Use struct pid and struct cred to store the peer credentials on struct
sock.  This gives enough information to convert the peer credential
information to a value relative to whatever namespace the socket is in
at the time.

This removes nasty surprises when using SO_PEERCRED on socket
connetions where the processes on either side are in different pid and
user namespaces.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

To keep the coming code clear and to allow both the sock
code and the scm code to share the logic introduce a
fuction to translate from struct cred to struct ucred.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

CAIF is using "xxx-AF_MAX" strings for the lock validator. It should use
its own strings.
Signed-off-by: NAlex Lorca <alex.lorca@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This new sock lock primitive was introduced to speedup some user context
socket manipulation. But it is unsafe to protect two threads, one using
regular lock_sock/release_sock, one using lock_sock_bh/unlock_sock_bh

This patch changes lock_sock_bh to be careful against 'owned' state.
If owned is found to be set, we must take the slow path.
lock_sock_bh() now returns a boolean to say if the slow path was taken,
and this boolean is used at unlock_sock_bh time to call the appropriate
unlock function.

After this change, BH are either disabled or enabled during the
lock_sock_bh/unlock_sock_bh protected section. This might be misleading,
so we rename these functions to lock_sock_fast()/unlock_sock_fast().
Reported-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch makes tun update its socket classid every time we
inject a packet into the network stack.  This is so that any
updates made by the admin to the process writing packets to
tun is effected.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Up until now cls_cgroup has relied on fetching the classid out of
the current executing thread.  This runs into trouble when a packet
processing is delayed in which case it may execute out of another
thread's context.

Furthermore, even when a packet is not delayed we may fail to
classify it if soft IRQs have been disabled, because this scenario
is indistinguishable from one where a packet unrelated to the
current thread is processed by a real soft IRQ.

In fact, the current semantics is inherently broken, as a single
skb may be constructed out of the writes of two different tasks.
A different manifestation of this problem is when the TCP stack
transmits in response of an incoming ACK.  This is currently
unclassified.

As we already have a concept of packet ownership for accounting
purposes in the skb->sk pointer, this is a natural place to store
the classid in a persistent manner.

This patch adds the cls_cgroup classid in struct sock, filling up
an existing hole on 64-bit :)

The value is set at socket creation time.  So all sockets created
via socket(2) automatically gains the ID of the thread creating it.
Whenever another process touches the socket by either reading or
writing to it, we will change the socket classid to that of the
process if it has a valid (non-zero) classid.

For sockets created on inbound connections through accept(2), we
inherit the classid of the original listening socket through
sk_clone, possibly preceding the actual accept(2) call.

In order to minimise risks, I have not made this the authoritative
classid.  For now it is only used as a backup when we execute
with soft IRQs disabled.  Once we're completely happy with its
semantics we can use it as the sole classid.

Footnote: I have rearranged the error path on cls_group module
creation.  If we didn't do this, then there is a window where
someone could create a tc rule using cls_group before the cgroup
subsystem has been registered.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use low order bit of skb->_skb_dst to tell dst is not refcounted.

Change _skb_dst to _skb_refdst to make sure all uses are catched.

skb_dst() returns the dst, regardless of noref bit set or not, but
with a lockdep check to make sure a noref dst is not given if current
user is not rcu protected.

New skb_dst_set_noref() helper to set an notrefcounted dst on a skb.
(with lockdep check)

skb_dst_drop() drops a reference only if skb dst was refcounted.

skb_dst_force() helper is used to force a refcount on dst, when skb
is queued and not anymore RCU protected.

Use skb_dst_force() in __sk_add_backlog(), __dev_xmit_skb() if
!IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE or skb enqueued on qdisc queue, in
sock_queue_rcv_skb(), in __nf_queue().

Use skb_dst_force() in dev_requeue_skb().

Note: dst_use_noref() still dirties dst, we might transform it
later to do one dirtying per jiffies.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

TCP-MD5 sessions have intermittent failures, when route cache is
invalidated. ip_queue_xmit() has to find a new route, calls
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->u.dst), destroying the 

sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK

that MD5 desperately try to make all over its way (from
tcp_transmit_skb() for example)

So we send few bad packets, and everything is fine when
tcp_transmit_skb() is called again for this socket.

