- 31 5月, 2023 4 次提交
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由 Guoqing Jiang 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc1 commit 9dfbdafd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6OMCC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=v6.3-rc3&id=9dfbdafda3b34e262e43e786077bab8e476a89d1 -------------------------------- Since the bug which commit 8b48ec23 ("md: don't unregister sync_thread with reconfig_mutex held") fixed is related with action_store path, other callers which reap sync_thread didn't need to be changed. Let's pull md_unregister_thread from md_reap_sync_thread, then fix previous bug with belows. 1. unlock mddev before md_reap_sync_thread in action_store. 2. save reshape_position before unlock, then restore it to ensure position not changed accidentally by others. Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Yu Kuai 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc2 commit 428913bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6MQLP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e5cfefa97bccf956ea0bb6464c1f6c84fd7a8d9f -------------------------------- If disk_scan_partitions() is called with 'FMODE_EXCL', blkdev_get_by_dev() will be called without 'FMODE_EXCL', however, follow blkdev_put() is still called with 'FMODE_EXCL', which will cause 'bd_holders' counter to leak. Fix the problem by using the right mode for blkdev_put(). Reported-by: syzbot+2bcc0d79e548c4f62a59@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f9649d501bc8c3444769418f6c26263555d9d3be.camel@linux.ibm.com/T/Tested-by: NJulian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: e5cfefa9 ("block: fix scan partition for exclusively open device again") Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Yu Kuai 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit e5cfefa9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6MQLP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e5cfefa97bccf956ea0bb6464c1f6c84fd7a8d9f -------------------------------- As explained in commit 36369f46 ("block: Do not reread partition table on exclusively open device"), reread partition on the device that is exclusively opened by someone else is problematic. This patch will make sure partition scan will only be proceed if current thread open the device exclusively, or the device is not opened exclusively, and in the later case, other scanners and exclusive openers will be blocked temporarily until partition scan is done. Fixes: 10c70d95 ("block: remove the bd_openers checks in blk_drop_partitions") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Suggested-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217022200.3092987-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.comSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Conflicts: block/genhd.c block/ioctl.c Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc1 commit e16e506c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6MQLP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e16e506ccd673a3a888a34f8f694698305840044 -------------------------------- Unify the functionality that implements a partition rescan for a gendisk. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211122130625.1136848-6-hch@lst.deSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Conflicts: block/blk.h block/genhd.c block/ioctl.c Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 23 5月, 2023 1 次提交
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @zhangjialin11 Pull new CVEs: CVE-2023-32233 CVE-2023-2124 Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/801 Reviewed-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
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- 22 5月, 2023 2 次提交
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由 Pablo Neira Ayuso 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.180 commit e044a24447189419c3a7ccc5fa6da7516036dc55 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71F49 CVE: CVE-2023-32233 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e044a24447189419c3a7ccc5fa6da7516036dc55 -------------------------------- commit c1592a89 upstream. Toggle deleted anonymous sets as inactive in the next generation, so users cannot perform any update on it. Clear the generation bitmask in case the transaction is aborted. The following KASAN splat shows a set element deletion for a bound anonymous set that has been already removed in the same transaction. [ 64.921510] ================================================================== [ 64.923123] BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in nf_tables_commit+0xa24/0x1490 [nf_tables] [ 64.924745] Write of size 8 at addr dead000000000122 by task test/890 [ 64.927903] CPU: 3 PID: 890 Comm: test Not tainted 6.3.0+ #253 [ 64.931120] Call Trace: [ 64.932699] <TASK> [ 64.934292] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 64.935908] ? nf_tables_commit+0xa24/0x1490 [nf_tables] [ 64.937551] kasan_report+0xda/0x120 [ 64.939186] ? nf_tables_commit+0xa24/0x1490 [nf_tables] [ 64.940814] nf_tables_commit+0xa24/0x1490 [nf_tables] [ 64.942452] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x2d/0x60 [ 64.944070] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify+0x190/0x190 [nf_tables] [ 64.945710] ? kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 64.947323] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x709/0xd90 [nfnetlink] [ 64.948898] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x480/0x480 [nfnetlink] Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLu Wei <luwei32@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc6 commit 22ed903e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6X4UN CVE: CVE-2023-2124 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=22ed903eee23a5b174e240f1cdfa9acf393a5210 -------------------------------- syzbot detected a crash during log recovery: XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791 XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200. XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074 CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517 xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913 xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713 xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953 xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946 xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930 xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829 xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933 xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10 RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50 </TASK> The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item for that AGF. The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log item. xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be newer. Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the buffer with no buffer ops specified: error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, buf_f->blf_blkno, buf_f->blf_len, buf_flags, &bp, NULL); Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified. This sets us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32. This is impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash. Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt. It might be smarter to force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the conservative option where we stop immediately. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994eSigned-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: NLong Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 17 5月, 2023 6 次提交
