Pass the fs instance with lower_layers array instead of the dentry
lowerstack array to ovl_check_origin_fh(), because the dentry members
of lowerstack play no role in this helper.

This change simplifies the argument list of ovl_check_origin(),
ovl_cleanup_index() and ovl_verify_index().
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Re-factor ovl_check_origin() and ovl_get_origin(), so origin fh xattr is
read from upper inode only once during lookup with multiple lower layers
and only once when verifying index entry origin.
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Store the fs root layer index inside ovl_layer struct, so we can
get the root fs layer index from merge dir lower layer instead of
find it with ovl_find_layer() helper.
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

When work dir creation fails, a warning is emitted and overlay is
mounted r/o. Trying to remount r/w will fail with no work dir.

When index dir creation fails, the same warning is emitted and overlay
is mounted r/o, but trying to remount r/w will succeed. This may cause
unintentional corruption of filesystem consistency.

Adjust the behavior of index dir creation failure to that of work dir
creation failure and do not allow to remount r/w. User needs to state
an explicitly intention to work without an index by mounting with
option 'index=off' to allow r/w mount with no index dir.

When mounting with option 'index=on' and no 'upperdir', index is
implicitly disabled, so do not warn about no file handle support.

The issue was introduced with inodes index feature in v4.13, but this
patch will not apply cleanly before ovl_fill_super() re-factoring in
v4.15.

Fixes: 02bcd157 ("ovl: introduce the inodes index dir feature")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.13
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Overlayfs falls back to index=off if lower/upper fs does not support
file handles. Do the same if upper fs does not support xattr.
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

For a merge dir that was copied up before v4.12 or that was hand crafted
offline (e.g. mkdir {upper/lower}/dir), upper dir does not contain the
'trusted.overlay.origin' xattr.  In that case, stat(2) on the merge dir
returns the lower dir st_ino, but getdents(2) returns the upper dir d_ino.

After this change, on merge dir lookup, missing origin xattr on upper
dir will be fixed and 'impure' xattr will be fixed on parent of the legacy
merge dir.
Suggested-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

The optimization in ovl_cache_get_impure() that tries to remove an
unneeded "impure" xattr needs to take mnt_want_write() on upper fs.

Fixes: 4edb83bb ("ovl: constant d_ino for non-merge dirs")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.14
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

There are several write operations on upper fs not covered by
mnt_want_write():

- test set/remove OPAQUE xattr
- test create O_TMPFILE
- set ORIGIN xattr in ovl_verify_origin()
- cleanup of index entries in ovl_indexdir_cleanup()

Some of these go way back, but this patch only applies over the
v4.14 re-factoring of ovl_fill_super().

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.14
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

The functions ovl_lower_positive() and ovl_check_empty_dir() both take
inode mutex on the real lower dir under ovl_want_write() which takes
the upper_mnt sb_writers lock.

While this is not a clear locking order or layering violation, it creates
an undesired lock dependency between two unrelated layers for no good
reason.

This lock dependency materializes to a false(?) positive lockdep warning
when calling rmdir() on a nested overlayfs, where both nested and
underlying overlayfs both use the same fs type as upper layer.

rmdir() on the nested overlayfs creates the lock chain:
  sb_writers of upper_mnt (e.g. tmpfs) in ovl_do_remove()
  ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[] of lower overlay dir in ovl_lower_positive()

rmdir() on the underlying overlayfs creates the lock chain in
reverse order:
  ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[] of lower overlay dir in vfs_rmdir()
  sb_writers of nested upper_mnt (e.g. tmpfs) in ovl_do_remove()

To rid of the unneeded locking dependency, move both ovl_lower_positive()
and ovl_check_empty_dir() to before ovl_want_write() in rmdir() and
rename() implementation.

This change spreads the pieces of ovl_check_empty_and_clear() directly
inside the rmdir()/rename() implementations so the helper is no longer
needed and removed.
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

As a writable mount, it is not expected for overlayfs to return
EINVAL/EROFS for fsync, even if dir/file is not changed.

This commit fixes the case of fsync of directory, which is easier to
address, because overlayfs already implements fsync file operation for
directories.

