stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.123
commit 26f6f231f6a5a79ccc274967939b22602dec76e8
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5D5RS
CVE: CVE-2022-21123,CVE-2022-21125,CVE-2022-21166

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=26f6f231f6a5a79ccc274967939b22602dec76e8

--------------------------------

commit 8cb861e9 upstream

Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst.

These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as:

Device Register Partial Write (DRPW):
  Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are
  smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only
  copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte
  write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be
  written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale
  data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write
  transaction.

Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS):
  After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied
  stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS
  can leak data from the fill buffer.

Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR):
  It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the
  data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state.

An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill
buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill
buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a
guest.

On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data
from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can
still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with
VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable
guests.

Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control
the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYipeng Zou <zouyipeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit 3aa5c8657292e05e6dfa8fe2316951001dab7e3a
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3aa5c8657292e05e6dfa8fe2316951001dab7e3a

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit b9bed78e ]

Set vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS, a.k.a. the pending single-step
breakpoint flag, when re-injecting a #DB with RFLAGS.TF=1, and STI or
MOVSS blocking is active.  Setting the flag is necessary to make VM-Entry
consistency checks happy, as VMX has an invariant that if RFLAGS.TF is
set and STI/MOVSS blocking is true, then the previous instruction must
have been STI or MOV/POP, and therefore a single-step #DB must be pending
since the RFLAGS.TF cannot have been set by the previous instruction,
i.e. the one instruction delay after setting RFLAGS.TF must have already
expired.

Normally, the CPU sets vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS appropriately
when recording guest state as part of a VM-Exit, but #DB VM-Exits
intentionally do not treat the #DB as "guest state" as interception of
the #DB effectively makes the #DB host-owned, thus KVM needs to manually
set PENDING_DBG.BS when forwarding/re-injecting the #DB to the guest.

Note, although this bug can be triggered by guest userspace, doing so
requires IOPL=3, and guest userspace running with IOPL=3 has full access
to all I/O ports (from the guest's perspective) and can crash/reboot the
guest any number of ways.  IOPL=3 is required because STI blocking kicks
in if and only if RFLAGS.IF is toggled 0=>1, and if CPL>IOPL, STI either
takes a #GP or modifies RFLAGS.VIF, not RFLAGS.IF.

MOVSS blocking can be initiated by userspace, but can be coincident with
a #DB if and only if DR7.GD=1 (General Detect enabled) and a MOV DR is
executed in the MOVSS shadow.  MOV DR #GPs at CPL>0, thus MOVSS blocking
is problematic only for CPL0 (and only if the guest is crazy enough to
access a DR in a MOVSS shadow).  All other sources of #DBs are either
suppressed by MOVSS blocking (single-step, code fetch, data, and I/O),
are mutually exclusive with MOVSS blocking (T-bit task switch), or are
already handled by KVM (ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1).

This bug was originally found by running tests[1] created for XSA-308[2].
Note that Xen's userspace test emits ICEBP in the MOVSS shadow, which is
presumably why the Xen bug was deemed to be an exploitable DOS from guest
userspace.  KVM already handles ICEBP by skipping the ICEBP instruction
and thus clears MOVSS blocking as a side effect of its "emulation".

[1] http://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/xtf/xsa-308_2main_8c_source.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-308.htmlReported-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220120000624.655815-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I53PTV?from=project-issue
CVE: NA

-----------------------------------------------------

Since the reset function is in kvm_intel module instead of kvm
module, the attribute weak function in kvm_main.c could not be found, which
would cause st_max in X86 never be refreshed.
The solution is to define the reset function in x86.c under the kvm module.
Signed-off-by: Nliangtian <liangtian13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKeqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.93
commit 413b427f5fff5d658c2605ca889d6b13b88efd0c
bugzilla: 186204 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5311N

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=413b427f5fff5d658c2605ca889d6b13b88efd0c

--------------------------------

commit f4b027c5 upstream.

Override the Processor Trace (PT) interrupt handler for guest mode if and
only if PT is configured for host+guest mode, i.e. is being used
independently by both host and guest.  If PT is configured for system
mode, the host fully controls PT and must handle all events.

Fixes: 8479e04e ("KVM: x86: Inject PMI for KVM guest")
Reported-by: NAlexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: NArtem Kashkanov <artem.kashkanov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-4-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.89
commit 28626e76baf50e6b37d8a92564844d873aa6b51f
bugzilla: 186140 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4S8HA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=28626e76baf50e6b37d8a92564844d873aa6b51f

--------------------------------

commit fdba608f upstream.

