Replace the full "kick" with just the "wake" in the fallback path when
triggering a virtual interrupt via a posted interrupt fails because the
guest is not IN_GUEST_MODE.  If the guest transitions into guest mode
between the check and the kick, then it's guaranteed to see the pending
interrupt as KVM syncs the PIR to IRR (and onto GUEST_RVI) after setting
IN_GUEST_MODE.  Kicking the guest in this case is nothing more than an
unnecessary VM-Exit (and host IRQ).

Opportunistically update comments to explain the various ordering rules
and barriers at play.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-17-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Don't bother updating the Physical APIC table or IRTE when loading a vCPU
that is blocking, i.e. won't be marked IsRun{ning}=1, as the pCPU is
queried if and only if IsRunning is '1'.  If the vCPU was migrated, the
new pCPU will be picked up when avic_vcpu_load() is called by
svm_vcpu_unblocking().
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use kvm_vcpu_is_blocking() to determine whether or not the vCPU should be
marked running during avic_vcpu_load().  Drop avic_is_running, which
really should have been named "vcpu_is_not_blocking", as it tracked if
the vCPU was blocking, not if it was actually running, e.g. it was set
during svm_create_vcpu() when the vCPU was obviously not running.

This is technically a teeny tiny functional change, as the vCPU will be
marked IsRunning=1 on being reloaded if the vCPU is preempted between
svm_vcpu_blocking() and prepare_to_rcuwait().  But that's a benign change
as the vCPU will be marked IsRunning=0 when KVM voluntarily schedules out
the vCPU.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove handling of KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE from svm_vcpu_unblocking(), it's
no longer needed as it was made obsolete by commit df7e4827 ("KVM:
SVM: call avic_vcpu_load/avic_vcpu_put when enabling/disabling AVIC").
Prior to that commit, the manual check was necessary to ensure the AVIC
stuff was updated by avic_set_running() when a request to enable APICv
became pending while the vCPU was blocking, as the request handling
itself would not do the update.  But, as evidenced by the commit, that
logic was flawed and subject to various races.

Now that svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() does avic_vcpu_load/put() in
response to an APICv status change, drop the manual check in the
unblocking path.
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop the avic_vcpu_is_running() check when waking vCPUs in response to a
VM-Exit due to incomplete IPI delivery.  The check isn't wrong per se, but
it's not 100% accurate in the sense that it doesn't guarantee that the vCPU
was one of the vCPUs that didn't receive the IPI.

The check isn't required for correctness as blocking == !running in this
context.

From a performance perspective, waking a live task is not expensive as the
only moderately costly operation is a locked operation to temporarily
disable preemption.  And if that is indeed a performance issue,
kvm_vcpu_is_blocking() would be a better check than poking into the AVIC.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Signal the AVIC doorbell iff the vCPU is running in the guest.  If the vCPU
is not IN_GUEST_MODE, it's guaranteed to pick up any pending IRQs on the
next VMRUN, which unconditionally processes the vIRR.

Add comments to document the logic.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop kvm_x86_ops' pre/post_block() now that all implementations are nops.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Unexport switch_to_{hv,sw}_timer() now that common x86 handles the
transitions.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Handle the switch to/from the hypervisor/software timer when a vCPU is
blocking in common x86 instead of in VMX.  Even though VMX is the only
user of a hypervisor timer, the logic and all functions involved are
generic x86 (unless future CPUs do something completely different and
implement a hypervisor timer that runs regardless of mode).

Handling the switch in common x86 will allow for the elimination of the
pre/post_blocks hooks, and also lets KVM switch back to the hypervisor
timer if and only if it was in use (without additional params).  Add a
comment explaining why the switch cannot be deferred to kvm_sched_out()
or kvm_vcpu_block().
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Move the seemingly generic block_vcpu_list from kvm_vcpu to vcpu_vmx, and
rename the list and all associated variables to clarify that it tracks
the set of vCPU that need to be poked on a posted interrupt to the wakeup
vector.  The list is not used to track _all_ vCPUs that are blocking, and
the term "blocked" can be misleading as it may refer to a blocking
condition in the host or the guest, where as the PI wakeup case is
specifically for the vCPUs that are actively blocking from within the
guest.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Move the posted interrupt pre/post_block logic into vcpu_put/load
respectively, using the kvm_vcpu_is_blocking() to determining whether or
not the wakeup handler needs to be set (and unset).  This avoids updating
the PI descriptor if halt-polling is successful, reduces the number of
touchpoints for updating the descriptor, and eliminates the confusing
behavior of intentionally leaving a "stale" PI.NDST when a blocking vCPU
is scheduled back in after preemption.