The problem reported by Raphael is that new PostgreSQL 10.0 with a
database in overlayfs where lower layer in squashfs fails to start.
The failure is due to fsync error, when PostgreSQL does fsync on all
existing db directories on startup and a specific directory exists
lower layer with no changes.
Reported-by: NRaphael Hertzog <raphael@ouaza.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NRaphaël Hertzog <hertzog@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

fsnotify pins a watched directory inode in cache, but if directory dentry
is released, new lookup will allocate a new dentry and a new inode.
Directory events will be notified on the new inode, while fsnotify listener
is watching the old pinned inode.

Hash all directory inodes to reuse the pinned inode on lookup. Pure upper
dirs are hashes by real upper inode, merge and lower dirs are hashed by
real lower inode.

The reference to lower inode was being held by the lower dentry object
in the overlay dentry (oe->lowerstack[0]). Releasing the overlay dentry
may drop lower inode refcount to zero. Add a refcount on behalf of the
overlay inode to prevent that.

As a by-product, hashing directory inodes also detects multiple
redirected dirs to the same lower dir and uncovered redirected dir
target on and returns -ESTALE on lookup.

The reported issue dates back to initial version of overlayfs, but this
patch depends on ovl_inode code that was introduced in kernel v4.13.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.13
Reported-by: NNiklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NNiklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@axis.com>

The previous fix in commit 384632e6 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative:
fix fork use after free") corrected the refcounting in case of
UFFD_EVENT_FORK failure for the fork userfault paths.

That still didn't clear the vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx of the vmas that
were set to point to the aborted new uffd ctx earlier in
dup_userfaultfd.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171223002505.593-2-aarcange@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This is a logical revert of commit e37fdb78 ("exec: Use secureexec
for setting dumpability")

This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
being tied to secureexec.

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633Reported-by: NTom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>
Fixes: e37fdb78 ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix some integer overflow problems if offset + count happen to be large
enough to cause an integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

xfs_qm_init_quotainfo() does not check result of register_shrinker()
which was tagged as __must_check recently, reported by sparse.
Signed-off-by: NAliaksei Karaliou <akaraliou.dev@gmail.com>
[darrick: move xfs_qm_destroy_quotainos nearer xfs_qm_init_quotainos]
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

xfs_qm_destroy_quotainfo() does not destroy quotainfo->qi_tree_lock
while destroys quotainfo->qi_quotaofflock.
Signed-off-by: NAliaksei Karaliou <akaraliou.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

refcounts have a generic implementation and an asm optimized one.  The
generic version has extra debugging to make sure that once a refcount
goes to zero, refcount_inc won't increase it.

The btrfs delayed inode code wasn't expecting this, and we're tripping
over the warnings when the generic refcounts are used.  We ended up with
this race:

Process A                                         Process B
                                                  btrfs_get_delayed_node()
						  spin_lock(root->inode_lock)
						  radix_tree_lookup()
__btrfs_release_delayed_node()
refcount_dec_and_test(&delayed_node->refs)
our refcount is now zero
						  refcount_add(2) <---
						  warning here, refcount
                                                  unchanged

spin_lock(root->inode_lock)
radix_tree_delete()

With the generic refcounts, we actually warn again when process B above
tries to release his refcount because refcount_add() turned into a
no-op.

We saw this in production on older kernels without the asm optimized
refcounts.

The fix used here is to use refcount_inc_not_zero() to detect when the
object is in the middle of being freed and return NULL.  This is almost
always the right answer anyway, since we usually end up pitching the
delayed_node if it didn't have fresh data in it.

This also changes __btrfs_release_delayed_node() to remove the extra
check for zero refcounts before radix tree deletion.
btrfs_get_delayed_node() was the only path that was allowing refcounts
to go from zero to one.