Since ip_queue_xmit() is at a lower level than TCP-MD5, I chose to use a
socket field, sk_route_nocaps, containing bits to mask on sk_route_caps.
Reported-by: NBhaskar Dutta <bhaskie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sk_callback_lock rwlock actually protects sk->sk_sleep pointer, so we
need two atomic operations (and associated dirtying) per incoming
packet.

RCU conversion is pretty much needed :

1) Add a new structure, called "struct socket_wq" to hold all fields
that will need rcu_read_lock() protection (currently: a
wait_queue_head_t and a struct fasync_struct pointer).

[Future patch will add a list anchor for wakeup coalescing]

2) Attach one of such structure to each "struct socket" created in
sock_alloc_inode().

3) Respect RCU grace period when freeing a "struct socket_wq"

4) Change sk_sleep pointer in "struct sock" by sk_wq, pointer to "struct
socket_wq"

5) Change sk_sleep() function to use new sk->sk_wq instead of
sk->sk_sleep

6) Change sk_has_sleeper() to wq_has_sleeper() that must be used inside
a rcu_read_lock() section.

7) Change all sk_has_sleeper() callers to :
  - Use rcu_read_lock() instead of read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock)
  - Use wq_has_sleeper() to eventually wakeup tasks.
  - Use rcu_read_unlock() instead of read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock)

8) sock_wake_async() is modified to use rcu protection as well.

9) Exceptions :
  macvtap, drivers/net/tun.c, af_unix use integrated "struct socket_wq"
instead of dynamically allocated ones. They dont need rcu freeing.

Some cleanups or followups are probably needed, (possible
sk_callback_lock conversion to a spinlock for example...).
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.

We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.

Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.

Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Define a new function to return the waitqueue of a "struct sock".

static inline wait_queue_head_t *sk_sleep(struct sock *sk)
{
	return sk->sk_sleep;
}

Change all read occurrences of sk_sleep by a call to this function.

Needed for a future RCU conversion. sk_sleep wont be a field directly
available.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With latest CONFIG_PROVE_RCU stuff, I felt more comfortable to make this
work.

sk->sk_dst_cache is currently protected by a rwlock (sk_dst_lock)

This rwlock is readlocked for a very small amount of time, and dst
entries are already freed after RCU grace period. This calls for RCU
again :)

This patch converts sk_dst_lock to a spinlock, and use RCU for readers.

__sk_dst_get() is supposed to be called with rcu_read_lock() or if
socket locked by user, so use appropriate rcu_dereference_check()
condition (rcu_read_lock_held() || sock_owned_by_user(sk))

This patch avoids two atomic ops per tx packet on UDP connected sockets,
for example, and permits sk_dst_lock to be much less dirtied.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We test that "prot->rsk_prot" is non-null right before we dereference it
on this line.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sk_add_backlog -> __sk_add_backlog
sk_add_backlog_limited -> sk_add_backlog
Signed-off-by: NZhu Yi <yi.zhu@intel.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We got system OOM while running some UDP netperf testing on the loopback
device. The case is multiple senders sent stream UDP packets to a single
receiver via loopback on local host. Of course, the receiver is not able
to handle all the packets in time. But we surprisingly found that these
packets were not discarded due to the receiver's sk->sk_rcvbuf limit.
Instead, they are kept queuing to sk->sk_backlog and finally ate up all
the memory. We believe this is a secure hole that a none privileged user
can crash the system.

The root cause for this problem is, when the receiver is doing
__release_sock() (i.e. after userspace recv, kernel udp_recvmsg ->
skb_free_datagram_locked -> release_sock), it moves skbs from backlog to
sk_receive_queue with the softirq enabled. In the above case, multiple
busy senders will almost make it an endless loop. The skbs in the
backlog end up eat all the system memory.

The issue is not only for UDP. Any protocols using socket backlog is
potentially affected. The patch adds limit for socket backlog so that
the backlog size cannot be expanded endlessly.
Reported-by: NAlex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru
Cc: "Pekka Savola (ipv6)" <pekkas@netcore.fi>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Cc: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Cc: Andrew Hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NZhu Yi <yi.zhu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Update rcu_dereference() primitives to use new lockdep-based
checking. The rcu_dereference() in __in6_dev_get() may be
protected either by rcu_read_lock() or RTNL, per Eric Dumazet.
The rcu_dereference() in __sk_free() is protected by the fact
that it is never reached if an update could change it.  Check
for this by using rcu_dereference_check() to verify that the
struct sock's ->sk_wmem_alloc counter is zero.
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com
Cc: niv@us.ibm.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
LKML-Reference: <1266887105-1528-5-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

kasprintf() makes code smaller.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

__net_init/__net_exit are apparently not going away, so use them
to full extent.

In some cases __net_init was removed, because it was called from
__net_exit code.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In sock_getsockopt the symbol 'lv' is declared as an
unsigned int type, probably due to sizeof returning a
size_t which is really an unsigned int.

