1. 31 7月, 2023 3 次提交
  2. 29 7月, 2023 6 次提交
  3. 28 7月, 2023 1 次提交
  4. 25 7月, 2023 5 次提交
  5. 24 7月, 2023 5 次提交
  6. 21 7月, 2023 2 次提交
  7. 20 7月, 2023 7 次提交
    • T
      netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval · bd37035e
      Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v6.5-rc2
      commit caf3ef7468f7534771b5c44cd8dbd6f7f87c2cbd
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7ISR1
      CVE: CVE-2023-35001
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=caf3ef7468f7534771b5c44cd8dbd6f7f87c2cbd
      
      ---------------------------
      
      When evaluating byteorder expressions with size 2, a union with 32-bit and
      16-bit members is used. Since the 16-bit members are aligned to 32-bit,
      the array accesses will be out-of-bounds.
      
      It may lead to a stack-out-of-bounds access like the one below:
      
      [   23.095215] ==================================================================
      [   23.095625] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
      [   23.096020] Read of size 2 at addr ffffc90000007948 by task ping/115
      [   23.096358]
      [   23.096456] CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.4.0+ #413
      [   23.096770] Call Trace:
      [   23.096910]  <IRQ>
      [   23.097030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xc0
      [   23.097218]  print_report+0xcf/0x630
      [   23.097388]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
      [   23.097577]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xc0
      [   23.097760]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
      [   23.097949]  kasan_report+0xc9/0x110
      [   23.098106]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
      [   23.098298]  __asan_load2+0x83/0xd0
      [   23.098453]  nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
      [   23.098659]  nft_do_chain+0x1c8/0xc50
      [   23.098852]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain+0x10/0x10
      [   23.099078]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
      [   23.099295]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
      [   23.099535]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
      [   23.099745]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
      [   23.099929]  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0xfe/0x140
      [   23.100105]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
      [   23.100327]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
      [   23.100515]  ? nf_hook.constprop.0+0x340/0x550
      [   23.100779]  nf_hook_slow+0x6c/0x100
      [   23.100977]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
      [   23.101223]  nf_hook.constprop.0+0x334/0x550
      [   23.101443]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
      [   23.101677]  ? __pfx_nf_hook.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
      [   23.101882]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
      [   23.102071]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
      [   23.102291]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x4b/0x70
      [   23.102481]  ip_local_deliver+0xbb/0x110
      [   23.102665]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
      [   23.102839]  ip_rcv+0x199/0x2a0
      [   23.102980]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
      [   23.103140]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13e/0x150
      [   23.103362]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
      [   23.103647]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
      [   23.103819]  ? process_backlog+0x36c/0x380
      [   23.103999]  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xc0
      [   23.104179]  process_backlog+0x91/0x380
      [   23.104350]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x66/0x360
      [   23.104589]  ? net_rx_action+0x1cb/0x610
      [   23.104811]  net_rx_action+0x33e/0x610
      [   23.105024]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x50
      [   23.105257]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
      [   23.105485]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
      [   23.105741]  __do_softirq+0xfa/0x5ab
      [   23.105956]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x765/0x1c00
      [   23.106193]  do_softirq.part.0+0x49/0xc0
      [   23.106423]  </IRQ>
      [   23.106547]  <TASK>
      [   23.106670]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf5/0x120
      [   23.106903]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x789/0x1c00
      [   23.107131]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
      [   23.107381]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
      [   23.107585]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
      [   23.107798]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
      [   23.108049]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
      [   23.108265]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
      [   23.108514]  neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
      [   23.108753]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
      [   23.109003]  ip_finish_output2+0x3c3/0x10b0
      [   23.109250]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
      [   23.109510]  ? __pfx_nf_hook+0x10/0x10
      [   23.109732]  __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x390
      [   23.109978]  ip_finish_output+0x2f/0x130
      [   23.110207]  ip_output+0xc9/0x170
      [   23.110404]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x1a0/0x240
      [   23.110652]  raw_sendmsg+0x102e/0x19e0
      [   23.110871]  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
      [   23.111093]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
      [   23.111304]  ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x148/0x330
      [   23.111567]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
      [   23.111777]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
      [   23.111993]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x7c/0x2f0
      [   23.112225]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x18a/0x550
      [   23.112431]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x4f1/0x900
      [   23.112665]  ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10
      [   23.112880]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
      [   23.113098]  inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
      [   23.113297]  ? inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
      [   23.113500]  ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
      [   23.113727]  sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x100
      [   23.113924]  ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x4f/0xa0
      [   23.114190]  __sys_sendto+0x1d4/0x290
      [   23.114391]  ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
      [   23.114621]  ? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
      [   23.114869]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
      [   23.115076]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
      [   23.115287]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x60
      [   23.115503]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x6e2/0x860
      [   23.115778]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
      [   23.116008]  ? blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x8d/0x770
      [   23.116285]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
      [   23.116503]  ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
      [   23.116713]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x7f/0xb0
      [   23.116924]  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90
      [   23.117123]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x30
      [   23.117387]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
      [   23.117593]  ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x140
      [   23.117806]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
      [   23.118081] RIP: 0033:0x7f744aee2bba
      [   23.118282] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
      [   23.119237] RSP: 002b:00007ffd04a7c9f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
      [   23.119644] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd04a7e0a0 RCX: 00007f744aee2bba
      [   23.120023] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056488e9e6300 RDI: 0000000000000003
      [   23.120413] RBP: 000056488e9e6300 R08: 00007ffd04a80320 R09: 0000000000000010
      [   23.120809] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
      [   23.121219] R13: 00007ffd04a7dc38 R14: 00007ffd04a7ca00 R15: 00007ffd04a7e0a0
      [   23.121617]  </TASK>
      [   23.121749]
      [   23.121845] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
      [   23.121845]  [ffffc90000000000, ffffc90000009000) created by:
      [   23.121845]  irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x1cf/0x270
      [   23.122707]
      [   23.122803] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
      [   23.123104] page:0000000072ac19f0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x24a09
      [   23.123609] flags: 0xfffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
      [   23.123998] page_type: 0xffffffff()
      [   23.124194] raw: 000fffffc0001000 ffffea0000928248 ffffea0000928248 0000000000000000
      [   23.124610] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
      [   23.125023] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      [   23.125326]
      [   23.125421] Memory state around the buggy address:
      [   23.125682]  ffffc90000007800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      [   23.126072]  ffffc90000007880: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00
      [   23.126455] >ffffc90000007900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00
      [   23.126840]                                               ^
      [   23.127138]  ffffc90000007980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3
      [   23.127522]  ffffc90000007a00: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
      [   23.127906] ==================================================================
      [   23.128324] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
      