Fixes: 6de5f18e ("btrfs: fix refcount_t usage when deleting btrfs_delayed_node")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Commit e0ae9994 ("btrfs: preallocate device flush bio") reworked
the way the flush bio is allocated and used. Concretely it allocates
the bio in __alloc_device and then re-uses it multiple times with a
very simple endio routine that just calls complete() without consuming
a reference. Allocated bios by default come with a ref count of 1,
which is then consumed by the endio routine (or not, in which case they
should be bio_put by the caller). The way the impleementation works now
is that the flush bio has a refcount of 2 and we only ever bio_put it
once, leaving it to hang indefinitely. Fix this by removing the extra
bio_get in __alloc_device.

Fixes: e0ae9994 ("btrfs: preallocate device flush bio")
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

afs_write_end() is missing page unlock and put if afs_fill_page() fails.
Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Repeating creation and deletion of a file on an afs mount will run the box
out of memory, e.g.:

	dd if=/dev/zero of=/afs/scratch/m0 bs=$((1024*1024)) count=512
	rm /afs/scratch/m0

The problem seems to be that it's not properly decrementing the nlink count
so that the inode can be scrapped.

Note that this doesn't fix local creation followed by remote deletion.
That's harder to handle and will require a separate patch as we're not told
that the file has been deleted - only that the directory has changed.
Reported-by: NMarc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Smatch warns that:

    fs/afs/rxrpc.c:922 afs_extract_data()
    error: uninitialized symbol 'remote_abort'.

Smatch is right that "remote_abort" might be uninitialized when we pass
it to afs_set_call_complete().  I don't know if that function uses the
uninitialized variable.  Anyway, the comment for rxrpc_kernel_recv_data(),
says that "*_abort should also be initialised to 0." and this patch does
that.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

For rmap removal, refactor the rmap owner checks into a separate
function, then skip the checks if we are performing an unknown-owner
removal.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Calling xfs_rmap_free with an unknown owner is supposed to remove any
rmaps covering that range regardless of owner.  This is used by the EFI
recovery code to say "we're freeing this, it mustn't be owned by
anything anymore", but for whatever reason xfs_free_ag_extent filters
them out.

Therefore, remove the filter and make xfs_rmap_unmap actually treat it
as a wildcard owner -- free anything that's already there, and if
there's no owner at all then that's fine too.

There are two existing callers of bmap_add_free that take care the rmap
deferred ops themselves and use OWN_UNKNOWN to skip the EFI-based rmap
cleanup; convert these to use OWN_NULL (via helpers), and now we really
require that an RUI (if any) gets added to the defer ops before any EFI.

Lastly, now that xfs_free_extent filters out OWN_NULL rmap free requests,
growfs will have to consult directly with the rmap to ensure that there
aren't any rmaps in the grown region.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Under the deferred rmap operation scheme, there's a certain order in
which the rmap deferred ops have to be queued to maintain integrity
during log replay.  For alloc/map operations that order is cui -> rui;
for free/unmap operations that order is cui -> rui -> efi.  However, the
initial refcount code got the ordering wrong in the free side of things
because it queued refcount free op and an EFI and the refcount free op
queued a rmap free op, resulting in the order cui -> efi -> rui.

If we fail before the efd finishes, the efi recovery will try to do a
wildcard rmap removal and the subsequent rui will fail to find the rmap
and blow up.  This didn't ever happen due to other screws up in handling
unknown owner rmap removals, but those other screw ups broke recovery in
other ways, so fix the ordering to follow the intended rules.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

If a user performs a direct CoW write, we end up loading the CoW fork
with preallocated extents.  Therefore, we must set the cowblocks tag so
that they can be cleared out if we run low on space.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

When we're remounting the filesystem readonly, remove all CoW
preallocations prior to going ro.  If the fs goes down after the ro
remount, we never clean up the staging extents, which means xfs_check
will trip over them on a subsequent run.  Practically speaking, the next
mount will clean them up too, so this is unlikely to be seen.  Since we
shut down the cowblocks cleaner on remount-ro, we also have to make sure
we start it back up if/when we remount-rw.

Found by adding clonerange to fsstress and running xfs/017.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Currently, xfs_itruncate_extents clears the cowblocks tag if i_cnextents
is zero.  This is wrong, since i_cnextents only tracks real extents in
the CoW fork, which means that we could have some delayed CoW
reservations still in there that will now never get cleaned.

