negotiate_resp().
Signed-off-by: NAndres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109100704.9152-1-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Pointers to ring-buffer packets sent by Hyper-V are used within the
guest VM. Hyper-V can send packets with erroneous values or modify
packet fields after they are processed by the guest. To defend
against these scenarios, return a copy of the incoming VMBus packet
after validating its length and offset fields in hv_pkt_iter_first().
In this way, the packet can no longer be modified by the host.
Signed-off-by: NAndres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208045311.10244-1-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Currently, pointers to guest memory are passed to Hyper-V as
transaction IDs in netvsc. In the face of errors or malicious
behavior in Hyper-V, netvsc should not expose or trust the transaction
IDs returned by Hyper-V to be valid guest memory addresses. Instead,
use small integers generated by vmbus_requestor as requests
(transaction) IDs.
Signed-off-by: NAndres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109100402.8946-4-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Currently, VMbus drivers use pointers into guest memory as request IDs
for interactions with Hyper-V. To be more robust in the face of errors
or malicious behavior from a compromised Hyper-V, avoid exposing
guest memory addresses to Hyper-V. Also avoid Hyper-V giving back a
bad request ID that is then treated as the address of a guest data
structure with no validation. Instead, encapsulate these memory
addresses and provide small integers as request IDs.
Signed-off-by: NAndres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109100402.8946-2-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

When a guest communicate with the hypervisor, it must use HV_HYP_PAGE to
calculate PFN, so introduce a few hvpfn helper functions as the
counterpart of the page helper functions. This is the preparation for
supporting guest whose PAGE_SIZE is not 4k.
Signed-off-by: NBoqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916034817.30282-7-boqun.feng@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

There will be more places other than vmbus where we need to calculate
the Hyper-V page PFN from a virtual address, so move virt_to_hvpfn() to
hyperv generic header.
Signed-off-by: NBoqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916034817.30282-6-boqun.feng@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

This patch introduces two types of GPADL: HV_GPADL_{BUFFER, RING}. The
types of GPADL are purely the concept in the guest, IOW the hypervisor
treat them as the same.

The reason of introducing the types for GPADL is to support guests whose
page size is not 4k (the page size of Hyper-V hypervisor). In these
guests, both the headers and the data parts of the ringbuffers need to
be aligned to the PAGE_SIZE, because 1) some of the ringbuffers will be
mapped into userspace and 2) we use "double mapping" mechanism to
support fast wrap-around, and "double mapping" relies on ringbuffers
being page-aligned. However, the Hyper-V hypervisor only uses 4k
(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE) headers. Our solution to this is that we always make
the headers of ringbuffers take one guest page and when GPADL is
established between the guest and hypervisor, the only first 4k of
header is used. To handle this special case, we need the types of GPADL
to differ different guest memory usage for GPADL.

Type enum is introduced along with several general interfaces to
describe the differences between normal buffer GPADL and ringbuffer
GPADL.
Signed-off-by: NBoqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916034817.30282-4-boqun.feng@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The spinlock is (now) *not used to protect test-and-set accesses
to attributes of the structure or sc_list operations.

There is, AFAICT, a distinct lack of {WRITE,READ}_ONCE()s in the
handling of channel->state, but the changes below do not seem to
make things "worse".  ;-)
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617164642.37393-9-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The field is read only in numa_node_show() and it is already stored twice
(after a call to cpu_to_node()) in target_cpu_store() and init_vp_index();
there is no need to "cache" its value in the channel data structure.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617164642.37393-3-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The field is read only in __vmbus_open() and it is already stored twice
(after a call to hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number()) in target_cpu_store() and
init_vp_index(); there is no need to "cache" its value in the channel
data structure.
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617164642.37393-2-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

init_vp_index() uses the (per-node) hv_numa_map[] masks to record the
CPUs allocated for channel interrupts at a given time, and distribute
the performance-critical channels across the available CPUs: in part.,
the mask of "candidate" target CPUs in a given NUMA node, for a newly
offered channel, is determined by XOR-ing the node's CPU mask and the
node's hv_numa_map.  This operation/mechanism assumes that no offline
CPUs is set in the hv_numa_map mask, an assumption that does not hold
since such mask is currently not updated when a channel is removed or
assigned to a different CPU.