The downside is that KVM will do the PID update twice if the vCPU is
preempted after prepare_to_rcuwait() but before schedule(), but that's a
rare case (and non-existent on !PREEMPT kernels).

The notable wart is the need to send a self-IPI on the wakeup vector if
an outstanding notification is pending after configuring the wakeup
vector.  Ideally, KVM would just do a kvm_vcpu_wake_up() in this case,
but the scheduler doesn't support waking a task from its preemption
notifier callback, i.e. while the task is right in the middle of
being scheduled out.

Note, setting the wakeup vector before halt-polling is not necessary:
once the pending IRQ will be recorded in the PIR, kvm_vcpu_has_events()
will detect this (via kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(), kvm_apic_get_interrupt(),
apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr() and finally vmx_sync_pir_to_irr()) and
terminate the polling.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Reject KVM_RUN if emulation is required (because VMX is running without
unrestricted guest) and an exception is pending, as KVM doesn't support
emulating exceptions except when emulating real mode via vm86.  The vCPU
is hosed either way, but letting KVM_RUN proceed triggers a WARN due to
the impossible condition.  Alternatively, the WARN could be removed, but
then userspace and/or KVM bugs would result in the vCPU silently running
in a bad state, which isn't very friendly to users.

Originally, the bug was hit by syzkaller with a nested guest as that
doesn't require kvm_intel.unrestricted_guest=0.  That particular flavor
is likely fixed by commit cd0e615c ("KVM: nVMX: Synthesize
TRIPLE_FAULT for L2 if emulation is required"), but it's trivial to
trigger the WARN with a non-nested guest, and userspace can likely force
bad state via ioctls() for a nested guest as well.

Checking for the impossible condition needs to be deferred until KVM_RUN
because KVM can't force specific ordering between ioctls.  E.g. clearing
exception.pending in KVM_SET_SREGS doesn't prevent userspace from setting
it in KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, and disallowing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS with
emulation_required would prevent userspace from queuing an exception and
then stuffing sregs.  Note, if KVM were to try and detect/prevent the
condition prior to KVM_RUN, handle_invalid_guest_state() and/or
handle_emulation_failure() would need to be modified to clear the pending
exception prior to exiting to userspace.

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 137812 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1623 vmx_queue_exception+0x14f/0x160 [kvm_intel]
 CPU: 6 PID: 137812 Comm: vmx_invalid_nes Not tainted 5.15.2-7cc36c3e14ae-pop #279
 Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014
 RIP: 0010:vmx_queue_exception+0x14f/0x160 [kvm_intel]
 Code: <0f> 0b e9 fd fe ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffffa45c83577d38 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000080000006 RCX: 0000000000000006
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000010002 RDI: ffff9916af734000
 RBP: ffff9916af734000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000006
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9916af734038 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  00007f1e1a47c740(0000) GS:ffff99188fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f1e1a6a8008 CR3: 000000026f83b005 CR4: 00000000001726e0
 Call Trace:
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x13a2/0x1f20 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x690 [kvm]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Reported-by: syzbot+82112403ace4cbd780d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211228232437.1875318-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The PMU event filter may contain up to 300 events. Replace the linear
search in reprogram_gp_counter() with a binary search.
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220115052431.447232-2-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

According to Intel extended feature disable (XFD) spec, the sub-function i
(i > 1) of CPUID function 0DH enumerates "details for state component i.
ECX[2] enumerates support for XFD support for this state component."

If KVM does not report F(XFD) feature (e.g. due to CONFIG_X86_64),
then the corresponding XFD support for any state component i
should also be removed. Translate this dependency into KVM terms.

Fixes: 690a757d ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220117074531.76925-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Rewrite the comment in kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access() that explains
why it is safe to flush TLBs outside of the MMU lock after
write-protecting SPTEs for dirty logging. The current comment is a long
run-on sentence that was difficult to understand. In addition it was
specific to the shadow MMU (mentioning mmu_spte_update()) when the TDP
MMU has to handle this as well.

The new comment explains:
 - Why the TLB flush is necessary at all.
 - Why it is desirable to do the TLB flush outside of the MMU lock.
 - Why it is safe to do the TLB flush outside of the MMU lock.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-5-dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SPTEs are tagged with software-only bits to indicate if it is
"MMU-writable" and "Host-writable". These bits are used to determine why
KVM has marked an SPTE as read-only.

