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  1. 06 5月, 2009 3 次提交
  3. 01 5月, 2009 1 次提交
    • O
      do_wait: do take security_task_wait() into account · 78a3d9d5
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      I was never able to understand what should we actually do when
security_task_wait() fails, but the current code doesn't look right.

If ->task_wait() returns the error, we update *notask_error correctly.
But then we either reap the child (despite the fact this was forbidden)
or clear *notask_error (and hide the securiy policy problems).

This patch assumes that "stolen by ptrace" doesn't matter. If selinux
denies the child we should ignore it but make sure we report -EACCESS
instead of -ECHLD if there are no other eligible children.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      78a3d9d5
  5. 30 4月, 2009 3 次提交
  7. 15 4月, 2009 1 次提交
    • S
      modules: Fix up build when CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=n. · 19e4529e
      由 Stephen Rothwell 提交于 
      Commit 3d43321b ("modules: sysctl to
block module loading") introduces a modules_disabled variable that is
only defined if CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD is enabled, despite being used in
other places. This moves it up and fixes up the build.

  CC      kernel/module.o
kernel/module.c: In function 'sys_init_module':
kernel/module.c:2401: error: 'modules_disabled' undeclared (first use in this function)
kernel/module.c:2401: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
kernel/module.c:2401: error: for each function it appears in.)
make[1]: *** [kernel/module.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel/module.o] Error 2
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      19e4529e
  9. 14 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  11. 07 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  13. 03 4月, 2009 2 次提交
    • S
      don't raise all privs on setuid-root file with fE set (v2) · b5f22a59
      由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于 
      Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use
file capabilities.  For instance, removing setuid root from ping and
doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel
or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for
non-root users.

In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware
program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability,
which makes the capability effective immediately.  This patch
uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full
privilege to a setuid-root program.

So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with
privilege.  But if /bin/ping has both setuid-root and cap_net_raw in
fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run
with only cap_net_raw.

Changelog:
	Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded,
		as per James Morris' suggestion.
	Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0.
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      b5f22a59
    • K
      modules: sysctl to block module loading · 3d43321b
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      Implement a sysctl file that disables module-loading system-wide since
there is no longer a viable way to remove CAP_SYS_MODULE after the system
bounding capability set was removed in 2.6.25.

Value can only be set to "1", and is tested only if standard capability
checks allow CAP_SYS_MODULE.  Given existing /dev/mem protections, this
should allow administrators a one-way method to block module loading
after initial boot-time module loading has finished.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      3d43321b
  15. 02 4月, 2009 1 次提交
    • K
      Permissive domain in userspace object manager · 8a6f83af
      由 KaiGai Kohei 提交于 
      This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.

Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.

This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.

This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/avc.c              |    2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    4 +++-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   30 +++++-------------------------
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      8a6f83af
  17. 29 3月, 2009 26 次提交