      Using simple s16 pointers for the 16-bit accesses fixes the problem. For
      the 32-bit accesses, src and dst can be used directly.
      
      Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reported-by: Tanguy DUBROCA (@SidewayRE) from @Synacktiv working with ZDI
      Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit d241d149)
      bd37035e
    • Z
      ipv6/addrconf: fix a potential refcount underflow for idev · 1ddfd3cf
      Ziyang Xuan 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v6.5-rc2
      commit 06a0716949c22e2aefb648526580671197151acc
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7M991
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=06a0716949c22e2aefb648526580671197151acc
      
      ---------------------------
      
      Now in addrconf_mod_rs_timer(), reference idev depends on whether
      rs_timer is not pending. Then modify rs_timer timeout.
      
      There is a time gap in [1], during which if the pending rs_timer
      becomes not pending. It will miss to hold idev, but the rs_timer
      is activated. Thus rs_timer callback function addrconf_rs_timer()
      will be executed and put idev later without holding idev. A refcount
      underflow issue for idev can be caused by this.
      
      	if (!timer_pending(&idev->rs_timer))
      		in6_dev_hold(idev);
      		  <--------------[1]
      	mod_timer(&idev->rs_timer, jiffies + when);
      
      To fix the issue, hold idev if mod_timer() return 0.
      
      Fixes: b7b1bfce ("ipv6: split duplicate address detection and router solicitation timer")
      Suggested-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit 7c087997)
      1ddfd3cf
    • H
      media: dvb-core: Fix use-after-free due on race condition at dvb_net · 185aae74
      Hyunwoo Kim 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v6.4-rc3
      commit 4172385b
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I635JD
      CVE: CVE-2022-45886
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?id=4172385b0c9ac366dcab78eda48c26814b87ed1a
      
      ----------------------------------------
      
      A race condition may occur between the .disconnect function, which
      is called when the device is disconnected, and the dvb_device_open()
      function, which is called when the device node is open()ed.
      This results in several types of UAFs.
      
      The root cause of this is that you use the dvb_device_open() function,
      which does not implement a conditional statement
      that checks 'dvbnet->exit'.
      
