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  1. 08 6月, 2016 1 次提交
  3. 24 5月, 2016 1 次提交
  5. 13 5月, 2016 2 次提交
  7. 23 3月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories · 378c6520
      由 Jann Horn 提交于 
      This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where
all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

 - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2.
 - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems
   where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.)
 - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is
   true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by
   default using a distro patch.)

Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules,
causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user
namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be
written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but
this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process,
allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with
root privileges.

To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that
are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init.
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      378c6520
  9. 21 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      fs/coredump: prevent "" / "." / ".." core path components · ac94b6e3
      由 Jann Horn 提交于 
      Let %h and %e print empty values as "!", "." as "!" and
".." as "!.".

This prevents hostnames and comm values that are empty or consist of one
or two dots from changing the directory level at which the corefile will
be stored.

Consider the case where someone decides to sort coredumps by hostname
with a core pattern like "/cores/%h/core.%e.%p.%t" or so.  In this
case, hostnames "" and "." would cause the coredump to land directly in
/cores, which is not what the intent behind the core pattern is, and
".." would cause the coredump to land in /.

Yeah, there probably aren't many people who do that, but I still don't
want this edgecase to be kind of broken.

It seems very unlikely that this caused security issues anywhere, so I'm
not requesting a stable backport.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak code comment]
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ac94b6e3
  11. 07 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 07 11月, 2015 2 次提交
  15. 11 9月, 2015 2 次提交
    • J
      fs: Don't dump core if the corefile would become world-readable. · 40f705a7
      由 Jann Horn 提交于 
      On a filesystem like vfat, all files are created with the same owner
and mode independent of who created the file. When a vfat filesystem
is mounted with root as owner of all files and read access for everyone,
root's processes left world-readable coredumps on it (but other
users' processes only left empty corefiles when given write access
because of the uid mismatch).

Given that the old behavior was inconsistent and insecure, I don't see
a problem with changing it. Now, all processes refuse to dump core unless
the resulting corefile will only be readable by their owner.
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      40f705a7
    • J
      fs: if a coredump already exists, unlink and recreate with O_EXCL · fbb18169
      由 Jann Horn 提交于 
      It was possible for an attacking user to trick root (or another user) into
writing his coredumps into an attacker-readable, pre-existing file using
rename() or link(), causing the disclosure of secret data from the victim
process' virtual memory.  Depending on the configuration, it was also
possible to trick root into overwriting system files with coredumps.  Fix
that issue by never writing coredumps into existing files.

Requirements for the attack:
 - The attack only applies if the victim's process has a nonzero
   RLIMIT_CORE and is dumpable.
 - The attacker can trick the victim into coredumping into an
   attacker-writable directory D, either because the core_pattern is
   relative and the victim's cwd is attacker-writable or because an
   absolute core_pattern pointing to a world-writable directory is used.
 - The attacker has one of these:
  A: on a system with protected_hardlinks=0:
     execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable file on the same partition as D, and the
     victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack
     takes place. (In practice, there are lots of files that fulfill
     this condition, e.g. entries in Debian's /var/lib/dpkg/info/.)
     This does not apply to most Linux systems because most distros set
     protected_hardlinks=1.
  B: on a system with protected_hardlinks=1:
     execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable and attacker-writable file on the same partition
     as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part
     of the attack takes place.
     (This seems to be uncommon.)
  C: on any system, independent of protected_hardlinks:
     write access to a non-sticky folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable file on the same partition as D
     (This seems to be uncommon.)

The basic idea is that the attacker moves the victim-owned file to where
he expects the victim process to dump its core.  The victim process dumps
its core into the existing file, and the attacker reads the coredump from
it.

If the attacker can't move the file because he does not have write access
to the containing directory, he can instead link the file to a directory
he controls, then wait for the original link to the file to be deleted
(because the kernel checks that the link count of the corefile is 1).

A less reliable variant that requires D to be non-sticky works with link()
and does not require deletion of the original link: link() the file into
D, but then unlink() it directly before the kernel performs the link count
check.

On systems with protected_hardlinks=0, this variant allows an attacker to
not only gain information from coredumps, but also clobber existing,
victim-writable files with coredumps.  (This could theoretically lead to a
privilege escalation.)
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      fbb18169
  17. 26 6月, 2015 2 次提交
  19. 24 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 12 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 07 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 20 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 14 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • O
      coredump: add %i/%I in core_pattern to report the tid of the crashed thread · b03023ec
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      format_corename() can only pass the leader's pid to the core handler,
but there is no simple way to figure out which thread originated the
coredump.

As Jan explains, this also means that there is no simple way to create
the backtrace of the crashed process:

As programs are mostly compiled with implicit gcc -fomit-frame-pointer
one needs program's .eh_frame section (equivalently PT_GNU_EH_FRAME
segment) or .debug_frame section.  .debug_frame usually is present only
in separate debug info files usually not even installed on the system.
While .eh_frame is a part of the executable/library (and it is even
always mapped for C++ exceptions unwinding) it no longer has to be
present anywhere on the disk as the program could be upgraded in the
meantime and the running instance has its executable file already
unlinked from disk.

