- 07 3月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Syzbot is reporting that ext4 can enter fs reclaim from kvmalloc() while the transaction is started like: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x117/0x150 mm/page_alloc.c:4340 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:193 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:493 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2817 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x5f/0x430 mm/slub.c:4015 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:575 [inline] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 mm/util.c:587 kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:781 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find fs/ext4/xattr.c:1465 [inline] ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1508 [inline] ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x1ce6/0x3780 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1649 ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x78/0x2b0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2224 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x8f4/0x13e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2380 ext4_xattr_set+0x13a/0x340 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2493 This should be impossible since transaction start sets PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS. Add some assertions to the code to catch if something isn't working as expected early. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/000000000000563a0205bafb7970@google.com/Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210222171626.21884-1-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 23 12月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
The wrapper is now useless since it does what ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() does. Just remove it. Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-9-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Protect all superblock modifications (including checksum computation) with a superblock buffer lock. That way we are sure computed checksum matches current superblock contents (a mismatch could cause checksum failures in nojournal mode or if an unjournalled superblock update races with a journalled one). Also we avoid modifying superblock contents while it is being written out (which can cause DIF/DIX failures if we are running in nojournal mode). Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-4-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 10 12月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Chunguang Xu 提交于
Signed-off-by: NChunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-7-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.comSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 22 10月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Harshad Shirwadkar 提交于
This patch adds main fast commit commit path handlers. The overall patch can be divided into two inter-related parts: (A) Metadata updates tracking This part consists of helper functions to track changes that need to be committed during a commit operation. These updates are maintained by Ext4 in different in-memory queues. Following are the APIs and their short description that are implemented in this patch: - ext4_fc_track_link/unlink/creat() - Track unlink. link and creat operations - ext4_fc_track_range() - Track changed logical block offsets inodes - ext4_fc_track_inode() - Track inodes - ext4_fc_mark_ineligible() - Mark file system fast commit ineligible() - ext4_fc_start_update() / ext4_fc_stop_update() / ext4_fc_start_ineligible() / ext4_fc_stop_ineligible() These functions are useful for co-ordinating inode updates with commits. (B) Main commit Path This part consists of functions to convert updates tracked in in-memory data structures into on-disk commits. Function ext4_fc_commit() is the main entry point to commit path. Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NHarshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201015203802.3597742-6-harshadshirwadkar@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 06 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Markus Elfring 提交于
The brelse() function tests whether its argument is NULL and then returns immediately. Thus remove the tests which are not needed around the shown calls. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: NRitesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0d713702-072f-a89c-20ec-ca70aa83a432@web.deSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 13 6月, 2020 1 次提交
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The Hurd gained[0] support for moving the translator and author fields out of the inode and into the "gnu.*" xattr namespace. In anticipation of that, an xattr INDEX was reserved[1]. The Hurd has now been brought into compliance[2] with that. This patch adds support for reading and writing such attributes from Linux; you can now do something like mkdir -p hurd-root/servers/socket touch hurd-root/servers/socket/1 setfattr --name=gnu.translator --value='"/hurd/pflocal\0"' \ hurd-root/servers/socket/1 getfattr --name=gnu.translator hurd-root/servers/socket/1 # file: 1 gnu.translator="/hurd/pflocal" to setup a pipe translator, which is being used to create[3] a vm-image for the Hurd from GNU Guix. [0] https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/projects/#5869799859027968 [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=3980bd3b406addb327d858aebd19e229ea340b9a [2] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/hurd/hurd.git/commit/?id=a04c7bf83172faa7cb080fbe3b6c04a8415ca645 [3] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/log/?h=wip-hurd-vmSigned-off-by: NJan Nieuwenhuizen <janneke@gnu.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525193940.878-1-janneke@gnu.orgSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 04 6月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Harshad Shirwadkar 提交于