Drop a check that guards triggering a posted interrupt on the currently
running vCPU, and more importantly guards waking the target vCPU if
triggering a posted interrupt fails because the vCPU isn't IN_GUEST_MODE.
If a vIRQ is delivered from asynchronous context, the target vCPU can be
the currently running vCPU and can also be blocking, in which case
skipping kvm_vcpu_wake_up() is effectively dropping what is supposed to
be a wake event for the vCPU.

The "do nothing" logic when "vcpu == running_vcpu" mostly works only
because the majority of calls to ->deliver_posted_interrupt(), especially
when using posted interrupts, come from synchronous KVM context.  But if
a device is exposed to the guest using vfio-pci passthrough, the VFIO IRQ
and vCPU are bound to the same pCPU, and the IRQ is _not_ configured to
use posted interrupts, wake events from the device will be delivered to
KVM from IRQ context, e.g.

  vfio_msihandler()
  |
  |-> eventfd_signal()
      |
      |-> ...
          |
          |->  irqfd_wakeup()
               |
               |->kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic()
                  |
                  |-> kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast()
                      |
                      |-> kvm_apic_set_irq()

This also aligns the non-nested and nested usage of triggering posted
interrupts, and will allow for additional cleanups.

Fixes: 379a3c8e ("KVM: VMX: Optimize posted-interrupt delivery for timer fastpath")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NLongpeng (Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-18-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.84
commit 7722e88505226d64d7b2158b470e6945ef759832
bugzilla: 186030 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4QV2F

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7722e88505226d64d7b2158b470e6945ef759832

--------------------------------

commit 2b4a5a5d upstream.

Flush the current VPID when handling KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST instead of
always flushing vpid01.  Any TLB flush that is triggered when L2 is
active is scoped to L2's VPID (if it has one), e.g. if L2 toggles CR4.PGE
and L1 doesn't intercept PGE writes, then KVM's emulation of the TLB
flush needs to be applied to L2's VPID.
Reported-by: NLai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai+lkml@gmail.com>
Fixes: 07ffaf34 ("KVM: nVMX: Sync all PGDs on nested transition with shadow paging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211125014944.536398-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit e6209a3b
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e6209a3bef793e8fe29c873a7612023916eaa611

-------------------

The current vPMU only supports Architecture Version 2. According to
Intel SDM "17.4.7 Freezing LBR and Performance Counters on PMI", if
IA32_DEBUGCTL.Freeze_LBR_On_PMI = 1, the LBR is frozen on the virtual
PMI and the KVM would emulate to clear the LBR bit (bit 0) in
IA32_DEBUGCTL. Also, guest needs to re-enable IA32_DEBUGCTL.LBR
to resume recording branches.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-9-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit 1b5ac322
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=1b5ac3226a1aa071135fe0ee5d1055d9e88b717c

-------------------

In addition to DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR, any KVM trap caused by LBR msrs access
will result in a creation of guest LBR event per-vcpu.

If the guest LBR event is scheduled on with the corresponding vcpu context,
KVM will pass-through all LBR records msrs to the guest. The LBR callstack
mechanism implemented in the host could help save/restore the guest LBR
records during the event context switches, which reduces a lot of overhead
if we save/restore tens of LBR msrs (e.g. 32 LBR records entries) in the
much more frequent VMX transitions.

To avoid reclaiming LBR resources from any higher priority event on host,
KVM would always check the exist of guest LBR event and its state before
vm-entry as late as possible. A negative result would cancel the
pass-through state, and it also prevents real registers accesses and
potential data leakage. If host reclaims the LBR between two checks, the
interception state and LBR records can be safely preserved due to native
save/restore support from guest LBR event.

The KVM emits a pr_warn() when the LBR hardware is unavailable to the
guest LBR event. The administer is supposed to reminder users that the
guest result may be inaccurate if someone is using LBR to record
hypervisor on the host side.
Suggested-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-7-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit 8e12911b
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8e12911b243e485f5e4c7c5fbc79cdf185728700

-------------------

When vcpu sets DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR in the MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, the KVM handler
would create a guest LBR event which enables the callstack mode and none of
hardware counter is assigned. The host perf would schedule and enable this
event as usual but in an exclusive way.

