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  1. 18 6月, 2021 20 次提交
  3. 07 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • V
      KVM: nVMX: Always make an attempt to map eVMCS after migration · f5c7e842
      由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于 
      When enlightened VMCS is in use and nested state is migrated with
vmx_get_nested_state()/vmx_set_nested_state() KVM can't map evmcs
page right away: evmcs gpa is not 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'
and we can't read it from VP assist page because userspace may decide
to restore HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE after restoring nested state
(and QEMU, for example, does exactly that). To make sure eVMCS is
mapped /vmx_set_nested_state() raises KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
request.

Commit f2c7ef3b ("KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
on nested vmexit") added KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES clearing to
nested_vmx_vmexit() to make sure MSR permission bitmap is not switched
when an immediate exit from L2 to L1 happens right after migration (caused
by a pending event, for example). Unfortunately, in the exact same
situation we still need to have eVMCS mapped so
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow() reflects changes in VMCS12 to eVMCS.

As a band-aid, restore nested_get_evmcs_page() when clearing
KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES in nested_vmx_vmexit(). The 'fix' is far
from being ideal as we can't easily propagate possible failures and even if
we could, this is most likely already too late to do so. The whole
'KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES' idea for mapping eVMCS after migration
seems to be fragile as we diverge too much from the 'native' path when
vmptr loading happens on vmx_set_nested_state().

Fixes: f2c7ef3b ("KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES on nested vmexit")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210503150854.1144255-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      f5c7e842
  5. 26 4月, 2021 4 次提交
  7. 20 4月, 2021 2 次提交
    • S
      KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC · 72add915
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed
to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU
model exposed to the guest.  Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an
admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel.

When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX
LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on
the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an
SGX-enabled guest.  With the exception of the provision key, all SGX
attribute bits may be exposed to the guest.  Guest access to the
provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a
future patch.

Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <a99e9c23310c79f2f4175c1af4c4cbcef913c3e5.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      72add915
    • S
      KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave · 3c0c2ad1
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX
enclave.  In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment,
wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the
state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave.  When exiting
an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the
enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state
is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and
then reloaded when re-entering the enclave.  E.g. after an instruction
based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP
of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point
to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code
that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave).

To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to
existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and
GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR.  Define the
new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache
VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE.  Clear the bit in exit_reason so that
checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g.
"if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work.

KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to
account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but
otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits
from enclaves.

The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for
all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to
the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit.  The inability
to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might
trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit
check.  For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never
sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only
if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD,
e.g. RDRAND_EXITING.

But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation,
e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit
from an enclave.  This is architecturally accurate for instruction
VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable
to killing the VM.  In practice, only broken or particularly stupid
guests should ever encounter this behavior.

Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to
modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows
should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before
getting to skip_emulated_instruction.

[1] Impossible for all practical purposes.  Not truly impossible
    since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme.

[2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at
    CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <315f54a8507d09c292463ef29104e1d4c62e9090.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      3c0c2ad1
  9. 17 4月, 2021 1 次提交
  11. 22 3月, 2021 1 次提交
    • I
      x86: Fix various typos in comments, take #2 · 163b0991
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      Fix another ~42 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments,
missed a few in the first pass, in particular in .S files.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      163b0991
  13. 15 3月, 2021 4 次提交
    • S
      KVM: x86: Handle triple fault in L2 without killing L1 · cb6a32c2
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Synthesize a nested VM-Exit if L2 triggers an emulated triple fault
instead of exiting to userspace, which likely will kill L1.  Any flow
that does KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT is suspect, but the most common scenario
for L2 killing L1 is if L0 (KVM) intercepts a contributory exception that
is _not_intercepted by L1.  E.g. if KVM is intercepting #GPs for the
VMware backdoor, a #GP that occurs in L2 while vectoring an injected #DF
will cause KVM to emulate triple fault.

Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210302174515.2812275-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      cb6a32c2
    • S
      KVM: x86: Move nVMX's consistency check macro to common code · 648fc8ae
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Move KVM's CC() macro to x86.h so that it can be reused by nSVM.
Debugging VM-Enter is as painful on SVM as it is on VMX.

Rename the more visible macro to KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK
to avoid any collisions with the uber-concise "CC".
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      648fc8ae
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Defer the MMU reload to the normal path on an EPTP switch · c805f5d5
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Defer reloading the MMU after a EPTP successful EPTP switch.  The VMFUNC
instruction itself is executed in the previous EPTP context, any side
effects, e.g. updating RIP, should occur in the old context.  Practically
speaking, this bug is benign as VMX doesn't touch the MMU when skipping
an emulated instruction, nor does queuing a single-step #DB.  No other
post-switch side effects exist.

Fixes: 41ab9372 ("KVM: nVMX: Emulate EPTP switching for the L1 hypervisor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210305011101.3597423-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      c805f5d5
    • D
      KVM: x86: to track if L1 is running L2 VM · 43c11d91
      由 Dongli Zhang 提交于 
      The new per-cpu stat 'nested_run' is introduced in order to track if L1 VM
is running or used to run L2 VM.

An example of the usage of 'nested_run' is to help the host administrator
to easily track if any L1 VM is used to run L2 VM. Suppose there is issue
that may happen with nested virtualization, the administrator will be able
to easily narrow down and confirm if the issue is due to nested
virtualization via 'nested_run'. For example, whether the fix like
commit 88dddc11 ("KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after
guest reset") is required.

Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210305225747.7682-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      43c11d91
  15. 19 2月, 2021 2 次提交
    • M
      KVM: VMX: Dynamically enable/disable PML based on memslot dirty logging · a85863c2
      由 Makarand Sonare 提交于 
      Currently, if enable_pml=1 PML remains enabled for the entire lifetime
of the VM irrespective of whether dirty logging is enable or disabled.
When dirty logging is disabled, all the pages of the VM are manually
marked dirty, so that PML is effectively non-operational.  Setting
the dirty bits is an expensive operation which can cause severe MMU
lock contention in a performance sensitive path when dirty logging is
disabled after a failed or canceled live migration.

Manually setting dirty bits also fails to prevent PML activity if some
code path clears dirty bits, which can incur unnecessary VM-Exits.

In order to avoid this extra overhead, dynamically enable/disable PML
when dirty logging gets turned on/off for the first/last memslot.
Signed-off-by: NMakarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Co-developed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210213005015.1651772-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      a85863c2
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Disable PML in hardware when running L2 · c3bb9a20
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Unconditionally disable PML in vmcs02, KVM emulates PML purely in the
MMU, e.g. vmx_flush_pml_buffer() doesn't even try to copy the L2 GPAs
from vmcs02's buffer to vmcs12.  At best, enabling PML is a nop.  At
worst, it will cause vmx_flush_pml_buffer() to record bogus GFNs in the
dirty logs.

Initialize vmcs02.GUEST_PML_INDEX such that PML writes would trigger
VM-Exit if PML was somehow enabled, skip flushing the buffer for guest
mode since the index is bogus, and freak out if a PML full exit occurs
when L2 is active.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210213005015.1651772-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      c3bb9a20
  17. 18 2月, 2021 1 次提交
  19. 04 2月, 2021 4 次提交