      So, add 'remove_mutex` to protect 'dvbnet->exit' and use
      locked_dvb_net_open() function to check 'dvbnet->exit'.
      
      [mchehab: fix a checkpatch warning]
      
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20221117045925.14297-3-imv4bel@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NHyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NCai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit b47ba5df)
      185aae74
    • L
      dm: don't lock fs when the map is NULL during suspend or resume · d464494a
      Li Lingfeng 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v6.4-rc8
      commit 2760904d
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FI78
      CVE: NA
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=v6.4-rc7&id=2760904d895279f87196f0fa9ec570c79fe6a2e4
      
      ----------------------------------------
      
      As described in commit 38d11da5 ("dm: don't lock fs when the map is
      NULL in process of resume"), a deadlock may be triggered between
      do_resume() and do_mount().
      
      This commit preserves the fix from commit 38d11da5 but moves it to
      where it also serves to fix a similar deadlock between do_suspend()
      and do_mount().  It does so, if the active map is NULL, by clearing
      DM_SUSPEND_LOCKFS_FLAG in dm_suspend() which is called by both
      do_suspend() and do_resume().
      
      Fixes: 38d11da5 ("dm: don't lock fs when the map is NULL in process of resume")
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
      
      Conflicts:
        drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit 0ba9dcd9)
      d464494a
    • L
      dm: don't lock fs when the map is NULL in process of resume · 22030e13
      Li Lingfeng 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v6.4-rc1
      commit 38d11da5
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FI78
      CVE: NA
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=v6.4&id=38d11da522aacaa05898c734a1cec86f1e611129
      
      ----------------------------------------
      
      Commit fa247089 ("dm: requeue IO if mapping table not yet available")
      added a detection of whether the mapping table is available in the IO
      submission process. If the mapping table is unavailable, it returns
      BLK_STS_RESOURCE and requeues the IO.
      This can lead to the following deadlock problem:
      
      dm create                                      mount
      ioctl(DM_DEV_CREATE_CMD)
      ioctl(DM_TABLE_LOAD_CMD)
                                     do_mount
                                      vfs_get_tree
                                       ext4_get_tree
                                        get_tree_bdev
                                         sget_fc
                                          alloc_super
                                           // got &s->s_umount
                                           down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, ...);
                                         ext4_fill_super
                                          ext4_load_super
                                           ext4_read_bh
                                            submit_bio
                                            // submit and wait io end
      ioctl(DM_DEV_SUSPEND_CMD)
      dev_suspend
       do_resume
        dm_suspend
         __dm_suspend
          lock_fs
           freeze_bdev
            get_active_super
             grab_super
              // wait for &s->s_umount
              down_write(&s->s_umount);
        dm_swap_table
         __bind
          // set md->map(can't get here)
      
      IO will be continuously requeued while holding the lock since mapping
      table is NULL. At the same time, mapping table won't be set since the
      lock is not available.
      Like request-based DM, bio-based DM also has the same problem.
      
      It's not proper to just abort IO if the mapping table not available.
      So clear DM_SKIP_LOCKFS_FLAG when the mapping table is NULL, this
      allows the DM table to be loaded and the IO submitted upon resume.
      
      Fixes: fa247089 ("dm: requeue IO if mapping table not yet available")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
      
      Conflicts:
        drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit 14dd9b4d)
      22030e13
    • M
      dm: requeue IO if mapping table not yet available · d328b147
      Mike Snitzer 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v5.18-rc1
      commit fa247089
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FI78
      CVE: NA
      
      Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=v6.4-rc7&id=fa247089de9936a46e290d4724cb5f0b845600f5
      
      ----------------------------------------
      
      Update both bio-based and request-based DM to requeue IO if the
      mapping table not available.
      
      This race of IO being submitted before the DM device ready is so
      narrow, yet possible for initial table load given that the DM device's
      request_queue is created prior, that it best to requeue IO to handle
      this unlikely case.
      Reported-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit e50475d3)
      d328b147
    • L
      Revert "dm: make sure dm_table is binded before queue request" · 1df0978e
      Li Lingfeng 提交于
      hulk inclusion
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FI78
      
      --------------------------------
      
      This reverts commit 90d1a836.
      
      It's not proper to just abort IO when the map is not ready.
      So revert this and requeue IO to keep consistent with the community.
      Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
      (cherry picked from commit bc4c0996)
      1df0978e
  8. 19 7月, 2023 3 次提交
  9. 18 7月, 2023 8 次提交