The guest LBR event will be released when the vPMU is reset but soon,
the lazy release mechanism would be applied to this event like a vPMC.
Suggested-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-6-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit c6462363
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c646236344e9054cc84cd5a9f763163b9654cf7e

-------------------

Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records.

The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR
(checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible
with the host one.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit 9c9520ce
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=9c9520ce883386dc3794c7d60204487ff1db09cb

-------------------

Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records.

The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR
(checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible
with the host one.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit 252e365e
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=252e365eb28ddf49eb31cec1a5d99e708c73f57b

-------------------

To make code responsibilities clear, we may resue and invoke the
vmx_set_intercept_for_msr() in other vmx-specific files (e.g. pmu_intel.c),
so expose it to passthrough LBR msrs later.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc1
commit d855066f
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d855066f81726155caf766e47eea58ae10b1fd57

-------------------

SVM already has specific handlers of MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR in the
svm_get/set_msr, so the x86 common part can be safely moved to VMX.
This allows KVM to store the bits it supports in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

Add vmx_supported_debugctl() to refactor the throwing logic of #GP.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210108013704.134985-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
[Merge parts of Chenyi Qiang's "KVM: X86: Expose bus lock debug exception
 to guest". - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NWangJian <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.80
commit 9f9d6d391ff5f8a3a4f6a0547fe8ed78dc4d8f15
bugzilla: 185821 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4L7CG

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9f9d6d391ff5f8a3a4f6a0547fe8ed78dc4d8f15

--------------------------------

commit 7dfbc624 upstream.

Check the current VMCS controls to determine if an MSR write will be
intercepted due to MSR bitmaps being disabled.  In the nested VMX case,
KVM will disable MSR bitmaps in vmcs02 if they're disabled in vmcs12 or
if KVM can't map L1's bitmaps for whatever reason.

Note, the bad behavior is relatively benign in the current code base as
KVM sets all bits in vmcs02's MSR bitmap by default, clears bits if and
only if L0 KVM also disables interception of an MSR, and only uses the
buggy helper for MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.  Because KVM explicitly tests WRMSR
before disabling interception of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, the flawed check
will only result in KVM reading MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL from hardware when it
isn't strictly necessary.

Tag the fix for stable in case a future fix wants to use
msr_write_intercepted(), in which case a buggy implementation in older
kernels could prove subtly problematic.

Fixes: d28b387f ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109013047.2041518-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.80
commit 2f65b76c444587ca1033a9af1ce60766ac910628
bugzilla: 185821 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4L7CG

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=2f65b76c444587ca1033a9af1ce60766ac910628

--------------------------------

commit ec5a4919 upstream.

Unregister KVM's posted interrupt wakeup handler during unsetup so that a
spurious interrupt that arrives after kvm_intel.ko is unloaded doesn't
call into freed memory.

Fixes: bf9f6ac8 ("KVM: Update Posted-Interrupts Descriptor when vCPU is blocked")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211009001107.3936588-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.76
commit 8f042315fcc46b7fc048ba7d7a3e136927e384d4
bugzilla: 182988 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4IAHF

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8f042315fcc46b7fc048ba7d7a3e136927e384d4

--------------------------------

commit 3a25dfa6 upstream.

Since commit c300ab9f ("KVM: x86: Replace late check_nested_events() hack with
more precise fix") there is no longer the certainty that check_nested_events()
tries to inject an external interrupt vmexit to L1 on every call to vcpu_enter_guest.
Therefore, even in that case we need to set KVM_REQ_EVENT.  This ensures
that inject_pending_event() is called, and from there kvm_check_nested_events().

Fixes: c300ab9f ("KVM: x86: Replace late check_nested_events() hack with more precise fix")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.71
commit 3778511dfc5941b0ee99d1040faab5c69e51dfac
bugzilla: 182981 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4I3KD

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3778511dfc5941b0ee99d1040faab5c69e51dfac

--------------------------------

commit 8d68bad6 upstream.

Windows Server 2022 with Hyper-V role enabled failed to boot on KVM when
enlightened VMCS is advertised. Debugging revealed there are two exposed
secondary controls it is not happy with: SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC and
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS. These controls are known to be unsupported,
as there are no corresponding fields in eVMCSv1 (see the comment above
EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC definition).

Previously, commit 31de3d25 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls
sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()") introduced the required
filtering mechanism for VMX MSRs but for some reason put only known
to be problematic (and not full EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* lists) controls
there.