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @openeuler-sync-bot Origin pull request: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/768 Backport 5.10.151 LTS patches from upstream. Total patches: 5 Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/779 Reviewed-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.151 commit ecad3312111798d84dac1ce6a853e0ac9de8d505 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I64L0X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ecad3312111798d84dac1ce6a853e0ac9de8d505 -------------------------------- New pahole (version 1.24) generates by default new BTF_KIND_ENUM64 BTF tag, which is not supported by stable kernel. As a result the kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF option will fail to compile with following error: BTFIDS vmlinux FAILED: load BTF from vmlinux: Invalid argument New pahole provides --skip_encoding_btf_enum64 option to skip BTF_KIND_ENUM64 generation and produce BTF supported by stable kernel. Adding this option to scripts/pahole-flags.sh. This change does not have equivalent commit in linus tree, because linus tree has support for BTF_KIND_ENUM64 tag, so it does not need to be disabled. Signed-off-by: NMartin Rodriguez Reboredo <yakoyoku@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLipeng Sang <sanglipeng1@jd.com> (cherry picked from commit d7de1c44)
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由 Jiri Olsa 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.151 commit c5006abb80e276896ff7237300a6d447708c7924 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I64L0X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c5006abb80e276896ff7237300a6d447708c7924 -------------------------------- commit 9741e07e upstream. [skipped --btf_gen_floats option in pahole-flags.sh, skipped Makefile.modfinal change, because there's no BTF kmod support, squashing in 'exit 0' change from merge commit fc02cb2b] Using new PAHOLE_FLAGS variable to pass extra arguments to pahole for both vmlinux and modules BTF data generation. Adding new scripts/pahole-flags.sh script that detect and prints pahole options. [ fixed issues found by kernel test robot ] Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211029125729.70002-1-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLipeng Sang <sanglipeng1@jd.com> (cherry picked from commit 9119ff95)
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由 Andrii Nakryiko 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.151 commit f5f413cb3e8af235c5d310bea9942424fb242c2c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I64L0X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f5f413cb3e8af235c5d310bea9942424fb242c2c -------------------------------- commit a0b8200d upstream. [small context changes due to missing floats support in 5.10] Commit "mm/page_alloc: convert per-cpu list protection to local_lock" will introduce a zero-sized per-CPU variable, which causes pahole to generate invalid BTF. Only pahole versions 1.18 through 1.21 are impacted, as before 1.18 pahole doesn't know anything about per-CPU variables, and 1.22 contains the proper fix for the issue. Luckily, pahole 1.18 got --skip_encoding_btf_vars option disabling BTF generation for per-CPU variables in anticipation of some unanticipated problems. So use this escape hatch to disable per-CPU var BTF info on those problematic pahole versions. Users relying on availability of per-CPU var BTFs would need to upgrade to pahole 1.22+, but everyone won't notice any regressions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210530002536.3193829-1-andrii@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Cc: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLipeng Sang <sanglipeng1@jd.com> (cherry picked from commit 40a0d0a9)
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由 Javier Martinez Canillas 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.151 commit 06481cd9f7f692088bce03244f8cf132018f2fc6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I64L0X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=06481cd9f7f692088bce03244f8cf132018f2fc6 -------------------------------- commit ff2e6efd upstream. [backported for dependency, skipped Makefile.modfinal change, because module BTF is not supported in 5.10] The ccache tool can be used to speed up cross-compilation, by calling the compiler and binutils through ccache. For example, following should work: $ export ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE="ccache aarch64-linux-gnu-" $ make M=drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/ but pahole fails to extract the BTF info from DWARF, breaking the build: CC [M] drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip//rockchipdrm.mod.o LD [M] drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip//rockchipdrm.ko BTF [M] drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip//rockchipdrm.ko aarch64-linux-gnu-objcopy: invalid option -- 'J' Usage: aarch64-linux-gnu-objcopy [option(s)] in-file [out-file] Copies a binary file, possibly transforming it in the process ... make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.modpost:156: __modpost] Error 2 make: *** [Makefile:1866: modules] Error 2 this fails because OBJCOPY is set to "ccache aarch64-linux-gnu-copy" and later pahole is executed with the following command line: LLVM_OBJCOPY=$(OBJCOPY) $(PAHOLE) -J --btf_base vmlinux $@ which gets expanded to: LLVM_OBJCOPY=ccache aarch64-linux-gnu-objcopy pahole -J ... instead of: LLVM_OBJCOPY="ccache aarch64-linux-gnu-objcopy" pahole -J ... Fixes: 5f9ae91f ("kbuild: Build kernel module BTFs if BTF is enabled and pahole supports it") Signed-off-by: NJavier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210526215228.3729875-1-javierm@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLipeng Sang <sanglipeng1@jd.com> (cherry picked from commit 143c9045)