Document these bits and their invariants, and enforce the invariants
with new WARNs in spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable() to ensure they
are not accidentally violated in the future.

Opportunistically move DEFAULT_SPTE_{MMU,HOST}_WRITABLE next to
EPT_SPTE_{MMU,HOST}_WRITABLE since the new documentation applies to
both.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-4-dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When handling the changed_pte notifier and the new PTE is read-only,
clear both the Host-writable and MMU-writable bits in the SPTE. This
preserves the invariant that MMU-writable is set if-and-only-if
Host-writable is set.

No functional change intended. Nothing currently relies on the
aforementioned invariant and technically the changed_pte notifier is
dead code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-3-dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When the TDP MMU is write-protection GFNs for page table protection (as
opposed to for dirty logging, or due to the HVA not being writable), it
checks if the SPTE is already write-protected and if so skips modifying
the SPTE and the TLB flush.

This behavior is incorrect because it fails to check if the SPTE
is write-protected for page table protection, i.e. fails to check
that MMU-writable is '0'.  If the SPTE was write-protected for dirty
logging but not page table protection, the SPTE could locklessly be made
writable, and vCPUs could still be running with writable mappings cached
in their TLB.

Fix this by only skipping setting the SPTE if the SPTE is already
write-protected *and* MMU-writable is already clear.  Technically,
checking only MMU-writable would suffice; a SPTE cannot be writable
without MMU-writable being set.  But check both to be paranoid and
because it arguably yields more readable code.

Fixes: 46044f72 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-2-dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock is taken from hard interrupt context
(pi_wakeup_handler), therefore it cannot sleep.

Switch it to a raw spinlock.

Fixes:

[41297.066254] BUG: scheduling while atomic: CPU 0/KVM/635218/0x00010001
[41297.066323] Preemption disabled at:
[41297.066324] [<ffffffff902ee47f>] irq_enter_rcu+0xf/0x60
[41297.066339] Call Trace:
[41297.066342]  <IRQ>
[41297.066346]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[41297.066353]  ? irq_enter_rcu+0xf/0x60
[41297.066356]  __schedule_bug.cold+0x7d/0x8b
[41297.066361]  __schedule+0x439/0x5b0
[41297.066365]  ? task_blocks_on_rt_mutex.constprop.0.isra.0+0x1b0/0x440
[41297.066369]  schedule_rtlock+0x1e/0x40
[41297.066371]  rtlock_slowlock_locked+0xf1/0x260
[41297.066374]  rt_spin_lock+0x3b/0x60
[41297.066378]  pi_wakeup_handler+0x31/0x90 [kvm_intel]
[41297.066388]  sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x9d/0xd0
[41297.066392]  </IRQ>
[41297.066392]  asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x12/0x20
...
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The new module parameter to control PMU virtualization should apply
to Intel as well as AMD, for situations where userspace is not trusted.
If the module parameter allows PMU virtualization, there could be a
new KVM_CAP or guest CPUID bits whereby userspace can enable/disable
PMU virtualization on a per-VM basis.

If the module parameter does not allow PMU virtualization, there
should be no userspace override, since we have no precedent for
authorizing that kind of override. If it's false, other counter-based
profiling features (such as LBR including the associated CPUID bits
if any) will not be exposed.

Change its name from "pmu" to "enable_pmu" as we have temporary
variables with the same name in our code like "struct kvm_pmu *pmu".

Fixes: b1d66dad ("KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU virtualization")
Suggested-by : Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220111073823.21885-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit feb627e8 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
forbade changing CPUID altogether but unfortunately this is not fully
compatible with existing VMMs. In particular, QEMU reuses vCPU fds for
CPU hotplug after unplug and it calls KVM_SET_CPUID2. Instead of full ban,
check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what was previously set.
Reported-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Fixes: feb627e8 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Do not call kvm_find_cpuid_entry repeatedly. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() mangles CPUID data coming from userspace
VMM after updating 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries', this makes it
impossible to compare an update with what was previously
supplied. Introduce __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() version which can be
used to tweak the input before it goes to 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries'
so the upcoming update check can compare tweaked data.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

According to CPUID 0x0A.EBX bit vector, the event [7] should be the
unrealized event "Topdown Slots" instead of the *kernel* generalized
common hardware event "REF_CPU_CYCLES", so we need to skip the cpuid
unavaliblity check in the intel_pmc_perf_hw_id() for the last
REF_CPU_CYCLES event and update the confusing comment.