This produces a sparse warning for SO_PEERNAME due to
the sock->ops->getname() call:

warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different signedness)
   expected int *sockaddr_len
   got unsigned int *<noident>

Quiet the warning by changing the type of 'lv' to an int.
Signed-off-by: NH Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes a netstamp_needed accounting issue when the listen socket
has SO_TIMESTAMP set:

    s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
    setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMP, 1); -> netstamp_needed = 1
    bind(s, ...);
    listen(s, ...);
    s2 = accept(s, ...); -> netstamp_needed = 1
    close(s2); -> netstamp_needed = 0
    close(s); -> netstamp_needed = -1
Signed-off-by: NOctavian Purdila <opurdila@ixiacom.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net/core/sock.c: In function 'sock_setsockopt':
net/core/sock.c:396: warning: 'index' may be used uninitialized in this function
net/core/sock.c:396: note: 'index' was declared here

GCC can't see that all paths initialize index, so just
set it to the default (0) and eliminate the specific
code block that handles the null device name string.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Avoid dev_hold()/dev_put() in sock_bindtodevice()
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

dst_negative_advice() should check for changed dst and reset
sk_tx_queue_mapping accordingly. Pass sock to the callers of
dst_negative_advice.

(sk_reset_txq is defined just for use by dst_negative_advice. The
only way I could find to get around this is to move dst_negative_()
from dst.h to dst.c, include sock.h in dst.c, etc)
Signed-off-by: NKrishna Kumar <krkumar2@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Introduce sk_tx_queue_mapping; and functions that set, test and
get this value. Reset sk_tx_queue_mapping to -1 whenever the dst
cache is set/reset, and in socket alloc. Setting txq to -1 and
using valid txq=<0 to n-1> allows the tx path to use the value
of sk_tx_queue_mapping directly instead of subtracting 1 on every
tx.
Signed-off-by: NKrishna Kumar <krkumar2@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sock_queue_rcv_skb() can update sk_drops itself, removing need for
callers to take care of it. This is more consistent since
sock_queue_rcv_skb() also reads sk_drops when queueing a skb.

This adds sk_drops managment to many protocols that not cared yet.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Create a new socket level option to report number of queue overflows

Recently I augmented the AF_PACKET protocol to report the number of frames lost
on the socket receive queue between any two enqueued frames.  This value was
exported via a SOL_PACKET level cmsg.  AFter I completed that work it was
requested that this feature be generalized so that any datagram oriented socket
could make use of this option.  As such I've created this patch, It creates a
new SOL_SOCKET level option called SO_RXQ_OVFL, which when enabled exports a
SOL_SOCKET level cmsg that reports the nubmer of times the sk_receive_queue
overflowed between any two given frames.  It also augments the AF_PACKET
protocol to take advantage of this new feature (as it previously did not touch
sk->sk_drops, which this patch uses to record the overflow count).  Tested
successfully by me.

Notes:

1) Unlike my previous patch, this patch simply records the sk_drops value, which
is not a number of drops between packets, but rather a total number of drops.
Deltas must be computed in user space.

2) While this patch currently works with datagram oriented protocols, it will
also be accepted by non-datagram oriented protocols. I'm not sure if thats
agreeable to everyone, but my argument in favor of doing so is that, for those
protocols which aren't applicable to this option, sk_drops will always be zero,
and reporting no drops on a receive queue that isn't used for those
non-participating protocols seems reasonable to me.  This also saves us having
to code in a per-protocol opt in mechanism.

3) This applies cleanly to net-next assuming that commit
97775007 (my af packet cmsg patch) is reverted
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 2b85a34e
(net: No more expensive sock_hold()/sock_put() on each tx)
opens a window in sock_wfree() where another cpu
might free the socket we are working on.