Note, Windows Server 2022 seems to have gained some sanity check for VMX
MSRs: it doesn't even try to launch a guest when there's something it
doesn't like, nested_evmcs_check_controls() mechanism can't catch the
problem.

Let's be bold this time and instead of playing whack-a-mole just filter out
all unsupported controls from VMX MSRs.

Fixes: 31de3d25 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210907163530.110066-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.65
commit bf36224463356526f56d992d3f6d09cbd57e2d2f
bugzilla: 182361 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EH3U

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bf36224463356526f56d992d3f6d09cbd57e2d2f

--------------------------------

commit 81b4b56d upstream.

If we are emulating an invalid guest state, we don't have a correct
exit reason, and thus we shouldn't do anything in this function.
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210826095750.1650467-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95b5a48c ("KVM: VMX: Handle NMIs, #MCs and async #PFs in common irqs-disabled fn", 2019-06-18)
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.50
commit 39d0dfab6c3e6ab7052b502fe4ad24a9359a9de6
bugzilla: 174522 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DNFY

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=39d0dfab6c3e6ab7052b502fe4ad24a9359a9de6

--------------------------------

commit b33bb78a upstream.

Mark #ACs that won't be reinjected to the guest as wanted by L0 so that
KVM handles split-lock #AC from L2 instead of forwarding the exception to
L1.  Split-lock #AC isn't yet virtualized, i.e. L1 will treat it like a
regular #AC and do the wrong thing, e.g. reinject it into L2.

Fixes: e6f8b6c1 ("KVM: VMX: Extend VMXs #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest")
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210622172244.3561540-1-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.41
commit 514883ebac77ff9939da92e268b24a71c9fe4e05
bugzilla: 51890
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 16045714 upstream.

Defer the call to account guest time until after servicing any IRQ(s)
that happened in the guest or immediately after VM-Exit.  Tick-based
accounting of vCPU time relies on PF_VCPU being set when the tick IRQ
handler runs, and IRQs are blocked throughout the main sequence of
vcpu_enter_guest(), including the call into vendor code to actually
enter and exit the guest.

This fixes a bug where reported guest time remains '0', even when
running an infinite loop in the guest:

  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209831

Fixes: 87fa7f3e ("x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs")
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210505002735.1684165-4-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.38
commit 31f29749ee970c251b3a7e5b914108425940d089
bugzilla: 51875
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 5104d7ff upstream.

Disable preemption when probing a user return MSR via RDSMR/WRMSR.  If
the MSR holds a different value per logical CPU, the WRMSR could corrupt
the host's value if KVM is preempted between the RDMSR and WRMSR, and
then rescheduled on a different CPU.

Opportunistically land the helper in common x86, SVM will use the helper
in a future commit.

Fixes: 4be53410 ("KVM: VMX: Initialize vmx->guest_msrs[] right after allocation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210504171734.1434054-6-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.38
commit 79abde761e05ea1cb5996d458c0d31f0d80813f1
bugzilla: 51875
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8aec21c0 upstream.

Clear KVM's RDPID capability if the ENABLE_RDTSCP secondary exec control is
unsupported.  Despite being enumerated in a separate CPUID flag, RDPID is
bundled under the same VMCS control as RDTSCP and will #UD in VMX non-root
if ENABLE_RDTSCP is not enabled.

Fixes: 41cd02c6 ("kvm: x86: Expose RDPID in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210504171734.1434054-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NReiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.38
commit 2f86dd3d2bcfda3e14e8ee734e970dc05287d5fc
bugzilla: 51875
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 2183de41 upstream.

Add a dedicated intercept enum for RDPID instead of piggybacking RDTSCP.
Unlike VMX's ENABLE_RDTSCP, RDPID is not bound to SVM's RDTSCP intercept.

Fixes: fb6d4d34 ("KVM: x86: emulate RDPID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210504171734.1434054-5-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.38
commit bfccc4eade2bec1493f891ebcd3c6751eee971c9
bugzilla: 51875
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit a217a659 upstream.

In VMX, the host NMI handler needs to be invoked after NMI VM-Exit.
Before commit 1a5488ef ("KVM: VMX: Invoke NMI handler via indirect
call instead of INTn"), this was done by INTn ("int $2"). But INTn
microcode is relatively expensive, so the commit reworked NMI VM-Exit
handling to invoke the kernel handler by function call.