If the event is marked as unavailable in the Intel guest CPUID
0AH.EBX leaf, we need to avoid any perf_event creation, whether
it's a gp or fixed counter. To distinguish whether it is a rejected
event or an event that needs to be programmed with PERF_TYPE_RAW type,
a new special returned value of "PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX + 1" is introduced.

Fixes: 62079d8a ("KVM: PMU: add proper support for fixed counter 2")
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220105051509.69437-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Always intercepting IA32_XFD causes non-negligible overhead when this
register is updated frequently in the guest.

Disable r/w emulation after intercepting the first WRMSR(IA32_XFD)
with a non-zero value.

Disable WRMSR emulation implies that IA32_XFD becomes out-of-sync
with the software states in fpstate and the per-cpu xfd cache. This
leads to two additional changes accordingly:

  - Call fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() after vm-exit to bring
    software states back in-sync with the MSR, before handle_exit_irqoff()
    is called.

  - Always trap #NM once write interception is disabled for IA32_XFD.
    The #NM exception is rare if the guest doesn't use dynamic
    features. Otherwise, there is at most one exception per guest
    task given a dynamic feature.

p.s. We have confirmed that SDM is being revised to say that
when setting IA32_XFD[18] the AMX register state is not guaranteed
to be preserved. This clarification avoids adding mess for a creative
guest which sets IA32_XFD[18]=1 before saving active AMX state to
its own storage.
Signed-off-by: NKevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-22-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

With KVM_CAP_XSAVE, userspace uses a hardcoded 4KB buffer to get/set
xstate data from/to KVM. This doesn't work when dynamic xfeatures
(e.g. AMX) are exposed to the guest as they require a larger buffer
size.

Introduce a new capability (KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Userspace VMM gets the
required xstate buffer size via KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).
KVM_SET_XSAVE is extended to work with both legacy and new capabilities
by doing properly-sized memdup_user() based on the guest fpu container.
KVM_GET_XSAVE is kept for backward-compatible reason. Instead,
KVM_GET_XSAVE2 is introduced under KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 as the preferred
interface for getting xstate buffer (4KB or larger size) from KVM
(Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/12/15/510)

Also, update the api doc with the new KVM_GET_XSAVE2 ioctl.
Signed-off-by: NGuang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-19-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Extend CPUID emulation to support XFD, AMX_TILE, AMX_INT8 and
AMX_BF16. Adding those bits into kvm_cpu_caps finally activates all
previous logics in this series.

Hide XFD on 32bit host kernels. Otherwise it leads to a weird situation
where KVM tells userspace to migrate MSR_IA32_XFD and then rejects
attempts to read/write the MSR.
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-17-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Two XCR0 bits are defined for AMX to support XSAVE mechanism. Bit 17
is for tilecfg and bit 18 is for tiledata.

The value of XCR0[17:18] is always either 00b or 11b. Also, SDM
recommends that only 64-bit operating systems enable Intel AMX by
setting XCR0[18:17]. 32-bit host kernel never sets the tile bits in
vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0.
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-16-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This saves one unnecessary VM-exit in guest #NM handler, given that the
MSR is already restored with the guest value before the guest is resumed.
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-15-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Emulate read/write to IA32_XFD_ERR MSR.

Only the saved value in the guest_fpu container is touched in the
emulation handler. Actual MSR update is handled right before entering
the guest (with preemption disabled)
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NZeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-14-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Guest IA32_XFD_ERR is generally modified in two places:

  - Set by CPU when #NM is triggered;
  - Cleared by guest in its #NM handler;

Intercept #NM for the first case when a nonzero value is written
to IA32_XFD. Nonzero indicates that the guest is willing to do
dynamic fpstate expansion for certain xfeatures, thus KVM needs to
manage and virtualize guest XFD_ERR properly. The vcpu exception
bitmap is updated in XFD write emulation according to guest_fpu::xfd.

Save the current XFD_ERR value to the guest_fpu container in the #NM
VM-exit handler. This must be done with interrupt disabled, otherwise
the unsaved MSR value may be clobbered by host activity.

The saving operation is conducted conditionally only when guest_fpu:xfd
includes a non-zero value. Doing so also avoids misread on a platform
which doesn't support XFD but #NM is triggered due to L1 interception.

Queueing #NM to the guest is postponed to handle_exception_nmi(). This
goes through the nested_vmx check so a virtual vmexit is queued instead
when #NM is triggered in L2 but L1 wants to intercept it.

Restore the host value (always ZERO outside of the host #NM
handler) before enabling interrupt.