A fix is to call sk->sk_write_space(sk) while still
holding a reference on sk.
Reported-by: NJike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This provides safety against negative optlen at the type
level instead of depending upon (sometimes non-trivial)
checks against this sprinkled all over the the place, in
each and every implementation.

Based upon work done by Arjan van de Ven and feedback
from Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Sizing of memory allocations shouldn't depend on the number of physical
pages found in a system, as that generally includes (perhaps a huge amount
of) non-RAM pages.  The amount of what actually is usable as storage
should instead be used as a basis here.

Some of the calculations (i.e.  those not intending to use high memory)
should likely even use (totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages).
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

After commit 2b85a34e
(net: No more expensive sock_hold()/sock_put() on each tx)
sk_free() frees socks conditionally and depends
on sk_wmem_alloc being set e.g. in sock_init_data(). But in some
cases sk_free() is called earlier, usually after other alloc errors.

Fix is to move sk_wmem_alloc initialization from sock_init_data()
to sk_alloc() itself.
Signed-off-by: NJarek Poplawski <jarkao2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This sockopt goes in line with SO_TYPE and SO_PROTOCOL. It makes it
possible for userspace programs to pass around file descriptors — I
am referring to arguments-to-functions, but it may even work for the
fd passing over UNIX sockets — without needing to also pass the
auxiliary information (PF_INET6/IPPROTO_TCP).
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Similar to SO_TYPE returning the socket type, SO_PROTOCOL allows to
retrieve the protocol used with a given socket.

I am not quite sure why we have that-many copies of socket.h, and why
the values are not the same on all arches either, but for where hex
numbers dominate, I use 0x1029 for SO_PROTOCOL as that seems to be
the next free unused number across a bunch of operating systems, or
so Google results make me want to believe. SO_PROTOCOL for others
just uses the next free Linux number, 38.
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

String literals are constant, and usually, we can also tag the array
of pointers const too, moving it to the .rodata section.
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

I guess it should be -EINVAL rather than EINVAL. I have not checked
when the bug came in. Perhaps a candidate for -stable?
Signed-off-by: NRémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit e912b114
(net: sk_prot_alloc() should not blindly overwrite memory)
took care of not zeroing whole new socket at allocation time.

sock_copy() is another spot where we should be very careful.
We should not set refcnt to a non null value, until
we are sure other fields are correctly setup, or
a lockless reader could catch this socket by mistake,
while not fully (re)initialized.

This patch puts sk_node & sk_refcnt to the very beginning
of struct sock to ease sock_copy() & sk_prot_alloc() job.

We add appropriate smp_wmb() before sk_refcnt initializations
to match our RCU requirements (changes to sock keys should
be committed to memory before sk_refcnt setting)
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Some sockets use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, and our RCU code correctness
depends on sk->sk_nulls_node.next being always valid. A NULL
value is not allowed as it might fault a lockless reader.

Current sk_prot_alloc() implementation doesnt respect this hypothesis,
calling kmem_cache_alloc() with __GFP_ZERO. Just call memset() around
the forbidden field.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Adding memory barrier after the poll_wait function, paired with
receive callbacks. Adding fuctions sock_poll_wait and sk_has_sleeper
to wrap the memory barrier.

Without the memory barrier, following race can happen.
The race fires, when following code paths meet, and the tp->rcv_nxt
and __add_wait_queue updates stay in CPU caches.

CPU1                         CPU2

sys_select                   receive packet
  ...                        ...
  __add_wait_queue           update tp->rcv_nxt
  ...                        ...
  tp->rcv_nxt check          sock_def_readable
  ...                        {
  schedule                      ...
                                if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
                                        wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep)
                                ...
                             }

If there was no cache the code would work ok, since the wait_queue and
rcv_nxt are opposit to each other.

Meaning that once tp->rcv_nxt is updated by CPU2, the CPU1 either already
passed the tp->rcv_nxt check and sleeps, or will get the new value for
tp->rcv_nxt and will return with new data mask.
In both cases the process (CPU1) is being added to the wait queue, so the
waitqueue_active (CPU2) call cannot miss and will wake up CPU1.

The bad case is when the __add_wait_queue changes done by CPU1 stay in its
cache, and so does the tp->rcv_nxt update on CPU2 side.  The CPU1 will then
endup calling schedule and sleep forever if there are no more data on the
socket.

