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  1. 13 3月, 2014 4 次提交
  3. 12 3月, 2014 2 次提交
  5. 11 3月, 2014 6 次提交
  7. 10 3月, 2014 2 次提交
  9. 09 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 08 3月, 2014 3 次提交
  13. 07 3月, 2014 5 次提交
  15. 05 3月, 2014 2 次提交
  17. 04 3月, 2014 7 次提交
    • T
      af_rxrpc: Keep rxrpc_call pointers in a hashtable · 7727640c
      由 Tim Smith 提交于 
      Keep track of rxrpc_call structures in a hashtable so they can be
found directly from the network parameters which define the call.

This allows incoming packets to be routed directly to a call without walking
through hierarchy of peer -> transport -> connection -> call and all the
spinlocks that that entailed.
Signed-off-by: NTim Smith <tim@electronghost.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      7727640c
    • D
      net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable · ec0223ec
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:

  The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
  the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
  specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
  the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
  AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
  and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
  defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
  key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
  all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]

  When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
  authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
  because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
  in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
  containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
  chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
  them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
  packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
  the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
  authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
  parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
  obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
  shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
  specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
  the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
  the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
  MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
  process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
  from the existing association to authenticate the
  COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]

Commit bbd0d598 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.

Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.

The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.

Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.

Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d598 created a skb clone in that case.

I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.

Fixes: bbd0d598 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ec0223ec
    • Y
      tcp: snmp stats for Fast Open, SYN rtx, and data pkts · f19c29e3
      由 Yuchung Cheng 提交于 
      Add the following snmp stats:

TCPFastOpenActiveFail: Fast Open attempts (SYN/data) failed beacuse
the remote does not accept it or the attempts timed out.

TCPSynRetrans: number of SYN and SYN/ACK retransmits to break down
retransmissions into SYN, fast-retransmits, timeout retransmits, etc.

TCPOrigDataSent: number of outgoing packets with original data (excluding
retransmission but including data-in-SYN). This counter is different from
TcpOutSegs because TcpOutSegs also tracks pure ACKs. TCPOrigDataSent is
more useful to track the TCP retransmission rate.

Change TCPFastOpenActive to track only successful Fast Opens to be symmetric to
TCPFastOpenPassive.
Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NNandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NLawrence Brakmo <brakmo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f19c29e3
    • X
      ip_tunnel:multicast process cause panic due to skb->_skb_refdst NULL pointer · 10ddceb2
      由 Xin Long 提交于 
      when ip_tunnel process multicast packets, it may check if the packet is looped
back packet though 'rt_is_output_route(skb_rtable(skb))' in ip_tunnel_rcv(),
but before that , skb->_skb_refdst has been dropped in iptunnel_pull_header(),
so which leads to a panic.

fix the bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70681Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      10ddceb2
    • H
      sch_tbf: Remove holes in struct tbf_sched_data. · a135e598
      由 Hiroaki SHIMODA 提交于 
      On x86_64 we have 3 holes in struct tbf_sched_data.

The member peak_present can be replaced with peak.rate_bytes_ps,
because peak.rate_bytes_ps is set only when peak is specified in
tbf_change(). tbf_peak_present() is introduced to test
peak.rate_bytes_ps.

The member max_size is moved to fill 32bit hole.
Signed-off-by: NHiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a135e598
    • Y
      tcp: fix bogus RTT on special retransmission · c84a5711
      由 Yuchung Cheng 提交于 
      RTT may be bogus with tall loss probe (TLP) when a packet
is retransmitted and latter (s)acked without TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS flag.

For example, TLP calls __tcp_retransmit_skb() instead of
tcp_retransmit_skb(). The skb timestamps are updated but the sacked
flag is not marked with TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS. As a result we'll
get bogus RTT in tcp_clean_rtx_queue() or in tcp_sacktag_one() on
spurious retransmission.

The fix is to apply the sticky flag TCP_EVER_RETRANS to enforce Karn's
check on RTT sampling. However this will disable F-RTO if timeout occurs
after TLP, by resetting undo_marker in tcp_enter_loss(). We relax this
check to only if any pending retransmists are still in-flight.
Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: NNandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c84a5711
    • D
      hsr: off by one sanity check in hsr_register_frame_in() · de39d7a4
      由 Dan Carpenter 提交于 
      This is a sanity check and we never pass invalid values so this patch
doesn't change anything.  However the node->time_in[] array has
HSR_MAX_SLAVE (2) elements and not HSR_MAX_DEV (3).
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      de39d7a4
  19. 03 3月, 2014 4 次提交
  21. 01 3月, 2014 4 次提交