- 01 9月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them to select the hashing algorithm. Without this, something like the following error might get written to dmesg: [ 31.829322] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [32] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829328] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [180] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829330] Unsupported digest algo: 55 Where the 55 on the third line is OID__NR indicating an unknown OID. Reported-by: NValdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-By: NValdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 28 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
The module signing script (sign-file) used to be a wrapper around the openssl program. It has now been replaced by a C program that uses the crypto library from the OpenSSL package meaning that the OpenSSL devel packages are necessary to provide the devel library link and the header files. This would be openssl-devel on Fedora and libssl-dev on Debian. Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 27 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于
...so "git status" doesn't nag us about them. Cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 26 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Merge tag 'modsign-pkcs7-20150814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into ra-next
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- 15 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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- 14 8月, 2015 5 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Since commit 1329e8cc ("modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed"), the build system has carefully coped with the signing key being specified as a relative path in either the source or or the build trees. However, the actual signing of modules has not worked if the filename is relative to the source tree. Fix that by moving the config_filename helper into scripts/Kbuild.include so that it can be used from elsewhere, and then using it in the top-level Makefile to find the signing key file. Kill the intermediate $(MODPUBKEY) and $(MODSECKEY) variables too, while we're at it. There's no need for them. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
We couldn't use if_changed for this before, because it didn't live in the kernel/ directory so we couldn't add it to $(targets). It was easier just to leave it as it was. Now it's in the certs/ directory we can use if_changed, the same as we do for the trusted certificate list. Aside from making things consistent, this means we don't need to depend explicitly on the include/config/module/sig/key.h file. And we also get to automatically do the right thing and re-extract the cert if the user does odd things like using a relative filename and then playing silly buggers with adding/removing that file in both the source and object trees. We always favour the one in the object tree if it exists, and now we'll correctly re-extract the cert when it changes. Previously we'd *only* re-extract the cert if the config option changed, even if the actual file we're using did change. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/ directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated signing keys into this directory. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Merge tag 'modsign-pkcs7-20150812-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
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- 13 8月, 2015 13 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Fix the following warning: scripts/sign-file.c: In function ‘main’: scripts/sign-file.c:188: warning: value computed is not used whereby the result of BIO_ctrl() is cast inside of BIO_reset() to an integer of a different size - which we're not checking but probably should. Reported-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add a MODULE_LICENSE() line to the PKCS#7 test key module to fix this warning: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_test_key.o Whilst we're at it, also add a module description. Reported-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues that were bothering me. Reported-by: NJim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
The revised sign-file program is no longer a script that wraps the openssl program, but now rather a program that makes use of OpenSSL's crypto library. This means that to build the sign-file program, the kernel build process now has a dependency on the OpenSSL development packages in addition to OpenSSL itself. Document this in Kconfig and in module-signing.txt. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 into the pkey_id_type_name array. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder fill in a time64_t rather than a struct tm to make comparison easier (unfortunately, this makes readable display less easy) and export it so that it can be used by the PKCS#7 code too. Further, tighten up its parsing to reject invalid dates (eg. weird characters, non-existent hour numbers) and unsupported dates (eg. timezones other than 'Z' or dates earlier than 1970). Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Fix up the dependencies somewhat too, while we're at it. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
This is not required for the module signing key, although it doesn't do any harm — it just means that any additional certs in the PEM file are also trusted by the kernel. But it does allow us to use the extract-cert tool for processing the extra certs from CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS, instead of that horrid awk|base64 hack. Also cope with being invoked with no input file, creating an empty output file as a result. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make sign-file use the OpenSSL CMS routines to generate a message to be used as the signature blob instead of the PKCS#7 routines. This allows us to change how the matching X.509 certificate is selected. With PKCS#7 the only option is to match on the serial number and issuer fields of an X.509 certificate; with CMS, we also have the option of matching by subjectKeyId extension. The new behaviour is selected with the "-k" flag. Without the -k flag specified, the output is pretty much identical to the PKCS#7 output. Whilst we're at it, don't include the S/MIME capability list in the message as it's irrelevant to us. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com
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由 David Howells 提交于
Since CMS is an evolution of PKCS#7, with much of the ASN.1 being compatible, add support for CMS signed-data messages also [RFC5652 sec 5]. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
The key identifiers fabricated from an X.509 certificate are currently: (A) Concatenation of serial number and issuer (B) Concatenation of subject and subjectKeyID (SKID) When verifying one X.509 certificate with another, the AKID in the target can be used to match the authoritative certificate. The AKID can specify the match in one or both of two ways: (1) Compare authorityCertSerialNumber and authorityCertIssuer from the AKID to identifier (A) above. (2) Compare keyIdentifier from the AKID plus the issuer from the target certificate to identifier (B) above. When verifying a PKCS#7 message, the only available comparison is between the IssuerAndSerialNumber field and identifier (A) above. However, a subsequent patch adds CMS support. Whilst CMS still supports a match on IssuerAndSerialNumber as for PKCS#7, it also supports an alternative - which is the SubjectKeyIdentifier field. This is used to match to an X.509 certificate on the SKID alone. No subject information is available to be used. To this end change the fabrication of (B) above to be from the X.509 SKID alone. The AKID in keyIdentifier form then only matches on that and does not include the issuer. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
