The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.
Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

I guess commit 15ea0e1e ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023c ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.
Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

Commit 0b6cf6b9 ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to
tpm_pcr_extend()") modifies tpm_pcr_extend() to accept a digest for each
PCR bank. After modification, tpm_pcr_extend() expects that digests are
passed in the same order as the algorithms set in chip->allocated_banks.

This patch fixes two issues introduced in the last iterations of the patch
set: missing initialization of the TPM algorithm ID in the tpm_digest
structures passed to tpm_pcr_extend() by the trusted key module, and
unreleased locks in the TPM driver due to returning from tpm_pcr_extend()
without calling tpm_put_ops().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b6cf6b9 ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

The first time a rule set is configured for SafeSetID, we shouldn't be
trying to release the previously configured ruleset, since there isn't
one. Currently, the pointer that would point to a previously configured
ruleset is uninitialized on first rule set configuration, leading to a
crash when we try to call release_ruleset with that pointer.
Acked-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMicah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>

No reason for these not to be const.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in
which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it
makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:

	BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038
	Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30
	Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
	...
	NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0
	LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0
	Call Trace:
	[...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable)
	[...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0
	[...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540
	[...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110
	[...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
	[...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0
	[...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130
	[...] system_call+0x5c/0x70

Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.

Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.

[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check
 in the read routine]

Fixes: 04c567d9 ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key")
Reported-by: NSachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NSachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security().  There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.

Fixes: bbd3662a ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
    if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
    ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: NJia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.
Signed-off-by: NLiguang Zhang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884c ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

If check_cached_key() returns a non-NULL value, we still need to call
key_type::match_free() to undo key_type::match_preparse().

Fixes: 7743c48e ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct")
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:

struct ima_template_entry {
	...
        struct ima_field_data template_data[0]; /* template related data */
};

instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ima_template_entry) + count * sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);

Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:

instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_NOFS);

This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:

struct foo {
   int stuff;
   struct boo entry[];
};

instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);

Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:

instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);

This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

If we can't parse the PKCS7 in the appended modsig, we will free the modsig
structure and then access one of its members to determine the error value.

Fixes: 39b07096 ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: NJulia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NThiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).

This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).

We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
range again.
Suggested-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit.  This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.

The message now patterned something like:

        Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().

(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs.  Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead.  The following changes are made:

 (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
     can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).

 (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
     are permitted to be opened:

	- The file must have mode 00444
	- The file must not have ioctl methods
	- The file must not have mmap

 (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.

Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.

Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.

I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator.  This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to
access kernel data.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
Suggested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is
locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration.
This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal
crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed
modules.
Reported-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown
confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
depending on local policy.
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).
Suggested-by: NAlan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port.  This only appears to be an issue for the serial
drivers that use the core serial code.  All other drivers seem to either
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
Reported-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.  Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.

This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load().  Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.

This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded.  KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.

Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.

Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

I have adjusted the errors generated:

 (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
     ENOKEY), then:

     (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.

     (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
	 locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
	 other lockdown cases).

 (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
     the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
     return the error we got.

Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.

 [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
  be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
  patchset.]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).

(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>