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由 Ilya Leoshkevich 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.151 commit bbaea0f1cd33d702d053d5bdaf6d6dec3932894c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I64L0X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bbaea0f1cd33d702d053d5bdaf6d6dec3932894c -------------------------------- commit db16c1fe upstream. [backported for dependency only extra_paholeopt variable setup and usage, we don't want floats generated in 5.10] pahole v1.21 supports the --btf_gen_floats flag, which makes it generate the information about the floating-point types [1]. Adjust link-vmlinux.sh to pass this flag to pahole in case it's supported, which is determined using a simple version check. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/dwarves/YHRiXNX1JUF2Az0A@kernel.org/Signed-off-by: NIlya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210413190043.21918-1-iii@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLipeng Sang <sanglipeng1@jd.com> (cherry picked from commit 492ab132)
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- 16 5月, 2023 15 次提交
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @zhangjialin11 Pull new CVEs: CVE-2023-32269 CVE-2023-2002 CVE-2023-26544 CVE-2023-0459 mm bugfixes from Yu Kuai fs bugfix from yangerkun fs perfs from Zhihao Cheng Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/774 Reviewed-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-5.19-rc4 commit 5ccc944d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6YDHU CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=5ccc944dce3df5fd2fd683a7df4fd49d1068eba2 ------------------------------------------------- We had an off-by-one error which meant that we never marked the first page in a read as accessed. This was visible as a slowdown when re-reading a file as pages were being evicted from cache too soon. In reviewing this code, we noticed a second bug where a multi-page folio would be marked as accessed multiple times when doing reads that were less than the size of the folio. Abstract the comparison of whether two file positions are in the same folio into a new function, fixing both of these bugs. Reported-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Conflict: folios is not supported yet Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Yu Kuai 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6YDHU CVE: NA -------------------------------- This reverts commit 939325bb. Because this commit make a mistake to judge if the page is the same. Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Hyunwoo Kim 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.168 commit dd6991251a1382a9b4984962a0c7a467e9d71812 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I70OFF CVE: CVE-2023-32269 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=dd6991251a1382a9b4984962a0c7a467e9d71812 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 61179292 ] If you call listen() and accept() on an already connect()ed AF_NETROM socket, accept() can successfully connect. This is because when the peer socket sends data to sendmsg, the skb with its own sk stored in the connected socket's sk->sk_receive_queue is connected, and nr_accept() dequeues the skb waiting in the sk->sk_receive_queue. As a result, nr_accept() allocates and returns a sock with the sk of the parent AF_NETROM socket. And here use-after-free can happen through complex race conditions: ``` cpu0 cpu1 1. socket_2 = socket(AF_NETROM) . . listen(socket_2) accepted_socket = accept(socket_2) 2. socket_1 = socket(AF_NETROM) nr_create() // sk refcount : 1 connect(socket_1) 3. write(accepted_socket) nr_sendmsg() nr_output() nr_kick() nr_send_iframe() nr_transmit_buffer() nr_route_frame() nr_loopback_queue() nr_loopback_timer() nr_rx_frame() nr_process_rx_frame(sk, skb); // sk : socket_1's sk nr_state3_machine() nr_queue_rx_frame() sock_queue_rcv_skb() sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason() __sock_queue_rcv_skb() __skb_queue_tail(list, skb); // list : socket_1's sk->sk_receive_queue 4. listen(socket_1) nr_listen() uaf_socket = accept(socket_1) nr_accept() skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); 5. close(accepted_socket) nr_release() nr_write_internal(sk, NR_DISCREQ) nr_transmit_buffer() // NR_DISCREQ nr_route_frame() nr_loopback_queue() nr_loopback_timer() nr_rx_frame() // sk : socket_1's sk nr_process_rx_frame() // NR_STATE_3 nr_state3_machine() // NR_DISCREQ nr_disconnect() nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0; 6. close(socket_1) // sk refcount : 3 nr_release() // NR_STATE_0 sock_put(sk); // sk refcount : 0 sk_free(sk); close(uaf_socket) nr_release() sock_hold(sk); // UAF ``` KASAN report by syzbot: ``` BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nr_release+0x66/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:520 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880235d8080 by task syz-executor564/5128 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x141/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:102 [inline] atomic_fetch_add_relaxed include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:116 [inline] __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline] sock_hold include/net/sock.h:775 [inline] nr_release+0x66/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:520 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1365 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0xaa8/0x2950 kernel/exit.c:867 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1012 get_signal+0x21c3/0x2450 kernel/signal.c:2859 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f6c19e3c9b9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f6c19e3c98f. RSP: 002b:00007fffd4ba2ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: 0000000000000116 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f6c19e3c9b9 RDX: 0000000000000318 RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055555566a2c0 R13: 0000000000000011 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 5128: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091 nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433 __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515 sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline] __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 5128: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline] __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline] __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] nr_release+0x39e/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:554 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1365 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0xaa8/0x2950 kernel/exit.c:867 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1012 get_signal+0x21c3/0x2450 kernel/signal.c:2859 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ``` To fix this issue, nr_listen() returns -EINVAL for sockets that successfully nr_connect(). Reported-by: syzbot+caa188bdfc1eeafeb418@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: NHyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Reviewed-by: NKuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NLiu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Ruihan Li 