We only support PKCS#7 signed-data [RFC2315 sec 9] content at the top level, so reject anything else. Further, check that the version numbers in SignedData and SignerInfo are 1 in both cases. Note that we don't restrict the inner content type. In the PKCS#7 code we don't parse the data attached there, but merely verify the signature over it. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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- 12 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
The keyrings mailing list has moved to keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 11 8月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Roman Kubiak 提交于
Adds an ignore case for kernel tasks, so that they can access all resources. Since kernel worker threads are spawned with floor label, they are severely restricted by Smack policy. It is not an issue without onlycap, as these processes also run with root, so CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE kicks in. But with onlycap turned on, there is no way to change the label for these processes. Signed-off-by: NRoman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 07 8月, 2015 14 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Let the user explicitly provide a file containing trusted keys, instead of just automatically finding files matching *.x509 in the build tree and trusting whatever we find. This really ought to be an *explicit* configuration, and the build rules for dealing with the files were fairly painful too. Fix applied from James Morris that removes an '=' from a macro definition in kernel/Makefile as this is a feature that only exists from GNU make 3.82 onwards. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
The current rule for generating signing_key.priv and signing_key.x509 is a classic example of a bad rule which has a tendency to break parallel make. When invoked to create *either* target, it generates the other target as a side-effect that make didn't predict. So let's switch to using a single file signing_key.pem which contains both key and certificate. That matches what we do in the case of an external key specified by CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY anyway, so it's also slightly cleaner. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Where an external PEM file or PKCS#11 URI is given, we can get the cert from it for ourselves instead of making the user drop signing_key.x509 in place for us. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
This is only the key; the corresponding *cert* still needs to be in $(topdir)/signing_key.x509. And there's no way to actually use this from the build system yet. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
We don't want this in the Kconfig since it might then get exposed in /proc/config.gz. So make it a parameter to Kbuild instead. This also means we don't have to jump through hoops to strip quotes from it, as we would if it was a config option. Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h as it doesn't use the one thing that exports. Remove the inclusion. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 Luis R. Rodriguez 提交于
Make the -d option (which currently isn't actually wired to anything) write out the PKCS#7 message as per the -p option and then exit without either modifying the source or writing out a compound file of the source, signature and metadata. This will be useful when firmware signature support is added upstream as firmware will be left intact, and we'll only require the signature file. The descriptor is implicit by file extension and the file's own size. Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Move to using PKCS#7 messages as module signatures because: (1) We have to be able to support the use of X.509 certificates that don't have a subjKeyId set. We're currently relying on this to look up the X.509 certificate in the trusted keyring list. (2) PKCS#7 message signed information blocks have a field that supplies the data required to match with the X.509 certificate that signed it. (3) The PKCS#7 certificate carries fields that specify the digest algorithm used to generate the signature in a standardised way and the X.509 certificates specify the public key algorithm in a standardised way - so we don't need our own methods of specifying these. (4) We now have PKCS#7 message support in the kernel for signed kexec purposes and we can make use of this. To make this work, the old sign-file script has been replaced with a program that needs compiling in a previous patch. The rules to build it are added here. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Provide a utility that: (1) Digests a module using the specified hash algorithm (typically sha256). [The digest can be dumped into a file by passing the '-d' flag] (2) Generates a PKCS#7 message that: (a) Has detached data (ie. the module content). (b) Is signed with the specified private key. (c) Refers to the specified X.509 certificate. (d) Has an empty X.509 certificate list. [The PKCS#7 message can be dumped into a file by passing the '-p' flag] (3) Generates a signed module by concatenating the old module, the PKCS#7 message, a descriptor and a magic string. The descriptor contains the size of the PKCS#7 message and indicates the id_type as PKEY_ID_PKCS7. (4) Either writes the signed module to the specified destination or renames it over the source module. This allows module signing to reuse the PKCS#7 handling code that was added for PE file parsing for signed kexec. Note that the utility is written in C and must be linked against the OpenSSL crypto library. Note further that I have temporarily dropped support for handling externally created signatures until we can work out the best way to do those. Hopefully, whoever creates the signature can give me a PKCS#7 certificate. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
It is possible for a PKCS#7 message to have detached data. However, to verify the signatures on a PKCS#7 message, we have to be able to digest the data. Provide a function to supply that data. An error is given if the PKCS#7 message included embedded data. This is used in a subsequent patch to supply the data to module signing where the signature is in the form of a PKCS#7 message with detached data, whereby the detached data is the module content that is signed. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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由 David Howells 提交于
If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing certificate. If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well. If the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate, EKEYREJECTED is returned. This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier. This is necessary as we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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