ext4_mark_inode_dirty() can fail for real reasons. Ignoring its return value may lead ext4 to ignore real failures that would result in corruption / crashes. Harden ext4_mark_inode_dirty error paths to fail as soon as possible and return errors to the caller whenever appropriate. One of the possible scnearios when this bug could affected is that while creating a new inode, its directory entry gets added successfully but while writing the inode itself mark_inode_dirty returns error which is ignored. This would result in inconsistency that the directory entry points to a non-existent inode. Ran gce-xfstests smoke tests and verified that there were no regressions. Signed-off-by: NHarshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200427013438.219117-1-harshadshirwadkar@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Jeffle Xu 提交于
Don't pass error pointers to brelse(). commit 7159a986 ("ext4: fix some error pointer dereferences") has fixed some cases, fix the remaining one case. Once ext4_xattr_block_find()->ext4_sb_bread() failed, error pointer is stored in @bs->bh, which will be passed to brelse() in the cleanup routine of ext4_xattr_set_handle(). This will then cause a NULL panic crash in __brelse(). BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000005b RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x1b/0x50 Call Trace: ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x163/0x5d0 ext4_xattr_set+0x95/0x110 __vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x80 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x68/0x1b0 vfs_setxattr+0xa0/0xb0 setxattr+0x12c/0x1a0 path_setxattr+0x8d/0xc0 __x64_sys_setxattr+0x27/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe In this case, @bs->bh stores '-EIO' actually. Fixes: fb265c9c ("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases") Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.19 Reviewed-by: NRitesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1587628004-95123-1-git-send-email-jefflexu@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 02 4月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Using a separate function, ext4_set_errno() to set the errno is problematic because it doesn't do the right thing once s_last_error_errorcode is non-zero. It's also less racy to set all of the error information all at once. (Also, as a bonus, it shrinks code size slightly.) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200329020404.686965-1-tytso@mit.edu Fixes: 878520ac ("ext4: save the error code which triggered...") Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 18 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
As Jan pointed out[1], as of commit 81378da6 ("jbd2: mark the transaction context with the scope GFP_NOFS context") we use memalloc_nofs_{save,restore}() while a jbd2 handle is active. So ext4_kvmalloc() so we can call allocate using GFP_NOFS is no longer necessary. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109100007.GC27035@quack2.suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200116155031.266620-1-tytso@mit.eduReviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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- 27 12月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
This allows the cause of an ext4_error() report to be categorized based on whether it was triggered due to an I/O error, or an memory allocation error, or other possible causes. Most errors are caused by a detected file system inconsistency, so the default code stored in the superblock will be EXT4_ERR_EFSCORRUPTED. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204032335.7683-1-tytso@mit.eduSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 06 11月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
So far we have reserved only relatively high fixed amount of revoke credits for each transaction. We over-reserved by large amount for most cases but when freeing large directories or files with data journalling, the fixed amount is not enough. In fact the worst case estimate is inconveniently large (maximum extent size) for freeing of one extent. We fix this by doing proper estimate of the amount of blocks that need to be revoked when removing blocks from the inode due to truncate or hole punching and otherwise reserve just a small amount of revoke credits for each transaction to accommodate freeing of xattrs block or so. Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-23-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Provide accessor function to get number of credits available in a handle and use it from ext4. Later, computation of available credits won't be so straightforward. Reviewed-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-11-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Provide ext4_journal_ensure_credits_fn() function to ensure transaction has given amount of credits and call helper function to prepare for restarting a transaction. This allows to remove some boilerplate code from various places, add proper error handling for the case where transaction extension or restart fails, and reduces following changes needed for proper revoke record reservation tracking. Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-10-jack@suse.czSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 10 4月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
In other places in fs/ext4/xattr.c, if e_value_inum is non-zero, the code ignores the value in e_value_offs. The e_value_offs *should* be zero, but we shouldn't depend upon it, since it might not be true in a corrupted/fuzzed file system. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202897 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202877Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 22 2月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