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc1 commit 25c150ac category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6WHKQ CVE: CVE-2023-2002 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?id=25c150ac103a4ebeed0319994c742a90634ddf18 ---------------------------------------- Previously, capability was checked using capable(), which verified that the caller of the ioctl system call had the required capability. In addition, the result of the check would be stored in the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED flag, making it persistent for the socket. However, malicious programs can abuse this approach by deliberately sharing an HCI socket with a privileged task. The HCI socket will be marked as trusted when the privileged task occasionally makes an ioctl call. This problem can be solved by using sk_capable() to check capability, which ensures that not only the current task but also the socket opener has the specified capability, thus reducing the risk of privilege escalation through the previously identified vulnerability. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f81f5b2d ("Bluetooth: Send control open and close messages for HCI raw sockets") Signed-off-by: NRuihan Li <lrh2000@pku.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: NLuiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NLiu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 65801516 category: bugfix bugzilla: 188526, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71SYO CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=658015167a8432b88f5d032e9d85d8fd50e5bf2c -------------------------------- There were two patches which addressed the same bug and added the same condition: commit 6db62086 ("fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset") commit 887bfc54 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack") Delete one condition. Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Hawkins Jiawei 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 887bfc54 category: bugfix bugzilla: 188526, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71SYO CVE: CVE-2023-26544 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=887bfc546097fbe8071dac13b2fef73b77920899 -------------------------------- Syzkaller reports slab-out-of-bounds bug as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bbdff02 by task syz-executor131/3611 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944 run_unpack_ex+0xb0/0x7c0 fs/ntfs3/run.c:1057 ntfs_read_mft fs/ntfs3/inode.c:368 [inline] ntfs_iget5+0xc20/0x3280 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:501 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x124/0x5d0 fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:272 ntfs_fill_super+0x1eff/0x37f0 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1018 get_tree_bdev+0x440/0x760 fs/super.c:1323 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [...] </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00006ef600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1bbd8 head:ffffea00006ef600 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801bbdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbdfe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88801bbdff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88801bbdff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbe0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Kernel will tries to read record and parse MFT from disk in ntfs_read_mft(). Yet the problem is that during enumerating attributes in record, kernel doesn't check whether run_off field loading from the disk is a valid value. To be more specific, if attr->nres.run_off is larger than attr->size, kernel will passes an invalid argument run_buf_size in run_unpack_ex(), which having an integer overflow. Then this invalid argument will triggers the slab-out-of-bounds Read bug as above. This patch solves it by adding the sanity check between the offset to packed runs and attribute size. link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000009145fc05e94bd5c3@google.com/#t Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+8d6fbb27a6aded64b25b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NHawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Edward Lo 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 6db62086 category: bugfix bugzilla: 188526, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71SYO CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6db620863f8528ed9a9aa5ad323b26554a17881d -------------------------------- This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors. [ 82.940342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.941180] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888008a8487f by task mount/240 [ 82.941670] [ 82.942069] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #15 [ 82.942482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 82.943720] Call Trace: [ 82.944204] <TASK> [ 82.944471] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 82.944908] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x67b [ 82.945141] ? __wait_on_bit+0x106/0x120 [ 82.945750] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.946626] kasan_report+0xa7/0x120 [ 82.947046] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947280] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60 [ 82.947483] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947709] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x70 [ 82.947927] ? run_pack+0x7a0/0x7a0 [ 82.948158] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3f0 [ 82.948399] ? mi_enum_attr+0x14a/0x200 [ 82.948717] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570 [ 82.949072] ? ni_enum_attr_ex+0x1b2/0x1c0 [ 82.949332] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 82.949611] ? mi_read+0x262/0x2c0 [ 82.949970] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 82.950249] ntfs_iget5+0x632/0x1870 [ 82.950621] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 82.951192] ? evict+0x223/0x280 [ 82.951525] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 82.951969] ntfs_fill_super+0x1321/0x1e20 [ 82.952436] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.952822] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 82.953188] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 82.953379] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 82.954001] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 82.954438] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.954700] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 82.955049] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 82.955292] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 82.955615] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.955955] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 82.956310] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 