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  1. 23 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 15 1月, 2019 2 次提交
  5. 14 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 09 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • Z
      drm/i915/gvt: Fix workload request allocation before request add · f0e99437
      由 Zhenyu Wang 提交于 
      In commit 6bb2a2af ("drm/i915/gvt: Fix crash after request->hw_context change"),
forgot to handle workload scan path in ELSP handler case which was to
optimize scanning earlier instead of in gvt submission thread, so request
alloc and add was splitting then which is against right process.

This trys to do a partial revert of that commit which still has workload
request alloc helper and make sure shadow state population is handled after
request alloc for target state buffer.

v3: Fix missed workload status setting in request alloc error path
v2: Fix dispatch workload err path that should add request after alloc anyway.

Fixes: 6bb2a2af ("drm/i915/gvt: Fix crash after request->hw_context change")
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Tested-by: NBin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiaolin Zhang <xiaolin.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NZhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
      f0e99437
  9. 05 1月, 2019 2 次提交
    • L
      make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()' · 594cc251
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.

But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar.  Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.

If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin().  But
nothing really forces the range check.

By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses.  We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      594cc251
    • L
      i915: fix missing user_access_end() in page fault exception case · 0b2c8f8b
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      When commit fddcd00a ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a
user-write error") unified the error handling for various user access
problems, it didn't do the user_access_end() that is needed for the
unsafe_put_user() case.

It's not a huge deal: a missed user_access_end() will only mean that
SMAP protection isn't active afterwards, and for the error case we'll be
returning to user mode soon enough anyway.  But it's wrong, and adding
the proper user_access_end() is trivial enough (and doing it for the
other error cases where it isn't needed doesn't hurt).

I noticed it while doing the same prep-work for changing
user_access_begin() that precipitated the access_ok() changes in commit
96d4f267 ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function").

Fixes: fddcd00a ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a user-write error")
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.20
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0b2c8f8b
  11. 04 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • L
      Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function · 96d4f267
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      96d4f267
  13. 29 12月, 2018 2 次提交
  15. 21 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 12 12月, 2018 3 次提交
  19. 07 12月, 2018 5 次提交
  21. 05 12月, 2018 5 次提交
  23. 04 12月, 2018 16 次提交