1. 14 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  2. 06 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 01 8月, 2019 6 次提交
  4. 31 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 23 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  6. 17 7月, 2019 5 次提交
  7. 16 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 15 7月, 2019 21 次提交
  9. 13 7月, 2019 3 次提交
    • A
      mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options · 6471384a
      Alexander Potapenko 提交于
      Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
      
      Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
      
      These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
      control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
      
      Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
      page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes.  SLOB allocator
      isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
      handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
      
      Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
      initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
      stale data by using a dangling pointer.
      
      As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
      disable initialization for certain allocations.  There's not enough
      evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
      to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
      
      This patch (of 2):
      
      The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
      control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
      
      This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS.  And it
      gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
      boot args.  (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
      where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
      
      init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
      objects with zeroes.  Initialization is done at allocation time at the
      places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
      
      init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
      with zeroes upon their deletion.  This helps to ensure sensitive data
      doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
      
      Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
      returns zeroed memory.  The two exceptions are slab caches with
      constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag.  Those are never
      zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
      
      Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
      can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
      CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
      
      If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
      precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
      applied to unpoisoned allocations.
      
      Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
      
      hackbench, init_on_free=1:  +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
      hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
      
      Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
      Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
      Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
      Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
      
      The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
      is within the standard error.
      
      The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
      tagging (e.g.  arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
      hooks to set the tags for heap objects.  With MTE, tagging will have the
      same cost as memory initialization.
      
      Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
      in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized.  There are various
      arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
      given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
      people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
      it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
      
      [glider@google.com: v8]
        Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
      [glider@google.com: v9]
        Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
      [glider@google.com: v10]
        Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.comSigned-off-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>		[page and dmapool parts
      Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
      Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
      Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
      Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
      Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6471384a
    • S
      mm, memcg: introduce memory.events.local · 1e577f97
      Shakeel Butt 提交于
      The memory controller in cgroup v2 exposes memory.events file for each
      memcg which shows the number of times events like low, high, max, oom
      and oom_kill have happened for the whole tree rooted at that memcg.
      Users can also poll or register notification to monitor the changes in
      that file.  Any event at any level of the tree rooted at memcg will
      notify all the listeners along the path till root_mem_cgroup.  There are
      existing users which depend on this behavior.
      
      However there are users which are only interested in the events
      happening at a specific level of the memcg tree and not in the events in
      the underlying tree rooted at that memcg.  One such use-case is a
      centralized resource monitor which can dynamically adjust the limits of
      the jobs running on a system.  The jobs can create their sub-hierarchy
      for their own sub-tasks.  The centralized monitor is only interested in
      the events at the top level memcgs of the jobs as it can then act and
      adjust the limits of the jobs.  Using the current memory.events for such
      centralized monitor is very inconvenient.  The monitor will keep
      receiving events which it is not interested and to find if the received
      event is interesting, it has to read memory.event files of the next
      level and compare it with the top level one.  So, let's introduce
      memory.events.local to the memcg which shows and notify for the events
      at the memcg level.
      
      Now, does memory.stat and memory.pressure need their local versions.  IMHO
      no due to the no internal process contraint of the cgroup v2.  The
      memory.stat file of the top level memcg of a job shows the stats and
      vmevents of the whole tree.  The local stats or vmevents of the top level
      memcg will only change if there is a process running in that memcg but v2
      does not allow that.  Similarly for memory.pressure there will not be any
      process in the internal nodes and thus no chance of local pressure.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527174643.209172-1-shakeelb@google.comSigned-off-by: NShakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1e577f97
    • V
      mm, debug_pagealloc: use a page type instead of page_ext flag · 3972f6bb
      Vlastimil Babka 提交于
      When debug_pagealloc is enabled, we currently allocate the page_ext
      array to mark guard pages with the PAGE_EXT_DEBUG_GUARD flag.  Now that
      we have the page_type field in struct page, we can use that instead, as
      guard pages are neither PageSlab nor mapped to userspace.  This reduces
      memory overhead when debug_pagealloc is enabled and there are no other
      features requiring the page_ext array.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603143451.27353-4-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
      Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
      Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3972f6bb