82.956723] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.957023] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 82.957411] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 82.957638] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 82.957948] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 82.958310] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 82.958719] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 82.959341] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0d1ce948a [ 82.960193] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 82.961532] RSP: 002b:00007ffe59ff69a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 82.962527] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564dcc107060 RCX: 00007fd0d1ce948a [ 82.963266] RDX: 0000564dcc107260 RSI: 0000564dcc1072e0 RDI: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.963686] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564dcc107280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 82.964272] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.964785] R13: 0000564dcc107260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff Signed-off-by: NEdward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: NZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZXOM CVE: NA Reference: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/xfs/patch/20230420033550.339934-1-yangerkun@huaweicloud.com/ -------------------------------- When a buffer is unpinned by xfs_buf_item_unpin(), we need to access the buffer after we've dropped the buffer log item reference count. This opens a window where we can have two racing unpins for the buffer item (e.g. shutdown checkpoint context callback processing racing with journal IO iclog completion processing) and both attempt to access the buffer after dropping the BLI reference count. If we are unlucky, the "BLI freed" context wins the race and frees the buffer before the "BLI still active" case checks the buffer pin count. This results in a use after free that can only be triggered in active filesystem shutdown situations. To fix this, we need to ensure that buffer existence extends beyond the BLI reference count checks and until the unpin processing is complete. This implies that a buffer pin operation must also take a buffer reference to ensure that the buffer cannot be freed until the buffer unpin processing is complete. Reported-by: Nyangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nyangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zhihao Cheng 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I70MZX CVE: NA -------------------------------- Following process: P1 P2 path_openat link_path_walk may_lookup inode_permission(rcu) ovl_permission acl_permission_check check_acl get_cached_acl_rcu ovl_get_inode_acl realinode = ovl_inode_real(ovl_inode) drop_cache __dentry_kill(ovl_dentry) iput(ovl_inode) ovl_destroy_inode(ovl_inode) dput(oi->__upperdentry) dentry_kill(upperdentry) dentry_unlink_inode upperdentry->d_inode = NULL ovl_inode_upper upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(ovl_inode) d_inode(upperdentry) // returns NULL IS_POSIXACL(realinode) // NULL pointer dereference , will trigger an null pointer dereference at realinode: [ 205.472797] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [ 205.476701] CPU: 2 PID: 2713 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.3.0-12064-g2edfa098e750-dirty #1216 [ 205.478754] RIP: 0010:do_ovl_get_acl+0x5d/0x300 [ 205.489584] Call Trace: [ 205.489812] <TASK> [ 205.490014] ovl_get_inode_acl+0x26/0x30 [ 205.490466] get_cached_acl_rcu+0x61/0xa0 [ 205.490908] generic_permission+0x1bf/0x4e0 [ 205.491447] ovl_permission+0x79/0x1b0 [ 205.491917] inode_permission+0x15e/0x2c0 [ 205.492425] link_path_walk+0x115/0x550 [ 205.493311] path_lookupat.isra.0+0xb2/0x200 [ 205.493803] filename_lookup+0xda/0x240 [ 205.495747] vfs_fstatat+0x7b/0xb0 Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Fix it by checking realinode whether to be NULL before accessing it. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217404 Fixes: 332f606b ("ovl: enable RCU'd ->get_acl()") Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zhihao Cheng 提交于
hulk inclusion category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZCW0 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fix kabi broken for importing new inode operation get_inode_acl. Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit 332f606b category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZCW0 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=332f606b32b6291a944c8cf23b91f53a6e676525 -------------------------------- Overlayfs does not cache ACL's (to avoid double caching). Instead it just calls the underlying filesystem's i_op->get_acl(), which will return the cached value, if possible. In rcu path walk, however, get_cached_acl_rcu() is employed to get the value from the cache, which will fail on overlayfs resulting in dropping out of rcu walk mode. This can result in a big performance hit in certain situations. Fix by calling ->get_acl() with rcu=true in case of ACL_DONT_CACHE (which indicates pass-through) Reported-by: Ngaryhuang <zjh.20052005@163.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Conflicts: fs/posix_acl.c Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit 0cad6246 category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZCW0 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0cad6246621b5887d5b33fea84219d2a71f2f99a -------------------------------- Add a rcu argument to the ->get_acl() callback to allow get_cached_acl_rcu() to call the ->get_acl() method in the next patch. Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> [chengzhihao: rename get_acl to get_acl2 to prevent KABI changes, and only backport(realize) overlayfs] Conflicts: fs/overlayfs/dir.c fs/overlayfs/inode.c fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h fs/posix_acl.c include/linux/fs.h Signed-off-by: NZhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.170 commit 12e3119a87627741bd3871c895ce198f21529eb3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71N8L Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=12e3119a87627741bd3871c895ce198f21529eb3 -------------------------------- commit f3dd0c53 upstream. Commit 74e19ef0 ("uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()") built fine on x86-64 and arm64, and that's the extent of my local build testing. It turns out those got the <linux/nospec.h> include incidentally through other header files (<linux/kvm_host.h> in particular), but that was not true of other architectures, resulting in build errors kernel/bpf/core.c: In function ‘___bpf_prog_run’: kernel/bpf/core.c:1913:3: error: implicit declaration of function ‘barrier_nospec’ so just make sure to explicitly include the proper <linux/nospec.h> header file to make everybody see it. Fixes: 74e19ef0 ("uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()") Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: NViresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Reported-by: NHuacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Tested-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/core.c Signed-off-by: NMa Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NNanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.170 commit 3b6ce54cfa2c04f0636fd0c985913af8703b408d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I71N8L CVE: CVE-2023-0459 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3b6ce54cfa2c04f0636fd0c985913af8703b408d -------------------------------- commit 74e19ef0 upstream. The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that you can end speculatively: if (access_ok(from, size)) // Right here even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results can never be mis-speculated. But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via "copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down. "copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take something like this: if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size)) do_something_with(kernelvar); If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other) side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values. Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent mis-speculated values which happen after the copy. Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec(). This makes the macro usable in generic code. Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the BPF code can also go away. Reported-by: NJordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # BPF bits Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: lib/usercopy.c Signed-off-by: NMa Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NNanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 11 5月, 2023 1 次提交
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @openeuler-sync-bot Origin pull request: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/675 When using allyesconfig to configure the kernel, errors may occur during the linking process when making. Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/685 Reviewed-by: Chiqijun <chiqijun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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- 10 5月, 2023 11 次提交
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @zhangjialin11 Pull new CVEs: CVE-2022-4382 CVE-2023-0458 CVE-2023-2269 CVE-2023-2483 CVE-2023-31436 CVE-2023-2194 CVE-2023-2166 CVE-2023-2176 CVE-2023-2007 fs bugfixes from Baokun Li bpf bugfixes from Liu Jian Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/721 Reviewed-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
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由 openeuler-ci-bot 提交于
Merge Pull Request from: @openeuler-sync-bot Origin pull request: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/625 This PR fixes below build warnings: WARNING: modpost: EXPORT symbol "__SCT__perf_lopwr_cb" [vmlinux] version generation failed, symbol will not be versioned. WARNING: modpost: EXPORT symbol "__SCT__perf_lopwr_cb" [vmlinux] version generation failed, symbol will not be versioned. Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/694 Reviewed-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
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由 Alan Stern 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc5 commit d18dcfe9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I66IZK CVE: CVE-2022-4382 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d18dcfe9860e842f394e37ba01ca9440ab2178f4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The syzbot fuzzer and Gerald Lee have identified a use-after-free bug in the gadgetfs driver, involving processes concurrently mounting and unmounting the gadgetfs filesystem. In particular, gadgetfs_fill_super() can race with gadgetfs_kill_sb(), causing the latter to deallocate the_device while the former is using it. The output from KASAN says, in part: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:102 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880276d7840 by task syz-executor126/18689 CPU: 0 PID: 18689 Comm: syz-executor126 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> ... atomic_fetch_sub_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:176 [inline] __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] put_dev drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:159 [inline] gadgetfs_kill_sb+0x33/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:2086 deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332 vfs_get_super fs/super.c:1190 [inline] get_tree_single+0xd0/0x160 fs/super.c:1207 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1531 vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:232 [inline] The simplest solution is to ensure that gadgetfs_fill_super() and gadgetfs_kill_sb() are serialized by making them both acquire a new mutex. Signed-off-by: NAlan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+33d7ad66d65044b93f16@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: NGerald Lee <sundaywind2004@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/CAO3qeMVzXDP-JU6v1u5Ags6Q-bb35kg3=C6d04DjzA9ffa5x1g@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: e5d82a73 ("vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API") CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y6XCPXBpn3tmjdCC@rowland.harvard.eduSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ntong tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Xia Fukun 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.165 commit 9f8e45720e0e7edb661d0082422f662ed243d8d8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6Z6SU?from=project-issue CVE: CVE-2023-0458 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=9f8e45720e0e7edb661d0082422f662ed243d8d8 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 73979060 ] do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that will subsequently be dereferenced. In order to help prevent this codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be added after checking the range. Reported-by: NJordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Tested-by: NJordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NXia Fukun <xiafukun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Qiao <zhangqiao22@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Baokun Li 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188724, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I70Q22 Reference: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg4779681.html ---------------------------------------- When ext4_iomap_overwrite_begin() calls ext4_iomap_begin() map blocks may fail for some reason (e.g. memory allocation failure, bare disk write), and later because "iomap->type ! = IOMAP_MAPPED" triggers