Fix a further bug where we /don't/ clear the reflink iflag if there are
any attribute blocks -- really, it's only safe to clear the reflink flag
if there are no data fork extents and no cow fork extents.

Found by adding clonerange to fsstress in xfs/017.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

The EOFBLOCKS/COWBLOCKS tags are totally separate things, so track them
with separate i_flags.  Right now we're abusing IEOFBLOCKS for both,
which is totally bogus because we won't tag the inode with COWBLOCKS if
IEOFBLOCKS was set by a previous tagging of the inode with EOFBLOCKS.
Found by wiring up clonerange to fsstress in xfs/017.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This reverts commit 04e35f44.

SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.
Reported-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NTomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

With CONFIG_MTD=m and CONFIG_CRAMFS=y, we now get a link failure:

  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mount': inode.c:(.text+0x220): undefined reference to `mount_mtd'
  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mtd_fill_super':
  inode.c:(.text+0x6d8): undefined reference to `mtd_point'
  inode.c:(.text+0xae4): undefined reference to `mtd_unpoint'

This adds a more specific Kconfig dependency to avoid the broken
configuration.

Alternatively we could make CRAMFS itself depend on "MTD || !MTD" with a
similar result.

Fixes: 99c18ce5 ("cramfs: direct memory access support")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

[ Note, this is a Git cherry-pick of the following commit:

    506458ef ("locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()")

  ... for easier x86 PTI code testing and back-porting. ]

READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it
can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in
semantics.
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This reverts commits 5c9d2d5c, c7da82b8, and e7fe7b5c.

We'll probably need to revisit this, but basically we should not
complicate the get_user_pages_fast() case, and checking the actual page
table protection key bits will require more care anyway, since the
protection keys depend on the exact state of the VM in question.

Particularly when doing a "remote" page lookup (ie in somebody elses VM,
not your own), you need to be much more careful than this was.  Dave
Hansen says:

 "So, the underlying bug here is that we now a get_user_pages_remote()
  and then go ahead and do the p*_access_permitted() checks against the
  current PKRU. This was introduced recently with the addition of the
  new p??_access_permitted() calls.

  We have checks in the VMA path for the "remote" gups and we avoid
  consulting PKRU for them. This got missed in the pkeys selftests
  because I did a ptrace read, but not a *write*. I also didn't
  explicitly test it against something where a COW needed to be done"

It's also not entirely clear that it makes sense to check the protection
key bits at this level at all.  But one possible eventual solution is to
make the get_user_pages_fast() case just abort if it sees protection key
bits set, which makes us fall back to the regular get_user_pages() case,
which then has a vma and can do the check there if we want to.

We'll see.

Somewhat related to this all: what we _do_ want to do some day is to
check the PAGE_USER bit - it should obviously always be set for user
pages, but it would be a good check to have back.  Because we have no
generic way to test for it, we lost it as part of moving over from the
architecture-specific x86 GUP implementation to the generic one in
commit e585513b ("x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic
get_user_page_fast() implementation").

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If there were no commit requests, then nfs_commit_inode() should not
wait on the commit or mark the inode dirty, otherwise the following
BUG_ON can be triggered:

[ 1917.130762] kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:578!
[ 1917.130766] Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
[ 1917.130768] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[ 1917.130772] Modules linked in: iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi blocklayoutdriver rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc sg nx_crypto pseries_rng ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_common ibmvscsi scsi_transport_srp ibmveth scsi_tgt dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 1917.130805] CPU: 2 PID: 14923 Comm: umount.nfs4 Tainted: G               ------------ T 3.10.0-768.el7.ppc64 #1
[ 1917.130810] task: c0000005ecd88040 ti: c00000004cea0000 task.ti: c00000004cea0000
[ 1917.130813] NIP: c000000000354178 LR: c000000000354160 CTR: c00000000012db80
[ 1917.130816] REGS: c00000004cea3720 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G               ------------ T  (3.10.0-768.el7.ppc64)
[ 1917.130820] MSR: 8000000100029032 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 22002822  XER: 20000000
[ 1917.130828] CFAR: c00000000011f594 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c000000000354160 c00000004cea39a0 c0000000014c4700 c0000000018cc750
GPR04: 000000000000c750 80c0000000000000 0600000000000000 04eeb76bea749a03
GPR08: 0000000000000034 c0000000018cc758 0000000000000001 d000000005e619e8
GPR12: c00000000012db80 c000000007b31200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000000dfc3ec 0000000000000000 c0000005eefc02c0
GPR28: d0000000079dbd50 c0000005b94a02c0 c0000005b94a0250 c0000005b94a01c8
[ 1917.130867] NIP [c000000000354178] .evict+0x1c8/0x350
[ 1917.130871] LR [c000000000354160] .evict+0x1b0/0x350
[ 1917.130873] Call Trace:
[ 1917.130876] [c00000004cea39a0] [c000000000354160] .evict+0x1b0/0x350 (unreliable)
[ 1917.130880] [c00000004cea3a30] [c0000000003558cc] .evict_inodes+0x13c/0x270
[ 1917.130884] [c00000004cea3af0] [c000000000327d20] .kill_anon_super+0x70/0x1e0
[ 1917.130896] [c00000004cea3b80] [d000000005e43e30] .nfs_kill_super+0x20/0x60 [nfs]
[ 1917.130900] [c00000004cea3c00] [c000000000328a20] .deactivate_locked_super+0xa0/0x1b0
[ 1917.130903] [c00000004cea3c80] [c00000000035ba54] .cleanup_mnt+0xd4/0x180
[ 1917.130907] [c00000004cea3d10] [c000000000119034] .task_work_run+0x114/0x150
[ 1917.130912] [c00000004cea3db0] [c00000000001ba6c] .do_notify_resume+0xcc/0x100
[ 1917.130916] [c00000004cea3e30] [c00000000000a7b0] .ret_from_except_lite+0x5c/0x60
[ 1917.130919] Instruction dump:
[ 1917.130921] 7fc3f378 486734b5 60000000 387f00a0 38800003 4bdcb365 60000000 e95f00a0
[ 1917.130927] 694a0060 7d4a0074 794ad182 694a0001 <0b0a0000> 892d02a4 2f890000 40de0134
Signed-off-by: NScott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

The following deadlock can occur between a process waiting for a client
to initialize in while walking the client list during nfsv4 server trunking
detection and another process waiting for the nfs_clid_init_mutex so it
can initialize that client:

Process 1                               Process 2
---------                               ---------
spin_lock(&nn->nfs_client_lock);
list_add_tail(&CLIENTA->cl_share_link,
        &nn->nfs_client_list);
spin_unlock(&nn->nfs_client_lock);
                                        spin_lock(&nn->nfs_client_lock);
                                        list_add_tail(&CLIENTB->cl_share_link,
                                                &nn->nfs_client_list);
                                        spin_unlock(&nn->nfs_client_lock);
                                        mutex_lock(&nfs_clid_init_mutex);
                                        nfs41_walk_client_list(clp, result, cred);
                                        nfs_wait_client_init_complete(CLIENTA);
(waiting for nfs_clid_init_mutex)

Make sure nfs_match_client() only evaluates clients that have completed
initialization in order to prevent that deadlock.

This patch also fixes v4.0 trunking behavior by not marking the client
NFS_CS_READY until the clientid has been confirmed.
Signed-off-by: NScott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NThiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: N"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit:

  fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]

This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source
arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the
destination is terminated.

This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target
buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the
actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time
check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN.

There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is
currently the case.  We could get away with doing only the check or
passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.deSigned-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit ecc0c469 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error") was
meant to replace an 'if' with a 'switch', but instead added the 'switch'
leaving the case in place.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87zi6wstmw.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Fixes: ecc0c469 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error")
Reported-by: NBen Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since we as yet have no way of holding on to the indlen blocks that are
reserved as part of CoW fork delalloc reservations, let the CoW remap
transaction dip into the reserves so that we avoid failing writes.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>