But this missed a detail. The NMI entry point for direct invocation is
fetched from the IDT table and called on the kernel stack.  But on 64-bit
the NMI entry installed in the IDT expects to be invoked on the IST stack.
It relies on the "NMI executing" variable on the IST stack to work
correctly, which is at a fixed position in the IST stack.  When the entry
point is unexpectedly called on the kernel stack, the RSP-addressed "NMI
executing" variable is obviously also on the kernel stack and is
"uninitialized" and can cause the NMI entry code to run in the wrong way.

Provide a non-ist entry point for VMX which shares the C-function with
the regular NMI entry and invoke the new asm entry point instead.

On 32-bit this just maps to the regular NMI entry point as 32-bit has no
ISTs and is not affected.

[ tglx: Made it independent for backporting, massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 1a5488ef ("KVM: VMX: Invoke NMI handler via indirect call instead of INTn")
Signed-off-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r1imi8i1.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.37
commit 8fcdfa71ba6a1baa7bff73353b914df2a15b1bb8
bugzilla: 51868
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit dbdd096a ]

Disable pass-through of the FS and GS base MSRs for 32-bit KVM.  Intel's
SDM unequivocally states that the MSRs exist if and only if the CPU
supports x86-64.  FS_BASE and GS_BASE are mostly a non-issue; a clever
guest could opportunistically use the MSRs without issue.  KERNEL_GS_BASE
is a bigger problem, as a clever guest would subtly be broken if it were
migrated, as KVM disallows software access to the MSRs, and unlike the
direct variants, KERNEL_GS_BASE needs to be explicitly migrated as it's
not captured in the VMCS.

Fixes: 25c5f225 ("KVM: VMX: Enable MSR Bitmap feature")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210422023831.3473491-1-seanjc@google.com>
[*NOT* for stable kernels. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.37
commit e9bd1af4c038061c67789e298067478c79cedb2b
bugzilla: 51868
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit d9e46d34 ]

If the VM entry/exit controls for loading/saving MSR_EFER are either
not available (an older processor or explicitly disabled) or not
used (host and guest values are the same), reading GUEST_IA32_EFER
from the VMCS returns an inaccurate value.

Because of this, in dump_vmcs() don't use GUEST_IA32_EFER to decide
whether to print the PDPTRs - always do so if the fields exist.

Fixes: 4eb64dce ("KVM: x86: dump VMCS on invalid entry")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Edmondson <david.edmondson@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210318120841.133123-2-david.edmondson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.32
commit 7f64753835a78c7d2cc2932a5808ef3b7fd4c050
bugzilla: 51796

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 04c4f2ee ]

__vmx_handle_exit() uses vcpu->run->internal.ndata as an index for
an array access.  Since vcpu->run is (can be) mapped to a user address
space with a writer permission, the 'ndata' could be updated by the
user process at anytime (the user process can set it to outside the
bounds of the array).
So, it is not safe that __vmx_handle_exit() uses the 'ndata' that way.

Fixes: 1aa561b1 ("kvm: x86: Add "last CPU" to some KVM_EXIT information")
Signed-off-by: NReiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210413154739.490299-1-reijiw@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.32
commit c670ff84fac9c92c4260b359f24fff1312b98218
bugzilla: 51796

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 8e533240 ]

Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32).  The
full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in
bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16.

Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed
VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and
required dedicated handling.  I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY
bit was a somewhat viable approach.  But even with only a single bit to
worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit
reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx.

Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can
be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more
restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off
flows isn't scalable.  Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to
explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic
exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers.

No functional change intended.

Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NChenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 46853
CVE: NA

Export EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER kvm exits to vcpu_stat debugfs.
Add a new column to vcpu_stat, and provide preemption_timer status to
virtualization detection tools.
Signed-off-by: Nchenjiajun <chenjiajun8@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiangyou Xie <xiexiangyou@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 46853
CVE: NA

At present, there is a flaw in the statistics of KVM exits by debugfs,
which only counts trigger times of exits processing function in kvm_vmx_exit_handlers.
The kvm exits handles in vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath is omitted, so there is a large numerical error
in EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE statistics sometimes.
Signed-off-by: Nchenjiajun <chenjiajun8@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiangyou Xie <xiexiangyou@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.15
commit 6c0e069ac6e8db0c49dcc90d37ede5b1da08fe0b
bugzilla: 48167

--------------------------------

commit 7131636e upstream.