Restore the guest value from the guest_fpu container right before
entering the guest (with interrupt disabled).
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-13-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Intel's eXtended Feature Disable (XFD) feature allows the software
to dynamically adjust fpstate buffer size for XSAVE features which
have large state.

Because guest fpstate has been expanded for all possible dynamic
xstates at KVM_SET_CPUID2, emulation of the IA32_XFD MSR is
straightforward. For write just call fpu_update_guest_xfd() to
update the guest fpu container once all the sanity checks are passed.
For read simply return the cached value in the container.
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NZeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-11-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM can request fpstate expansion in two approaches:

  1) When intercepting guest updates to XCR0 and XFD MSR;

  2) Before vcpu runs (e.g. at KVM_SET_CPUID2);

The first option doesn't waste memory for legacy guest if it doesn't
support XFD. However doing so introduces more complexity and also
imposes an order requirement in the restoring path, i.e. XCR0/XFD
must be restored before XSTATE.

Given that the agreement is to do the static approach. This is
considered a better tradeoff though it does waste 8K memory for
legacy guest if its CPUID includes dynamically-enabled xfeatures.

Successful fpstate expansion requires userspace VMM to acquire
guest xstate permissions before calling KVM_SET_CPUID2.

Also take the chance to adjust the indent in kvm_set_cpuid().
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-9-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in
CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise
a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to
KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a
dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is
required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic
bit.
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-5-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

CPUID.0xD.1.EBX enumerates the size of the XSAVE area (in compacted
format) required by XSAVES. If CPUID.0xD.i.ECX[1] is set for a state
component (i), this state component should be located on the next
64-bytes boundary following the preceding state component in the
compacted layout.

Fix xstate_required_size() to follow the alignment rule. AMX is the
first state component with 64-bytes alignment to catch this bug.
Signed-off-by: NJing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-4-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

With TDP MMU being the default now, access to mmu_rmaps_stat debugfs
file causes following oops:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 3185 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #204
RIP: 0010:pte_list_count+0x6/0x40
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_show+0x15e/0x320
  seq_read_iter+0x126/0x4b0
  ? aa_file_perm+0x124/0x490
  seq_read+0xf5/0x140
  full_proxy_read+0x5c/0x80
  vfs_read+0x9f/0x1a0
  ksys_read+0x67/0xe0
  __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7fca6fc13912

Return early when rmaps are not present.
Reported-by: NVasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Tested-by: NVasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NNikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220105040337.4234-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3bcd0662 ("KVM: X86: Introduce mmu_rmaps_stat per-vm debugfs file")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Both source and dest vms' kvm->locks are held in sev_lock_two_vms.
Mark one with a different subtype to avoid false positives from lockdep.

Fixes: c9d61dcb (KVM: SEV: accept signals in sev_lock_two_vms)
Reported-by: NYiru Xu <xyru1999@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NJinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1641364863-26331-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Normally guests will set up CR3 themselves, but some guests, such as
kselftests, and potentially CONFIG_PVH guests, rely on being booted
with paging enabled and CR3 initialized to a pre-allocated page table.

Currently CR3 updates via KVM_SET_SREGS* are not loaded into the guest
VMCB until just prior to entering the guest. For SEV-ES/SEV-SNP, this
is too late, since it will have switched over to using the VMSA page
prior to that point, with the VMSA CR3 copied from the VMCB initial
CR3 value: 0.

Address this by sync'ing the CR3 value into the VMCB save area
immediately when KVM_SET_SREGS* is issued so it will find it's way into
the initial VMSA.
Suggested-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20211216171358.61140-10-michael.roth@amd.com>
[Remove vmx_post_set_cr3; add a remark about kvm_set_cr3 not calling the
 new hook. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use asm-goto-output for smaller fast path code.

Message-Id: <YbcbbGW2GcMx6KpD@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.

So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.

We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.

Fixes: 629b5348 ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: Nbutt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211210163625.2886-6-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This adds basic support for delivering 2 level event channels to a guest.

Initially, it only supports delivery via the IRQ routing table, triggered
by an eventfd. In order to do so, it has a kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast()
function which will use the pre-mapped shared_info page if it already
exists and is still valid, while the slow path through the irqfd_inject
workqueue will remap the shared_info page if necessary.

It sets the bits in the shared_info page but not the vcpu_info; that is
deferred to __kvm_xen_has_interrupt() which raises the vector to the
appropriate vCPU.

Add a 'verbose' mode to xen_shinfo_test while adding test cases for this.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211210163625.2886-5-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>