We can't pass error pointers to brelse(). Fixes: fb265c9c ("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases") Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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- 20 12月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If we receive a file handle, either from NFS or open_by_handle_at(2), and it points at an inode which has not been initialized, and the file system has metadata checksums enabled, we shouldn't try to get the inode, discover the checksum is invalid, and then declare the file system as being inconsistent. This can be reproduced by creating a test file system via "mke2fs -t ext4 -O metadata_csum /tmp/foo.img 8M", mounting it, cd'ing into that directory, and then running the following program. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <fcntl.h> struct handle { struct file_handle fh; unsigned char fid[MAX_HANDLE_SZ]; }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct handle h = {{8, 1 }, { 12, }}; open_by_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, &h.fh, O_RDONLY); return 0; } Google-Bug-Id: 120690101 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
In ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(), we calculate the total size of the xattr header, plus the xattr entries so we know how much of the beginning part of the xattrs to move when expanding the inode extra size. We need to include the terminating u32 at the end of the xattr entries, or else if there is uninitialized, non-zero bytes after the xattr entries and before the xattr values, the list of xattr entries won't be properly terminated. Reported-by: NSteve Graham <stgraham2000@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 26 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Today, when sb_bread() returns NULL, this can either be because of an I/O error or because the system failed to allocate the buffer. Since it's an old interface, changing would require changing many call sites. So instead we create our own ext4_sb_bread(), which also allows us to set the REQ_META flag. Also fixed a problem in the xattr code where a NULL return in a function could also mean that the xattr was not found, which could lead to the wrong error getting returned to userspace. Fixes: ac27a0ec ("ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.19 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 10 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
According to Ted Ts'o ext4_getblk() called in ext4_xattr_inode_write() should not return bh = NULL The only time that bh could be NULL, then, would be in the case of something really going wrong; a programming error elsewhere (perhaps a wild pointer dereference) or I/O error causing on-disk file system corruption (although that would be highly unlikely given that we had *just* allocated the blocks and so the metadata blocks in question probably would still be in the cache). Fixes: e50e5129 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support") Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
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- 08 11月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
Fixes: de05ca85 ("ext4: move call to ext4_error() into ...") Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.17
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
Fixes: 3f2571c1 ("ext4: factor out xattr moving") Fixes: 6dd4ee7c ("ext4: Expand extra_inodes space per ...") Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.23
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
bs.bh was taken in previous ext4_xattr_block_find() call, it should be released before re-using Fixes: 7e01c8e5 ("ext3/4: fix uninitialized bs in ...") Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.26
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
Fixes: dec214d0 ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication") Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
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- 07 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 02 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Extended attribute names are defined to be NUL-terminated, so the name must not contain a NUL character. This is important because there are places when remove extended attribute, the code uses strlen to determine the length of the entry. That should probably be fixed at some point, but code is currently really messy, so the simplest fix for now is to simply validate that the extended attributes are sane. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200401Reported-by: NWen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 17 6月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Use a separate journal transaction if it turns out that we need to convert an inline file to use an data block. Otherwise we could end up failing due to not having journal credits. This addresses CVE-2018-10883. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
When expanding the extra isize space, we must never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body. For performance reasons, it doesn't make any sense, and the inline data implementation assumes that system.data xattr is never in the external xattr block. This addresses CVE-2018-10880 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200005Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 13 6月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If there an inode points to a block which is also some other type of metadata block (such as a block allocation bitmap), the buffer_verified flag can be set when it was validated as that other metadata block type; however, it would make a really terrible external attribute block. The reason why we use the verified flag is to avoid constantly reverifying the block. However, it doesn't take much overhead to make sure the magic number of the xattr block is correct, and this will avoid potential crashes. This addresses CVE-2018-10879. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