WARN_ON(). When ext4 iomap_begin() returns an error, it is normal that the type of iomap->type may not match the expectation. Therefore, we only determine if iomap->type is as expected when ext4_iomap_begin() is executed successfully. Reported-by: syzbot+08106c4b7d60702dbc14@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000015760b05f9b4eee9@google.comReviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Mike Snitzer 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc1 commit 3d32aaa7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6YQZS CVE: CVE-2023-2269 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?id=3d32aaa7e66d5c1479a3c31d6c2c5d45dd0d3b89 ---------------------------------------- syzkaller found the following problematic rwsem locking (with write lock already held): down_read+0x9d/0x450 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1509 dm_get_inactive_table+0x2b/0xc0 drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c:773 __dev_status+0x4fd/0x7c0 drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c:844 table_clear+0x197/0x280 drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c:1537 In table_clear, it first acquires a write lock https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.2/source/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c#L1520 down_write(&_hash_lock); Then before the lock is released at L1539, there is a path shown above: table_clear -> __dev_status -> dm_get_inactive_table -> down_read https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.2/source/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c#L773 down_read(&_hash_lock); It tries to acquire the same read lock again, resulting in the deadlock problem. Fix this by moving table_clear()'s __dev_status() call to after its up_write(&_hash_lock); Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NZheng Zhang <zheng.zhang@email.ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c Signed-off-by: NLi Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Zheng Wang 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc4 commit 6b6bc5b8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZWOL CVE: CVE-2023-2483 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6b6bc5b8bd2d4ca9e1efa9ae0f98a0b0687ace75 --------------------------- In emac_probe, &adpt->work_thread is bound with emac_work_thread. Then it will be started by timeout handler emac_tx_timeout or a IRQ handler emac_isr. If we remove the driver which will call emac_remove to make cleanup, there may be a unfinished work. The possible sequence is as follows: Fix it by finishing the work before cleanup in the emac_remove and disable timeout response. CPU0 CPU1 |emac_work_thread emac_remove | free_netdev | kfree(netdev); | |emac_reinit_locked |emac_mac_down |//use netdev Fixes: b9b17deb ("net: emac: emac gigabit ethernet controller driver") Signed-off-by: NZheng Wang <zyytlz.wz@163.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 6b6bc5b8) Signed-off-by: NLiu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Gwangun Jung 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.179 commit ddcf35deb8f2a1d9addc74b586cf4c5a1f5d6020 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6ZISA CVE: CVE-2023-31436 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ddcf35deb8f2a1d9addc74b586cf4c5a1f5d6020 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 30379334 ] If the TCA_QFQ_LMAX value is not offered through nlattr, lmax is determined by the MTU value of the network device. The MTU of the loopback device can be set up to 2^31-1. As a result, it is possible to have an lmax value that exceeds QFQ_MIN_LMAX. Due to the invalid lmax value, an index is generated that exceeds the QFQ_MAX_INDEX(=24) value, causing out-of-bounds read/write errors. The following reports a oob access: [ 84.582666] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) [ 84.583267] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810f676948 by task ping/301 [ 84.583686] [ 84.583797] CPU: 3 PID: 301 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.3.0-rc5 #1 [ 84.584164] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 84.584644] Call Trace: [ 84.584787] <TASK> [ 84.584906] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) [ 84.585108] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:320 mm/kasan/report.c:430) [ 84.585570] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:538) [ 84.585988] qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) [ 84.586599] qfq_enqueue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1255) [ 84.587607] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3776) [ 84.587749] __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/sch_generic.h:186 net/core/dev.c:3865 net/core/dev.c:4212) [ 84.588763] ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:546 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228) [ 84.589460] ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:430) [ 84.590132] ip_push_pending_frames (./include/net/dst.h:444 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:126 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1586 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1606) [ 84.590285] raw_sendmsg (net/ipv4/raw.c:649) [ 84.591960] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) [ 84.592084] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2142) [ 84.593306] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2150) [ 84.593779] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [ 84.593902] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [ 84.594070] RIP: 0033:0x7fe568032066 [ 84.594192] Code: 0e 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c09[ 84.594796] RSP: 002b:00007ffce388b4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== [ 84.595047] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce388cc70 RCX: 00007fe568032066 [ 84.595281] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00005605fdad6d10 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 84.595515] RBP: 00005605fdad6d10 R08: 00007ffce388eeec R09: 0000000000000010 [ 84.595749] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 84.595984] R13: 00007ffce388cc30 R14: 00007ffce388b4f0 R15: 0000001d00000001 [ 84.596218] </TASK> [ 84.596295] [ 84.596351] Allocated by task 291: [ 84.596467] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:46) [ 84.596597] kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52) [ 84.596725] __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:384) [ 84.596852] __kmalloc_node (./include/linux/kasan.h:196 mm/slab_common.c:967 mm/slab_common.c:974) [ 84.596979] qdisc_alloc (./include/linux/slab.h:610 ./include/linux/slab.h:731 net/sched/sch_generic.c:938) [ 84.597100] qdisc_create (net/sched/sch_api.c:1244) [ 84.597222] tc_modify_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1680) [ 84.597357] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6174) [ 