To address the issues described above, this adds hooks in the channel
removal path (hv_process_channel_removal()) and in target_cpu_store()
in order to clear, resp. to update, the hv_numa_map[] masks as needed.
This also adds a (missed) update of the masks in init_vp_index() (cf.,
e.g., the memory-allocation failure path in this function).

Like in the case of init_vp_index(), such hooks require to determine
if the given channel is performance critical.  init_vp_index() does
this by parsing the channel's offer, it can not rely on the device
data structure (device_obj) to retrieve such information because the
device data structure has not been allocated/linked with the channel
by the time that init_vp_index() executes.  A similar situation may
hold in hv_is_alloced_cpu() (defined below); the adopted approach is
to "cache" the device type of the channel, as computed by parsing the
channel's offer, in the channel structure itself.

Fixes: 75278105 ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Introduce the CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL message type")
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522171901.204127-3-parri.andrea@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 76497732 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200507185323.GA14416@embeddedorSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

For each storvsc_device, storvsc keeps track of the channel target CPUs
associated to the device (alloced_cpus) and it uses this information to
fill a "cache" (stor_chns) mapping CPU->channel according to a certain
heuristic.  Update the alloced_cpus mask and the stor_chns array when a
channel of the storvsc device is re-assigned to a different CPU.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406001514.19876-12-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Reviewed-by; Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
[ wei: fix a small issue reported by kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> ]
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

VMBus version 4.1 and later support the CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL(22)
message type which can be used to request Hyper-V to change the vCPU
that a channel will interrupt.

Introduce the CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL message type, and define the
vmbus_send_modifychannel() function to send CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL
requests to the host via a hypercall.  The function is then used to
define a sysfs "store" operation, which allows to change the (v)CPU
the channel will interrupt by using the sysfs interface.  The feature
can be used for load balancing or other purposes.

One interesting catch here is that Hyper-V can *not* currently ACK
CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL messages with the promise that (after the ACK
is sent) the channel won't send any more interrupts to the "old" CPU.

The peculiarity of the CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL messages is problematic
if the user want to take a CPU offline, since we don't want to take a
CPU offline (and, potentially, "lose" channel interrupts on such CPU)
if the host is still processing a CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL message
associated to that CPU.

It is worth mentioning, however, that we have been unable to observe
the above mentioned "race": in all our tests, CHANNELMSG_MODIFYCHANNEL
requests appeared *as if* they were processed synchronously by the host.
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406001514.19876-11-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
[ wei: fix conflict in channel_mgmt.c ]
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The logic is unused since commit 509879bd ("Drivers: hv: Introduce
a policy for controlling channel affinity").

This logic assumes that a channel target_cpu doesn't change during the
lifetime of a channel, but this assumption is incompatible with the new
functionality that allows changing the vCPU a channel will interrupt.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406001514.19876-9-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Since vmbus_chan_sched() dereferences the ring buffer pointer, we have
to make sure that the ring buffer data structures don't get freed while
such dereferencing is happening.  Current code does this by sending an
IPI to the CPU that is allowed to access that ring buffer from interrupt
level, cf., vmbus_reset_channel_cb().  But with the new functionality
to allow changing the CPU that a channel will interrupt, we can't be
sure what CPU will be running the vmbus_chan_sched() function for a
particular channel, so the current IPI mechanism is infeasible.

Instead synchronize vmbus_chan_sched() and vmbus_reset_channel_cb() by
using the (newly introduced) per-channel spin lock "sched_lock".  Move
the test for onchannel_callback being NULL before the "switch" control
statement in vmbus_chan_sched(), in order to not access the ring buffer
if the vmbus_reset_channel_cb() has been completed on the channel.
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406001514.19876-7-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

When Hyper-V sends an interrupt to the guest, the guest has to figure
out which channel the interrupt is associated with.  Hyper-V sets a bit
in a memory page that is shared with the guest, indicating a particular
"relid" that the interrupt is associated with.  The current Linux code
then uses a set of per-CPU linked lists to map a given "relid" to a
pointer to a channel structure.