Calls to poll_wait in following modules were ommited:
	net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
	net/irda/af_irda.c
	net/irda/irnet/irnet_ppp.c
	net/mac80211/rc80211_pid_debugfs.c
	net/phonet/socket.c
	net/rds/af_rds.c
	net/rfkill/core.c
	net/sunrpc/cache.c
	net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c
	net/tipc/socket.c
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

2009/2/24 Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>:
> ok, this is the last warning i have from today's overnight -tip
> testruns - a 32-bit system warning in sock_init_data():
>
> [    2.610389] NET: Registered protocol family 16
> [    2.616138] initcall netlink_proto_init+0x0/0x170 returned 0 after 7812 usecs
> [    2.620010] WARNING: kmemcheck: Caught 32-bit read from uninitialized memory (f642c184)
> [    2.624002] 010000000200000000000000604990c000000000000000000000000000000000
> [    2.634076]  i i i i i i u u i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
> [    2.641038]          ^
> [    2.643376]
> [    2.644004] Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted (2.6.29-rc6-tip-01751-g4d1c22c-dirty #885)
> [    2.648003] EIP: 0060:[<c07141a1>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0
> [    2.652008] EIP is at sock_init_data+0xa1/0x190
> [    2.656003] EAX: 0001a800 EBX: f6836c00 ECX: 00463000 EDX: c0e46fe0
> [    2.660003] ESI: f642c180 EDI: c0b83088 EBP: f6863ed8 ESP: c0c412ec
> [    2.664003]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
> [    2.668003] CR0: 8005003b CR2: f682c400 CR3: 00b91000 CR4: 000006f0
> [    2.672003] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
> [    2.676003] DR6: ffff4ff0 DR7: 00000400
> [    2.680002]  [<c07423e5>] __netlink_create+0x35/0xa0
> [    2.684002]  [<c07443cc>] netlink_kernel_create+0x4c/0x140
> [    2.688002]  [<c072755e>] rtnetlink_net_init+0x1e/0x40
> [    2.696002]  [<c071b601>] register_pernet_operations+0x11/0x30
> [    2.700002]  [<c071b72c>] register_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
> [    2.704002]  [<c0bf3c8c>] rtnetlink_init+0x4c/0x100
> [    2.708002]  [<c0bf4669>] netlink_proto_init+0x159/0x170
> [    2.712002]  [<c0101124>] do_one_initcall+0x24/0x150
> [    2.716002]  [<c0bbf3c7>] do_initcalls+0x27/0x40
> [    2.723201]  [<c0bbf3fc>] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x20
> [    2.728002]  [<c0bbfb8a>] kernel_init+0x5a/0xa0
> [    2.732002]  [<c0103e47>] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x10
> [    2.736002]  [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff

We fix this false positive by annotating the bitfield in struct
sock.
Reported-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>

One of the problem with sock memory accounting is it uses
a pair of sock_hold()/sock_put() for each transmitted packet.

This slows down bidirectional flows because the receive path
also needs to take a refcount on socket and might use a different
cpu than transmit path or transmit completion path. So these
two atomic operations also trigger cache line bounces.

We can see this in tx or tx/rx workloads (media gateways for example),
where sock_wfree() can be in top five functions in profiles.

We use this sock_hold()/sock_put() so that sock freeing
is delayed until all tx packets are completed.

As we also update sk_wmem_alloc, we could offset sk_wmem_alloc
by one unit at init time, until sk_free() is called.
Once sk_free() is called, we atomic_dec_and_test(sk_wmem_alloc)
to decrement initial offset and atomicaly check if any packets
are in flight.

skb_set_owner_w() doesnt call sock_hold() anymore

sock_wfree() doesnt call sock_put() anymore, but check if sk_wmem_alloc
reached 0 to perform the final freeing.

Drawback is that a skb->truesize error could lead to unfreeable sockets, or
even worse, prematurely calling __sk_free() on a live socket.

Nice speedups on SMP. tbench for example, going from 2691 MB/s to 2711 MB/s
on my 8 cpu dev machine, even if tbench was not really hitting sk_refcnt
contention point. 5 % speedup on a UDP transmit workload (depends
on number of flows), lowering TX completion cpu usage.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

IEEE 802.15.4 stack requires several constants to be defined/adjusted.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSergey Lapin <slapin@ossfans.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>