Userspace that does not know about KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
will generally use the default value for MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
When this happens and the host has tsx=on, it is possible to end up with
virtual machines that have HLE and RTM disabled, but TSX_CTRL available.

If the fleet is then switched to tsx=off, kvm_get_arch_capabilities()
will clear the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit and it will not be possible to
use the tsx=off hosts as migration destinations, even though the guests
do not have TSX enabled.

To allow this migration, allow guests to write to their TSX_CTRL MSR,
while keeping the host MSR unchanged for the entire life of the guests.
This ensures that TSX remains disabled and also saves MSR reads and
writes, and it's okay to do because with tsx=off we know that guests will
not have the HLE and RTM features in their CPUID.  (If userspace sets
bogus CPUID data, we do not expect HLE and RTM to work in guests anyway).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cbbaa272 ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 46853
CVE: NA

Export vcpu_stat via debugfs for x86, which contains x86 kvm exits items.
The path of the vcpu_stat is /sys/kernel/debug/kvm/vcpu_stat, and
each line of vcpu_stat is a collection of various kvm exits for a vcpu.
And through vcpu_stat, we only need to open one file to
tail performance of virtual machine, which is more convenient.
Signed-off-by: NFeng Lin <linfeng23@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Nchenjiajun <chenjiajun8@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiangyou Xie <xiexiangyou@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.4
commit 49830b2d1b91e7d840808a6a9809496e70edeeab
bugzilla: 46903

--------------------------------

commit 39485ed9 upstream.

Until commit e7c587da ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for
IBRS/IBPB/STIBP"), KVM was testing both Intel and AMD CPUID bits before
allowing the guest to write MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD.
Testing only Intel bits on VMX processors, or only AMD bits on SVM
processors, fails if the guests are created with the "opposite" vendor
as the host.

While at it, also tweak the host CPU check to use the vendor-agnostic
feature bit X86_FEATURE_IBPB, since we only care about the availability
of the MSR on the host here and not about specific CPUID bits.

Fixes: e7c587da ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NDenis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

It was noticed that evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls() is not being executed
nowadays despite the code checking 'enable_evmcs' static key looking
correct. Turns out, static key magic doesn't work in '__init' section
(and it is unclear when things changed) but setup_vmcs_config() is called
only once per CPU so we don't really need it to. Switch to checking
'enlightened_vmcs' instead, it is supposed to be in sync with
'enable_evmcs'.

Opportunistically make evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls '__init' and drop unneeded
extra newline from it.
Reported-by: NYang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201014143346.2430936-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

allyesconfig results in:

ld: drivers/block/paride/paride.o: in function `pi_init':
(.text+0x1340): multiple definition of `pi_init'; arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.o:posted_intr.c:(.init.text+0x0): first defined here
make: *** [Makefile:1164: vmlinux] Error 1

because commit:

commit 8888cdd0
Author: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Date:   Wed Sep 23 11:31:11 2020 -0700

    KVM: VMX: Extract posted interrupt support to separate files

added another pi_init(), though one already existed in the paride code.
Reported-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Intercept CR4 bits that are guest reserved so that KVM correctly injects
a #GP fault if the guest attempts to set a reserved bit.  If a feature
is supported by the CPU but is not exposed to the guest, and its
associated CR4 bit is not intercepted by KVM by default, then KVM will
fail to inject a #GP if the guest sets the CR4 bit without triggering
an exit, e.g. by toggling only the bit in question.

Note, KVM doesn't give the guest direct access to any CR4 bits that are
also dependent on guest CPUID.  Yet.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200930041659.28181-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Now that vcpu_after_set_cpuid() and update_exception_bitmap() are called
back-to-back, subsume the exception bitmap update into the common CPUID
update.  Drop the SVM invocation entirely as SVM's exception bitmap
doesn't vary with respect to guest CPUID.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200930041659.28181-4-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This will be used to signal an error to the userspace, in case
the vendor code failed during handling of this msr. (e.g -ENOMEM)
Signed-off-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Rework the resetting of the MSR bitmap for x2APIC MSRs to ignore userspace
filtering.  Allowing userspace to intercept reads to x2APIC MSRs when
APICV is fully enabled for the guest simply can't work; the LAPIC and thus
virtual APIC is in-kernel and cannot be directly accessed by userspace.
To keep things simple we will in fact forbid intercepting x2APIC MSRs
altogether, independent of the default_allow setting.

Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201005195532.8674-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Modified to operate even if APICv is disabled, adjust documentation. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>