One possibility is to echo 0x3f >/proc/*/coredump_filter and dump all
the file-backed memory including the executable's .eh_frame section.
But that can create huge core files, for example even due to mmapped
data files.

Other possibility would be to read .eh_frame from /proc/PID/mem at the
core_pattern handler time of the core dump.  For the backtrace one needs
to read the register state first which can be done from core_pattern
handler:

    ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT)
    close(0);    // close pipe fd to resume the sleeping dumper
    waitpid();   // should report EXIT
    PTRACE_GETREGS or other requests

The remaining problem is how to get the 'tid' value of the crashed
thread.  It could be read from the first NT_PRSTATUS note of the core
file but that makes the core_pattern handler complicated.

Unfortunately %t is already used so this patch uses %i/%I.

Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/overview)
is experimenting with this.  It is using the elfutils
(https://fedorahosted.org/elfutils/) unwinder for generating the
backtraces.  Apart from not needing matching executables as mentioned
above, another advantage is that we can get the backtrace without saving
the core (which might be quite large) to disk.

[mmilata@redhat.com: final paragraph of changelog]
Signed-off-by: NJan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Milata <mmilata@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b03023ec
  29. 24 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  31. 20 4月, 2014 1 次提交
    • E
      coredump: fix va_list corruption · 404ca80e
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      A va_list needs to be copied in case it needs to be used twice.

Thanks to Hugh for debugging this issue, leading to various panics.

Tested:

  lpq84:~# echo "|/foobar12345 %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h" >/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern

'produce_core' is simply : main() { *(int *)0 = 1;}

  lpq84:~# ./produce_core
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)
  lpq84:~# dmesg | tail -1
  [  614.352947] Core dump to |/foobar12345 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 (null) pipe failed

Notice the last argument was replaced by a NULL (we were lucky enough to
not crash, but do not try this on your production machine !)

After fix :

  lpq83:~# echo "|/foobar12345 %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h" >/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
  lpq83:~# ./produce_core
  Segmentation fault
  lpq83:~# dmesg | tail -1
  [  740.800441] Core dump to |/foobar12345 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 pipe failed

Fixes: 5fe9d8ca ("coredump: cn_vprintf() has no reason to call vsnprintf() twice")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.11+
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      404ca80e
  33. 24 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  35. 16 11月, 2013 2 次提交
  37. 09 11月, 2013 5 次提交
  39. 25 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  41. 12 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 04 7月, 2013 6 次提交
  45. 05 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 01 5月, 2013 3 次提交
    • O
      coredump: change wait_for_dump_helpers() to use wait_event_interruptible() · dc7ee2aa
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      wait_for_dump_helpers() calls wake_up/kill_fasync from inside the
wait_event-like loop.  This is not needed and in fact this is not
strictly correct, we can/should do this only once after we change
pipe->writers.  We could even check if it becomes zero.

Change this code to use use wait_event_interruptible(), this can also
help to make this wait freezable.

With this patch we check pipe->readers without pipe_lock(), this is
fine.  Once we see pipe->readers == 1 we know that the handler
decremented the counter, this is all we need.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      dc7ee2aa
    • O
      coredump: factor out the setting of PF_DUMPCORE · 079148b9
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      Cleanup.  Every linux_binfmt->core_dump() sets PF_DUMPCORE, move this into
zap_threads() called by do_coredump().
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      079148b9
    • O
      coredump: introduce dump_interrupted() · 528f827e
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      By discussion with Mandeep.

Change dump_write(), dump_seek() and do_coredump() to check
signal_pending() and abort if it is true.  dump_seek() does this only
before f_op->llseek(), otherwise it relies on dump_write().

We need this change to ensure that the coredump won't delay suspend, and
to ensure it reacts to SIGKILL "quickly enough", a core dump can take a
lot of time.  In particular this can help oom-killer.

We add the new trivial helper, dump_interrupted() to add the comments and
to simplify the potential freezer changes.  Perhaps it will have more
callers.

Ideally it should do try_to_freeze() but then we need the unpleasant
changes in dump_write() and wait_for_dump_helpers().  It is not trivial to
change dump_write() to restart if f_op->write() fails because of
freezing().  We need to handle the short writes, we need to clear
TIF_SIGPENDING (and we can't rely on recalc_sigpending() unless we change
it to check PF_DUMPCORE).  And if the buggy f_op->write() sets
TIF_SIGPENDING we can not distinguish this case from the race with
freeze_task() + __thaw_task().

So we simply accept the fact that the freezer can truncate a core-dump but
at least you can reliably suspend.  Hopefully we can tolerate this
unlikely case and the necessary complications doesn't worth a trouble.
But if we decide to make the coredumping freezable later we can do this on
top of this change.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      528f827e