In theory this should have been caught earlier when the xattr list was verified, but in case it got missed, it's simple enough to add check to make sure we don't overrun the xattr buffer. This addresses CVE-2018-10879. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 23 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Ext4 will always create ext4 extended attributes which do not have a value (where e_value_size is zero) with e_value_offs set to zero. In most places e_value_offs will not be used in a substantive way if e_value_size is zero. There was one exception to this, which is in ext4_xattr_set_entry(), where if there is a maliciously crafted file system where there is an extended attribute with e_value_offs is non-zero and e_value_size is 0, the attempt to remove this xattr will result in a negative value getting passed to memmove, leading to the following sadness: [ 41.225365] EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null) [ 44.538641] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9ec9a3000000 [ 44.538733] IP: __memmove+0x81/0x1a0 [ 44.538755] PGD 1249bd067 P4D 1249bd067 PUD 1249c1067 PMD 80000001230000e1 [ 44.538793] Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI [ 44.539074] CPU: 0 PID: 1470 Comm: poc Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #1 ... [ 44.539475] Call Trace: [ 44.539832] ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x9e7/0xf80 ... [ 44.539972] ext4_xattr_block_set+0x212/0xea0 ... [ 44.540041] ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x514/0x610 [ 44.540065] ext4_xattr_set+0x7f/0x120 [ 44.540090] __vfs_removexattr+0x4d/0x60 [ 44.540112] vfs_removexattr+0x75/0xe0 [ 44.540132] removexattr+0x4d/0x80 ... [ 44.540279] path_removexattr+0x91/0xb0 [ 44.540300] SyS_removexattr+0xf/0x20 [ 44.540322] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x120 [ 44.540344] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199347 This addresses CVE-2018-10840. Reported-by: N"Xu, Wen" <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: dec214d0 ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
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- 31 3月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Add explicit checks in ext4_xattr_block_get() just in case the e_value_offs and e_value_size fields in the the xattr block are corrupted in memory after the buffer_verified bit is set on the xattr block. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Add some paranoia checks to make sure we don't stray beyond the end of the valid memory region containing ext4 xattr entries while we are scanning for a match. Also rename the function to xattr_find_entry() since it is static and thus only used in fs/ext4/xattr.c Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Refactor the call to EXT4_ERROR_INODE() into ext4_xattr_check_block(). This simplifies the code, and fixes a problem where not all callers of ext4_xattr_check_block() were not resulting in ext4_error() getting called when the xattr block is corrupted. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 30 3月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
ext4 isn't validating the sizes of xattrs where the value of the xattr is stored in an external inode. This is problematic because ->e_value_size is a u32, but ext4_xattr_get() returns an int. A very large size is misinterpreted as an error code, which ext4_get_acl() translates into a bogus ERR_PTR() for which IS_ERR() returns false, causing a crash. Fix this by validating that all xattrs are <= INT_MAX bytes. This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1095. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199185 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560793Reported-by: NWen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e50e5129 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
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- 29 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 25 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Tahsin Erdogan 提交于
Original Lustre ea_inode feature did not have ref counts on xattr inodes because there was always one parent that referenced it. New implementation expects ref count to be initialized which is not true for Lustre case. Handle this by detecting Lustre created xattr inode and set its ref count to 1. The quota handling of xattr inodes have also changed with deduplication support. New implementation manually manages quotas to support sharing across multiple users. A consequence is that, a referencing inode incorporates the blocks of xattr inode into its own i_block field. We need to know how a xattr inode was created so that we can reverse the block charges during reference removal. This is handled by introducing a EXT4_STATE_LUSTRE_EA_INODE flag. The flag is set on a xattr inode if inode appears to have been created by Lustre. During xattr inode reference removal, the manual quota uncharge is skipped if the flag is set. Signed-off-by: NTahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 14 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Tahsin Erdogan 提交于
When updating an extended attribute, if the padded value sizes are the same, a shortcut is taken to avoid the bulk of the work. This was fine until the xattr hash update was moved inside ext4_xattr_set_entry(). With that change, the hash update got missed in the shortcut case. Thanks to ZhangYi (yizhang089@gmail.com) for root causing the problem. Fixes: daf83281 ("ext4: eliminate xattr entry e_hash recalculation for removes") Reported-by: NMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: NTahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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