This design introduces a synchronization problem if the CPU that Hyper-V
will interrupt for a certain channel is changed.  If the interrupt comes
on the "old CPU" and the channel was already moved to the per-CPU list
of the "new CPU", then the relid -> channel mapping will fail and the
interrupt is dropped.  Similarly, if the interrupt comes on the new CPU
but the channel was not moved to the per-CPU list of the new CPU, then
the mapping will fail and the interrupt is dropped.

Relids are integers ranging from 0 to 2047.  The mapping from relids to
channel structures can be done by setting up an array with 2048 entries,
each entry being a pointer to a channel structure (hence total size ~16K
bytes, which is not a problem).  The array is global, so there are no
per-CPU linked lists to update.  The array can be searched and updated
by loading from/storing to the array at the specified index.  With no
per-CPU data structures, the above mentioned synchronization problem is
avoided and the relid2channel() function gets simpler.
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406001514.19876-4-parri.andrea@gmail.comReviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

vmbus_onmessage() doesn't need the header of the message, it only
uses it to get to the payload, we can pass the pointer to the
payload directly.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406104154.45010-4-vkuznets@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

Add util_pre_suspend() and util_pre_resume() for some hv_utils devices
(e.g. kvp/vss/fcopy), because they need special handling before
util_suspend() calls vmbus_close().

For kvp, all the possible pending work items should be cancelled.

For vss and fcopy, some extra clean-up needs to be done, i.e. fake a
THAW message for hv_vss_daemon and fake a CANCEL_FCOPY message for
hv_fcopy_daemon, otherwise when the VM resums back, the daemons
can end up in an inconsistent state (i.e. the file systems are
frozen but will never be thawed; the file transmitted via fcopy
may not be complete). Note: there is an extra patch for the daemons:
"Tools: hv: Reopen the devices if read() or write() returns errors",
because the hv_utils driver can not guarantee the whole transaction
finishes completely once util_suspend() starts to run (at this time,
all the userspace processes are frozen).

util_probe() disables channel->callback_event to avoid the race with
the channel callback.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When a Linux hv_sock app tries to connect to a Service GUID on which no
host app is listening, a recent host (RS3+) sends a
CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT (23) message to Linux and this triggers such
a warning:

unknown msgtype=23
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c:1031 vmbus_on_msg_dpc

Actually Linux can safely ignore the message because the Linux app's
connect() will time out in 2 seconds: see VSOCK_DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
and vsock_stream_connect(). We don't bother to make use of the message
because: 1) it's only supported on recent hosts; 2) a non-trivial effort
is required to use the message in Linux, but the benefit is small.

So, let's not see the warning by silently ignoring the message.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Introduce user specified latency in the packet reception path
By exposing the test parameters as part of the debugfs channel
attributes. We will control the testing state via these attributes.
Signed-off-by: NBranden Bonaby <brandonbonaby94@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Hyper-V has added VMBus protocol versions 5.1 and 5.2 in recent release
versions.  Allow Linux guests to negotiate these new protocol versions
on versions of Hyper-V that support them.  While on this, also allow
guests to negotiate the VMBus protocol version 4.1 (which was missing).
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

The technique used to get the next VMBus version seems increasisly
clumsy as the number of VMBus versions increases.  Performance is
not a concern since this is only done once during system boot; it's
just that we'll end up with more lines of code than is really needed.

As an alternative, introduce a table with the version numbers listed
in order (from the most recent to the oldest).  vmbus_connect() loops
through the versions listed in the table until it gets an accepted
connection or gets to the end of the table (invalid version).
Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When the host re-offers the primary channels upon resume, the host only
guarantees the Instance GUID  doesn't change, so vmbus_bus_suspend()
should invalidate channel->offermsg.child_relid and figure out the
number of primary channels that need to be fixed up upon resume.

Upon resume, vmbus_onoffer() finds the old channel structs, and maps
the new offers to the old channels, and fixes up the old structs,
and finally the resume callbacks of the VSC drivers will re-open
the channels.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

The high-level VSC drivers will implement device-specific callbacks.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

The existing method of telling if a channel is sub-channel in
vmbus_process_offer() is cumbersome. This new simple helper function
is preferred in future.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

This interface driver is a helper driver allows other drivers to
have a common interface with the Hyper-V PCI frontend driver.
Signed-off-by: NHaiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSaeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>