84.597495] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2574) [ 84.597627] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365) [ 84.597759] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942) [ 84.597891] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) [ 84.598016] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2501) [ 84.598147] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2557) [ 84.598275] __sys_sendmsg (./include/linux/file.h:31 net/socket.c:2586) [ 84.598399] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [ 84.598520] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [ 84.598688] [ 84.598744] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810f674000 [ 84.598744] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 [ 84.599135] The buggy address is located 2664 bytes to the right of [ 84.599135] allocated 7904-byte region [ffff88810f674000, ffff88810f675ee0) [ 84.599544] [ 84.599598] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 84.599777] page:00000000e638567f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10f670 [ 84.600074] head:00000000e638567f order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 84.600330] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) [ 84.600517] raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100043180 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 84.600764] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080020002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 84.601009] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 84.601187] [ 84.601241] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 84.601396] ffff88810f676800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.601620] ffff88810f676880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.601845] >ffff88810f676900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602069] ^ [ 84.602243] ffff88810f676980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602468] ffff88810f676a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602693] ================================================================== [ 84.602924] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: 3015f3d2 ("pkt_sched: enable QFQ to support TSO/GSO") Reported-by: NGwangun Jung <exsociety@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NGwangun Jung <exsociety@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim<jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NZhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Wei Chen 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc4 commit 92fbb6d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6XHPL CVE: CVE-2023-2194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=92fbb6d1296f81f41f65effd7f5f8c0f74943d15 -------------------------------- The data->block[0] variable comes from user and is a number between 0-255. Without proper check, the variable may be very large to cause an out-of-bounds when performing memcpy in slimpro_i2c_blkwr. Fix this bug by checking the value of writelen. Fixes: f6505fba ("i2c: add SLIMpro I2C device driver on APM X-Gene platform") Signed-off-by: NWei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NAndi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NWolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Baokun Li 提交于
maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188499, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6TNVT CVE: NA Reference: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20230412124126.2286716-2-libaokun1@huawei.com/ ---------------------------------------- In our fault injection test, we create an ext4 file, migrate it to non-extent based file, then punch a hole and finally trigger a WARN_ON in the ext4_da_update_reserve_space(): EXT4-fs warning (device sda): ext4_da_update_reserve_space:369: ino 14, used 11 with only 10 reserved data blocks When writing back a non-extent based file, if we enable delalloc, the number of reserved blocks will be subtracted from the number of blocks mapped by ext4_ind_map_blocks(), and the extent status tree will be updated. We update the extent status tree by first removing the old extent_status and then inserting the new extent_status. If the block range we remove happens to be in an extent, then we need to allocate another extent_status with ext4_es_alloc_extent(). use old to remove to add new |----------|------------|------------| old extent_status The problem is that the allocation of a new extent_status failed due to a fault injection, and __es_shrink() did not get free memory, resulting in a return of -ENOMEM. Then do_writepages() retries after receiving -ENOMEM, we map to the same extent again, and the number of reserved blocks is again subtracted from the number of blocks in that extent. Since the blocks in the same extent are subtracted twice, we end up triggering WARN_ON at ext4_da_update_reserve_space() because used > ei->i_reserved_data_blocks. For non-extent based file, we update the number of reserved blocks after ext4_ind_map_blocks() is executed, which causes a problem that when we call ext4_ind_map_blocks() to create a block, it doesn't always create a block, but we always reduce the number of reserved blocks. So we move the logic for updating reserved blocks to ext4_ind_map_blocks() to ensure that the number of reserved blocks is updated only after we do succeed in allocating some new blocks. Fixes: 5f634d06 ("ext4: Fix quota accounting error with fallocate") Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NBaokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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由 Oliver Hartkopp 提交于
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.159 commit c42221efb1159d6a3c89e96685ee38acdce86b6f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6WUDS CVE: CVE-2023-2166 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c42221efb1159d6a3c89e96685ee38acdce86b6f -------------------------------- commit 0acc4423 upstream. Analogue to commit 8aa59e35 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()") we need to check for a missing initialization of ml_priv in the receive path of CAN frames. Since commit 4e096a18 ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") the check for dev->type to be ARPHRD_CAN is not sufficient anymore since bonding or tun netdevices claim to be CAN devices but do not initialize ml_priv accordingly. Fixes: 4e096a18 ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") Reported-by: syzbot+2d7f58292cb5b29eb5ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: NWei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NOliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221206201259.3028-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NZiyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NYue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
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